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Georgians and Abkhazians
The Search for a Peace Settlement
Sonderveröffentlichung des BIOst 1998
Bruno Coppieters
Introduction
An analysis of the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-93 and an assessment of the possibilities for a 
peace settlement has to combine a number of characteristics which do not easily fit together. It 
should not only present a factual account of the historic origins of the conflict but also help rea-
ders gain more insight into how Georgian and Abkhaz intellectuals describe it. The analysis 
should generate more understanding of these particular interpretations among readers, and should 
not  be  concerned  primarily  with  refuting  them.  In  both  post-war  communities,  however, 
reconstructions of the past are largely based on a criticism of the interpretation made by "the op-
posite side". The analysis should therefore inform the reader about  this inward view of the 
conflict to be found among Georgians and Abkhazians, including prejudices and mutual accu-
sations. The present volume has been prepared in the conviction that a contribution to such an 
analysis can be made through a dialogue between Georgian and Abkhaz scholars.
First drafts of the papers collected in this volume were discussed at a conference, held in Brussels 
at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel on 12-14 June 1997, which was co-organized by Ghia Nodia, 
Yuri Anchabadze and myself. The authors have striven for an academic presentation of their 
views on Georgian-Abkhaz history, aiming at a personal interpretation of the reasons why fear 
and distrust turned into hatred and an unrestrained use of force. Their reflection on the war is 
largely the result of a discussion on a broader scale. They present the views prevalent among 
Georgian and Abkhaz public opinion on, for instance, past injustices during czarist and Soviet 
times, their respective national projects and the transformation of these projects as a result of the 
war.
The attempt to present a balanced account of the Georgian and Abkhaz perspectives does not 
mean that normative concepts or polemical arguments had to be avoided. Viacheslav Chirikba 
uses the term "aggressive integrationalism" to describe the attempt by central governments to op-
pose, at whatever cost – including by violent means – the right to self-determination of a minority 
on their territory. This phrase – even if this is not stated explicitly by the author – mirrors the 
term "aggressive  separatism"  which  has  been repeatedly  used  by  Eduard  Shevardnadze to 
describe the attempts by nationalist movements to secede from established states at any cost and 
without any democratic legitimization or any possible justification by international legal stan-
dards. But even when being critical, or even polemical, the authors produce an argumentation 
that remains open to a productive discussion. Readers will notice that the participants in this book 
project do not put much effort into refuting their adversaries, but concentrate rather on giving a 
detailed explanation of their own points of view. Readers should bear in mind that before 1997 
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such exchanges of views in public academic fora took place only rarely. Though sometimes the 
authors do not hide their disappointment that the political perspective of their own public has not 
been properly understood by the other side, this attitude should be regarded as positive: it means 
that  neither side is ruling out common ground in a  rational exchange of arguments. Not all 
intellectual links between Georgians and Abkhaz have been broken off since the war.
The objective of this academic dialogue was to present a multifaceted analysis of the war, its ori-
gins and the prospects for ending it with a settlement. The conference and book project also had 
practical objectives. Encounters between academics have different aims from meetings between 
political  representatives or  NGOs.  Here,  the dialogue was not  intended to  duplicate  on an 
academic level the negotiations taking place in Moscow or Geneva, or to come up with a mu-
tually acceptable compromise for a settlement to the conflict. Nor was it to discuss how common 
projects could satisfy needs that are common to both communities – the objective of NGO co-
operation projects. The specific academic objectives of this book project could be subsumed 
under two headings: first, to promote academic co-operation between the two communities in an 
international framework; second, to stimulate discussion among public opinion by producing a 
publication intended for a wide audience in Georgia and Abkhazia. These two objectives of the 
organizers are  quite  traditional  in  scientific  activities.  As the  first  objective,  shared  by the 
Georgian and Abkhaz participants, implies an internationalization of their co-operation through 
the  involvement  of  foreign  universities  and  research  centres,  it  has,  however,  a  political 
dimension which is not to be found in all scientific research projects. It parallels the efforts by the 
Abkhaz and Georgian governments to find recognition in the international community for their 
own proposals for a settlement, but it differs from these efforts in being confined to an exchange 
of views.
Co-Operation
The first objective of the conference project was co-operation. In the view of the organizers at the 
time of its initiation in summer 1996, a conference to discuss the first drafts for a book project 
and the ensuing publication had to demonstrate that practical co-operation between Georgian and 
Abkhaz academics was able, on a  scientific level, to overcome the deadlock in the political 
negotiations between their governments. The conference in Brussels was not the first one in 
which Georgians and Abkhaz had met. There have been several conferences with the explicit aim 
of  facilitating  a  dialogue  between the  conflicting sides.  Initiatives have been taken  by or-
ganizations such as the Norwegian Refugee Council and the George Mason University, and by 
individuals such as Paula Garb from the University of California. NGO representatives had met 
in Moscow in March 1996 and in Schlainingen (Austria). In 1997, the OSCE invited Georgian 
and Abkhazian  journalists  to  Warsaw.  In  early  June  1997,  a  conference was organized in 
Haarlem by Mehmet Tütüncü, with the participation of Georgian and Abkhazian scholars.1 The 
London-based  NGO  International  Alert  started  with  a  confidence-building  pro-gramme 
consisting of a series of six workshops, after a successful one in 1997.2
The Georgian and Abkhaz governments, faced with a deadlock in the discussion on their rela-
tions and with a mutual dependence on Russia which became to a certain extent a liability for 
1 Mehmet Tütüncü, Caucasus: War and Peace. The New World Disorder and Caucasia, Haarlem, 1998 (the 
book can be ordered by email <sota@euronet.nl>.
2 See the report by Anna Matveeva in: Coordinating Committee for Conflict Resolution Training in Europe, no. 
5, Spring 1997, http://www.c-r.org/cr/ccts/.
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both sides, had come to understand that it would be to the advantage of both of them to develop 
direct  political  contacts,  aside  from the  negotiations organized in  Moscow by the  Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or those held under the auspices of the UN in Geneva. Such direct 
contacts did not lead to any breakthrough, but both sides continued to consider them useful and 
they have been supplemented in recent years by meetings between representatives of both com-
munities at a more functional level. Officials from the security services and technical experts 
have met regularly in the last few years to tackle problems of common concern. In November 
1997, the creation of a Co-ordination Council institutionalized direct encounters. The UN, which 
was most active in setting this up, hoped that such an attempt at rapprochement would facilitate a 
political settlement.
Encounters and co-operation projects between academics proceed from a  similar  perspective. 
Even before the war, relations between the two national scientific communities were deeply con-
flictual. Of all the social science disciplines, history and linguistics were the most prominent in 
ideological controversies. Historians and linguists engaged in scientific disputes on the origins of 
the Abkhaz language and on the presence of the two nationalities in the region in previous 
centuries.  Their  arguments lent  support  to  nationalist  politicians on both sides. Meanwhile, 
conflicts between scientific communities were also taking place on an institutional level. The 
creation of a branch of Tbilisi University in Sukhum(i) in 1989 was seen as provocation and 
resented by the Abkhaz community.3 National identity and national sovereignty were the main 
issues in the war of 1992-93. The destruction of the Abkhaz historical archives in Sukhum(i) by 
Georgian troops was aimed at destroying the Abkhaz national memory. When the war came, all 
remaining contact between the two scientific communities was completely broken off, and this 
situation remained unchanged until initial contacts between the two communities could be made 
at a functional level.
Historians, philosophers and social scientists have no less professional interest in co-operating 
than engineers or other technical experts. Their involvement in ideological disputes does not 
hinder collaboration – on the contrary, it makes such co-operation even more urgent. For social 
scientists, engaging in ideological controversies is a normal part of their intellectual creativity. 
The quality of their research may be impaired only if they become blind to the possible conse-
quences of their ideological involvement. But the latter will not interfere with the scientific nature 
of their research as long as basic methodological rules are respected, research results can be 
verified by colleages and the researchers themselves remain open to the criticism of their peers. 
The ideological component of scientific activity will have a negative effect on the quality of the 
research only if one of those conditions is not met. The critique by colleagues who do not share 
the same ideological presuppositions is an important element in this respect. The absence of 
scientific criticism which did not depart from Marxist-Leninist presuppositions, for instance, led 
to a  dogmatization of social sciences in the Soviet Union. Scientific disputes between social 
scientists with different ideological affinities, or who defend opposing national interests, may 
stimulate fruitful reflection on the new societies which have emerged with the ending of the 
Soviet Union.
Georgian and Abkhaz social scientists have been quite active since the war in producing scientif-
ic articles, books and leaflets analysing the origins of the conflict. These books were intended for 
a domestic and, to a lesser degree, an international audience. There has, however, been no op-
portunity for social scientists from Georgia and Abkhazia to develop their argumentation or to 
discuss their research results within a common framework. During the discussion of the first 
drafts and the preparation of the second drafts, it was interesting to see that all the authors were 
3 See Naira Gelaschwili, Georgien. Ein Paradies in Trümmern, Berlin, Aufbau Verlag, 1993.
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open to comments from all the other participants and have modified the contents of their second 
drafts accordingly, without, however, compromising on ideological issues which they regard as 
important.  The  factual  accuracy of their  descriptions, in  particular,  has  benefited from this 
exchange of views.
This book primarily serves academic interests. Yet the preparation of such a book project also in-
volves political interests, which need clarification. The relationship between academic and po-
litical motivation may, in this particular instance, seem an ambiguous one. There are various rea-
sons to suppose that the political dimension of such academic co-operation would predominate. 
First, this collaboration between Abkhaz and Georgian academics took place in a situation where 
every form of contact between the two communities necessarily had a strong political colouring. 
Second, the subject of this scientific collaboration was history and politics. Third, several authors 
had been, or still were, actively involved in politics. Stanislav Lakoba, for instance, was the vice-
chairman  of  the  previous  parliament  of  Abkhazia,  Viacheslav  Chirikba  is  the  official 
representative of Abkhazia in Western Europe and Revaz Gachechiladze is current Georgian 
Ambassador to Israel. Fourth, the conference was funded by a TACIS contract with the European 
Commission, which is actively pursuing its own interests in the Caucasus region and regards such 
a conference as a contribution to a political settlement of the conflict. Fifth, the Georgian and 
Abkhaz  governments tend  to  see  a  conference like  this  as  one  means,  amongst  others,  of 
attracting international attention to their conflict and enlisting support for their positions among 
an international audience. They may also expect political benefits from such a conference, by 
obtaining better information about the variety of positions defended in the other community than 
is usually possible during direct political negotiations.
All these factors, which could have led to a "politicization" of the discussion to the detriment of 
its scientific character, were taken into account in the preparation of this project. In order to avoid 
negative interference in the book project by particular political interests, the editors were con-
vinced that it was sufficient to follow quite traditional academic practices in organizing the dis-
cussions at the conference. They did not think that they needed to do more than require the au-
thors to respect the usual scientific standards when preparing the book for publication. These re-
quirements were intended to prevent too much interference by political interests in scientific de-
bates, but  were not meant to exclude ideological commitments or prevent value judgements. 
Scholars should not be considered less committed than other citizens to the political conflict in 
which their own community is engaged. Distrust and hatred are essential factors in a conflict 
where those involved failed to avoid the use of military force. The presentation of this dimension 
of the conflict was expected to proceed according to a rational line of argument, which would be 
conscious of all the difficulties in reaching a "balanced", "unbiased" approach to past injustices, 
to the horrors of the war and to the responsibilities of political leaders and the international 
community.
The conference was closed to the public, but some academic experts from Western universities 
and research centres were invited to prepare comments on the first drafts. In order to avoid a "po-
liticization" of the debates, in such cases some specialists in confidence-building programmes 
advise  inviting  not  academic  regional  experts  but  rather  experts  in  specific  disciplines 
(federalism, conflict resolution etc.) who are able to take a more abstract view of the conflict. 
Regional specialists, indeed, tend to be biased and to share the prejudices of one of the commu-
nities  involved  in  the  conflict,  whereas  theoretically-minded  and  regionally-uninformed 
specialists can help to relativize the ideological issues at stake. As conference organizers, we did 
not stick to this rule but considered that the standard academic procedures described above were 
sufficient to safeguard the primarily scientific character of any such project. We invited about 
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twenty researchers from various Western universities and research centres,4  who in many cases 
happened to have better contacts with one side than the other. The fact that they were well 
informed about  the  issues under  discussion,  and  were sometimes to  be  seen defending  the 
arguments of one party to the dispute against  the arguments of the other party,  was not  a 
handicap in debating an issue as complex as the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, but rather an ad-
vantage. The multiplicity of perspectives allowed for a fruitful exchange of information, which 
would probably not have taken place if the Georgian and Abkhaz scholars had had a monopoly 
on concrete historic information about the conflict, and the Western participants had been forced 
to stick to more abstract considerations.
The complex link between academic and political interests should not only be seen from the per-
spective that science may become dependent on political interests. Political organizations dealing 
with security issues are quite eager to make use of the activities of academic institutions and 
other NGOs, as they present a number of advantages over traditional forms of multilateral or 
bilateral  diplomacy.  First,  for  a  number  of  international  organizations it  is  not  possible to 
establish direct relations with the governments of "suspended states" such as Abkhazia. With the 
exception of regular meetings with the UN and Russia (which are mediating between the two 
sides in the armed conflict),  and sporadic discussions of an  exploratory nature  between the 
Abkhaz  government  and  Western  diplomats  or  representatives  of  international  institutions, 
Abkhazia remains an outcast from international diplomatic fora. The funding of co-operation 
activities with non-governmental organizations from Abkhazia is one possible way of avoiding, 
to some extent, the negative consequences of this exclusion. This does, however, involve the risk 
that  political discussions with suspended states on ethnic and regional conflicts may become 
dependent on spontaneous initiatives taken (in their own interest) by academic institutions or 
other  NGOs which are  capable of attracting sufficient attention and financial  support  from 
funding organizations.
From the perspective of political organizations dealing with security issues, there is a second 
advantage to academic or other types of co-operation at the level of NGOs: such forms of colla-
boration are based on their own time-scales – proceeding at a different pace from political ne-
gotiations – and are far less sensitive to ups and downs in the political situation. A dialogue be-
tween scholars can make progress according to their own criteria,  regardless of setbacks in 
governmental negotiations. In the second half of 1996, for instance, a breakdown in the political 
negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia – due to the preparation of parliamentary elections 
by the Abkhaz government without the participation of the Georgian IDPs – was only narrowly 
avoided.  Yet  these  tensions  between  the  two  governments  did  not  threaten  the  ongoing 
preparations for this conference, including the support of the Georgian and Abkhaz authorities.
Most NGOs working on Georgian-Abkhaz issues are funded by Western organizations. It  is 
remarkable, in this respect, that the Russian authorities, which have considerable interests at 
stake and a strong military involvement in the Caucasus region, have up to now not sufficiently 
realized the opportunities that can be offered by confidence-building programmes or by scientific 
4 The conference was attended by Anthony Antoine (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), Lincoln Allison (University of 
Warwick), Martina Bohm (La Trobe University, Melbourne), Kevin Clements (George Mason University), 
Rachel Clogg (University of Oxford), Jonathan Cohen (Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, The Hague), 
Jan  de  Voogd  (TACIS  Monitoring  &  Evaluation  Office,  Tbilisi),  Theodore  Hanf  (Arnold  Bergsträsser 
Institute, Freiburg), Heidi Hiltunen (European Commission), Terrence Hopmann (Brown University), Kahka 
Gogoloshvili  (Georgian  Embassy),  Ria  Laenen  (Katholieke  Universiteit  Leuven),  Anna  Matveeva 
(International Alert, London), Nino Nanava (London School of Economics), Klaus Rasmussen (University of 
Copenhagen),  Eric  Remacle  (Université  Libre  de  Bruxelles),  Andrea Schmidt  (Université  Catholique  de 
Louvain), David Tirr (European Commission) and Martin Schuemer (UN Volunteers).
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collaboration between academics in regions in conflict,5 including even the opportunity to allow a 
better understanding of Russian policies which – as one can read in the Georgian and Abkhaz 
contributions – are in need of legitimacy and acceptance.
Public Opinion
The production of a  book was the main practical objective of the conference. In the case of 
Georgia and Abkhazia, such an activity takes on a particular connotation. Active involvement by 
public opinion in the discussion on the terms for a fair settlement of the conflict may be seen by 
some political representatives or by officials from international organizations as superfluous, or 
even as a threat to steady progress in the negotiations, but in the end it is an indispensable con-
dition of any political solution in the Caucasus. The mobilization of public opinion in the con-
flicts in the region has been too thorough and the struggle for power in all Caucasian countries is 
too bitter to allow any compromise solution in conditions where public opinion is not prepared to 
follow suit. The Armenian president, Levon Ter-Petrosian, learned through experience that a 
willingness to compromise can easily been interpreted by political adversaries as a selling-out of 
state interests.
The Georgian and Abkhaz leaderships are constantly on their guard against a negative reaction 
from their public to initiatives they are taking. The confrontational policies that the Georgian and 
Abkhaz governments have pursued – even after 1993, when they agreed to a cease-fire and the 
principle of peaceful negotiations – were framed largely on the basis of domestic political needs. 
Such uncompromising policies aimed to  counter  the anger of large parts of the population 
dissatisfied with the lack of concrete positive results achieved through negotiation, and their 
anxiety that their interests would be neglected. Both governments" fear of losing the confidence 
of their own rank and file may partly explain why discussions on the political status of the 
Abkhazian state and on a peace agreement did not make significant progress. In these conditions, 
it  makes sense to strive for direct involvement by public opinion in the ongoing discussions 
between the two sides. The production of a book for both a Georgian and an Abkhaz audience 
may be a contribution to the dialogue between these communities – one that is not confined to 
political  representatives, and that  may be helpful  in  fostering more understanding in  public 
opinion on each side of the aspirations and aims of the main political players in the other.
The concept of public opinion is used by several authors in this book. Revaz Gachechiladze e-
quates the opinion of "the Abkhaz" or "the Georgians" with "the prevailing public opinion in the 
two ethnic groups". A similar use of the term "the Abkhazians" or "the Georgians" can be found 
in the contributions of Yuri Anchabadze or Ghia Nodia. The preference of all the authors for the 
concept of public opinion rather than the term "civil society", which is far more popular  in 
academic circles, is interesting in itself. The concept of  "public opinion" denotes a relatively less 
active form of involvement in public affairs than that implied in the concept of  "civil society". 
The use of this term (or the use of the term "the Abkhazians" or "the Georgians" as defined by 
Revaz Gachechiladze) avoids difficult debates on the question as to how far there is an active (a 
"real") civil society in Georgia or Abkhazia. Many may doubt the significance of "civil society" 
in both communities, but few would question the importance of public opinion in their struggles 
for sovereignty and independence.
5 In an article for  Nezavisimaya gazeta,  Alexander Iskandarian has expressed his  bitterness at this  lack of 
interest: 'Uchenye obsuzhdayut problemy Kavkaza', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 November 1997.
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The idea for this book project was based on the observation that the search for a negotiated solu-
tion remains the very highest priority in Abkhazia and Georgia, but that the discussions on po-
litical perspectives are not taking place within a suitable framework. The discussion on alterna-
tives to economic embargoes, to the refusal to undo ethnic cleansing or to permanent military 
mobilization are, in general, being held within rather than between the communities. Each side 
lacks information concerning the debates on political strategy taking place on the other side. 
What are people's views on a common state? How will the local population of Abkhazia react to 
the return of refugees? How does public opinion in Georgia and Abkhazia perceive the future of 
the Caucasus region? What is the link between national identities and regional identities? What 
do people feel about the creation of common Caucasian institutions? Generally, those who are 
shaping the discussion in  public  opinion themselves lack  information about  the  intellectual 
perspectives to be found at the other side of the cease-fire line. This book project aims at filling 
that gap. The creation of a "common state", on which the Georgian and Abkhaz governments 
seem to agree in very general terms, is also in need of a "common public opinion" in order to 
define its precise institutional content.
The authors were not writing exclusively for their own "home" public or for the anonymous read-
ership of international scientific journals. One of the aims striven for during the preparation of 
this book was that the authors would bear in mind the sensitivity of the public on "the other side". 
The discussion of first drafts at the conference in Brussels appeared fruitful in that respect. This 
may explain why the polemical style, so characteristic in writing aimed at a domestic audience, 
was avoided. When Georgians read the contribution from Stanislav Lakoba, for instance, they 
will be confronted with the proposal for a Confederation to be constituted initially by Georgia, 
Abkhazia and Chechnya, and which would remain open for other Caucasian nations to join. In 
this article, the author gives a  sharp critique of Georgian policies during the brief period of 
independence 1918-21,  but  he  also  takes  into  account  what  he  perceives as  the  common 
geopolitical  interests  and  civilizational  traditions  of  Georgia,  Chechnya  and  Abkhazia.  He 
explains his preference for a confederal solution – in which all participant states would safeguard 
their sovereignty and would deal with one other on equal terms – by the lack of trust in federal 
institutions. According to his argumentation, federal institutions would inevitably lead to the 
oppression of the Abkhazian community. The main reason (and here the author is quoting from 
"Severnyi Kavkaz", a pan-Caucasian émigré journal published in Warsaw in 1934) is that "this 
has been the fate of all states in which small nations have united around large nations".
The reader may raise various objections or formulate further research questions concerning this 
proposal for a settlement of the conflict. The European experience has indeed shown that wider 
regional integration could have positive consequences for the federalization of previously unitary 
states in the European Union, such as Spain or Belgium, and for regionalization or devolution 
processes in non-federal countries such as Italy or the United Kingdom. The European Union 
itself has acquired a  quasi-federal structure through limiting the sovereignty of its members, 
which may be interesting for regionalization processes in other areas. But is there something like 
a Caucasian identity which might be based on specific civilizational values like equality and 
independence, and which could underpin an integration process? Is integration possible without a 
severe limitation of the national sovereignty of states, implying the necessity to go beyond any 
confederal type of governance? Does the integration process in pan-European institutions or 
alliances with regional  powers not offer a  more attractive prospect to  the North and South 
Caucasian nations – which may make all Caucasian integration processes extremely difficult? 
Would a confederation solve the problem of co-existence between the Georgian and Abkhaz 
communities in Abkhazia itself? What guarantees could a  confederation offer for a  peaceful 
resolution of conflicts between constituent members? Is it still true in the 1990s (as it was largely 
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true in the 1930s) that unequal strength of nationalities in a federal structure is never corrected 
by adequate institutions and inevitably leads to the oppression of the weaker nation? Are the 
Catalans, the Basques and the Galicians now oppressed minorities in Spain, as they were in the 
1930s? Is the German-speaking Community an oppressed minority in Belgium (it constitutes a 
smaller percentage of the total Belgian population (0.7%) than the Abkhaz constituted in Georgia 
in  1989)?  Last  but  not  least:  what  guarantees  would  such  an  option  of  a  Caucasian 
Confederation offer for vital Russian security interests at its southern borders? Would political 
frameworks other than a confederation (integrative structures similar to the Nordic Council, for 
instance, in which both national and regional governments are represented)6 not be better suited to 
integrating the various interests of the regions and states of the Caucasus, including Russia? 
Some of these issues were discussed during the June conference and some contributions to this 
volume give partial answers. Here, suffice it to say that the ideas of Stanislav Lakoba go beyond 
a  defence of Abkhaz interests, and that  he bases his proposal on his personal perception of 
common Caucasian interests.
The same concern for common interests can be found in the contribution from Revaz Gachechi-
ladze. He does not refrain from making accusations against the Abkhaz leadership regarding past 
policies and their responsibility for the lack of progress in the political negotiations, but at the 
same time he builds the entire structure of his chapter on the thesis that the international economy 
only needs the goods and services that Abkhazia used to produce in Soviet times on condition 
that  a  political  agreement between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides secures stability and an 
adequate work-force. Normal contacts with the outside world would be a prerequisite for any 
economic development, which could take place only after a mutually agreed political settlement. 
Someone defending Abkhazia's right of secession could oppose this argument with the thesis that 
the need for small national minorities to be integrated into a larger economic market and to be 
protected by strong state power may have been true in the past, but that the globalization of the 
world economy and the strengthening of international law has now significantly lowered the costs 
of independence.7 The number of independent countries has risen from 62 before World War I to 
193 today. Of these, 35 have less than half a million people, whereas the pre-war population of 
Abkhazia was 537,000.8 Independence might render Abkhazia's access to international markets 
and its participation in international fora more difficult than if it  were a  federated state, but 
economic reasons would not make independence impossible. It could be asked whether Revaz 
Gachechiladze's arguments would be convincing to proponents of Abkhazian independence, who 
generally regard national freedom as far more important than the material welfare of their own 
population. This does not, however, challenge Revaz Gachechiladze's main thesis, which is that a 
political agreement is a precondition for the economic reconstruction of Abkhazia. Abkhazia will 
have more difficulty in joining St Vincent, Iceland, Luxemburg, Tonga, Tuvalu and Nauru in the 
club  of  micro-states  –  as  it  requires  the  blessing of  the  international  community  and  the 
agreement of the Georgian government – than in joining the club of European regions, together 
with Ajaria – which has been a member of the Assembly of the Regions of Europe (ARE) since 
1987 –  and other federated states to be created in Georgia. In this case too, the academic debate 
on the future  shape of Abkhazian statehood will  eventually have to  hinge on the common 
interests shared between Georgia and Abkhazia.
6 See Johan Galtung, 'Some observations on the Caucasus', in:  Caucasian Regional Studies, vol. 2, Issue 1, 
http://www.vub.ac.be/POLI/.
7 cf.  Will  Kymlicka, 'Is Federalism a Viable Alternative to  Secession?',  in:  Percy B.  Lehning,  Theories  of  
Secession, Routledge, London and New York, 1998, pp. 140-141.
8 'Small but Perfectly Formed', The Economist, 3 January 1998.
Georgians and Abkhazians 13
The dialogue between Georgian and Abkhaz academics should not be considered an intellectual 
form of negotiation between representatives of the two nationalities. None of the participants has 
received any political mandate to negotiate, and their contributions express individual views. 
Evidence for these personal perceptions can be found in the different approaches to the conflict 
taken by the Georgian and Abkhaz authors.  First  of all,  the reader will  find different me-
thodological approaches presented in this book. Ghia Nodia, for instance – trained as a political 
philosopher – focuses his attention on how both communities have conceived their respective 
national projects through changing historical circumstances and how these projects collided in 
their struggle for emancipation. Both communities defined themselves as nations on an ethnic 
basis and strove for full sovereignty at the expense of other ethnic groups. This explanation of the 
conflict emphasizes the importance of the subjective grasp of reality by social collectives. Revaz 
Gachechiladze, as a social geographer, is far more interested in analysing the common material 
interests of the communities which may bring them to a compromise.
Secondly, the reader will find differences between the political projects and their proposed solu-
tions to the conflict. The Georgian participants do not necessarily all share the same views of the 
steps to be followed in resolving the conflict. The same may be said of the Abkhaz contributions. 
To take the latter as an example: as indicated above, Stanislav Lakoba regards the creation of a 
confederal triangle consisting of Georgia, Abkhazia and Chechnya as the starting-point for a 
reconciliation  between  Georgia  and  Abkhazia,  whereas  Viacheslav  Chirikba  examines  a 
federative formula,  based on the principle of internal self-determination, in which Abkhazia, 
Georgia, Ajaria and South Ossetia would enjoy full sovereignty on their territory but – retaining 
strong veto rights – would delegate functions such as border control, customs and foreign policy 
to common bodies. He is far more optimistic than Stanislav Lakoba about the possibility of 
learning lessons – from the present world experience of devolution and shared sovereignty – for 
putting into practice the principles of equality and self-determination for smaller nations within 
bigger states. He remains, however, quite careful not to go beyond the statement that "shared 
sovereignty" may be considered an option. The delegation of a number of functions to common 
bodies, while retaining strong veto rights, does not go beyond a loose confederal arrangement, 
where sovereignty is not shared but all powers remain under the control of the founding states.
Thirdly, the reader may also notice the approach taken by the individual authors to the question 
of political responsibility for the escalation of the conflict into open war. It is not the aim of this 
introduction to go into a detailed comparison of the positions held, but merely to explain the 
background to  this book project  and to  point  out  some issues which may be of particular 
importance to the reader. But it  is possible to demonstrate that the different ethical positions 
taken by the authors do not simply reflect their allegiance to particular  official political ob-
jectives. They are based on different views of political ethics and of the moral value of concepts 
such as "nation" and "citizen", which transcend such communal differences.
These individually different approaches and proposals do not reflect a contradiction between mo-
derate and radical positions. All the proposals are, indeed, to be considered as a positive intel-
lectual contribution to political negotiations, even if, in their present form, they are unlikely to be 
acceptable to the other side. Each proposal expresses the same degree of loyalty to one com-
munity. The differences in the proposals indicate that there is a good deal of room in both Geor-
gia and Abkhazia for independent political thought.
Opposing approaches to the conflict are also to be found in public opinion in Georgia and Abkha-
zia, as could be seen from the mixed reactions to the meeting of presidents Shevardnadze and Ar-
dzinba in Tbilisi in August 1997. Public opinion in both states was divided over the issue of 
whether this meeting – taking place on the anniversary of the outbreak of war in 1992 – should 
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or should not be regarded as a positive step towards a resolution of the conflict. The choice of this 
date was regarded by many Abkhaz (not without reason) as a tactless move, imposed by the 
Russian facilitator of the meeting without considering its symbolic significance for the civilian 
population. Public opinion in Georgia seems far more divided than in Abkhazia in its attitude to 
the negotiations. This is due first of all to the political and social marginalization of the IDPs 
(internally displaced persons) from Abkhazia in Georgian society. The civilian population that 
remained in Abkhazia is hurt in a relatively even-handed way by the ongoing economic isolation 
of the region while,  on the contrary,  there is  a  sharp differentiation between the long-term 
interests of the Georgian IDPs and those of the rest of the Georgian population. Secondly, the 
refusal by the Abkhaz leadership to have any dialogue with the political representatives of the 
Georgian population from Abkhazia has led to a radicalization of the latter's position. Some are 
advocating the use of force to make the return of refugees possible, drawing an analogy between 
their situation and that of the PLO before it could start negotiations with the Israeli government. 
It remains to be seen what consequences such differentiated  public attitudes and opinions will 
have on the  negotiations. Much will  depend on how the  public  perceives new institutional 
compromises. The majority of Georgians will not accept a compromise that could lead to the 
secession of Abkhazia, while Georgian IDPs and the other communities in Abkhazia expect far 
more  than  that.  They  want  strong  security  guarantees,  and  may  refuse  any  institutional 
compromise that they consider to be inadequate for preventing a new war sooner or later. From 
this perspective, the negotiations which have been going on in recent years give few grounds for 
optimism. Neither side has been able to propose a formula that takes into account the security 
needs of the other. A radical change in the attitude of both sides – as analysed in the contribution 
by Theo Jans – would be the first condition of success.
Ghia Nodia
The Conflict in Abkhazia: National Projects and Political Circumstances
There are many different ways in which to contextualize – and explain – a conflict like the one in 
Abkhazia. In some cases pre-existent ("ancient") ethnic hatred, previously kept in check by an 
outside power but liberated by democratization, is seen as the cause of all the trouble; others see 
the conflict as a minority's reaction to an assault by a majority's nationalism; while instrumen-
talists prefer to look for elites who manipulate ethnic sentiments in their particular ("group") 
interests: once these interests have been exposed, the puzzle of the conflict may be considered 
solved. Still others tend to reduce the problem to a conspiracy by an outside imperial power 
which decided to play the divide et impera card once again. I believe that all the above factors 
were valid (to different degrees, of course), but that they could do no more than encourage a 
conflict which had its root causes elsewhere.
In my view, the conflict in Abkhazia is a conflict of political modernization. In the modern era, 
ethnic groups find themselves in a world where the political map is increasingly defined by na-
tion-states rather than multi-ethnic empires, and where political power is legitimized by the will 
of peoples/nations rather than divine right of monarchs. In this new world, ethnic groups feel that 
they have  to define their own political status as well. Empires may acquire the policies of "of-
ficial nationalism", that is, they may try to assimilate minority populations into their language 
and culture (the Russification policy of the late 19th century is regarded as a classic example of 
this).1 Smaller groups that do not yet have separate political identities by the time the tide of po-
litical modernization reaches them find themselves in the situation described by some scholars as 
an "assimilation dilemma":2 either they have to acquire the national and political identity of a 
politically dominant – and usually more "advanced", that is, modernized – nation, which has 
already developed a statehood of its own, agree to reduce their native vernaculars to the status of 
"kitchen languages" and recognize the superiority of the ways of the powerful and "advanced" 
nation over their own traditional mores; or they have to acquire a distinct cultural and political 
personality and create ("invent", "imagine" – as modern students of nationalism like to say) their 
own programme for achieving proper political status which will  represent and maintain this 
distinctness.
The problem is that history does not provide ready-made material for modern nations-to-be: dif-
ferent ethnic groups create a  patchwork of languages, cultures and political traditions, which 
have to be reshaped to fit into the hard and fast lines of nation-states. Newly emerged nationalist 
elites take on this job of "reshaping" the pre-existent ethnic material so that it fits into the more 
rigid model of modern nationhood. I will call the basic pattern, on which the work of reshaping or 
reconstructing is based, a national project. A national project is an ideal construct which usually 
holds answers to at least several major questions: 1. "Who are we?", that is, how do we define the 
people comprising our national "we"? 2. What is "our land" – how can we demarcate the territory 
that is our national home? 3. What political status would be appropriate for our group (are we 
eligible for fully independent statehood or is something more "modest" acceptable)? 4. What are 
we not – in contrast to whom do we define our identity (remembering the assimilation dilemma, 
this question can be reformulated thus: "who would we become if we chose to be assimilated")? 
1 Hugh Seton-Watson, Nationalism and Communism, Methuen: London, 1964, pp. 19-24.
2 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Social  
Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations, Cambridge University Press: Cam-
bridge, 1985,  p. 12;  Karl W. Deutsch,  Problems of  Nation-Building  and  National  Development, in:  Karl 
W. Deutsch, William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation-Building, Atherton Press: New York, 1963, p. 140.
5. Who is our primary enemy? (this may or may not coincide with the group or state representing 
the threat of assimilation) – and who are our other enemies (usually seen as conspiratorial allies 
or puppets of the primary enemy)? 6. Who are our friends and relatives – who are our "natural" 
or provisional allies? 7. What is our civilizational orientation – what civilization are we part of 
(such as "Western", "Middle Eastern", "Latin", etc.)? 8. What kind of political and economic 
order do we want to have? (the late 20th century seems to provide few alternatives to "market 
democracy" – though in reality there is a choice, and it may be contingent on the answer to the 
previous question: for instance, nowadays a Western orientation provides stronger motivation for 
adopting a democratic system than do other cultural affiliations).
In an ideal world of utopian nationalism, every nation would have its own national project and 
national statehood in accordance with a certain idea of historical fairness; together, they would 
constitute a concert of humanity. In real life, however, the implementation of a national project 
may take place at the expense of one's neighbour: populations are mixed, the messages of history 
are vague, and there are no clear criteria for deciding who "deserves" what. Conflicts occur, 
grounded in clashes between different national projects.
The conflict in Abkhazia – or, to be more accurate, the conflict about Abkhazia – is a case of this 
generic type. I  believe that,  with the liberalization and further democratization of the Soviet 
Union, it was unavoidable. In saying this, however, I do not mean that the war in Abkhazia was 
unavoidable  too.  In  order  to  understand the  roots of  the  conflict,  one has  to  describe and 
understand the national projects around which Georgian and Abkhaz nationhood, respectively, 
were  constituted  (or  constructed  –  to  use  the  more  modern  word);  the  particular  political 
circumstances, however, will help us understand why the conflict unfolded the way it did.
Formation of the Georgian and Abkhaz National Projects
In describing national projects, I will have to refer back to some historical facts. Since history is 
often used by both parties in order to justify or denounce certain political claims, I  want to
make it clear at this point that I will only make my historical references in an attempt to under-
stand why Georgians and Abkhaz developed the kinds of national projects they did, and why 
their visions came into conflict. In doing so, I will not question legitimacy of either group.
Modern Georgian nationalism began in the mid 19th century.3 Ilya Chavchavadze, who can be 
regarded as its founding father, tried to base a new vision of Georgia on European models of li-
beral nationalism. He formulated his slogan as Mamuli, Ena, Sartsmunoeba – "Fatherland, Lan-
guage, Faith". This shows both continuity and a break with the medieval Georgian tradition. In 
the Middle Ages, "Georgian-ness" was equated with being an Orthodox Christian. The eastern 
Georgian kingdom of Kartli adopted Christianity in the 4th century, and from the religious split 
of the 7th  century,  when Georgia  became diophysitic (that  is,  shared Greek  Orthodoxy,  in 
contrast to monophysitic faith of the Armenian Church)4 until the late 18th century, when Russia 
became involved in the Caucasus, the Georgians were the only Orthodox Christians surrounded 
by a predominantly Islamic population. Those ethnic Georgians who adopted some other religion 
– even if they continued to speak the Georgian tongue – were no longer considered Georgians by 
others: they were called either Tartars  (if they switched to Islam),  Armenians (if they were 
3 There was an episode of aristocratic nationalism which expressed itself in the anti-imperial conspiracy of 
1832, but it did not develop further. In the 1860s, Ilya Chavchavadze had to start Georgian nationalism on a 
new basis, though tribute was paid to the conspirators of the previous generation.
4 The dogmatic difference is in interpreting the nature of Christ:  diophysites (i.e., Roman Catholics, Eastern 
Orthodox) recognize His dual (divine and human) nature, while monophytes (i.e., Armenian Gregorians) deny 
His human nature.
baptized in the Armenian church) or even prangi, "French" (if they adopted Roman Catholic 
faith). On the other hand, the church used Georgian, so language became an important marker as 
well, though in conjunction with religion. In the mid 10th century, the Georgian hagiographer 
Giorgi Merchule formulated what became the medieval paradigm of what "Georgia" meant: 
"Georgia consists of those spacious lands in which church services are celebrated and all prayers 
are said in the Georgian tongue".5 Ilya Chavchavadze, by putting "Language" before "Faith", 
secularized Georgian nationalism, making it similar to other linguistic nationalisms of the 19th 
century, and opened it up to Muslim Georgians and Georgians of other denominations; in doing 
so, however, he could also appeal to the medieval tradition.
This way in which the modern Georgian national project reconstructed a medieval past will help 
us understand important aspects of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. In the words of Ernest Gellner,6 
Georgians defined their country as the realm of Georgian "high culture", that is, the area where 
Georgian was the language of literacy and an elite culture. This area also included Abkhazia. 
The root of the conflict lay in a discrepancy between the high culture of Abkhazia and popular 
Abkhaz ethnic culture (we must remember that Gellner warned strongly against interpreting the 
term "high" in terms of value: it merely implies attribution to the "higher" classes of society). 
Ethnic Abkhazians are not ethnically related to Georgians – linguistically they are kin to the 
North Caucasian peoples (Kabardins, Adighe, etc.). But the medieval Abkhaz kingdom was part 
of the Georgian cultural and political realm. The Abkhaz, unlike the Georgians, had no alphabet, 
so  Georgian  was  the  language  of  the  Abkhaz  aristocracy.  Whenever  Georgia,  or  Western 
Georgia, represented a unified political structure, Abkhazia was part of it. In some periods, the 
whole of Western Georgia was unified under the name of Abkhazia (Abkhazeti), at other times, 
approximately the same territory bore the name of Egrisi (which means "land of the Megrelians" 
–  a  sub-ethnic Georgian group). When Georgia disintegrated into smaller  princedoms, these 
cultural  ties  between elites were preserved.  This  history has  led  Georgians  to  believe that 
Abkhazia is a legitimate part of Georgia, despite the fact that, ethnically speaking, the Abkhaz 
are not related to the Georgians.
However, this inference from the way the idea of Georgia was reconstructed in the 19th century 
became important only later, when Georgian nationalism reached the stage of a political move-
ment. In the beginning of the nationalist movement in Georgia, the national ambitions were still 
pretty timid, being mostly confined to issues of culture, the preservation of the native language 
and the like, and the idea of even limited autonomy within the Russian empire was not seriously 
entertained until the 1905 revolution in Russia. Georgian nationalism was not fully politicized 
until Georgia was pushed into acquiring full independence by the break-up of the Russian empire 
and, later, the failure of the Transcaucasian Federation in 1918. This was when the paradigm of 
Georgian  political  nationalism  was  formulated.  This  paradigm  was  re-invoked,  almost 
unchanged, by the national liberation movement of the perestroika period. After the experience 
of brief independence in 1918-21  (interrupted by the Russian Communist invasion), nothing 
short of full independence could satisfy Georgian political ambitions any more. In 1989-90, there 
was not a single political party or group in Georgia proper7 that did not include in its charter a 
demand for independence. Russia naturally filled the slot for "the enemy" (independence meant 
independence from Russia) and it also embodied the threat of assimilation. This did not mean 
particular emotional hostility to this country, much less to Russians as an ethnic group, but that is 
a different story: where the plan for independence was concerned, the major impediments were 
expected from the North. Turkey had been a threat in the period 1918-21, and recollections of 
5 Revaz Gachechiladze,  The New Georgia: Space, Society, Politics, Texas A & M University Press: College 
Station, 1995, pp. 19-20.
6 Ernest Gellner, Nation and Nationalism, Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1983, pp. 50-52.
7 "Georgia proper" excludes Abkhazia and South Ossetia, future breakaway regions.
medieval Muslim invasions were still strong enough to encourage mistrust, but since Turkey was 
a  rival  force  to  Russia,  this  made  her  an  ally  for
Georgia.
However, neither Turkey nor any other regional country is  the ally: the major protector and 
patron is seen – however realistically or otherwise – as "the West" in general. This is an ex-
trapolation of the paradigm of medieval times when Christian Georgia, which felt itself under 
siege from Muslim countries, looked for help to the "big" Christian world. Culturally, Georgians 
have difficulty in saying "we are a Western nation", though some would say that typologically, in 
their  essence, Georgians are  Westerners who went astray  under  the  influence of their  non-
Western neighbours. The fact is, however, that, in terms of orientation, since the 19th century the 
Georgian elite has been looking for models in the West. Democracy is considered to be the model 
of political order – not because Georgians are such committed democrats, but because nowadays 
there is no other way to be Western. Many supporters of the nationalist Georgian president 
Gamsakhurdia said that in the event of a contradiction, independence should take precedence 
over democracy – but, arguably, even this attitude does not contradict the "Western way" in 
principle: the nation-state is a Western idea as well, and Western nation-states have not always 
been democratic from the outset.
Since independence from Russia is the primary task of Georgian nationalism (and given the 
presence of Russian troops and the degree of Russian leverage on Georgia, many believe it has 
yet to be accomplished), all other adversaries are viewed in the light of this opposition. Minorities 
who are not loyal to Georgia therefore have to be conceptualized as accomplices of Russia. This 
is not to suggest that the Russians did – or did not – support Abkhaz or Ossetian secessionism; it 
merely explains why it is that, from the Georgian perspective, any conflict with minorities only 
makes sense in relation to its struggle for independence from Russia. This has seriously damaged 
the Georgian ability to assess the situation because, although Russian support for separatist 
causes within the "union republics" was indeed logical, these attitudes have prevented Georgian 
elites from seeing the interests of the Abkhaz or Ossetes in their own right.
Two other features of Georgian nationalism which are relevant here are that it is non-assimila-
tionist and non-imperialist. In relation to the first point, I will refer to a distinction frequently 
made between the French and German forms of nationalism. In the words of Roger Brubaker,8 
the former is assimilationist (and ultimately universalist), while the latter is differentialist. The 
French pursue the project of assimilating their minorities, which makes them willing to accept 
them as "French" in so far as they adopt French culture and agree to forget (or at least give 
secondary value to) their own particular  heritage. Ataturk's idea of Turkish nationalism also 
follows this pattern. The concept of Russian nationalism was never clearly formulated, but its 
mainstream is inclined towards the assimilationist model as well. In these cases, culture and 
language take  precedence over "blood", that  is,  common ancestry.  For the German type of 
nationalism, however, it is jus sanguinis – that is, the principle of blood heritage – that matters 
most. Even in today's highly democratic country, this principle remains valid for the acquisition 
of citizenship, so that in recent decades culturally Germanized descendants of Turkish immi-
grants have had greater difficulty in acquiring citizenship than ethnic Germans from Russia or 
Kazakhstan who did not even speak the language but had documents to prove their ethnic an-
cestry. Following this classification, Georgians (like most other Caucasians, with the possible 
exception of the Azeris, who assimilate any Muslims easily) give preference to the exclusionist 
model. Though some representatives of minorities (especially Armenians and Ossetes) have been 
quite happy to assimilate and made their names sound more Georgian, most Georgians resist this 
8 "If the French understanding of nationhood has been state-oriented and assimilationist, the German under-
standing has been Volk-centered and differentialist". Citizenship and Nationhood, Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge/Mass., 1990, p. 184.
and have difficulty in perceiving ethnic converts as "real" ones. Since Eduard Shevardnadze 
came to power in 1992, there have been some deliberate efforts on the part of non-governmental 
groups and Shevardnadze's party (the Citizens' Union of Georgia)  to  reinforce the sense of 
common citizenship rather than ethnicity, but  they have not been particularly successful and 
never reached the stage of endorsing assimilationism: this would be rejected by both ethnic 
Georgians and minority communities.
Likewise, Georgian nationalism has never had imperialist/expansionist ambitions. This is obvi-
ously not how it appears from the Abkhazian perspective: the Abkhaz see Georgia as an empire 
which wants to conquer "foreign countries" (such as Abkhazia). In an interview, the Russian 
democrat and Nobel prize-winner Andrei Sakharov once called Georgia "a small empire", and 
this line is quoted in most Abkhaz and Russian accounts of the conflict. Of course, if one calls 
any state with a  multi-ethnic population an  "empire", then Georgia may also be called one 
(although in this case there would be very few states that are not empires). But if an "empire" is 
defined as a state whose national project is based on the idea of conquest and expansion (which 
would make more sense to me, and would correspond to the traditional use of the word), then 
Georgia hardly fits into that  category.  The national  project of modern Georgia  is that  of a 
classical nation-state – it is based on the idea that "we only want what belongs to us, but what 
does belong to us, we will never give up". Abkhazia is Georgia, because it has always been part 
of Georgia when it was united. Georgians cannot see Abkhazia as a "foreign" land which was 
once conquered by them, and the accusation of imperialism usually makes them furious. They 
have a very clear idea of what "our land" is, even though it is now carved up by the borders of 
Soviet Georgia.  (Most people believe that  some land that  was "historically ours" is now in 
Turkey, as well as in Azerbaijan or Armenia, but even the most radical nationalists understand 
that bringing this up would be impractical – so it is better to allow the Soviet maps to define the 
image of "our land").
It is obvious to any serious scholar of nationalism that the definition of "our land" is politically 
contingent, and that there are no universally valid criteria here. But this is not the point: once the 
definition is formulated, nobody would consider claiming any territory which is not "historically 
ours". Georgians sometimes profess to playing a special role in the Caucasus, and the Iberian-
Caucasian idea (based on the alleged kinship between Georgians and many North-Caucasian 
peoples, including the Abkhaz) was indeed popular in Gamsakhurdia's times and may be seen as 
kind of proto-imperialism. But  even the craziest Georgian nationalist  would  be unlikely to 
contemplate annexing Chechnya or Daghestan. In general, in so far as nationalism is centred 
around the idea of a nation-state, it is hardly compatible with the idea of empire. There are also 
other kind of distinctions: nationalists are usually selfish and self-centred, while imperialists are 
altruistic and cosmopolitan, care for the world and try to improve it (although quite willing to 
impose happiness and progress by force). For good or ill, Georgians as a nation are not notable 
for the latter qualities.
As for the modern Abkhaz national project, its construction starts with the end of the 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th century.9 But the initial ethnic and historical setting in which the Abkhaz 
elite had to carry out its task was different from the Georgian one. Although Abkhazia had a 
history of statehood to which it could appeal, this history did not come with a corresponding 
"high culture", that is cultural traditions based on specifically Abkhazian writings.
9 In this section of my paper, I depend partly on my notes from the lecture delivered by the Abkhaz-Georgian 
historian,  Gia Anchabadze,  during the  conference  organized  by the  Caucasian  Home and  Heinrich  Böll
Foundation in Tbilisi in September 1992. Of course, Dr. Anchabadze cannot be held responsible for my in-
terpretation of his ideas. For understandable reasons, I feel less confident in my interpretation of the Abkhaz 
national project and would especially appreciate any criticisms or suggestions.
Another feature of Abkhaz nationalism was that the national project of the Abkhaz was less 
about political independence than about survival as a distinct ethnic group. This appeared to stem 
from particular historical circumstances. Circassian tribes put up strong resistance to Russian 
domination, and "appropriate" repercussions followed. In the 1870s, the majority of the ethnic 
Abkhaz population was forced to move to Turkey (in what is called Mokhajirstvo). Even so, they 
were luckier than peoples like the Shapsughs and Ubykhs, their neighbours to the north of the 
Caucasus range, who were either slaughtered or driven completely from their land (survivors 
from the slaughter also took refuge in Turkey). Being few in absolute numbers, not protected by 
traditions of literacy, and gradually becoming minority in their own land, the Abkhaz faced the 
obvious danger of sweeping assimilation. It could be said that the emotional cornerstone of the 
Abkhaz national project is to avoid a repetition of the fate of the Shapsughs and Ubykhs.
Following the above-mentioned duality of the cultural and political tradition, the Abkhaz na-
tional project started developing in two versions. Since ethnically they were kin to the Circassian 
tribes, the logic of ethno-linguistic nationalism naturally pushed the Abkhaz to seek their identity 
within this realm, in the pan-Circassian movement which was forming on the century-old border. 
After  the  Bolshevik  revolution  this  movement  gave  birth  to  the  short-lived  Republic  of 
[Caucasian]  Mountain Peoples. After the break-up  of the Soviet Union, the same idea  was 
revived in the form of a political movement, the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the 
Caucasus (at some point, "Mountainous" was dropped).
On the other hand, it  still  mattered that  the high culture and political  traditions of Abkhaz 
statehood were traditionally Georgian (though Turkish and Russian elements were added later). 
The Abkhaz aristocracy was very close to the Georgian, and cultural ties were still considerable. 
In  the  administrative  sense,  Sukhumskiy  okrug –  that  is,  Abkhazia  –  was  affiliated  to 
Kutaisskaya guberniya, or western Georgia. This was the basis for another movement which 
sought the establishment of Abkhaz identity in close connection to Georgia, though retaining a 
special status. Of course, initially it was not about political status, because Georgian nationalism 
itself was still not politicized, but if translated into political terms, "special status within Georgia" 
would probably describe this trend. In both cases, however, the Abkhaz looked not for autonomy 
vis-ŕ-vis Russia as a  whole, but for some larger cultural entity (Circassian, Georgian) within 
which it would have a chance to retain its separate identity. In other words, the emerging Abkhaz 
nationalism did not define itself in terms of relations with Russia as a whole, but sought the locus 
of a separate Abkhaz identity within the western Caucasian region.
Both trends competed, the former one appearing to get upper hand. In the period of Georgian 
independence 1918-21,  the  ethnic Abkhaz  elite  was divided,  with  opponents of  unity  with 
Georgia in the majority, but the Georgian government was able to combine an alliance with the 
pro-Georgian section of the Abkhaz elite with military pressure to keep the province within the 
newly independent Georgia.10 In the Georgian constitution of 1921, Abkhazia was defined as an 
autonomous unit within Georgia (this constitution was adopted, however, just four days before 
Georgian independence ended with the Russian invasion).
The attitude to the Soviet period differs radically in the Georgian and Abkhaz national visions. 
For the Georgians, the independence that was suspended in 1921 continued symbolically after the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. This means that  nothing that  happened during this period of 
suspension could be called legitimate: everything was imposed by the foreign occupying force. 
The same cannot be said of the Abkhaz. Since there was no time for the above-mentioned 
provision of the 1921 Georgian constitution to be implemented, one can only fantasize about 
what Abkhaz autonomy in an independent Georgia would be like. In reality, however, modern 
Abkhaz statehood (or, rather, its symbolic prototype) came into existence for the first time under 
10 See, for instance, Stanislav Lakoba, Abkhaziya posle dvukh okupatsiy, Gagra, 1994.
Soviet rule. An administrative unit within the Soviet matryoshka system of nationalities (that is, 
one nationally-defined territorial unit containing another one) can hardly be called a real "nation-
state", but a Soviet national-territorial unit still had many symbolically important features that 
contributed  to  the  development  of  national/political  consciousness:  the  territorial  unit  was 
actually called "Abkhazia",  and the Abkhaz language was given official  status –  that  is,  it 
became a  language of "high culture" with many consequences for bureaucracy,  educational 
policy, literature in Abkhaz language and the like.  Thus,  unlike the Georgians, the Abkhaz 
legitimize their post-Soviet claims by referring to the Soviet period of their history (though not to 
it alone).
The major change that occurred during the Soviet period was that Georgia and Georgians ex-
clusively filled the slot for "enemy image" in the Abkhaz national project. In addition, Russia 
became the chief protector against "Georgian imperialism". There were several reasons for this. 
Between 1921 and 1931, the administrative framework of nationalities in the South Caucasus 
changed several times and, with it, the status of Abkhazia. The Russian Bolsheviks encouraged 
ethnic minorities in Georgia to rebel against the central government, to make their own conquest 
of it easier, and they initially welcomed the proclamation of a separate Abkhaz Soviet Socialist 
Republic in March 1921  (when the military operation against Georgia was still under way). 
Later, Abkhazia was made part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic – and, in 
1931, an autonomous republic within Georgia.11 If the republic proclaimed in March 1921 is 
taken as the reference point, then becoming an autonomous unit within Georgia was a demotion. 
What was especially important about this, however, was that these events occurred when the 
Soviet Union was being run by Joseph Stalin, an ethnic Georgian, who was later  joined in 
Moscow by his compatriot, Lavrenti Beria. This allows the Abkhaz to think that the demotion of 
their status was really an expression of Georgian imperialism: Stalin did it because he was a 
Georgian.
From the  Georgian  perspective,  however,  the  whole  thing  looks  completely  different.  The 
Georgians' attitude to Stalin is quite controversial, but Georgian nationalists at least regard him 
as a Russian imperialist who actively sought to conquer Georgia in 1921 – and his actions af-
terwards can hardly be explained by Georgian patriotism either. No people as few in number as 
the Abkhaz were granted the status of "full" union republic in the Soviet Union. Abkhazia's 
becoming part of Georgia can be fully explained by the general logic of the clusterization of 
Soviet nationalities – why should one refer to a specifically "Georgian" factor in this particular 
case? Georgians can also argue that if Stalin was responsible for subordinating Abkhazia to 
Georgia in 1931, then he was also responsible for the separation of Abkhazia from Georgia in 
1921. Even if one insists that Stalin's actions were motivated by latent Georgian imperialism, 
Georgians in general can hardly be held accountable for Soviet nationality policies, whoever 
carried  them out:  they  never  elected  those  leaders,  and  were  never  consulted  about  what
they did.
Apart from this demotion in status, under Stalin's rule the Abkhaz endured a period of Georgian 
demographic expansion, when some of the ethnic Georgian population was resettled from other 
parts of Georgia, and a period of a "Georgianization" policy in late 1940s and early 1950s, when 
the Georgian language was imposed on Abkhaz students in schools and the Abkhaz were forced 
to use a Georgian-based alphabet instead of a Cyrillic-based one (there exists a unique Georgian 
11 As Georgian authors point out, Abkhazia existed as separate from Georgia only from March to December of 
1921, when it was attached to Georgia as "treaty republic", and the Soviet Constitution of 1924 "treated it in 
fact  as  an  autonomous  republic  within  Georgia",  so  in  1931  this  status  was  only  "made 
official" (R. Gachechiladze,  New Georgia, op.cit., p. 33). These legal subtleties, however, may mean much 
less today in comparison with firm belief prevalent in Abkhaz society that Georgian Stalin attached Abkhazia 
to Georgia in 1931.
alphabet). These policies aroused in the Abkhaz the above-mentioned fear of extinction as an 
ethnic group, through forced assimilation. Again, these policies could be explained by the latent 
"Georgian imperialism" of Stalin and Beria or by another shift in the Soviet nationality policy. I 
believe that Beria, unlike Stalin, was more of a secret Georgian nationalist, and that that might 
have had some influence on his decisions regarding Abkhazia – though these kinds of policies 
were hardly unprecedented in the former Soviet Union. In any case, these changes in Soviet 
policy substantially increased Abkhaz animosity towards Georgians. The fact that after Stalin's 
death the policy changed again, this time in favour of the Abkhaz, only reinforced the Abkhaz 
belief that full responsibility for their deprivations lay with Stalin's and Beria's nationality.
Nor did the system of Soviet ethnic quotas do much to help Georgian-Abkhaz relations. Certain 
bureaucratic posts were set aside for ethnic Abkhaz, and this, given that the latter comprised only 
a  minority of the  population of Abkhazia,  was a  serious impediment to  the  careers of the 
Georgians living in the autonomous republic. Georgians resented this. Some of them registered as 
ethnic Abkhaz, which increased the resentment of other Georgians even more. The Abkhaz, on 
the other hand, saw this system (introduced and maintained by Russians) as the main way of 
safeguarding their interests against the Georgian assault.
Soviet rule contributed in one more way to the deterioration of Georgian-Abkhaz relations. As I 
said, the Abkhaz aristocracy was more likely than other classes in Abkhaz society to envisage the 
future of Abkhazia in a union with Georgia. However, it was precisely this group that suffered 
most disproportionately from the Communist repression. It is difficult to detect here any intention 
to sever Abkhaz-Georgian relations, but the effect was the same.
Thus, by the end of the Soviet Union, there was only one element of the Abkhaz national vision 
which was quite unambiguous: Georgians were the enemy. The positive project for political 
status was not as clear. I see at least two reasons for this. First, as I said, the modern history of 
Abkhaz  statehood started  in  the  Soviet  Union,  which  made  the  Abkhaz  nationalist  vision 
confined to their status within the Russian Empire/Soviet Union. Second, the Abkhaz had a much 
weaker starting-point than the Georgians: they were much fewer in absolute numbers, they were 
the minority in Abkhazia, and their status within the USSR was lower than that of Georgia. This 
meant that unlike the Georgians who (in practical terms, mistakenly) appealed to "international 
law" to uphold their right to restore full independence, annulled by the Russian/Soviet invasion, 
the only practical option for the Abkhaz was to appeal to Moscow and the Soviet past before 
1931.  In saying this I am not repeating the one-sided (and humiliating) version promoted by 
many Georgians – that Abkhaz separatists are puppets of the Kremlin and have no agenda of 
their own; but the reality is that when formulating their demands the Abkhaz had to estimate in 
what circumstances they would have the greatest chances of support from Moscow.
As a result, the positive part of the Abkhaz political project changed with the circumstances, 
though two underlying ideas remained constant: 1. guarantees of security for the Abkhaz as an 
ethnic community – thereby preventing the Shapsugh and Ubykh scenario; 2. as much inde-
pendence from the arch-enemy (Georgia) as possible. Different versions of how to achieve this 
goal might have been: a) having equal status with Georgia within the Soviet Union – which of 
course meant separation from Georgia; b) joining the Russian federation with the same status as 
Abkhazia had in Georgia; c) full independence; d) federal/confederal relations based on an equal 
treaty with Georgia, which would in fact mean something very close to independence. The first 
option is no longer feasible, while the other three are still being discussed within Abkhazia and in 
negotiations led by the Sukhumi government.
The role of chief political patron/ally is, logically, filled by Russia. This alliance is a  purely 
pragmatic one, based on common interests: in so far as both see Georgian nationalists as the 
enemy, they have a  reason for coordinating their actions. The Russians can use the Abkhaz 
against the Tbilisi government, while the Abkhaz do not have a wide choice of powerful allies 
other than anti-Georgian forces in Moscow. This is not a sentimental alliance, of course, and the 
Abkhaz  can  hardly  forget  their  experience of  Mokhajirstvo (which  they  cannot  blame  on 
Georgians) or the tragic story of the Ubykhs and Shapsugs (nor did the more recent experience of 
the Chechen war do much to strengthen their trust in Russia). It has become quite evident to the 
Abkhaz that Russia is simply making use of them without being in any way committed to their 
security.  The  sentimental  allies  are  the  blood  brethren  in  the  Northern  Caucasus:  ethno-
linguistically related peoples who showed their solidarity by actually spilling blood in the war of 
1992-93. These two alliances, however, contradict each other and often put the Abkhaz in an 
awkward situation. During the meetings of the "Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples", 
while everybody else was involved in intense Russia-bashing, the Abkhaz had to say that Russia 
was not as bad as all that and was sometimes "constructive". Since the Chechen Republic is now 
seeking active cooperation with Georgia and Chechen officials often publicly denounce Chechen 
participation in the war with Georgia as a  "mistake", it  is becoming evident that  pragmatic 
considerations  have  to  take  precedence over  a  sentimental  vision  of  pan-Caucasian  ethnic 
solidarity. This means that as long as confrontation with Georgia continues, the Abkhaz still have 
no allies to rely on besides Russia.
The Abkhaz also have a dual cultural orientation. Their awareness of kinship with the Circassian 
peoples is the natural place for the Abkhaz to locate their cultural identity within the Caucasian 
realm. However, despite the undoubted popularity of the concept of a common Caucasian culture 
(and "Caucasian Home"), so far nobody has conceptualized this common-ness in a way that 
would make it fit into the modern world. "Caucasian-ness" is intuitively associated with ancient 
traditions of hospitality, highly ritualistic behaviour and a machistic glorification of militancy – 
something which has few chances of surviving the erosive forces of modernization. The Chechens 
have increasingly turned to Islam –  but  this is  unlikely to happen with the Abkhaz: ethnic 
Abkhaz include both Christians and Muslims, and most are hardly religious at all. Recently, an 
Abkhaz newspaper reported that the curriculum of the first private Abkhaz school in the capital, 
Sukhumi, would include a new subject: Christian ethics,12 something scarcely compatible with a 
Muslim-oriented culture. Abkhazia was very much Russified when in the Soviet Union: Russian 
was the lingua franca for its multiethnic population, and the domination of the Russian language 
was exacerbated by the fact that it was one of the most popular resort areas in the former Soviet 
Union. The Abkhaz elites are very Russified linguistically and, despite recent disappointments, 
culturally they remain very firmly oriented towards Russia (in contrast to the Chechens).
The attitude to political models and ideologies is also contingent on the political situation. In the 
final years of the Soviet Union, the Abkhaz sided with non-democratic forces standing for the 
preservation of the unified state. When Georgian troops entered Abkhazia in August 1992, they 
destroyed not only symbols of separate Abkhaz statehood, but statues of Lenin as well. Later, too, 
the Abkhaz tended to look for allies among Russian neo-Communists and nationalists. This does 
not mean that the Abkhaz are by nature less inclined to democracy than the Georgians. It just so 
happens that  anti-democrats in Russia  are more anti-Georgian (and hence pro-Abkhaz) than 
democrats. Many democratically-minded Russians also empathize emotionally with the Abkhaz 
cause but, as a  political force, the Russian democrats (or "so-called democrats") still tend to 
respect Georgia's independence and territorial integrity more than their opponents.
While not as politically ambitious as the Georgian variety (that is, it does not insist on full inde-
pendence), Abkhaz nationalism seems to be stronger and more intense. This is probably due to 
the fact that the Abkhaz face – or believe they are facing – physical extinction. While Georgians 
have a recent record of fighting not only with the Abkhaz and Ossetes, but also with each other, 
the Abkhaz have so far succeeded in keeping their political differences hidden (in the face of the 
"common enemy"). While Georgians have had their moments of weakness, and in the wake of 
12 "Private Schools Should Exist", Respublika Abkhazia, 15-17 January 1997, p. 3.
losing the war in 1993 were close to giving up their independence (in return for favours from 
Russia), the Abkhaz have so far expressed much greater firmness in their stand.
Possible Scenarios for Conflict Development
I have taken all this time to describe both parties' different ways of viewing the political status of 
Abkhazia because I wanted to demonstrate two points. First, I wanted to show why it was that, 
once the cultural  and political elites of both peoples felt free to express their visions (which 
started to happen around 1988), they would inevitably clash, and since it was these political 
visions of sovereignty that commanded human minds, there were grounds for a serious conflict. 
On the other hand, however, I do not think that this conflict was doomed to have the bloody 
consequences it did.
The conflict was unavoidable because each side had a radically different answer to the funda-
mental question: "What is Abkhazia?" For the Georgians, the answer was clear: "Abkhazia is 
Georgia". This was a slogan carried by demonstrators in March and April of 1989 when, for the 
first time during perestroika, the issue of Abkhazia became the subject of mass politics. It meant: 
"Abkhazia is an inseparable part of Georgia, just like any other historical Georgian province – 
Kakhety, Imerety, Samegrelo, etc." For the Abkhaz side it was equally clear that this answer was 
wrong. "Abkhazia is Abkhazia" – this is how Stanislav Lakoba, of the secessionist fraction of the 
Abkhazian parliament, entitled one of his articles published in the West.13 It should be pointed out 
that, during the war, this was not the only Abkhaz answer: another influential representative of 
the Abkhaz nationalist movement, Zurab Achba, published an article in the Russian press entitled 
"Abkhazia is Russia". This was a clear attempt to attract Russian support and it may not have 
expressed the true feelings of the Abkhaz, but still,  it  was possible for a  prominent Abkhaz 
nationalist to say this in print. At any rate, the bottom line was the same in both cases: "Abkhazia 
is not Georgia". This was a fundamental conflict, and though one could fantasize about how the 
history  of  Georgia  or  the  Caucasus  might  have  developed  were  it  not  for  the  Russian 
involvement,  at  the  time  the  problem could  not  be  explained  away  simply  as  a  Kremlin 
conspiracy, or even as a  clash between the selfish Georgian and Abkhaz "ethnocracies". The 
conflict was between the views of the overwhelming majority of Georgians and Abkhaz. It was 
the kind of issue on which it would be very difficult to reach a compromise. It was enough for the 
radicals on both sides to make the self-fulfilling prophecy that the problem could only be solved 
by bringing the prevailing power (Russian, Georgian or whatever) into the equation, rather than 
through agreement and compromise.
Still, I believe that if my above description of national projects is correct there was considerable 
space for compromise. Yes, the Abkhaz saw the Georgians as enemy number one. But they were 
not insisting on full independence. The basic Abkhaz concern was their fear of extinction as a 
separate ethnic community (the "Ubykh scenario"). Georgians could have taken this as a starting 
point in their attitude. A large majority of the Georgian elite recognizes the "autochthonous" 
status of the Abkhaz on their territory (a very powerful category in Caucasian politics – however 
illiberal and "non-constructivist" this may sound to many outsiders): it is widely accepted that the 
Abkhaz are the only ethnic group in Georgia (save for the Georgians themselves) who have no 
other homeland, so that it  is legitimate for them to have some sort of special territorial  and 
political arrangement which would guarantee the preservation of their identity. As I said, the 
constitution of the independent Georgia, adopted in 1921, also provided for that status. In the 
middle of the recent war, the Georgian parliament adopted a law which proclaimed the Abkhaz 
13 Central Asian Survey, vol. 14, no. 1, 1995, pp. 97-105.
language to be the second state language on the territory of Abkhazia, and future new immigrants 
were to be given the option of studying either Georgian or Abkhaz in order to obtain citizenship.
Presumably, this contradicts a "pure" idea of the nation-state: if the Abkhaz are a separate nation, 
why not let them have their own independent nation-state? If Abkhazia is a legitimate part of 
Georgia, how come the Abkhaz are non-Georgians? Georgians usually appeal to the above-
mentioned age-old tradition of political and cultural unity, and to the fact that ethnic Georgians 
have always lived in Abkhazia alongside the Abkhaz. Of course there were more radical anti-
Abkhaz sentiments as well, including calls for abolishing Abkhaz autonomy, but never – even 
during the war – did they become official policy.14 To account for this inconsistency – and justify 
more radical  claims –  a  different theory was invoked, based on the work  of the Georgian 
historian Pavle Ingoroqua.  According to this theory, the "real" or  historical  Abkhaz were a 
Georgian tribe, while in the 17th and 18th centuries Adighean tribes (known to themselves as the 
Apsua) resettled from the North Caucasus, assimilated the "real" Abkhaz and stole their name. 
This theory was never shared by the majority of Georgian historians, but in the course of the 
conflict it was widely propagated by such radical nationalist leaders as Akaki Bakradze, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia and others. The theory made everything very simple: as Gamsakhurdia said at 
rallies, the Abkhaz claims to self-determination were justified, but the territory was wrong: let 
them  return  to  the  North  Caucasus  and  we  will  support  their  struggle  there  (as,  later, 
Gamsakhurdia actually did support the Chechen bid for self-determination). In this way, the very 
existence of the Abkhaz autonomy was delegitimized.
This approach was frequently repeated by radical leaders and was often presented by the Abkhaz 
elites as the only Georgian position. Many Georgian leaders, however, did not take this attitude 
too seriously themselves, but thought it wise to adopt it in order to counter the claims made by 
the Abkhaz radicals. Gamsakhurdia himself frequently adjusted his assessment of Abkhaz history 
to the changing political situation.
On the Abkhaz side, strong anti-Georgian feelings certainly constituted a very important factor. 
But since they were mostly rooted in the recollection of the recent Soviet past, there was always a 
possibility of convincing the Abkhaz (however difficult this might be) that Stalin and Beria's 
policy had nothing to do with the will of the Georgian people. Anti-Georgian feelings among the 
Abkhaz were not countered by proportionate anti-Abkhaz feelings among Georgians, because the 
role of enemy had been taken by Russia, and Georgians felt threatened not by the Abkhaz per se, 
but by the prospect of the Abkhaz issue being used against them by Russia. Fewer than 100,000 
ethnic Abkhaz could not on their own be considered a serious security threat to Georgia (at least, 
this was what Georgians thought), and introducing particular arrangements guaranteeing special 
rights for the Abkhaz as an  ethnic community,  as well as corresponding political  status for 
Abkhazia as a territory – with the Abkhaz giving up their pro-Russian tendencies in return – 
would be quite acceptable to the Georgian public. It  would probably cause some discontent 
among  ethnic  Georgians  living  in  Abkhazia,  but  a  clear  and  firm  stance  by  the  Tbilisi 
government could take care of that.
Georgian willingness to accept special status and privileges for the Abkhaz was influenced by the 
fact that, in the Soviet Union, Abkhazian autonomy in practice meant not "Abkhazianization" but 
Russification. There was no conflict between the Abkhaz and Georgian languages in Abkhazia, it 
14 "The Georgian government and public have never questioned the status of Abkhazia. I am declaring this to 
everybody, to the whole world, to the Abkhaz: extensive autonomy will be guaranteed, the rights of every 
Abkhaz will be guaranteed" – Eduard Shevardnadze's speech to the joint sitting of the Defence Council and 
Council of Ministers of Abkhazia on 6 July 1993, Sakartvelos Respublika, 8 July 1993. One can argue that 
part  of the Georgian public  did  question  Abkhaz autonomy and that  some government officials  (such as 
Minister of Defence Kitovani) denounced autonomy in personal interviews, but in principle Shevardnadze's 
assertion (and many more statements like this may be quoted) is correct.
was  Georgian  and  Russian  that  were  really  competing.  In  the  late  seventies,  the  Abkhaz 
university was opened in Sukhumi in response to Abkhaz demands, with Abkhaz and Georgian 
departments. The Abkhaz department, however, was really a Russian-language university (save 
for a few courses in humanities), while the Georgian department was Georgian-language. Not 
much Abkhaz was taught in secondary schools or other colleges either. Thus, to the extent that 
Georgians saw the problem in the context of relations with Russia, the "Abkhazianization of 
Abkhazia" – in so far as it would reduce the cultural predominance of Russian – would be an 
acceptable scenario to moderate nationalists.
There were projects to help the Abkhaz "Abkhazianize" by translating and publishing Abkhaz-
language textbooks, etc. The more radically anti-Georgian Abkhaz saw in this a Georgian trick 
to alienate the Abkhaz from their Russian allies. With some reason, probably – but in that case, 
what was the real Abkhaz project? Of course, the Abkhaz were free to choose Russification as 
their national project, but then all the talk about their fear of an "Ubykh scenario" would lose 
credibility. The Georgians did seem to have a point here.
On the Abkhaz side, this compromise would have been difficult to accept, since the image of 
"Georgian imperialism" seemed deep-rooted enough. Certain tensions would have run for a long 
time. But,  however much the Abkhaz might have resented the fact of Georgian plurality on 
Abkhaz territory as a result of the Georgian "imperial policy", it was now a reality they would 
have had to accept. It was not difficult to calculate that relying too much on Russian help was not 
necessarily wise. And, if the real issue was to obtain guarantees that a separate Abkhaz ethnic 
identity would be preserved, then the Georgian argument that the Abkhaz would hardly be safer 
as part of Russia than part of Georgia was quite plausible: the fate of the Abkhaz' ethnic brethren 
in the northern Caucasus, as well as the fate of the Abkhaz themselves in the 19th century, were 
all too obvious evidence of this. Of course, there were many symbolical issues related to words: 
the  Abkhaz  happened  to  hate  the  word  "autonomy",  and  the  Georgians  found  it  hard  to 
comprehend how a "republic" could contain another "republic". But a certain amount of political 
cunning could have helped overcome these obstacles, so that a face-saving compromise could still 
have been achieved without any unravelling of the basics of each side's national project. It would 
not have been easy, and even in the best possible conditions it would probably have taken a long 
time to arrive at some kind of "finally acceptable" model – but interim solutions in the course of 
negotiations could  have  been even more  important,  because  they  would  have  stressed the 
possibility of a compromise between both parties.
Of course, this imagined scenario would have required a very big and problematic "if": the as-
sumption of prudence, patience, rationality and sensitivity on the part of those directly involved 
in the conflict. The powerful third party (the Soviet "Centre", later Russia) would also have had 
to refrain obligingly from any attempt to manipulate the conflict in its own (real or imagined) 
interest. None of these preconditions was present, however. Indeed, it would require explanation 
if the new players, freshly emerging from political  nothingness, actually had displayed such 
qualities.
Why the War?
I emphasize these factors to make my main point: the emergence of nationalism – that is, the idea 
of the nation-state – as the universal model of state-building, is in general responsible for the 
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. But why this conflict eventually led to ethnic violence is a different 
story, and one that requires different explananda.
These explanatory factors may be divided into two major categories: one set may be grouped 
under the heading of "political immaturity" or "lack of political skills"; the other would come 
under "specific circumstances". I will start with some of the features under the first heading (in a 
list which makes no claim to being exhaustive):
1. Giving precedence to ethno-historical rather than democratic legitimacy. Both sides sin-
cerely believed in the fairness of their respective claims, founding them on their visions of 
history (which I have tried to outline roughly above). Although ethno-demographic changes 
had occurred following "illegitimate" acts of conquest or imperial conspiracy, the interests of 
the real people who might be living on a specific territory as a result of this policy, but who 
could not be held responsible for it, were easily discounted. This was the Georgian attitude to 
the Ossetians, who, thanks to the Soviet policy, had become a majority in the South Ossetian 
Autonomous Oblast, and especially its capital Tskhinvali. The Abkhaz viewed the Georgians 
living in Abkhazia in the same way. The Abkhaz problem has become an issue of mass 
politics in Georgia since February 1989, when the ethnic Abkhaz population of Abkhazia 
gathered in the village of Lykhny to declare their demand for separation from Georgia and 
inclusion in the Russian federation. It was taken for granted that the wish of the Abkhaz 
ethnic community could be presented as the wish of Abkhazia because, whatever the current 
ethno-demographic situation, the historical  rights of the Abkhaz community should take 
precedence over the will of the total population of the territory called "Abkhazia". Later, the 
Abkhaz leaders started to emphasize the multi-ethnic character of their national movement, 
but  in  reality  this  multi-ethnicism  was  a  (reasonably  successful)  attempt  to  forge  an 
"everybody against the Georgians" coalition.
Of course, Georgian nationalists, especially in Gamsakhurdia's era, were not exactly sensitive 
to minority issues either. According to many accounts, "Georgia for the Georgians" was 
Gamsakhurdia's slogan, though this in fact is not true – I personally never saw this kind of 
slogan at his rallies, nor have I seen anybody quoting any source on this – but it probably did 
express his true attitude. It  is easy to find plenty of downright racist quotations from the 
Georgian press of that period. The difference here, however, is that at least Georgian na-
tionalists could refer to the democratic legitimacy of majority rule in this case, which the 
Abkhaz could not.
2. The revolutionary, confrontational mood of early nationalistic movements. In its style, the 
Georgian nationalist movement was probably the most radical in the former Soviet Union, at 
least among the movements at Union Republic level. This radicalism was targeted primarily 
against  the  imperial  "centre",  not  ethnic  minorities.  It  implied  a  symbolic  rejection  of 
cooperation with the "occupying forces", and hence a refusal to take part in the "Soviet" 
elections. "Compromise", and even more so "concession", or  even "realism",  were dirty 
words, semantically associated with "cowardice" at  best,  at  worst  with "betrayal".  Even 
though some Georgian nationalists did want to cut deals with rebellious minorities, they 
found it difficult to overcome this attitude and sell any compromise solutions to their sup-
porters. Nor were the Abkhaz immune from this glorification of radicalism.
3. Simplistic approach: single enemy image as the exclusive point of reference. The world 
view professed by mass nationalism on its heroic-revolutionary stage is usually very simple: 
everything is reduced to the confrontation "our enemy versus us". For Georgians, therefore, 
the Abkhaz problem did not exist in its own right: it was merely a corollary to the problem 
"Empire vs. Georgia". Whenever the Abkhaz raised any claims that were not acceptable, they 
were to be treated merely as puppets willing to be manipulated by the Russians. The fact that 
the Abkhaz did in fact seek an alliance with Russia lent credibility to this image. But it would 
have been in the Georgian interest to win over or "seduce" the Abkhaz by proposing them a 
better  deal,  rather  than  portraying their  claims as  inspired by Russia  in  the first  place. 
However, the art of political seduction was not something the Georgian radicals had mastered 
– or even thought it necessary to learn. Many Abkhaz, in turn, seemed blinded by the single 
enemy image of "Georgian imperialism" or "Georgian fascism" and made little effort to look 
beyond it.
4. Lack of will to take responsibility for the problem, expressing itself in appeals to the third  
party. Simplistic images of the world promoted by radical nationalist ideologues are the re-
sult not only of their simple-mindedness, but of their reluctance to take responsibility for real 
problems. Using the Russian conspiracy theory to explain away the very existence of the 
Abkhaz problem and portraying Abkhaz nationalists as nothing more than Russian puppets 
was a  way of avoiding reality.  But,  for  obvious reasons, the refusal  to  face a  problem 
dramatically  reduces the  chances of  solving it.  After  the end of the  war,  the  Georgian 
government changed its policy, trying to deal with the Abkhaz problem through cooperation 
with Russia; this in principle implied greater political pragmatism (the necessity to reach 
some compromise  with  the  Russian  power  was  acknowledged),  but  the  old  pattern  of 
avoiding the problem still continued. The deal with Russia, as seen by the ruling part of the 
Georgian political elite, may be summarized as follows: we will accept the disgrace of giving 
up  substantial  elements of  our  sovereignty,  but  you  solve  the  Abkhaz  problem for  us. 
Georgians did not seem to think too much about how, specifically, this would happen: if the 
Russians were able to create the mess in the first place, they should know how to clean it up.
The Abkhaz did not have the luxury of blaming the Georgian problem on somebody else: 
"Georgian fascism" was an evil in itself and they had to deal with it. But they also found it 
difficult to accept that they had to deal with it on their own. Many steps taken by the Abkhaz 
government,  especially  before the  war,  were  reckless and  obviously  provocative  to  the 
Georgians, and it is hard to imagine that they would have been able to take them without the 
hope of Russian help.15 Arguably, their gamble paid off, but there were no guarantees of this 
in the beginning, even though what was at  stake was the very physical existence of the 
Abkhaz nation.
5. Anti-political mood and lack of confidence. This factor may be regarded as the base from 
which all the above may be deduced – though it is not easy sum it up briefly. While express-
ing their readiness to fight and make sacrifices in order to achieve independence, Georgians 
were at the same time deeply sceptical about government (even if it was their own). An anti-
political attitude is hardly confined to the Caucasus, and it is far beyond the scope of this 
paper to judge how much this is the Zeitgeist of our times or how much the alienation of the 
people from politics is the legacy of Communist totalitarianism. It is clear, though, that recent 
Georgian history presents numerous examples of this trend. In the military domain, it was 
expressed by the total inability to build a viable regular army, so that the outcome of the war 
–  and the fate of the country –  depended on the enthusiasm and political preferences of 
irregular voluntary groups, which it was hardly possible to control. With an "army" like this, 
any military operation would soon degenerate into a spree of abuse, looting and also ethnic 
violence – as was the case in many post-Communist countries.
The deficit of political confidence stemming from lack of experience in managing one's own 
affairs is another possible explanation for the same phenomenon. The Georgians were fervent 
nationalists, but at the same time not overly confident in their ability to build a state and pursue 
their objectives through consistent political work oriented towards long-term objectives. This 
lack of confidence showed itself, especially at the first stage of the independence movement, in 
the propensity to impulsive and theatrical actions rather than systematic efforts. In this, Georgia 
presents a stark contrast to the Baltic states, whose people showed a much greater capacity for 
organization and orderly political  action. A higher political  culture  in  a  normative sense – 
15 Actions  by the  Abkhaz  government  are  described  in  Svetlana  Chervonnaya,  Conflict  in  the  Caucasus:  
Georgia, Abkhazia and the Russian Shadow, Somerset, Gothic Image Publications, 1994.
whether to be explained by different civic culture in general or by the more recent experience of 
political independence – may account for the success of Baltic political elites in preventing their 
"ethnic conflicts" with the Russian population from degenerating into violence.
It must be pointed out that, under traditions and circumstances which foster anti-political sen-
timents, the smaller group in the conflict –  which feels that  its very existence is threatened 
(Abkhaz, Chechens, Kosovo Albanians, etc.) –  has paradoxical advantages: in the absence of 
state-political traditions and the respect for formal order and discipline that comes with them, 
ethnic solidarity and a siege mentality fill the gap.
Nevertheless, these factors, based on the communist legacy or political culture, should not be 
treated as constants. On both sides, neither the political elite nor the public was fully devoid of 
common sense, and they could also learn from political experience. Georgian nationalists un-
derstood quite clearly from the very beginning that internal conflicts in Georgia diminished the 
chances of their movement in its fight with Moscow for independence, and at least some factions 
within it tried to avoid direct confrontation with minority separatist movements and/or tried to 
find some compromise with them – albeit not always skilfully enough. Some politicians, like 
Gamsakhurdia, willingly played the ethnic card because it brought political dividends. But other 
leaders sharply criticized him for  that  and  even pointed to  his  methods of  arousing ethnic 
sentiments as proof that he was a "Moscow agent".
But  when the same Gamsakhurdia  actually became leader of Georgia, he grew much more 
pragmatic. Shortly before the elections of 1990 he even reversed his demand for the abolition of 
the South Ossetian Autonomy, although (unlike in the case of Abkhazia) most of the Georgian 
public did not regard this autonomy as legitimate. Here it proved to be too late: the Ossetians 
held elections just a few days after the Georgian ones and proclaimed their independence, so 
Gamsakhurdia  could  think  of  nothing  better  than  to  abolish  Ossetian  autonomy,  thereby 
exacerbating hostilities in the region. But with Abkhazia he was much more cautious. Once in 
power, he never questioned the Abkhaz right to autonomy and, in 1991, actually did reach a 
compromise with the Abkhaz leaders, making concessions which were quite substantial from the 
Georgian perspective. This agreement was based on an electoral law which introduced de facto 
ethnic quotas. The Abkhaz ethnic community (17% of the population) received 28 seats in the 
65-seat  Abkhaz  parliament,  while  ethnic  Georgians  (46%)  took  26  seats.  The  rest  of  the 
population, i.e., 37%, were represented by the 11 remaining seats only. A two-thirds majority 
was required for making decisions on constitutional issues, which meant that agreement between 
the two communities was necessary. This system was introduced for the parliamentary elections 
in the autumn of 1992.
This agreement later proved not to work, and was hardly viable in the long run. In Georgian 
society especially, it was later very strongly criticized as an "apartheid law". But the fact was that 
the Georgians and the Abkhaz, represented by such strongly nationalist leaders as Gamsakhurdia 
and Ardzinba, did reach this compromise, and they did so without any direct external pressure or 
third-party mediators (perhaps it was precisely the mess in Moscow after the August putsch that 
allowed them to do this). The agreement was based on exactly the same political principles as the 
ones outlined above: the Abkhazian side agreed to have its fate resolved within the framework of 
the Georgian state, while Tbilisi recognized the special rights of the Abkhaz as the only ethnic 
minority in Georgia that was "autochthonous" and had no other homeland elsewhere. Nobody 
was completely happy about the arrangement, but this can be said of all political compromises. 
The ethnic Georgian community in Abkhazia had a particularly strong reason to be unhappy as 
they were under-represented.
If Abkhazia, with its ethnic demography of 1991, had been a really independent country, this 
Lebanese-type arrangement would probably have led sooner or later to a similar conflict between 
ethnic communities seeking a re-distribution of quotas for government office. But Abkhazia was 
not, and in the event of "normal" developments in Georgia proper, there would have been no need 
to unravel this agreement. The central  government in Tbilisi,  which had a  clear  interest in 
stability in one of its provinces and in legitimizing the agreement it had itself signed, could have 
played the game of limiting the discontent of the ethnic Georgian community in Abkhazia, 
thereby eventually gaining greater trust from the ethnic Abkhaz community. Once the first tide of 
particularly intense nationalism were over, the government would have been able to afford this 
kind of game.
To be sure, this rosy scenario can no longer be checked (while this author is exposed to possible 
accusations  of  "unscientific"  fantasizing).  Objections  may  be  raised  that  the  fragile  1991 
agreement was doomed to end in a bloody clash anyway. Although not a fan of political ar-
rangements based on  ethnic  quotas,  I  still  think  that  the  symbolism of having reached an 
agreement was in itself very important, and could provide a solid basis for further work – though 
this would be difficult work. But the reality was that the developments in Georgia were far from 
"normal" (and this was what I meant by "special political circumstances"). As a result of the 
December-January coup of 1991-92 the authoritarian, allegedly mentally unstable and obviously 
politically incapable President Gamsakhurdia was deposed by a strange coalition of nationalist 
military insurgents, liberal democrats and Communist nomenklatura. This led to a long period of 
political uncertainty and disorder in the country. A couple of month after the coup, the former 
Communist  leader  of  Georgia  and  former  foreign  minister  of  the  Soviet  Union,  Eduard 
Shevardnadze, was invited to help put Georgia straight. He was reasonably successful, but it took 
a good deal of time and, amongst other things, it cost him Abkhazia.
Whatever the reasons for the Georgian turmoil,16 it endangered the volatile political balance in 
Abkhazia as well as in relations between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. There were several reasons for 
and aspects to this:
1. The new Georgian authorities had no interest in promoting the legitimacy of the Geor-
gian-Abkhaz agreement reached by Gamsakhurdia. The delegitimization of Gamsakhurdia 
was the most urgent political task facing the new authorities, and since the ousted president 
was  accusing Shevardnadze of  being Moscow's man,  Shevardnadze's supporters  had  to 
counter these accusations by showing that it was Gamsakhurdia who was not really ardent 
enough about safeguarding Georgian national interests. The Georgian-Abkhaz agreement, 
which discriminated against ethnic Georgians on the "apartheid" basis, was the obvious tar-
get. It was not officially said that the agreement should not actually be honoured, and the new 
government was not at all more anti-Abkhaz or anti-minority than the previous one (quite the 
reverse, it also accused Gamsakhurdia of "parochial fascism" and wanted its minority policy 
to be much more liberal and citizenship-oriented), but the criticism of the agreement in fact 
eroded the basis of its legitimacy.
2. While Gamsakhurdia's credibility as a nationalist leader had allowed him to make con-
cessions such as those in the Abkhaz case, the legitimacy of the new Georgian authorities  
was founded on a much narrower base, especially before new elections were held in Octo-
ber 1992. Moreover, though Shevardnadze was the national leader, he did not really control 
the government or, especially, the armed formations. So the new government could not make 
any important decisions on Abkhazia, much less reach important compromises, as it was 
afraid of jeopardizing the fragile pro-Shevardnadze coalition.
3. Most of the ethnic Georgian population in Abkhazia supported Gamsakhurdia rather than  
Shevardnadze. Moreover, several districts adjacent to Abkhazia were actually controlled by 
pro-Gamsakhurdia groups openly hostile to the new government (the population of these 
districts, as well as most ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia, are Megrelians, which is a distinct 
16 In this context, see my "Georgia's Identity Crisis", Journal of Democracy, 1995/1, pp. 104-116.
sub-ethnic group in Georgia to which Gamsakhurdia also belonged and which was more 
supportive of him). This, naturally, seriously diminished the chances the Tbilisi government 
had of making an impact on Abkhazia and, on the contrary, gave the ethnic Abkhaz faction in 
the Abkhaz government more room to manoeuvre. The Georgian faction in the parliament, 
though for the most part loyal to Tbilisi, was also confused and did not know how to deal 
with the situation. The Abkhazian parliament divided into two factions, pro-Abkhaz and pro-
Georgian (34 and 31 MPs respectively, after the third-party deputies chose to join one of the 
two ethnic factions), each one unwilling to cooperate.
4. The open  challenge  to  the  Georgian-Abkhaz  agreement  came,  however,  not  from the  
Georgian but from the Abkhaz side. Apparently, the ethnic Abkhaz faction of the Abkhazian 
leadership, under Ardzinba, saw a window of opportunity in the breakdown of authority and 
legitimacy in Georgia.  Georgia  was weak  and divided, its new government lacked both 
popular  and formal legitimacy, and Abkhazia was separated from the territory under the 
control of the Georgian authorities by what the Abkhaz strategists called the "Megrelian 
pillow" (regions controlled by pro-Gamsakhurdia forces). They also felt that they had to seize 
their chance while they had it, because the situation in Georgia could eventually improve. 
The ethnic Abkhaz faction, with its small majority, decided to forget the agreement and 
ignore the ethnic Georgian faction in the Abkhaz parliament altogether (the latter's leadership 
displayed no political skills and could not think of anything better to do than to boycott 
sessions – but it did not have too many options anyway). The ethnic Georgian Minister of the 
Interior was forcibly removed from office and replaced by an ethnic Abkhaz (the distribution 
of major positions in the executive had also been part of the agreement). In July came the 
most provocative decision: the ethnic Abkhaz faction of Abkhazian parliament, using its slim 
majority, restored a 1925 constitution for Abkhazia, according to which it was not part of 
Georgia (the text adopted was actually a draft that had been rejected in 1925, but this is a 
detail). The legal pretext for this was the fact that in February 1992 the Georgian Military 
Council formally restored the powers granted under the 1921 constitution, thereby allegedly 
abolishing Abkhaz autonomy. The decision taken by the Georgian military authorities was 
certainly not very far-sighted: it  was designed to appease radical  nationalist groups who 
wanted symbolically to emphasize legal continuity with the Georgian Republic of 1918-21, 
but this constitution did also make provision for Abkhaz autonomy. The declaration by the 
Military Council also stipulated that the 1921 Constitution was reinvoked "without changing 
existing borders or territorial/administrative arrangements (the status of the Abkhazian and 
Ajarian autonomous Republics)". In any case, by taking this step the ethnic Abkhaz faction 
brought on the final collapse of the Georgian-Abkhaz agreement of 1991,  the essence of 
which was that the Abkhazian parliament could make no constitutional changes by a simple 
majority,  i.e.,  without  the  consent  of  the  two  communal  factions  (the  arcane  Abkhaz 
justification for this step was that it was only adopting a new constitution, not restoring the 
old one, that called for a two-thirds majority).
This open rebuttal of the 1991 agreement by the ethnic Abkhaz faction implied a de facto res-
toration of the concept that the historical right of the ethnic Abkhaz community took precedence 
over the democratic rights of the current Abkhaz population. It amounted to a latent declaration 
of war on the Georgian community in Abkhazia and on Tbilisi, and significantly strengthened the 
position of those factions in the Georgian leadership who believed that military methods were 
best in dealing with Ardzinba. This is not to imply that starting the war was a good idea on the 
Georgian side, but simply that an extremely dangerous gamble by Ardzinba's government lent an 
important element of legitimacy to the Georgian military effort.
To what extent can one say that Ardzinba deliberately tried to provoke a violent reaction from 
the Georgian side? One can find some logic to such provocation if it is remembered that the pre-
war ethnic and demographic situation in Abkhazia  –  i.e.,  the fact  that  the ethnic Georgian 
population outnumbered the Abkhaz by about two and a half  to one – was something that 
concerned Abkhaz nationalists more than anything else, and was considered to be the most 
dangerous legacy of "Georgian imperialism". War was the only way to change that.  If post-
communist ethnic wars are about ethnic cleansing, then in this case it was the Abkhaz side that 
needed it (in the South Ossetian case, according to the same logic, it was the Georgian side that 
needed the change in the ethno-demographic balance, and hence had a vested interest in starting 
the war). An assurance of military help from Russia would make the project look promising. If 
Ardzinba really believed that the Georgians were as inherently genocidal a  tribe as he often 
portrays them, then living together with the Georgian plurality was certainly a bleak perspective 
for his people. This makes a desperate gamble, which would bring neither final victory nor final 
destruction, psychologically understandable.
However, a  really confident answer to  this  question would require  a  much more thorough 
knowledge of the situation in Abkhazia and the mood of the Abkhaz leadership before the war. 
My preliminary hypothesis is based on my observation of other post-communist leaders: a clear 
and coherent calculation of different possible scenarios resulting from their actions is not one of 
their more striking characteristics. The theory of rational choice is not necessarily applicable 
here. The crisis in Georgia may have created a mood of "now or never" among the ethnic Abkhaz 
leadership, and their actions seem to have been quite compatible with this mood. Instinctively, 
they may have been driven to the violent outcome, which is not the same as saying that they had 
a clear and coldly calculated plan to provoke a war.
The War and its Results
How and why the war in Abkhazia started in August 1992 and why it ended the way it did in 
September 1993 is a big topic which has many political and military aspects. Many events are 
hidden and a number of mysteries may remain unsolved for a long time to come, if not for ever. I 
will only share observations on some key points.
The  beginning  of  the  war is  one of them. According to  the official  Georgian version, the 
Georgian troops entered Abkhazia to guard highways and railways, but since they met with 
resistance from the Abkhaz militia, which was an illegal armed formation, it was natural that the 
government troops should try to suppress this resistance and also depose those who inspired it – 
the separatist Abkhaz government led by Ardzinba. Even if this official reason for the military 
operation was just a  pretext, it  was a  pretty good pretext: the situation on the railways and 
highways really was desperate, owing to subversive activities by pro-Gamsakhurdia guerrillas, 
and since some of them also operated on the territory of Abkhazia the military operation had to 
comprise Abkhazia as well.
The question is,  however, what  one is to  understand by the "Georgian government" or  the 
"Georgian army", and who really controlled what. The real decision-making body in Georgia at 
that time was the four-member "Presidium of the State Council", consisting of Shevardnadze, two 
warlords (Kitovani and Ioseliani) and Prime Minister Sigua, who routinely sided with Kitovani. 
We are unlikely ever to find out exactly what happened at those meetings – and whether or not 
the  actions  of  specific  leaders  followed  collective  decisions  taken  there.  Shevardnadze's 
supporters always maintained in private that he really did not want this war, that it was the result 
of unauthorized actions by Kitovani, which he later had to legitimize. Shevardnadze's public 
speeches are not always models of lucidity and consistency but, especially since Kitovani and 
later  Ioseliani were removed from power and eventually put  in  jail,  the Georgian president 
retrospectively tends to attribute to them the responsibility for starting the Abkhaz war.
There are serious reasons to believe that Shevardnadze did not want the war to start. He is an 
extremely able political schemer, but strategic military planning is hardly his strong point, as was 
revealed during the war. The war situation strengthened the warlords, thereby diminishing his 
personal power. He put the war in South Ossetia to an end as soon as the level of his limited 
power allowed him to do so (in July 1992) – thereby creating almost open discontent among 
some military leaders. During the Abkhaz war, he pushed for cease-fires and agreements even 
though they later proved to be militarily disastrous for the Georgian side. Some neutral observers 
who saw him in the early days of the war testify that he was personally devastated.
This seems to be contradicted by the fact that on the eve of the Georgian military operation 
Shevardnadze went on Georgian television to announce the plan. Of course, he only spoke about 
guarding highways and railways, which was a perfectly constitutional matter, and his threats 
could have been interpreted as being aimed at the Zviadists (Gamsakhurdia's supporters) rather 
than  the  Ardzinba government.  But  he  certainly  understood that  military  resistance by the 
Abkhaz was quite possible. He claimed that the plan for the Georgian military operation had 
been cleared with  Ardzinba,  which the  latter  denies (again,  who can  check?),  but  even if 
Ardzinba had accepted the plan, how could he be trusted? And, on the other hand, how could his 
own warlords be trusted?
I can only build a hypothesis based on the general situation at the time and on my understanding 
of Shevardnadze's character and priorities. His attitude was really ambivalent. He did not want a 
war in Abkhazia, but he was in a desperate situation in western Georgia where Zviadist militias 
humiliated the government, virtually controlled the railway and had taken several high-ranking 
officials from Tbilisi  as  hostages, with no prospect of improvement in  sight.  He had to  do 
something resolute about it. And he was also under strong pressure from the military leaders, 
who were  demanding firm action  against  the  Zviadists  (who also  operated  on  part  of  the 
Abkhazian territory).  At some point, he yielded to this pressure, and he probably had some 
promise from the military that they would not become involved in direct hostilities with Ardzinba 
and his forces. It might have been reckless to believe this promise, but it was hardly in his power 
to stop them if both military leaders supported the military action. The only other option would 
have been resignation – which would have been a noble but extremely irresponsible act at that 
point.
Once the military operation started, he lost all control over it, at least for a period. Later, how-
ever, he tried to regain control and stopped Georgian troops from attempting to take Gudauta, 
where Ardzinba's government had taken refuge. Later, Kitovani, the head of the military op-
eration, openly complained that "the parties" (his euphemism for civilian politicians supporting 
Shevardnadze) "tied his hands" and would not let him march on Gudauta. Shevardnadze had two 
different explanations for why he prevented this: first he referred to humanitarian considerations, 
because if troops occupied Gudauta, the region most densely populated with ethnic Abkhaz, it 
would indeed be a  humanitarian  disaster.  Apart  from that,  he also understood that,  even if 
Gudauta were taken, there would be continuous guerrilla warfare which he wanted to avoid, and 
at the time he may have believed (erroneously) that some kind of deal with the more moderate 
Abkhaz leaders was still  possible.  The  second explanation is  simpler:  the Russian  military 
detachment stationed in Gudauta openly threatened Shevardnadze that they would stop Georgian 
troops, and Shevardnadze backed off. These two explanations are not mutually exclusive.
Of course, once the war was under way, Shevardnadze tried at least to take advantage of the 
situation in his fight against the "Zviadists". His success in this was only partial: Megrelian re-
gions too far away for Shevardnadze's propaganda to reach still supported Gamsakhurdia, al-
though when Georgian television broadcast  meetings of North Caucasian  leaders discussing 
giving military help to the Abkhaz against the Georgians, with Gamsakhurdia taking part in the 
discussion, viewers naturally did start to question Gamsakhurdia's patriotism.
Shevardnadze's ambivalent attitude towards the war continued throughout it and constituted, I 
think, one of the  reasons for Georgia's military defeat. The Georgian leader displayed great 
personal audacity in showing up at the most dangerous spots and gaining popularity among the 
soldiers. He probably did what he believed was best for what he repeatedly called a "dignified 
end to the war". But he also saw that the war situation was strengthening the warlords, thus 
endangering not only his own personal position, but also prospects for enforcing law and order in 
the country. It is debatable whether or not he was actually afraid of strengthening the army, but 
the fact is he did not try too hard to mobilize the country's resources to that end. On the other 
hand he, like most Georgians, believed that the war was really with Russia, and he reiterated that 
its fate would be decided in Moscow. Hence he did not really believe in Georgian military efforts 
because he did not believe that Georgia could win the war with Russia: the war in Chechnya had 
not yet happened, and a – partly irrational – awe of Russian military power was still intact. He 
saw the war effort as doomed and wanted to pull out of it as soon as possible, though cutting 
some deal involving Russian guarantees (which is why he preferred to speak not about "victory" 
in the war, but about its "dignified ending" – whatever that meant). He wanted this so much that 
he deceived himself into signing agreements that proved disastrous for Georgia. The September 
1992 agreement with the Abkhaz brokered by Russian President Yeltsin, though it seemed to be 
so favourable to the Georgian side, ended up losing it the northern part of Abkhazia – and thus 
control over the border with Russia – while another agreement, in July 1993, resulted in the loss 
of Sukhumi and the rest of Abkhazia. With all due respect to the heroic efforts of the Abkhaz 
militias and their supporters, their two most important military successes (taking Gagra  and 
Sukhumi) only occurred after Shevardnadze had put his trust in Russian guarantees and ordered 
the withdrawal of most of the Georgian forces from those cities.
It would be unfair to put all the blame on Shevardnadze personally. The belief that the war was 
really a war with Russia was shared by the great majority of Georgians, who were also mes-
merized by Russian military power, imagining it to be infinitely superior to their own. What was 
called a Georgian army was really a bunch of self-ruled (that is, quite unruly) poetically named 
"battalions" comprising both romantic patriots and thugs, whose activities were only loosely 
coordinated, and which were sometimes capable of heroic deeds but would not carry out orders 
they did not like. Their continuous abuse of civilians (and not only Abkhaz) alienated the local 
population (Georgian included) and significantly reduced any international  support  Georgia 
might otherwise have had. But many post-communist wars are fought by spontaneously created 
militias, they are never nice and noble, and some parties are still victorious. As in most wars (the 
Russian-Chechen war is the best example), losing the war depends on losing your nerve. He who 
blinks first loses. In this war, it was the Georgians who were the first to lose their nerve.
Though the Abkhaz side was objectively in a more difficult position, especially at the beginning 
of the war, it did not blink. Although its role is often overestimated by the Georgian side, Russian 
military support did count for a great deal, but it would not have been enough on its own. The 
Abkhaz saw their very existence as a  nation at stake, and that became a basis for enormous 
consolidation. Most neutral observers with whom I have had a chance to talk agreed that the 
military detachments fighting on the Abkhaz side were much more organized and combat-ready 
than the Georgian ones. However paradoxical it may sound, even the Russian military seemed to 
be more motivated when they fought for the Abkhaz than when they fought in Chechnya.
Something should be added here on the public attitude to the war. Unlike the situation in the 
Russo-Chechen war – when a substantial part of the Russian public did not support the war and 
after the defeat would probably agree to getting rid of Chechnya altogether – for the Georgian 
public fighting a war to retain Abkhazia as part of Georgia was clearly a legitimate exercise in 
itself, and efforts to regain Abkhazia continue to be an important item on the national political 
agenda. This difference may be explained by the fact that popular attachment to Chechnya as 
Russian territory is not much – if at all – stronger in Russia than was the attachment to Estonia or 
Georgia ("if we gave up Estonia and Georgia, why can we not give up Chechnya?"), whereas the 
Georgian public regarded Abkhazia as an "inalienable" part of Georgia for which it would only 
be natural to fight. Few liberal-pacifist voices were audible.
The only significant opposition to war came from the supporters of the ousted President Gam-
sakhurdia, for whom Shevardnadze was a Russian agent and the war a  Russian provocation 
aimed at taking Abkhazia away from Georgia (the results of the war quite reassured them in their 
belief). These same people, though, ardently supported the war and later opposed the peace in 
South Ossetia (because the war was started under Gamsakhurdia and stopped by Shevardnadze), 
and  would  probably  have  endorsed  a  military  operation  in  Abkhazia  if  it  had  been 
Gamsakhurdia's idea.
While the legitimacy of the war in principle was very rarely questioned, its  expediency was, 
especially down the road and, naturally, after the defeat: yes, in principle it was right to fight the 
war for what it considered to be a inalienable part of Georgia, but was it necessary? Was it not a 
miscalculation?   Most  people  now believe  it  was  a  mistake,  but  this  was  not  so  at  the
outset.
Whether people actually wanted to go to war and fight is a different matter altogether. As I said, 
most of the ethnic Georgian population of Abkhazia supported Gamsakhurdia and thus did not 
believe in the war. This led to the paradoxical situation where those Georgians for whom most 
was at stake and who had to fight for their own homes (and actually lost everything as a result of 
the war) did not want to fight at all. Here, Gamsakhurdia's propaganda worked too: as many 
refugees later  testified, he sent  a  message that,  following his agreement with Ardzinba,  his 
supporters would not be touched. To the majority of those people who did fight, the territorial 
integrity of Georgia was a matter more of political principle than personal interest. But, because 
of the anti-political mood described above, moral obligations imposed by nationalism did not 
translate into the specific duty of military service. Many young Georgians were responding to a 
romantic patriotic urge in going to war in the first place, but they considered that whether to go 
and stay was a  matter of personal choice rather than obligation. In practice, loyalty to their 
friends and particular commanders mattered much more than abstract patriotic duty. An attempt 
to build military detachments through a regular draft brought almost no success. Moreover, the 
ambiguous and half-hearted attitude of the Georgian government itself (which I tried to explain 
above) did little to boost patriotic enthusiasm. Many fighters questioned: is this war real? Does 
our government really want us to win it? (This was often reported by the Georgian media, and I 
was involved in such conversations myself.)
I have much less information to enable me to judge about the Abkhaz side, but it seems that the 
level of consolidation in Abkhaz society precluded any discussion on the legitimacy of the war. 
Ardzinba's leadership portrayed it as a war for the physical survival of the Abkhaz nation, which 
ruled out any chance of taking an ambiguous stand. It is widely known that at the beginning of it, 
however, ethnic Georgian and Abkhaz communities living in the same or adjacent villages made 
a kind of "separate pact": this war was started by politicians who have disagreements with each 
other, they said, but we have lived peacefully together for a long time and we should not take part 
in it. As the war continued, though, and mutual atrocities or rumours of atrocities increased, these 
kinds of pacts fell apart. A large number of Abkhaz left (mostly for Russia), but one can only 
guess as to whether they simply fled for their lives or whether a disagreement with Ardzinba's 
radicalism was involved (I am not familiar with any attempts to research this).
The main result of the war was not just the fact that the Georgian army was defeated and driven 
out of Abkhazia. The dramatic change in the ethno-demographic balance was an even more 
important  outcome.  Although  a  very  small  number  of  Georgians  stayed  behind  (mostly 
Gamsakhurdia's supporters), this was a politically insignificant amount. More than two hundred 
thousand Georgians were driven out. Statistics on both sides are quite unreliable and it is not 
completely clear whether the ethnic Abkhaz are now a majority in Abkhazia or not, but the ethnic 
element that was considered to be the most dangerous is not there any more (except in the Gali 
district in the south, but this area is quite isolated from the rest of Abkhazia).
Russian Involvement
This is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Obviously, careful 
analysis should find a middle ground between the extremes of explaining away all the problems 
of the Caucasus by a malevolent Russian conspiracy, and saying that the Russian impact on 
South Caucasian matters was only marginal, or even stabilizing. But where exactly does this 
middle ground lie?
One can say for sure that Russia has been, and still is, the Abkhaz' most important (though not 
necessarily most reliable) ally in this conflict. Although the Abkhaz may be far from happy with 
Russia's behaviour at particular times, they do not have any other politically important ally to 
turn to. So, even after the CIS agreed in March 1997 to change the mandate of the Russian 
(formally CIS)  peace-keepers in  the conflict zone, contrary to Abkhaz demands (this could 
obviously not have been done without Russian consent), Ardzinba still had to reiterate that he 
accepted Russia as the chief peace-keeper and agreed that Russia should continue its mission 
(presumably, within the old mandate).
The real question is, what are the Russian motives and what kind of support do they have. I will 
begin by repeating a now almost commonplace phrase, that Russia has no coherent policy in the 
Caucasus.17 In part, this is due to the fact that there is no single centre in the Russian government 
that could define Russian policy in this region (as it is often said, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Ministry of Defence have different agendas, while economic interest groups such as those 
represented by people like Chernomyrdin or Berezovski have other interests again, etc.).18 On the 
other hand, it must be admitted that Russia faces objective difficulties and challenges in the 
region which in fact account for its controversial and contradictory policy there.
Where there is no coherent and rational policy, however, instinct takes over, and instinctual 
behaviour may be quite consistent in its own way. In relation to the Caucasus, the Russian in-
stinct was to retain as much power and influence as possible and the military presence was be-
lieved to be the major means of doing this. It was correctly assumed by Russian strategists that, if 
Russia's southern neighbours – Georgia and Azerbaijan – were allowed to have their own way, 
they would try and conduct an independent foreign policy and look for alternative partners and 
alliances rather than choosing an exclusive partnership with Russia. Georgia usually looks to the 
West, while Azerbaijan saw its independence as a chance to establish a close partnership with 
17 This is usually admitted by most Russian scholars. See, for instance, Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Security In-
terests and Policies in the Caucasus Region", in: Bruno Coppieters (ed.) Contested Borders in the Caucasus, 
Brussels, VUBPRESS, 1996, pp. 91-102.
18 "Indeed, at the beginning of 1997 there appeared to be at least six key actors in the Russian foreign policy-
making process: 1. Yeltsin himself and the extensive presidential apparatus; 2. the Foreign Ministry led by 
Primakov; 3. Lukoil, Transneft, Gasprom and other energy conglomerates linked to Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin; 4. the Defence Ministry led by Igor Rodionov; 5. the Atomic Energy Ministry led by Viktor 
Mikhailov; 6. the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations led by Oleg Davydov, and the Rosvooruzheniye 
state-owned arms exporting company which is subordinate to the ministry." Robert O. Freedman, "Russian 
Policy-Making and Caspian Sea Oil", Analysis of Current Events, vol. 9, no. 2, February 1997, p. 6. The list 
of agencies may vary from one expert to another (why not add, for instance, the Border Troops Department led 
by Gen. Nikolayev?) and their weight changes over time, but  the assessment that  a single foreign policy-
making centre is lacking is universally shared by experts on Russia.
Turkey, but also with Western oil companies. How could Russia counter these tendencies? It was 
too  weak  and  internally  divided itself  to  become a  strong point  of  attraction  for  its  new 
neighbours ("near abroad"), or at least it did not believe in its ability to become such a magnet 
without some kind of military pressure. The most efficient way to maintain influence in the 
Caucasus appeared to be through the manipulation of ongoing conflicts there, so this became the 
main direction taken by its policy in the region. The only way to stop these countries from 
drifting away was by exacerbating their internal difficulties: being weak and divided, they would 
have much less real ability to resist Russian influence.
The main material  expression of this influence was seen predominantly in Russia's military 
presence there. It is also widely known that the military were extremely influential in defining 
Russian policy in the "near  abroad"; in  the first few years after the break-up of the Soviet
Union, a  de facto division of labour was established: the Foreign Ministry would deal with the 
"real" abroad, while relations with the countries of the former Soviet Union would be taken care 
of chiefly by the Ministry of Defence. Many Russian civilian politicians, not necessarily of the 
extreme nationalist variety, also shared this attitude to the Caucasus.19
On the other hand, however, Russia had more "real", rational interests as well. The North Cau-
casus is part of Russia, for which maintaining stability in this region was and is a vital necessity. 
The Chechen problem was already there, and in 1992 there were serious fears in Russia that the 
Chechen precedent could have a domino effect leading to a further disintegration of the country. 
In this context, instability in the South Caucasus, particularly in Georgia, was not necessarily in 
Russia's best interests. The Abkhazian problem was legally analogous to the Chechen case, and 
supporting separatist tendencies in Abkhazia was not a  logical thing for the Russians to do. 
Violence in the South Caucasus could have a spillover effect in Russia, at least in the form of a 
flood of refugees. There was also a contradiction between geopolitical and economic interests, 
which fully manifested itself in relation to the problem of Azerbaijani oil: while the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs  tried  to  prevent  Azerbaijan  from extracting oil  from the  Caspian  (through 
challenging the legal status of the Caspian Sea and not recognizing Azerbaijan's right to control 
its off-shore oil-fields), business circles politically represented by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 
looked for their share in the oil business (later, shares were acquired by the Lukoil company). 
But in relation to the Abkhazian problem, this kind of contradiction did not play much of a role – 
the Abkhazian region was economically less important.
The war phase of the conflict in Abkhazia also coincided with a sharp polarization within Rus-
sian political  forces between the "democrats" led by President Yeltsin and the neo-commu-
nists/nationalists ("red-brown coalition") who vehemently opposed him. The conflict in Abkhazia 
became one of the arenas in which these two forces came face to face. In general, Yeltsin's side 
tended to  support  Shevardnadze's government,  that  is,  they recognized Georgia's  territorial 
integrity, at least in principle; the communists/nationalists, in turn, openly supported the Abkhaz 
and issued appeals to Russia to annex Abkhazia. In his turn, throughout the war Shevardnadze 
emphasized  the  difference between  "democratic"  and  "reactionary"  Russia  and  used  every 
opportunity to express his support for Yeltsin.
The line dividing "democratic" from "reactionary" Russia, however, was not as hard and fast as 
Shevardnadze would have liked it to be. Minister of Defence Grachev was Yeltsin's man, but by 
and large the Russian military sided with the Abkhaz. Obviously, good relations with his own 
military was much more precious to Yeltsin than the support of Shevardnadze or Georgia's 
territorial integrity (whatever the repercussions for Chechnya), so he would not risk his own 
19 A liberal member of  the Russian Duma said in an interview with us in 1994 that the overwhelming majority 
of the Duma committee on relations with the CIS countries believed that Georgia should be kept weak and 
divided in order for Russia to dominate it. The Chairman of this committee, Konstantin Zatulin, publicly said 
that "Georgia should become our satellite or die".
position by restraining the military too much. And since keeping the South Caucasus under 
control was considered to be an important priority across the political spectrum, there was no pro-
Georgian consensus within the government either. The Russian political elite did not take the 
Georgian state seriously, so they found it difficult to put the Abkhaz and Chechen problems on 
the same level: Russia, they believed, would eventually resolve the Chechen problem without 
much effort, so why not manipulate the Abkhaz conflict in order to restrain Georgia? They would 
probably not have supported open military intervention in Georgia and were not happy about 
their  own military  showing too  much  independence from the  civilian  government,  but  the 
independence-minded stance taken by Georgia, which did not even want to join the CIS, was 
vexing for them too. At the same time, a number of liberal politicians and intellectuals (such as 
Galina Starovoitova and Yelena Bonner) considered Georgia to be a "small empire" and chose to 
support Abkhazia on moral grounds. If Russia let Georgia go, they argued, why should not 
Georgia let Abkhazia go as well?
One more "objective" reason why the Russian government was reluctant  to  stop support to 
Abkhazia  was the fear  of alienating other  North Caucasian  autonomies. Paradoxically (and 
maybe unexpectedly for the Russian politicians themselves), the crisis in Abkhazia helped redi-
rect the growing energy of nationalist sentiment in the North Caucasus which could otherwise 
have exploded in Russia's face (or so Russia feared). The leader of the Confederation of the 
Peoples of the Caucasus, Musa Shanibov, openly threatened the Russian authorities that, if they 
supported Georgia in the war against Abkhazia, the North Caucasian republics would follow the 
Chechen lead and seek independence from Russia.
So, while the nationalist/communist opposition backed the Abkhaz openly and consistently, the 
government and their supporters in the democratic camp were much less coherent. In practice this 
meant that Yeltsin did little to try and keep his military in Abkhazia in check, while occasionally 
reiterating general political support for the "territorial integrity of Georgia". The obvious fact that 
both sides in the Abkhaz war (as well as all the sides in all Caucasian wars) were supplied with 
arms from the Russian military can be explained by the fact that the Russians wanted to keep the 
war going, that they could not stop the lucrative arms trade which enriched their military, that 
different political or military groups supported different parties, or that the Russian government 
could not make up its mind whom to support and changed its attitude from time to time. None of 
these explanations contradicts any of the others.
The Russian attitude to Abkhazia may be considered a particular instance of its attempts to use 
internal conflicts in its "near abroad" to its own advantage. But there were some specific reasons 
as well. Abkhazia was one of the most popular resort areas in the former Soviet Union, so many 
Russians, especially in the elite, had personal sentimental recollections of it. This made the idea 
of annexing Abkhazia to Russia, or at least maintaining Russian control over Abkhazia in some 
form, especially attractive and meaningful. Moreover, some representatives of the Russian elite – 
including some generals, and various Russian agencies – owned property there, which created 
specific economic interests. And the Russian military's personal hatred of Shevardnadze for his 
role in dismantling the Soviet Empire is a specific – but possibly a quite important – motive.20
20 In his interview with Moscow News, Sergey Leonenko, a retired officer of the Russian army who fought in 
Abkhazia, listed hatred of Shevardnadze as the number one reason why the Russian military (meaning regular 
forces deployed in Abkhazia) support the Abkhaz. He also said that the Russian military believed that by 
supporting the Abkhaz they were promoting Russia's national interests. When asked about specific forms of 
support, he said he could not say everything because there was an official order to stay neutral, but he admit-
ted that  they could always get from the Russian army a "fully detailed plan of combat operations". "The 
success of the Abkhaz army confirms this," he continued. "But the battle for Sukhumi will be prolonged, 
because the army lacks people who are capable of properly carrying out those plans. Now it is our urgent task 
to  fill  positions  on the management level, predominantly at the expense of retired Russian officers." "Za 
Pravoye Delo?", 18 July 1993.
How decisive for the Abkhaz victory was Russian military and economic support? The answer to 
this question requires greater military expertise and, in any case, any assessment would be hard to 
verify. Since the Chechens defeated the Russians on their own, it has become more conceivable in 
principle that the Abkhaz could also beat the Georgians without any help, especially bearing in 
mind what has been said above about how disorganized the Georgian troops were and how their 
political leadership lacked unity and confidence. However, the help – and considerable help it 
was too – was there. Without claiming to give any final answer, I will just make several points:
1. The Chechens did indeed shatter the myth of the invincibility of the Russian army in the 
Caucasus. But during the Abkhaz war this myth was still very much alive. The very fact that 
Russian officers (whether retired or not) fought on the Abkhaz side, and Russian planes 
shelled  Georgian  positions  and  civilians  (and  these  two  facts  can  hardly  be  disputed) 
significantly eroded the morale of the Georgian army and convinced the political leadership 
that the war was unwinnable.
2. It is true that, overall, both sides fought with Russian arms, but it is also evident that the 
Russian military empathized with the Abkhaz rather than the Georgians. This suggests that 
the Abkhaz would have got preferential treatment when it came to arms supplies. In so far as 
arms supplies were politically dictated, Russia could supply the Georgians with enough arms 
to keep the war going and weaken Georgia still further, but never enough to actually win.
3. It should not be assumed that the military prowess of the Chechens may be transferred to the 
Abkhaz. The Chechens are a mountainous people with very strong military traditions, which 
is not true of the Abkhaz. The latter are largely urbanized, and a widespread involvement in 
the tourist industry hardly develops military skills.
4. I  have already made a  paradoxical  assertion: that  the morale of the Russian military in 
Abkhazia seemed to be higher, perhaps even considerably higher, than in Chechnya. Many of 
those Russians who actually took part in combat operations were retired officers, people with 
high qualifications, in contrast to the inexperienced youngsters who did not know why they 
were in Chechnya. Financial interest was evidently part of their motivation, but as far as one 
can judge from their interviews in the Russian media, idealistic considerations also played a 
major role. All of them believed they were fighting for Russia's national interests and were 
taking revenge on Shevardnadze, who had betrayed these interests (Shevardnadze was a 
much more obvious target of their anger than people like Dudaev or Maskhadov); while at 
the same time fighting together with the "oppressed" Abkhaz against "Georgian imperialism" 
relieved them of any imperial guilt. The logistical and material support provided by regular 
Russian detachments, combined with this professionalism and strong motivation, was capable 
of making an important difference.
5. Russian support was a great boost to Abkhaz confidence, not only during the war but also 
before and after it. A big question (to which, of course, we will never know the answer) is: 
would Ardzinba have conducted the same risky and confrontational policy before the war 
without the hope of Russian support? The hope that Russian nationalists and communists – 
who were much friendlier towards the Abkhaz, at least while in opposition – would come to 
power in Moscow made the Abkhaz government much less likely to accept any compromises 
after the war.
The Current Situation and Prospects for a Settlement
The humiliating defeat in the war – which was primarily considered to be a defeat at the hands of 
Russia –  made Georgia dramatically change its stance in relation to its northern neighbour. 
Joining the CIS was now perceived by Georgians to be a symbol of capitulation, of the disinte-
gration of the national project (we can say with hindsight that this was a gross overestimation of 
the  significance of  the  CIS,  but  symbols  have  always  played  extremely  important  role  in 
Georgian politics). In return, the people expected to be rewarded for this act of capitulation by 
peace, stability, better living conditions and a solution to the Abkhazian problem that would be in 
their favour.
Initially, Georgia did benefit from this step: the Zviadist insurrection in western Georgia was 
swiftly and relatively painlessly defeated, and this marked a return to greater stabilization. The 
Russian military barely took part in the hostilities, but their show of support for Shevardnadze's 
government was enough to  guarantee it  a  sweeping victory.  Such a  simple solution to  the 
Zviadist problem, which had been haunting the new authorities for almost two years, looked like 
a  miracle –  and created an expectation of further miracles. Getting a  chance to reverse the 
military defeat in Abkhazia was one of the major hopes – or illusions – of the new policy. This 
reversal would take the shape of a  deal known informally as "bases for Abkhazia". Georgia 
agreed to legitimize the Russian military presence in Georgia in three forms: 1. as peace-keepers 
in Abkhazia; 2. as border troops on the Georgian border with Turkey; 3. in several military bases 
deployed in different parts of Georgia. As compensation, Georgia expected Russia to "return 
Abkhazia", that is, to help Georgia restore  de facto control over the breakaway region. This 
provision was never written into any official agreement, of course, although the version of the 
agreement on Russian bases initialled by defence ministers in spring 1995 included an appendix 
saying that  the treaty would not be valid until  the restoration of Georgian jurisdiction over 
Abkhazia. This phrase was no longer there when Shevardnadze signed an agreement in October 
later  the  same year,  but  he  has  reiterated  in  public  many  times that  recovering Georgian 
territorial integrity is implied in it (the treaty still has to be ratified). Nor was it spelled out in any 
detail just how the actual restoration of Georgian control would take place, but the mass return of 
refugees under the protection of the Russian army was assumed to be the first step. Russian 
Defence Minister Grachev made informal and sweeping promises in front of witnesses.21 On 
several  occasions there  were  serious  expectations,  shared  by people  close to  the  Georgian 
government, that  "something" was about  to start.  The last  diplomatic victory scored by the 
Georgian side was at the March 1997 CIS summit, when the area of the peacekeeping operation 
was extended deeper into Abkhazia, so that the conditions for the return of Georgian refugees at 
least  to  the southern part  of Abkhazia  could be secured.  The Abkhaz leadership, however, 
rejected the new mandate –  changed without  their  consent –  and threatened to demand the 
withdrawal  of  the  Russian  troops altogether.  As a  result,  by the  end of  May nothing had 
happened beyond consultations on how to implement the results of the CIS summit.
And nothing ever did happen. The Russian attitude continues to be ambiguous. It seems obvious 
that,  for  Russia,  supporting Abkhazia  was just  an  instrument  to  punish –  and  influence – 
Georgia; now that Georgia had agreed to be influenced, why not reward her by reversing this 
support? This is logical, but too simple. The experience of the last three years has shown that 
Russia is really neither willing nor able to change the situation dramatically. First, attempting to 
change something would involve much greater effort and risk than it would like – or could afford 
– to take. Second, Russia is reluctant to help Georgia resolve the Abkhaz issue because it is 
afraid of losing leverage. Russian politicians think – correctly – that Georgia will never agree to 
be in the zone of exclusive Russian geostrategic domination unless strong enough pressure is 
exerted at all times. Keeping the Abkhaz issue unresolved seems to be the only way of  keeping 
Georgia more or less in check. With regard to the Abkhaz, although they have no alternative but 
to seek Russian help, they are not Russia's puppets either, and purely political or economic 
pressure  would  scarcely  be  sufficient  to  force  them into  a  compromise.  Since  the  war  in 
Chechnya,  even the  most  naively pro-Russian  Georgian  politicians understand that  spilling 
21 On this, see Ghia Nodia, 'Waiting for the Russian Bear', in: War Report, June 1995, no. 34, pp. 39-40.
Russian blood in Abkhazia for the sake of legitimizing Russian bases in Akhalkalaki or Batumi 
is inconceivable (and without spilling blood, dramatic change is unlikely to be achieved). An-
other type of "final solution" – annexing Abkhazia to Russia – can only seem a realistic option in 
the imaginations of the most extreme Russian nationalists.
In short, the current situation in the Georgian-Abkhaz crisis may be characterized as an impasse 
of volatile stability. Both Georgia and Russia persist with futile attempts to outsmart each other 
in pursuing the unattainable "Abkhazia for bases" deal (a situation increasingly reminiscent of 
the negotiations between two crooks in a popular Russian comic novel "12 Chairs": "Money first, 
then chairs" – "No, chairs first, then money"). Both of them cannot have their own way, but 
neither can give in to the other: the Georgians are afraid that Russia will lift all restrictions on 
Abkhazia and become openly pro-Abkhaz, which will make the Abkhaz even less inclined to 
compromise,  while Russia  is  afraid  that  Georgia  will  start  to  oppose the  Russian  military 
presence openly. Georgia occasionally makes noises about the military option for solving the 
Abkhaz issue being open, but is not really trying to create a viable army, and would hate to be 
involved in another uncertain adventure. Every time the mandate of  the Russian peace-keepers is 
extended (which happens twice a year), this heightens the pressure and kicks off a new round of 
fruitless negotiations. The Abkhaz have no option but to wait, worry about a possible Russo-
Georgian deal at their expense and try to enjoy their  de facto independence in the meantime. 
Nobody is happy, but nobody is terribly unhappy either, and life goes on – Georgia builds an oil 
pipeline from the Caspian, the Abkhaz have elections and state holidays, Russia signs partnership 
agreements with NATO, and things could continue in this way for a long time (the "Cyprus 
model" is a popular phrase when talking about the Abkhazian situation). Any resolute attempt by 
either of the parties to change the situation dramatically in its  favour  could undermine the 
existing – if fragile – balance and boomerang on the initiator, so everybody is cautious. The only 
people who are really unhappy are the refugees, but as we know from the Middle East and many 
other places, refugees may have to wait.
What could be the way out of the impasse? What kind of change can one think of that would be 
profound enough? To list some feasible options:
1. Dramatic change in the Russian position. Russia may accept the reality that there is no way 
of keeping Georgia and Azerbaijan within the area of exclusive Russian domination. Insisting 
on  keeping  Russian  border  guards  on  the  Georgian-Turkish  border  and  military  bases 
elsewhere is an unreasonable waste of economic resources and political capital –  both of 
which are in rather short supply. The pending reform of the Russian army requires a focusing 
of resources, which is hardly compatible with paying the Armenians and Georgians who 
comprise the bulk of the notionally "Russian" military personnel in the South Caucasus. The 
popular  Russian argument that,  were it  not for Russian military involvement, the South 
Caucasus would be in constant turmoil, thus undermining the stability of the North Caucasus, 
might have seemed plausible in 1992-93, but it is no longer. Georgia and Azerbaijan are 
unlikely to become Russia's open adversaries and try to undermine this stability: they have 
enough common interests even now, and if the Russian economy starts to pick up it will 
become an extremely strong magnet for the South Caucasus. So far, the policy based on 
military  pressure  not  only  did  not  help  Russia  to  achieve  its  objectives,  but  was 
counterproductive: Abkhazia is the best example of how Russia cut itself off from the South 
Caucasus economically. If Russia needs stability in the South Caucasus – an item on the list 
of her national interests which deserves only respect – then increasing Western involvement in 
the region has a stabilizing effect, and its expansion can only be welcome. If I were a Russian 
political strategist, I would advise President Yeltsin to start the programme for the withdrawal 
of Russian troops from the South Caucasus, starting with Georgia (the Armenians genuinely 
want the Russian troops to stay, so that is a different issue). I would say that this would make 
Georgia much friendlier towards Russia  overnight and eventually even increase Russian 
political and – even more so – economic influence. The military would not be happy, true, 
but the majority of the Russian public would support this idea.
Is this realistic? I believe what I say is rational from the position of Russian national interests. 
I am not Hegelian enough, though, to believe that whatever is reasonable will necessarily 
become real, and Russians themselves love to say that reason does not always apply to them 
("You cannot understand Russia by reason" – this phrase by the Russian poet Tiuchev is 
quoted all the time). But I can claim that this is conceivable in principle, especially if, when 
Russian foreign policy objectives are being defined, greater weight is given to economic 
considerations. What would be the repercussions of this change for the Georgian-Abkhazian 
problem? I will leave this question open for the moment, saying only that the Georgians and 
Abkhaz do not appear to have even considered this option. Both have been used to living 
within the Russian political universe for too long, so it is hard even to imagine how any 
decisions could be made that are not directly imposed by the powerful third party. But I think 
it makes a great deal of sense for both the Abkhaz and the Georgians to take this option 
seriously.
2. Closer involvement by the West and international organizations. Shevardnadze's strategy 
has always been to attract as much Western involvement as possible in the attempt to find an 
Abkhaz  settlement.  The  Abkhaz  have  been  very  suspicious  of  this,  because  the  West 
recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia and because their major allies were anti-West-
ern Russians, but this does not mean that the Abkhaz are basically ill-disposed towards the 
West. Georgia's main motivation for getting the West and international  organizations (it 
never really distinguished between the two) more closely involved was to counterbalance the 
exclusive Russian influence, and in this regard its efforts are of course understandable and 
legitimate. So far, its success has been very limited. The UN Security Council refused to 
grant the CIS (in fact Russian) peace-keepers UN status, but otherwise accepted the exclusive 
Russian participation in the peace-keeping operation, with the function of the UN military 
observers (UNOMIG) being reduced to monitoring the situation and reporting back to UN 
headquarters. Otherwise, Western involvement is confined to the humanitarian level. Nothing 
remotely reminiscent of NATO's role in the former Yugoslavia has been seen here, nor is it 
expected in the future.22
The Georgian leadership occasionally expresses the hope that, once the West is less busy with 
the former Yugoslavia, it will devote more attention and resources to solving problems in the 
Caucasus. I think that first, this is unrealistic, and second, the West's ability to solve these 
kinds of problems is also greatly overestimated.  Russia  is  hardly objective and may be 
pernicious, but at least it has real interests in the region and can be ruthless enough to enforce 
its will if it is ready and able to do so (it is often observed that the Russian language does not 
distinguish between peace-keeping and peace-making –  the literal  translation of the word 
most often used, mirotvorchestvo, is "peace-making"). Western countries, and especially the 
highly bureaucratized international organizations through which they usually prefer to work, 
do not apply real pressure unless there is a particular, and strong, interest or demonstrable 
threat to international security involved. Provided there is neither war in Abkhazia nor an 
immediate danger of its renewal, no decisive measures are imminent. The extraction and 
transportation of Caspian oil is currently the only issue that makes the Caucasus interesting to 
the rest of the world, but Abkhazia is not on any real or even projected pipeline routes.23 
Abkhazia's geographic position makes it vitally important for Russia's relations with Georgia 
22 For more on this, see: S. Neil MacFarlane, Larry Minear, and Stephen D. Schenfield,  Armed Conflict  in  
Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for In-
ternational Studies, Occasional Paper no. 21, 1996.
and with the South Caucasus in general, but only an actual renewal of war would make it 
significant for the West.
This is not to say that Western participation may not be valuable. Contacts with Westerners 
help both Georgians and Abkhaz understand what modern political thinking is about and 
shake off the illusions that  are distracting them from their  search for realistic solutions. 
Western interest in the region may be slight, but the Western interest in peace, at least, may 
be more genuine, so if the parties choose to reach a compromise they would have a better 
chance of doing so with Western mediation. But this last option would require a profound 
change in the attitudes of the parties directly involved in the conflict. The illusion that the 
West may one day come and impose a "fair" solution (whatever the definition of "fair" may 
be) can only postpone this change of attitude.
3. Changes in Georgia and Abkhazia. As I have tried to show in the previous sections, both the 
fact that the war happened, and its military outcome, were caused predominantly by internal 
Georgian turmoil. What influence can the change from turmoil to stability in Georgia proper 
have on prospects for a settlement in Abkhazia? One of the possible strategies of the Georgian 
political elite (which is rarely expressed in the form of a coherent doctrine but appears to be 
gaining influence nonetheless) is that, once Georgia picks up economically (and in 1996 its 
economic growth rate was already the highest in the CIS), and the situation in politically and 
economically  isolated Abkhazia  deteriorates,  the  Abkhaz will  be  more  likely  to  seek  a 
compromise. The Abkhaz will see more sense in being united with Georgia than in being 
dragged, kicking and screaming, into some form of federation. In the meantime, recollections 
of the cruelty of war will fade, making the reconciliation psychologically more possible.
I think this approach has many rational aspects to it. But there is a risk of overestimating 
economic factors here. The Abkhaz attempt to separate from Georgia  was not primarily 
dictated by economic considerations, and economic rationality on its own cannot reverse it. It 
is hard to imagine, realistically, the level of disorder and impoverishment of the Abkhaz 
society that  would be needed to  induce it  to  accept serious compromises. The so-called 
economic blockade was never really enforced by Russia, and presumably there will always be 
some influential forces there to help Abkhazia survive (the smallness of Abkhazia makes it 
easy).  Abkhazian land is good enough to prevent real starvation. As I  said, traditions of 
militancy are not as strong in Abkhaz as in Chechen society, a fact which, after the war, is 
purely positive: there are probably fewer chances of public order being disrupted by clashes 
between warlords. So far, at  least, nothing serious has happened. Under these conditions, 
isolation and external pressure alone may merely help Abkhaz society continue to consolidate 
itself around a more radical stance, rather than increasing its propensity to compromise.
Stabilization and growth in Georgia may give rise to a different tendency as well. Georgia 
could take the time to build up a strong army and prepare for a military revanche: an option 
sometimes referred to as  the "Croatian scenario". This trend would be quite logical  and 
should not be discounted. As I said, the majority of Georgians regard the country's territorial 
integrity as a legitimate cause in which to apply military force. It is still widely believed that, 
at the end of the day, the conflict will be solved by military means. The current political 
situation makes it  possible to create a  more regular  and disciplined army.  Provided that 
Chechnya  seeks  closer  contacts  with  Georgia  –  and  many  Chechen leaders  denounced 
23 After this paper was written, the idea emerged of putting Abkhazia on the map of oil pipeline networks – an 
issue presumably discussed during the meeting between Ardzinba and Shevardnadze in August 1997 in Tbi-
lisi. This appears to be based on the notion that there should be economic incentives for co-opting Abkhazia, 
rather than on any economic rationale for the project itself. It therefore has probably even slimmer chances of 
materializing than another idea for a "peace pipeline" – the one running through mountainous Karabagh.
Chechen participation in the war against Georgia24 –  the level of military support from the 
North Caucasians may be reduced. It seems likely that the Russians have learned their lesson 
in Chechnya and will not help the Abkhaz again. The Georgian minister for security, Shota 
Kviraia, stated in the spring of 1997 that his agencies' troops could only regain Abkhazia 
militarily.25 This may not be true (how is it possible to check without actually trying?), but it 
indicates that militancy on the Georgian side may be growing. So is pressure from the refugee 
community. Every now and then rumours spread of a coming eruption of hostilities.26
So the military option is there and the likelihood of Georgia's using it may increase. At the 
moment, however, I do not think that this likelihood is as great as it sometimes seems. The 
military coup is still a recent memory in Georgia, and Shevardnadze does not appear to be 
making a priority out of building a strong army. Keeping his minister of defence, Vardiko 
Nadibaidze, politically weak and isolated is a sign of that: nobody believes that this man can 
build a viable army, nor is he politically dangerous to anybody in his own country (least of all 
the Abkhaz, probably). Countries preparing for war do not act in this way. With the economic 
turnaround yet to prove its sustainability, most of the Georgian political or economic elite 
would hate to gamble with Georgia's future. The behaviour of Russia and its military in the 
event of a  fresh outbreak of conflict is unpredictable. The current, much more pragmatic 
political elite would start a war only if it were a safe bet. The general public, which has not 
reconciled itself to  having lost  Abkhazia,  would  probably accept  a  military  solution in 
principle, but nobody actually wants to fight in person. The period of military enthusiasm is 
over, and it has been discredited by the (disgracefully) lost war.
4. New Georgian-Abkhaz Dialogue? Since summer 1996, direct dialogue between the Geor-
gians and Abkhaz, until then virtually non-existent, seems to be intensifying. Several meet-
ings on a non-governmental level have taken place, and politicians are showing greater in-
terest in having direct contact, without Moscow's supervision. In October 1996, a confidential 
visit by the Abkhaz foreign minister, Ozgan, to Tbilisi became known to the media the next 
day  and  made  headlines,  while  in  January,  Georgian  foreign  minister  Menagharishvili 
reciprocated  by  visiting  Abkhazia.  Not  that  anything  important  was  achieved,  but  the 
tendency in itself is worth noting. I can offer no explanation for this other than that both sides 
are  pinning fewer hopes on Russia  and hence see more sense in  talking to  each other. 
Negotiations took place earlier too, of course, but that was only a politically correct ritual 
(both sides wanted to present themselves as properly peace-loving), while what mattered was 
persuading Russia to take the "right" position. Whatever the turning-point may have been 
(Georgia has had a  series of disappointments, the Abkhaz may have been counting on a 
Communist victory in the Russian elections), now neither the Abkhaz nor the Georgians are 
sure that they can reach their ends through Russia alone. Russia of course continues to be an 
important player, but at least the possibility of finding a common language should be checked 
out.
24 According to the interview with the Georgian MP Valeri Giorgobiani, even Shamil Basaev, the commander of 
the Chechen fighters in Abkhazia, says that his participation in the war was a mistake and they were deceived 
into  it  by  Russia:  "Kartvelebi  tsin  tsadit  da  chechnebi  mogqvebit  ukan,  –  atsxadebs  shamil 
basaevi" ("'Georgians, lead the way and we Chechens will follow you,' says Shamil Basayev"), Akhali Taoba, 
6 January 1997.
25 Georgian Chronicle, March 1997.
26 As recently as in April 1997, Radio Liberty expert on the Caucasus Liz Fuller was writing that "Politicians 
and political commentators in both Russia and Georgia predict that fighting between Georgia's central gov-
ernment and its breakaway Black Sea region of Abkhazia may soon break out again". Liz Fuller, 'Is Russia's 
Peacekeeping Force in Abkhazia a New Casus Belli?', RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 1, no. 21, 29 April 1997.
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The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict: In Search for Ways out
"The principle of the free self-determination of nations [is one] upon which all the  
modern  world  insists  (...)  It  is  the  principle  of  justice  to  all  peoples  and  
nationalities,  and their right  to live on equal  terms of liberty and safety with one  
another, whether they be strong or weak".
Woodrow Wilson
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the appearance on the map of 
Europe of dozens of new states marked a  transition in world history: from a  bipolar world, 
dominated by two superpowers, to a  completely new situation characterized by a substantial 
increase in the importance of internal and regional issues, including regional conflicts. In Western 
Europe, the fast-growing integration of national structures into a pan-European megastructure is 
leading to the erosion of classical notions of the state, including such sacred cows as state borders 
and state sovereignty.
But  old notions, which reflect the preceding Cold War era or even more archaic periods of 
history, still dominate major international organizations, the United Nations and the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe included. Arguably,  any true  reform of the United 
Nations, now much spoken about, should not be confined to fighting its bureaucracy and inef-
fectiveness, but – even more importantly – should get this major international organization to 
face the burning regional issues that are now to the fore in the making of the world's history. The 
UN should defend not only the interests of recognized governments, but also those of the peoples 
ruled, and sometimes oppressed, by these governments – it should become more an organization 
for peoples than for nations. Ethnic minorities should have their own place in UN structures, so 
that  their  voices are  heard when important  decisions or  resolutions that  directly affect their 
interests are being adopted. It is only because of the UN and OSCE's insensitivity to the plight of 
ethnic minorities that many of these see no other way out than to resort to violence in order to 
assert their rights and defend their interests.
It could be argued that a more principled approach by the United Nations to the conflict situa-
tions emerging in different parts of the world could, in  many cases, help to  overcome any 
deepening of these crises. Taking Georgia and Abkhazia as an example, one can ask whether it 
was normal that a country like the newly born Republic of Georgia should have been admitted to 
the UN in conditions of unresolved ethnic conflicts and civil war, simply because an allegedly 
pro-democracy leader came to rule the country after the democratically elected president had 
been deposed by a military coup. Was it normal that when in August 1992 this same leader, a 
short time after Georgia was granted UN membership, started a major military campaign against 
the small  Abkhazian republic that  was seeking more autonomy; when there were numerous 
reports  of  bloodshed and  abuses  of  basic  human  rights;  when,  in  a  televised address,  the 
commander  of  the  Georgian  forces in  Abkhazia  explicitly  threatened the  entire  Abkhazian 
population with genocide;1 when the monuments to Abkhazian culture were being desecrated and 
the National Archives and scientific establishments of Abkhazia were being burnt to ashes; when 
there were numerous appeals to the United Nations by the Abkhaz authorities and different 
international organizations and NGOs to intervene and help to stop violence – that, despite all 
this, there was no response whatsoever from the United Nations? But when Georgia began to lose 
ground in  Abkhazia  and,  sensing imminent defeat,  appealed to  the United Nations to  help 
preserve its "territorial integrity", it immediately got a  positive reaction. Is it normal that the 
United Nations resolutions should invariably use pejorative language towards Abkhazians and 
their elected authorities and, paradoxically, should treat Abkhazia as a culprit and the Tbilisi 
government, which started and waged the war, as a victim? And such an attitude is characteristic 
not  only  of  UN.  In  one of  its  resolutions,  the  European  Parliament  called  the  Abkhazian 
Government a "bandit-terrorist movement".2 This and many other instances clearly demonstrate 
the exclusively pro-government –  whatever the government –  attitude of major international 
structures, and their utter insensitivity to the voices of anyone other than recognized governments. 
It is this (in my view) outdated approach that needs to be reformed.
Self-Determination
All the UN Security Council resolutions on Georgia/Abkhazia – notorious for their one-sided 
pro-Georgian stance and harsh language towards Abkhazia – while ritualistically repeating the 
demand for respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia, leave 
out one very important element. Not a single word in these resolutions addresses the concerns of 
the Abkhazian side of the conflict or the legitimate and inalienable right of the Abkhazian people 
to self-determination.
The right to self-determination remains a burning issue for the international community, and one 
which the United Nations and OSCE are failing – or rather, are unwilling – to address properly. 
Though this principle is enshrined in the United Nations Charter (in Article 1), priority is in fact 
given to the concurring principle of territorial integrity and the inviolability of state borders. The 
history of the last decade, with the sudden and unexpected disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia, has showed 
that today this principle has only relative validity, and should be applied more to forced changes 
of the borders of one state by another state or states than to the emergence of two or more new 
states from an older one.
A number of important points emerge from this. First, whatever the apocalyptic predictions may 
be, the separation of part of a state does not necessarily lead to the annihilation of that state. It 
should be noted that despite the de facto separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, populated by 
1 The Commander-in-Chief of the Georgian forces in Abkhazia, Colonel Giorgi Karkarashvili, in an address to 
the population of Abkhazia broadcast on Sukhum television on 25 August 1992, warned that "Even if the total 
number of Georgians – 100,000 – are killed, then from your [Abkhazian] side all 97,000 will be killed", and 
he advised the Abkhazian leader V. Ardzinba "not to act in such a way that  the Abkhazian nation is  left 
without descendants" (cf. G. Amkuab, T. Illarionova,  Abxazija: Xronika neobjavlennoj vojny.  Chast' I. 14 
avgusta – 14 sentiabria 1992 goda. Moskva, 1992, p. 128). 97,000 was the approximate number of the entire 
Abkhazian population of Abkhazia. Soon after this event Karkarashvili was promoted by Shevardnadze to the 
rank of general, and later replaced Kitovani as Georgian Minister of Defence. In an interview given in the 
occupied city of Sukhum, another high-ranking Georgian official, the Minister of State for Abkhazia, Goga 
Khaindrava, told the correspondent from Le Monde Diplomatique (published in April 1993) that "there are 
only 80,000 Abkhazians, which means that we can easily and completely destroy the genetic stock of their 
nation by killing 15,000 of their youth. And we are perfectly capable of doing this."
2 "Abkhazi  [sic!]  terrorist-separatist  movement",  in  point  B  of  the  "Resolution  on  the  situation  in 
Georgia" (B3-1452, 1474, 1490, 1505 and 1516/93, November 1993).
distinctly non-Georgian and  independently minded nations,  Georgia  managed to  acquire  its 
much-needed internal coherence and enjoy the first years of a dynamic and relatively peaceful 
development. Secondly, it is sometimes more expedient to release part of a country and let it form 
an autonomy (as in the case of Gagauzia in Moldova), or even a separate state, than to engage in 
a bloody, costly and inhuman war trying to hold on at any cost to the independence-seeking 
territory, which is usually populated by a non-related people. Some analysts rightly call this latter 
phenomenon "aggressive integrationalism", a  description that  fully applies to such a  state as 
Georgia and to some other multi-ethnic states which, in the course of their history, incorporated 
or annexed territories and their indigenous populations. As noted by Gidon Gotlieb in his book 
Nation Against State, "The denial of statehood to the peoples who have engaged in a long and 
painful struggle or who continue to resist alien rule is increasingly difficult to justify even as the 
imperative of limiting the number of new states is becoming more pressing".3
While  informally  discussing these problems with  high-ranking UN officials,  the  Abkhazian 
delegation in Geneva was reminded that much bloodshed in world history had been caused by the 
striving for self-determination. At least two contrary arguments can be put forward against this 
claim, typical of the current UN attitude towards the issue of self-determination.
First, the overwhelming majority of the present UN member states came into existence precisely 
through asserting their right to self-determination, often by way of military struggle, the best-
known example being the United States of America. In more recent times, the fifteen newly 
recognized states of the former Soviet Union and the former union republics of Yugoslavia, as 
well  as  Slovakia  and  Eritrea,  emerged  as  independent  states  and  were  recognized by  the 
international community through realizing their right to self-determination, by separating from 
other  states and by changing internationally  recognized borders.  Incidentally,  most  of these 
examples show that, as such, the realization of the right to self-determination does not necessarily 
lead to violence and bloodshed, and that the "divorce" can be arranged in a peaceful and civilized 
manner.
Second, in justifying military action by the need to preserve a  country's territorial  integrity, 
aggressive integrationalism can lead to no less violence and bloodshed than is usually ascribed to 
the striving for self-determination. Examples of this abound, but the closest to my theme are the 
bloody wars waged by Georgia  against South Ossetia  and Abkhazia  and by Russia  against 
Chechnya.
In discussing the different forms of self-determination, I would like to put special emphasis on the 
cases where the competing principles of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination can 
–  though this may sound paradoxical –  coexist peacefully. This can happen when a  distinct 
territory is content to limit its claims to internal self-determination, which means the creation of a 
smaller state that maintains its internal sovereignty, or internal independence, without breaking 
away from the bigger state within whose borders it is confined. And this is exactly the case of 
Abkhazia  and Georgia.  One could discuss at  length how to  name such a  complex state:  a 
confederation, a  loose federation, or associated territories. Whatever the name, what is really 
important here is that peace is being preserved between the different ethnic components of a 
bigger state, that the borders are not violated, and the population of all parts of the formerly 
unitary state can fully enjoy the privilege of peace.
Similar federalization processes are taking place in our day in parallel with the more visible 
integration of Europe. We see the federalization of Belgium and the creation of separate Flemish 
and Wallonian parliaments, we observe the process of the devolution of power in Great Britain 
and the setting up of Scottish and Welsh parliaments, as well as the campaign for federalization 
3 G. Gotlieb, Nation Against State. A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty, New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. 19-20.
in Italy. Contrary to fears that such measures might undermine a country's stability, one can 
argue that the reverse may be true: they can actually lead to a strengthening of the country in 
question, as they allow it to avert the danger of a  destructive explosion caused by the long-
suppressed dissatisfaction of ethnic minorities or distinct territories.
Devolution of central power, shared responsibility, shared sovereignty, internal self-determina-
tion, internal sovereignty, internal self-government by smaller nations within bigger states – all 
these issues, when properly addressed, present a promising perspective for many countries that 
have, for decades, been vainly fighting the spectre of "separatism" at a cost of huge financial, 
military and human resources. Such solutions can, arguably, serve not as a destabilizing, but, on 
the contrary, as a stabilizing factor for the state in question, as they allow it to achieve a vitally 
important internal coherence between its ethnically heterogeneous components.
The Validity of Abkhazian Claims to Statehood
Before describing the situation with the Georgian-Abkhazian peace process, I would like to say a 
few words about  Abkhazians  and  their  country  simply in  order  to  make  it  clear  that  the 
Abkhazian  people  have  legitimate  grounds  for  their  claims  to  statehood  and  sovereignty. 
Abkhazians speak a language unrelated to Georgian. They have their own distinct culture and 
history. Abkhazians have never been, have never regarded themselves, and have never been 
regarded by Georgians or, for that matter, by any other people, as part of the Georgian nation. 
Apart from short intervals, they have always enjoyed independent statehood or very high levels of 
political autonomy.
The Abkhazians living in Abkhazia are predominantly (Orthodox) Christians (some 60%) or 
Sunni Moslem (some 40%).4 The majority of Moslem Abkhazians were deported by the Russian 
Tsarist  administration to  the  Ottoman Empire  in  the  second half  of the  19th  century  as  a 
punishment for their fierce resistance to the Russian occupation and colonization of Abkhazia.5 
This explains, on the one hand, the existence of quite a sizeable Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey 
4 No precise figures exist on the relative proportions of Christians, Moslems or atheists among Abkhazians 
living in Abkhazia. One may suppose that the proportion of Christians among the religious Abkhazians must 
reach 60%. My personal observations indicate that the number of believers among Abkhazian intellectuals has 
increased since the war of 1992-1993. All Abkhazian Moslems belong to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, 
while Christians  are Russian  or  (more rarely)  Eastern Orthodox.  The role  of the Abkhazian language in 
church  ceremonies  has  increased  in  recent  times.  The  major  Christian  texts  have been  translated  into 
Abkhazian since the middle of the 19th century. There is no antagonism whatsoever between Christian and 
Moslem Abkhazians and mixed marriages are very common. Abkhazia has never known any form of religious 
fanaticism, Abkhazians are very tolerant of other faiths, and, in all fairness, tend to be quite indifferent to 
matters of religion. Christian Abkhazians in general are not diligent churchgoers, and until recently those who 
regard themselves as Moslems have not had a single mosque to attend in Abkhazia. As rightly observed by 
many authors, the plain truth is that neither Christianity nor Islam forms more than a surface laid over the old 
Abkhazian paganism. Diaspora Abkhazians,  on the contrary,  are Moslems in  the true sense of the word, 
although they are not renowned for any fanaticism either.
5 The pre-emigration figure for Abkhazians was between 130,000 and 150,000, and for Abkhazo-Abazas about 
180,000 (cf. V.A. Chirikba, Common West Caucasian. The Reconstruction of its Phonological System and  
Parts of its Lexicon and Morphology. Leiden: CNWS Publications, 1996, pp. 1-3). In 1897 the first official 
all-Russia census established the presence in Abkhazia of 58,697 Abkhazians, which comprised 55.3% of 
Abkhazia's  106,000  population;  the  figures  for  other  ethnic groups  in  Abkhazia were:  25,875  Georgians 
(24.4%; these were mainly Megrelians), 6,552 Armenians (6.1%), 5,135 Russians (5.6%) and 5,393 Greeks 
(5.0%) (cf. S.Z. Lakoba (ed.), Istorija Abkhazii. Uchebnoe posobie, Gudauta: Alashara, 1993, p. 347).
and some Middle Eastern countries6 and, on the other, the fact that Abkhazians now represent 
only a minority in their own homeland.7
Contrary to the claim that  Abkhazia  has always been a  part  of Georgia,  the real  historical 
situation was quite different, because from the 13th century until 1918 Georgia as a single state 
simply did not exist. In the 8th century, Abkhazians created the Abkhazian Kingdom, which 
united in the 10th century with several Georgian kingdoms to form a united Abkhazian-Georgian 
Kingdom. In the 13th century this united kingdom was destroyed by the Mongol invasion, and 
from that time up until 1810 Abkhazia was always an independent principality, while Georgia 
disintegrated into a number of different principalities and "kingdoms", which in the 19th century 
were  incorporated,  one  after  another,  into  the  Russian  Empire.  In  1810  the  Abkhazian 
Principality, independently of Georgian lands, joined Russia. Even within Russia, the Abkhazian 
Principality under the Princes Chachba managed to maintain its political autonomy until 1864, at 
a time when all Georgian lands were reduced to mere provinces of the Russian Empire.
One often hears that autonomous status was granted to Abkhazia by the Bolsheviks, ostensibly in 
a plot to undermine Georgia's sovereignty. Again, the real situation was quite different. After the 
Russian Revolution of 1917, Abkhazia remained independent from Georgia. On 8 November 
1917 the Congress of the Abkhazian People formed the Abkhazian parliament (the "Abkhazian 
People's Council"), which adopted a "Declaration" and "Constitution". On 11 May 1918, the 
Batum Peace Conference proclaimed the Mountainous Republic, which included the whole of the 
North  Caucasus  and  Abkhazia.  That  same year,  Abkhazia  was  occupied by the  troops of 
neighbouring Georgia, who declared Abkhazia a part of Georgia and imprisoned members of the 
Abkhazian parliament, leading to protests from the command of the allied (British) forces in 
Transcaucasia and the Russian White Army. In 1921, Abkhazia and Georgia became Sovietized. 
On 31 March 1921, an independent Soviet Republic of Abkhazia was proclaimed. On 21 May 
1921, the Georgian Bolshevik government officially recognized the independence of Abkhazia. 
But  the  same year,  under  pressure  from Stalin  and  other  influential  Georgian  Bolsheviks, 
Abkhazia was forced to conclude a union (i.e., confederative) treaty with Georgia. Abkhazia still 
remained a full union republic until 1931, when its status was downgraded, under Stalin's orders, 
from that of Union Republic to that of an Autonomous Republic within Georgia. This act of 
incorporation of Abkhazia into Georgia was conducted without the approval and against the will 
6 The exact number of Abkhazians  in  Turkey is  not  known, as the official  Turkish data on minorities  are 
notoriously unreliable. Some specialists speak of more than 100,000 Abkhazians (G.A.  Dzidzariya, Macha-
dzhirstvo i problemy istorii Abkhazii XIX stoletija. Sukhumi: Alashara, 1982, p. 493), while other authors 
estimate their numbers in Turkey (together with that of the closely related Abazas) at half a million (cf. I. 
Marykhuba,  Abkhazija v sovetskuju epoxu. Abkhazskie pis'ma (1947-1989),  Sbornik dokumentov. Tom 1. 
Akua (Sukhum), 1994; P. Overeem, "Report of a UNPO coordinated human rights mission to Abkhazia and 
Georgia", in: Central Asian Survey, vol. 14, no. 1, 1995, p. 18). According to the results of my own field re-
search  in  Turkey,  there  are  no  fewer  than  250  Abkhaz-Abaza villages  in  that  country (V.A.  Chirikba, 
"Distribution of Abkhaz dialects in Turkey", in: Proceedings of the Conference dedicated to the memory of  
Tevfik Esenç, Istanbul, forthcoming). In addition, a large number of Abkhazians are now living in cities and 
towns, the most numerous communities being in Istanbul, Ankara, Duzce, Inegol, Bilecik, Eskishehir, Samsun 
and Sinop. As well as in Turkey, there are also some 5,000 Abkhazians in Syria (information from Syrian 
Abkhazians); still smaller Abkhazian communities are to be found in some other Middle Eastern countries. 
Abkhazian colonies (made up mainly of Turkish Abkhazians) exist also in many Western European countries, 
such as Germany (some 3,000), the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Britain, Switzerland and Austria. A small 
Abkhazian community in New Jersey, USA, is mostly made up of immigrants from Syria.
7 Apart from the forced emigration to Turkey, another factor responsible for the sharp decrease in the relative 
number of Abkhazians in Abkhazia was the (often forced) resettlement from Georgia to Abkhazia of tens of 
thousands of Georgians. This resettlement policy, aimed at shifting the demographic balance in Abkhazia in 
favour of ethnic Georgians, was successfully carried out by the Communist authorities of Georgia up to 1992, 
but this policy was practised on its largest scale in the 1930s and 1940s, under the rule of Stalin and Beria.
of  the  Abkhazian  people  and  caused mass protests  in  Abkhazia.  Thus  the  creation of  the 
Abkhazian Autonomous Republic within Georgia  was not the result  of the granting by the 
Bolsheviks of autonomous status to one of the republic's minorities, as it is often alleged, but was 
rather the forced convergence of two neighbouring states by the incorporation of one of them, 
Abkhazia, into the other, Georgia.
Another typical misunderstanding is that, by adopting certain constitutional acts in 1990-1992, 
the Abkhazian Republic proclaimed its independence from Georgia. In fact, Abkhazia has never 
officially declared its separation from Georgia. All acts undertaken by Abkhazia, beginning in 
1990, were designed to protect its autonomous political status, deemed necessary in view of the 
numerous statements made by leading Georgian politicians that they doubted the legal character 
of Georgia's autonomies and even threatened to abolish all of them and transform Georgia into a 
unitary state.
The Act of State Sovereignty, adopted by the Abkhazian Parliament in 1990, was to protect the 
Republic's federal status from being ignored or eliminated by the Tbilisi government. Abkhazia 
adopted this act following analogous acts adopted by all the other former autonomous republics 
of the Soviet Union, and in none of these other cases did this mean the separation of their territory 
from that of the metropolis.
By reverting in 1992  to the Constitution of Abkhazian Republic of 1925,  in which relations 
between Abkhazia and Georgia were based on a  special Treaty of Union, Abkhazia was at-
tempting to overcome a constitutional vacuum in its relations with Georgia after the abolition by 
the Georgian Military Council of all constitutional acts adopted in Georgia during Soviet times, 
and after its return to the Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1921, in which 
the autonomous status of Abkhazia was not defined. By adopting its new constitution in 1994, 
Abkhazia  broke  off  its  last  remaining  ties  with  the  old  Communist  regime,  and  declared 
Abkhazia a sovereign democratic state. This constitution did not specify the form its relations 
with Georgia should take, as these were to be defined through political talks with Georgia. Nor 
were the status of Abkhazia or its relations with Georgia specified in the new Georgian con-
stitution.
The Georgian War against Abkhazia (1992-1993)
In 1991 the Soviet Union disintegrated. In May 1991, the one who became the first president of 
an independent Georgia was the ardent nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who actually pursued 
the policy of "Georgia for the Georgians". A year later, Gamsakhurdia was deposed as a result of 
a  coup d'état organized by warlords and ex-criminals Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani. The 
former Communist boss of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, who was perceived in the West as a 
"democratic" politician during his service as the USSR's Foreign Minister, was invited to rule the 
country, although his alleged democratic credentials did not convince the Georgians or former 
autonomies within Georgia, who knew Shevardnadze all too well as a staunch Brezhnevite – one 
who, for more than 10 years, had ruled Georgia with an iron fist. As the new Georgian leadership 
declared all  laws adopted during  Soviet  times null  and  void,  the  leadership of  the  former 
Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, in order to save Abkhazia's political autonomy from being 
overridden, proposed a draft treaty whereby Georgia would become a federative state of which 
Abkhazia would be a constituent republic. The Georgian answer to this initiative was to launch a 
major military attack on Abkhazia on 14 August 1992. The Georgian leaders announced that 
there would be no autonomies in the new Georgia. To that country's great humiliation, the war 
was lost  by the  undisciplined and poorly trained Georgian army.  Most  of Abkhazia's non-
Kartvelian minorities (Armenians, Russians, Ukrainians, Greeks, Turks, etc.) allied themselves 
with the Abkhazians in their struggle against the aggressors. In addition, related peoples from the 
North Caucasian republics, notably Chechens, Circassians and Abazas, came to Abkhazia and 
fought alongside the Abkhazian forces. The war ended in late September 1993 with the decisive 
victory of the Abkhazian army and its North Caucasian allies.
The much speculated-about Russian military assistance to the Abkhazians should not be over-
estimated, as it is in practically all Georgian and many Western publications. First, there was of 
course no direct involvement by Russian troops in any Abkhazian operations (apart from the 
participation of Russian and Cossack volunteers; Georgia, in turn, was assisted by fighters from 
Western Ukraine). Despite allegations, nobody has yet produced any compelling evidence to 
prove such involvement. For example, the UNPO human rights mission that visited Tbilisi at the 
end of 1993  could not obtain from the Georgian side any reliable evidence to support such 
charges.8 One could perhaps claim that the bombardment of Georgian positions at the Gumsta 
front by Russian military planes could serve as proof. But the Russians themselves made no great 
secret of such raids, and explained that they were provoked by the Georgian artillery shelling of 
the Russian military laboratory in Eshera which caused numerous casualties, including deaths, 
among the Russian personnel. Arguably, all  warfare is a  profitable business, and the war in 
Chechnya showed that, paradoxically, some Russian elements sold weapons to the Chechen side 
in order to make a profit. In the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict too, all weapons on both sides 
were, after all, of Russian origin.
The difference was that while Georgia was getting huge amounts of weaponry and ammunition 
from the former Soviet Army free (in accordance with the CIS Tashkent Agreement, and via 
many other, non-official, channels), Abkhazia had to buy weapons from elements of the Russian 
army stationed in Abkhazia and beyond. The Russian military had no scruples about selling arms 
to  any  side,  although,  admittedly,  in  general  their  personal  sympathies  lay  more  with  the 
Abkhazians, who were fewer in number and therefore much more vulnerable. The selling of arms 
to them was regarded as a fair business, to counterbalance their numerical weakness. Besides, 
many weapons were coming to Abkhazia from or via North Caucasian sources and, probably, 
also via the diaspora.
One of the unexpected consequences of the Abkhazian victory became the mass exodus of ethnic 
Georgians (or rather Kartvelians, i.e., Georgians, Megrelians and Svans) from Abkhazia. During 
the Georgian occupation of parts of Abkhazia, many local Georgians collaborated with the troops 
sent by Tbilisi and, together with these troops, were responsible for acts of murder and other 
atrocities,  as  well  as  looting,  perpetrated  against  their  Abkhazian,  Armenian  and  Russian 
neighbours.  After  the  Abkhazian  victory,  fearing  reprisals,  the  panic-stricken  Kartvelian 
population of the republic fled en masse.
The Georgian side accuses Abkhazia of the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population of the 
republic.  In  response to  these accusations the  Abkhazian side has stated that  the Georgian 
population of the territory of Abkhazia south of Sukhum fled to Georgia and elsewhere before 
the arrival of Abkhazian troops, and that it was not the policy or intention of the Abkhazian 
government to expel Georgians or any other ethnic group from Abkhazia.
After the Abkhazian capital Sukhum was retaken by the Abkhazian troops, as a result of fierce 
fighting, there were in fact no other major battles between the Abkhazian and Georgian forces 
because the latter, demoralized by their defeat in Sukhum and by the dynamic Abkhazian army 
advance, rushed in panic (often leaving their heavy weaponry behind) towards the Georgian 
border, or to the Svanetian mountains, in exactly the same way as had already happened earlier 
in Gagra. This disorderly retreat caused, in turn, great panic amongst the local Georgian civil-
ians, who followed the fleeing Georgian soldiers en masse, with the result that when the victo-
rious Abkhazians entered the previously occupied territory of their  republic to the south of 
8 P. Overeem, op.cit., p. 138.
Sukhum, all they encountered in villages and towns were mostly deserted Georgian houses. The 
statement by the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, issued on 11 October 1993, read:
The local Georgian population, which in the course of a year-long war either witnessed or par-
ticipated in the brutal outrages of the Georgian soldiers against civilian Abkhazians, Armenians, 
Russians and Greeks (mainly old people, women and children) (...) preferred to leave Abkhazia 
for fear of acts of revenge.
A UN fact-finding mission was sent to Abkhazia by the Secretary-General in October 1993 to 
investigate human rights violations, especially the reports of ethnic cleansing. The mission was 
sent at the insistence of the Georgian side, and as a precondition to Georgian participation in 
talks in Geneva. Though in its report the mission stressed that it was not in a position to ascertain 
whether it had been a policy actively pursued by the authorities of either side, at any time, to 
clear the areas under their control of either the Abkhazian or the Georgian population, at the 
same time it clearly stated that most Georgians living in the region between the Gumsta and 
Ingur rivers had tried to flee before the arrival of the Abkhazian forces.9 Incidentally, some more 
objective Georgian authors also prefer not to exploit the controversial term "ethnic cleansing", 
speaking instead in terms of the flight of the Georgians from Abkhazia.10 However, official 
Tbilisi, which is trying to score points in its propaganda war against the Abkhazian Republic, 
continues its accusation of "the ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Georgian population of 
Abkhazia",  while at  the same time disclaiming all  responsibility for  unleashing the war  in 
Abkhazia  in August 1992  or  for the establishment of the regime of terror  on the occupied 
territory of Abkhazia.
Peace Process
The negotiations process between Georgia and Abkhazia, which started in December 1993 in 
Geneva under UN auspices and with mediation by the Russian Federation, initially produced 
promising documents, one of the most important of which was the "Declaration on measures for a 
political settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict", signed on 4 April 1994 in Moscow. The 
declaration emphasized the wish of the parties to reinstate their state-legal relations and outlined 
the contours of a future common state. According to this declaration, the Abkhazian Republic is 
to have its own constitution, parliament and government, and appropriate state symbols. The 
document  delimits  the  spheres  of  separate  and  shared  Georgian/Abkhazian  competence. 
Abkhazia is to delegate some of its state responsibilities – such as foreign policy and foreign 
economic ties,  border  guard  arrangements,  customs,  energy,  transport  and  communications, 
ecology, civil and human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities – to the common (federal) 
organs of power. All other responsibilities will remain the unique prerogative of the Abkhazian 
State. The declaration was signed by the parties to the conflict and the representatives of Russia, 
the UN and the OSCE in the presence of the Russian Foreign Minister, the UN Secretary-General 
and many Western ambassadors.
The relative stabilization of the situation in Abkhazia and the deployment of CIS peacekeeping 
troops and UN military observers on the border between Abkhazia and Georgia along the Ingur 
river allowed some 70,000 Georgian (mainly Megrelian) refugees to return to their homes in the 
Gal region of Abkhazia. These people, however, are suffering because of the destroyed economic 
9 UN Document S/26795.
10 R. Gachechiladze,  The New Georgia. Space, Society, Politics, London: UCL Press, 1995, pp. 43, 178. Ac-
cording to the Georgian State Committee for Refugees and Displaced Persons, some 160,000 refugees from 
Abkhazia have been officially registered and accommodated in 63 districts  of Georgia, cf. "The Georgian 
Chronicle", February-March 1994, as cited in A. Zverev, Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus. In: Bruno Cop-
pieters (ed.). Contested Borders in the Caucasus, Brussels: VUB University Press, 1996, pp. 13-71.
infrastructure  and  large  numbers of  landmines,  some of  which are  still  being deployed by 
subversive Georgian groups.
But the political process of the peaceful reintegration of Georgia and Abkhazia, as envisaged by 
the Declaration of 4 April 1994, was given no follow-up, and the situation took a turn for the 
worse. What happened was that Georgia, after having recuperated from the blow inflicted by 
military defeat, began revisiting the essential provisions of the Declaration of 4 April and trying 
to solve the problem of Abkhazia by separate military agreements with Russia and increased 
political pressure on Abkhazia. During the visit by the Russian Prime Minister, Chernomyrdin, to 
Tbilisi in 1995, it was agreed that Russia would help to restore Georgia's rule over Abkhazia in 
return for five Russian military bases in Georgia for a period of 25 years. These arrangements 
provoked a  strong protest  from Abkhazia.  Instead  of  trying  to  resolve its  differences with 
Abkhazia by means of mutual accommodation, Georgia, starting from the false premises that 
military intimidation and an economic blockade could force Abkhazia to give up its claim to 
sovereignty, preferred to reappear, as in the 19th century, as a major military ally and foothold 
for Russia in Transcaucasia. The UN is supporting the tough stance newly adopted by Georgia, 
blaming Abkhazia, as usual, for the breakdown in negotiations. Russian support has brought new 
optimism to Georgia that the Abkhazian problem can be solved by combined Russo-Georgian 
military action in Abkhazia. The spectre of a new war has begun to loom over the region.11
The political rapprochement between Georgia and Russia has resulted in a wholesale Russian 
blockade of Abkhazia aimed at the strangulation of Abkhazia's civilian population. Since 1995, 
Russia has established a naval and land blockade of Abkhazia, closed its borders with Abkhazia 
and refused to recognize Abkhazian passports or to allow Abkhazian citizens to travel abroad. 
Since April 1997, Russia has cut off all telephone lines connecting Abkhazia with the outside 
world, thereby establishing an information blockade of the small republic. All this raises serious 
doubts regarding Russia's capacity to act as a mediator, as such a position requires neutrality and 
a balanced approach to both sides in the conflict.
11 The dangerously increased tension  was due to  certain  declarations  made by Georgian leaders  and to  the 
actions carried out by the Russian military in Abkhazia. Thus, in an interview published in  Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta (29 June 1994), the Georgian leader Shevardnadze announced that the so-called "Council of Ministers 
of  the Autonomous Republic  of Abkhazia", based in  Tbilisi,  would soon move to  the Gal region.  In its 
statement  of  29  June,  the  Abkhazian  Supreme  Council  characterized  Shevardnadze's  declaration  as 
"provocative", and expressed deep concern about the actions of the peacekeeping force which, by permitting 
the uncontrolled mass return of refugees, had caused the destabilization of the situation in the region. On two 
occasions, around 15 May and 15 July 1995, tension in Abkhazia rose considerably owing to the statements 
issued by Georgian officials in Tbilisi, who called for the mass repatriation to Abkhazia of Georgian refugees. 
The statements made in early July by the Russian Commander of the CIS peacekeeping force, endorsing such 
an uncontrolled mass repatriation and promising the repatriates the protection of his forces, sparked sharp 
criticism from Abkhazia's officials, who declared that this could result in renewed hostilities. In the end, the 
much-heralded mass return of refugees was halted.  In September 1995 a high-ranking Russian delegation 
headed by Prime Minister  Viktor  Chernomyrdin visited Tbilisi.  On 15 September the sides  concluded a 
number of agreements, among them one on Russian military bases in Georgia, including the base in Gudauta, 
and  they declared  their  support  for  the  principle  of  territorial  integrity and  the  inviolability of  existing 
borders,  condemning "aggressive separatism and  terrorism in  any form" (cf.  S/1995/937).  The Russian-
Georgian deal on military bases and the unexpected announcement that military exercises would be carried 
out  on  30  September  1995  by  the  CIS  peacekeeping  troops,  obviously  designed  to  exert  pressure  on 
Abkhazia, prompted the Abkhazian forces to go into a state of heightened alert. It was planned to carry out the 
exercises in the Gal region of Abkhazia, in parallel with the introduction there of a CIS battalion consisting 
mainly of ethnic Georgians. Following the arrival of this battalion, it was planned that Georgian police troops 
would enter the region. These plans coincided with Shevardnadze's statement that the problem of the Gal 
region would be solved in the next few days, and that  Georgian sovereignty over this region of Abkhazia 
would be restored (cf. the statement by the Abkhazian Parliament on 4 October 1995).
The result of separate Georgian-Russian arrangements undermining Abkhazia is that the peace 
talks are nearly at a standstill, and the prospects of a peaceful settlement are as remote as they 
were at the beginning of talks in Geneva three years ago.
Possible Ways out
Despite such negative developments, I believe that the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is one of the 
most manageable among the conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and that there 
are still grounds for optimism, provided both sides can overcome sensitive psychological barriers 
and demonstrate enough political will to compromise. The recent history of Georgian-Abkhazian 
relations has shown that both parties to the conflict have insufficient strength to achieve the 
political goals they are pursuing: Georgia to overrun Abkhazia militarily and abolish its political 
autonomy, Abkhazia to gain international recognition as an independent state. This leaves the 
parties with room to compromise.
There are at  least two crucially important positions that  could lead to swift progress in the 
Georgian-Abkhazian peace process. First,  unlike the South Ossetian autonomy, Georgia  has 
never  officially  abolished  the  Abkhazian  Autonomous  Republic,  still  regarding  it  as  an 
Autonomous State. Second, unlike Chechnya in Russia, or Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Abkhazia 
has never officially declared its independence from Georgia. This means that both Georgia and 
Abkhazia still recognise, de jure and de facto, the existence of an Abkhazian State. These cru-
cially important  positions can offer quite promising prospects for an  early settlement of the 
Georgian-Abkhazian  conflict.  The  major  issue  now  is  how  exactly  to  accommodate  the 
Abkhazian Republic's sovereign status, in a  future state shared with Georgia, with Georgian 
claims to sovereignty over the whole of its territory.
The obvious diplomatic impasse in which Georgian-Abkhazian relations now find themselves 
could be neutralized in what I described above as internal self-determination. According to this 
formula, the Abkhazian Republic would remain within the internationally recognized borders of 
Georgia and would enjoy broad political autonomy, preserving its own constitution, parliament, 
government  and  state  symbols,  as  well  as  its  national  army,  while  delegating  some other 
important state functions, such as border control, customs, transport and communications, foreign 
policy, etc., to the common federative bodies: the federal parliament and government. Outside the 
competence of the federal institutions, both Georgia and Abkhazia would enjoy full sovereignty 
over their own internal affairs on the territory under the control of their own elected government 
bodies.
On 20 March 1996 tension between the Abkhazian authorities and the Russian border troops in Abkhazia 
again  rose  sharply.  A Russian  military ship,  N  040,  entered  Sukhum Bay without  permission  from the 
Abkhazian authorities  and, having arrested the Ukrainian trading ship "Vega", forced it  to  proceed to the 
nearby Russian port of Sochi. This incident, which happened during Shevardnadze's visit to Moscow, was 
supposedly meant as a pro-Georgian gesture. During Shevardnadze's visit  Russia  gave in  to  the Georgian 
demand that all foreign ships bound for Abkhazia – even those with humanitarian cargoes – would have to 
pass through customs in the Georgian port of Poti. In addition, it was decided that the Russians would forbid 
the boarding of any passengers or loading of any cargo in the port of Sukhum, which was tantamount to an 
almost  total  naval blockade of Abkhazia. In its  statement of 21 March 1996,  the Abkhazian Government 
protested against these measures, regarding them as having been taken unilaterally in the interests of Georgia 
and interfering in the internal affairs of Abkhazia. On 2 July 1996 an Abkhazian police post on the Gal canal 
was fired at with rocket-propelled grenades and small arms. At the end of September 1996, Georgia carried 
out military exercises in the vicinity of the conflict zone, contravening the cease-fire agreement of 14 May 
1994. These and some other incidents seriously aggravated the situation and led many to think there was a real 
possibility of renewed hostilities.
Such a structure will only be stable and capable of bringing about lasting peace if all parts of the 
federation are  satisfied with their  level  of sovereignty.  This  makes it  necessary to  create a 
constitutional arrangement in which Georgia, Abkhazia, Ajaria and South Ossetia enjoy equal 
political rights and are equally subordinated to the common federal legislative and executive 
structures. Within such a structure, each of the constituent republics should have a right of veto 
on decisions taken by the federal bodies that directly affect their vital interests. If the parties agree 
to make such arrangements, this will enhance their interest in common economic activity and 
cooperation,  and  will  inevitably,  within  an  estimated  period  of  five  years,  lead  to  closer 
reintegration.
There are signs that at least some international structures are ready to support such a solution to 
the problem. Thus, recently, in its Resolution of 22 April 1997, the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe stressed the importance of extensive autonomy status for Abkhazia as one 
of the basic elements of a political settlement.12 Any other arrangement, based on the principle of 
the subordination of one people to another, on the inequality of the subjects of a federation or on 
old  Soviet-style  super-centralized rule  from Tbilisi,  can  a  priori be regarded as  futile  and 
incapable of bringing lasting peace to this part of the former Soviet Empire.
International efforts can be instrumental in persuading the parties to reach a mutually accepted 
constitutional arrangement concerning the status of Abkhazia. Such concerted efforts were quite 
effective in achieving peace in Bosnia, and are now indispensable in the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process. Unfortunately, in the case of Georgia and Abkhazia all  pressure, including military 
intimidation and an inhuman economic blockade, is being put on Abkhazia. This is the wrong 
path to follow, as it was the UN, OSCE and individual governments' encouragement of Georgia 
in its uncompromising stance on political negotiations with Abkhazia that effectively brought the 
whole peace process to a halt.
This one-sided and mistaken approach should be radically changed. It is very important not to 
lose momentum and to try to revitalize the peace process now, before the current favourable 
situation changes and we become witnesses to another escalation of hostilities. It could be that 
either Georgia will start a new war against Abkhazia, or that Abkhazia, being convinced that it is 
futile to expect any equitable arrangement with Georgia, will declare its complete independence. 
These are real possibilities, which could substantially complicate the situation and diminish the 
chances of a comprehensive settlement.
Though the participation of Russia as facilitator is crucial  for the conclusion of any lasting 
agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia, there is nothing to say that the group around the 
negotiation table should not include a new member, representing a country with no direct po-
litical or economic interests in Georgia or Abkhazia. New initiatives, fresh ideas and probably 
fresh personalities are needed to push the stalemated peace process forward and to achieve, as 
speedily as possible, political arrangements that would preclude the possibility of the oppression 
of the smaller nation by the bigger one, allow thousands of refugees to return to their homes in 
safe and dignified conditions, and lay the basis for stability and progress in this part of Europe.
12 Resolution 233 (97), cf. www.coe.fr/cp/97/233a(97).htm.
Revaz Gachechiladze
Geographical Background to a Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia
Introduction
I had wished to begin the paper with the sentence: "The conflict in Abkhazia (Georgia), which 
reached its climax in the 1992-1993 civil war, is awaiting a settlement" but I realised immedi-
ately that the terminology might not match, since those involved in the conflict held a variety of 
opinions. For example, even the first line may bring a protest from a representative of the ethnic 
Abkhaz, who may not agree with the wording "Abkhazia (Georgia)" although it is present in all 
the UN Security Council resolutions on this conflict, while some would have preferred the term 
"the Georgian-Abkhazian war"  to "the civil war in Abkhazia". However, all the wars that take 
place on the territory of one state between the citizens (or, at least, permanent residents) of that 
state are in fact civil wars, irrespective of whether they are of class origin or ideological, religious 
or ethnic in nature. Since 1992 the Republic of Georgia has been recognised by the international 
community as an independent state within the borders of the Georgian SSR and received into the 
United Nations, and in addition local inhabitants of the most varied nationalities (not all, it is 
true; and that perhaps is no bad thing) were involved (without going into whether this is good or 
bad) on both sides in the military action in Abkhazia.
This was the terminology used in preparing the paper: "Georgia" means the entire state within the 
officially recognised borders, while "the rest of Georgia" means the part of Georgia without 
Abkhazia. The situation that has developed in Abkhazia since 1989 is called the "conflict", the 
war  of  1992-1993  is  called  "the  civil  war  in  Abkhazia",  the  supporters  of  the  separation 
(secession) of Abkhazia from Georgia are referred to as "secessionists" while the actual leader-
ship of the secessionists is referred to as "Sukhumi" or "the Sukhumi government", and in cor-
responding fashion the leadership of Georgia is referred to as "Tbilisi" or "the Tbilisi govern-
ment". When I refer to the opinion of "the Abkhaz" or "the Georgians" I mean the prevailing 
public opinion in the corresponding ethnic groups, while freely admitting that there are quite 
substantial groups that do not share the predominant view.
Since there was an aim for consensus from the outset,  not to  create additional  obstacles to 
constructive dialogue among the representatives of the parties by discussions on "which is the 
autochthonous population?" or "who started first?" and the like, I intend to give only my own 
opinion on the geographic (in the broad sense of the term) background to the conflict.
The fact that the conflict has created a difficult situation for both sides is beyond doubt:
the social and economic situation in Abkhazia is not improving, and the economic so-called 
blockade1 by the  CIS,  imposed against  the  secessionist  region is  aggravating  the  situation. 
Abkhazia paid a high price for the result achieved in the civil war, in the lives of many young 
people and in the loss of many loyal citizens who were forced to leave the territory. The sword of 
Damocles of revenge makes it  necessary to  maintain  a  costly standing army:  according to 
1 Actually economic sanctions imposed according to the decision of the Council of the Heads of State of CIS 
on 19 January, 1996 forbidding economic and other contacts with this secessionist region without the per-
mission of the Government of Georgia. Lifting the sanctions is being linked to serious efforts to settle the 
conflict, primarily the return of internally displaced persons, mostly of Georgian nationality, who were driven 
from the region as a result of the civil war, and guaranteeing their safety.
Russian sources 72% of the budget is being spent on defence.2 This is hardly a situation in which 
people would wish to live permanently;
in the rest of Georgia, which was plunged into two civil wars in 1993, being humiliated by defeat 
at the hands of the secessionists (this is no place for an analysis of why or how) and by forced 
entry into the CIS, its citizens constantly confronted by the spectre of a great mass of starving and 
deprived persons displaced from Abkhazia against their will, the ideas of revenge may prevail. 
This is not the best way to solve the problem.
The  principal  hypotheses in  my paper are  that  from the economic and  political-geographic 
viewpoints the dismemberment of Georgia (which is the actual aim of the secessionists in spite of 
frequent rhetoric to the contrary) is not to the advantage of the Georgians or the Abkhaz and the 
other nationalities living in Abkhazia, while from the cultural-geographic viewpoint there are no 
insuperable obstacles to finding common points of contact. The international community also has 
an interest in preserving the territorial integrity of a UN member and in the observance of human 
and ethnic minority rights. Accordingly public opinion, both in Abkhazia and in the rest of 
Georgia, will  clearly have to get used to the idea that  being in a  single state –  a  common 
economic and political space – will be more beneficial to both sides in the long run than endless 
confrontation.  However,  the  psychological  problems  in  the  various  communities,  greatly 
aggravated during and after the civil war, must be fully understood.
I wish to give a brief description below of the economic-geographical, cultural-geographical and 
political-geographical background against which the conflict developed. Of course, geography is 
neither the sole factor in the conflict nor a complete guarantor of a solution for it, but it may be 
helpful in explaining the reasons for it and, more importantly for us, in predicting particular 
difficulties in putting various solutions of the conflict into practice.
The Economic-Geographical Background
The geographical location of Abkhazia is extremely favourable and also predetermines its geo-
political significance. Situated along the shore of the Black Sea (however, the principal ports of 
Georgia – Poti, Batumi and Supsa, the latter now under construction – are further south, in the 
rest of Georgia), Abkhazia has a definite advantage over the land-locked North Caucasus re-
publics of the Russian Federation. After the Ubykhs and Adighean peoples, the Abkhaz' kinsfolk, 
who had previously occupied the Black Sea shore north-west of Gagra almost to the Sea of Azov, 
had been driven out by tsarism in the 1860s, the Abkhaz were left as the only autochthonous 
people in the Caucasus, apart from the Georgians, with access to the open sea (the Caspian is in 
fact a lake). This gives Abkhazia an opportunity to neutralise the CIS economic sanctions to a 
considerable extent. The coastal blockade by Russian warships is  more symbolic than real – 
economic contacts, e.g. with Turkish seaports, have been practically uninterrupted: according to 
the Russian mass media, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that last year more than 
75 ships were unloaded in the port of Sukhumi.3
The only railway linking the Central  and Western Transcaucasus to Russia  passes through 
Abkhazia. After it was closed due to the civil war, Abkhazia became a railway dead end and 
Russia was deprived of the possibility of a rail link, e.g. with its strategic partner – Armenia – 
and its military bases in the Transcaucasus. Restoration of this railway (which Tbilisi also links 
2 I. Maksakov, "Vozobnovlenie voyny vozmozhno", Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 April 1997.
3 E. Kharket, "Kontury dokumenta proyasniayutsia", Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 June 1997.
to a settlement of the conflict) will be extremely beneficial to all sides; this includes the economy 
of Abkhazia.
During the Soviet era Abkhazia, with natural and climatic resources unique in the USSR, was 
transformed into a major recreational area and producer of crops such as citrus fruits, tea and 
tobacco. These goods and services were almost entirely for the vast Soviet market (and in part for 
COMECON markets), which were protected from outside competition and now are almost lost. 
It will be very difficult to restore access to these markets, to say nothing of expanding them, if the 
conflict remains unresolved.
Abkhazia has relatively few mineral, fuel and energy resources. It is even difficult to use the 
fairly numerous and free-flowing rivers for power generation, because building dams on them 
will reduce the load and this will adversely affect the beach equilibrium and undermine the rec-
reational resources. For example, the construction of a hydroelectric power station on the River 
Bzyb will involve the destruction of Cape Pitsunda with its major resort and tourist complex. The 
fact that the contribution of Abkhazia to electric power generation in Georgia is substantial (over 
one-third) is almost entirely due to the Inguri cascade overfall generating stations in south-east 
Abkhazia, in the Gali district, to which water is supplied by a reservoir lying entirely within the 
territory  of  other  Georgian  provinces.  Operation  of  these  generating  stations  presupposes 
inevitable economic co-operation both now and in the future.
Abkhazia was not noted for industrial and agricultural products (other than tea and citrus fruit) 
even in terms of the Georgian SSR, which according to the Soviet yardstick had average eco-
nomic potential. For example, in 1990 Abkhazia, with 12.5% of all Georgia's territory and 9.8% 
of its population, produced 5.8% of all industrial production and 5.1% of consumer goods. The 
figures for agriculture looked better: in 1985-1990  on average Abkhazia produced 12.5% of 
Georgia's total agricultural output. This was almost entirely due to citrus fruit (43% production 
on collective and state farms, but 29% from state purchases: a substantial part of  the citrus fruit 
purchased was grown in the private sector in the rest of Georgia) and tea (20% production and 
18% purchases). However, Abkhazia could not meet its own requirements for basic food crops or 
for most livestock products, producing 6.6% of the grain, 5.1% of the vegetables, 5.8% of the 
fruit (excluding citrus fruit), 0.8% of the grapes, 9.3% of the meat and 5.3% of the milk in the 
total Republic collective and state farm output in 1985-1990.4
This does not mean that Abkhazia "was very poor" and "the rest of Georgia had to support it 
entirely": there was actually a pattern of geographical division of labour over a certain period 
which will be difficult to restore under the new conditions. During the Soviet era there was no 
need for Abkhazia to be self-sufficient in food, because expenditure on imported foodstuffs was 
more than covered by the income from the more expensive products of subtropical farming and 
tourist  services (in  fact  no such calculations were made,  because in  the USSR supply was 
centralised, like everything else).
Since the civil war the economic crisis has not receded. The present parlous economic state of 
Abkhazia is aggravated by the fact that the markets for subtropical farm products and tourist 
services are contracting sharply: the main reasons for this are increased competition at the in-
ternational level and the economic sanctions. But even lifting the sanctions cannot fully restore 
the flows of tourists from Russia unless a stable peace is achieved. It is difficult to judge as yet 
how effective this frequently breached blockade is from the political viewpoint, but it is obvi-
4 Calculations  based  on  Sakartvelos  respublikis  sotsialur-ekonomikuri  informatsiis  komiteti,  Sakartvelos  
regionebis sotsialur-ekonomikuri mdgomareoba, Tbilisi, 1991
ously damaging the economy of Abkhazia and affecting the material welfare of many sections of 
the population.
The fact that Abkhazia can maintain an army when the economy relies mostly on subsistence 
farming and the sanctions theoretically prevent exports leads us to assume that there is an un-
official and very substantial flow of outside (non-humanitarian) aid which makes it possible to 
maintain the military potential of Abkhazia and/or that the forces that are supposed to maintain 
the sanctions are breaching it.  In any case the situation provides no opportunity for genuine 
economic reforms.
Due to the substantial drop in population in Abkhazia there should be enough agricultural land to 
achieve self-sufficiency. If we make the theoretical  assumption that  the Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) simply will  not return to their homes, the problem will most probably be a 
shortage of capital and labour rather than a lack of land. But autarky can scarcely be an end in 
itself on the threshold of the 21st century.
For structural improvements to be made in the economy of Abkhazia, or if only for the partial 
restoration of the economic structure that existed there before the beginning of the 1990s, i.e. the 
tourist  business, subtropical  farming and market  gardening, to  say nothing of restoration of 
housing stock, transport and social infrastructure and the like, much greater labour resources 
than those left after the civil war will be required, apart from major capital investment. It is these 
limited  labour  resources that  may  prove to  be  the  main  complicating factor  in  the  future 
economic development of Abkhazia.
The whole population has declined: according to the Sukhumi government there were "over 
300,000 people" in the territory of Abkhazia by the beginning of 19975 compared with 535,600 
in 1989.6 The figure of "over 300,000", meaning that about 240,000 were IDPs and refugees, 
may be exaggerated, but if it is true the proportion of ethnic Abkhaz in the entire population (less 
than 100,000 before the conflict began) cannot exceed one-third. Even in 1993, directly after the 
end of hostilities and when expulsion of most of the Georgian population (described by many as 
"ethnic cleansing") was practically over, the Sukhumi leadership announced that the Abkhaz 
would  not  tolerate  becoming  a  minority  again  in  their  own  country.7 According  to  some 
estimates, after many had fled or been driven out the ethnic Abkhaz became a majority of 65%:8 
if this is a true estimate, the total population must have declined to under 150,000. In any event 
the  decline in labour resources is obvious.
If we assume theoretically that Abkhazia will become a monoethnic (Abkhaz) state it will be 
incapable of supplying even key sectors of its industry with a workforce. According to the 1989 
Population Census, the employed (economically active) population in Abkhazia amounted to 
260,042 persons, while the employed ethnic Abkhaz population (for the whole of Georgia: data 
for Abkhazia alone are not given, but the figure must be 1,000-2,000 less) numbered 47,954 
persons (including 15,694 in intellectual work and 12,228 in manual agricultural work).9 In the 
5 A. Krylov, "Peregovory mogut prekratit'sia po vine Tbilisi: takoe mnenie v intervyu 'NG' vyskazal prezident 
Respubliki Abkhaziya V. Ardzinba", Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 March.1997.
6 Sakartvelos  respublikis  sotsialur-ekonomikuri  informatsiis  komiteti,  Sakartvelos  regionebis  sotsialur-
ekonomikuri mdgomareoba, op.cit., p. 3
7 I. Rotar', "Dazhe reguliarnye voyska inogda maroderstvuyut: intervyu c V. Ardzinba", Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
15 October 1993.
8 F. Corley, "Peoples on the move" War report, no. 28, January/February 1997, pp.  22-23
9 Sakartvelos  mosakhleobis  dasakmeba.  Sakartelos  respublikis  sotsialur-ekonomikuri  informatsiis  komiteti, 
Statistikuri krebuli, Natsili 2, Tbilisi, 1992, pp. 74, 196, 200. 
absence of recent data it may be assumed with reasonable confidence that at best the labour 
resources of the ethnic Abkhaz have remained at the previous quantitative level or, most likely, 
have  declined  because  of  the  war  and  emigration.  Merely  to  restore  the  potentially  most 
profitable sector in Abkhazia, the tourist and recreation industry (including both direct services 
and infrastructure such as industrial, transport, agricultural, trading and sales and cultural and 
entertainment  sectors)  to  its  1988  level  (the  last  year  without  overt  confrontation  in  the 
Abkhazian ASSR) will  require not less than 40,000  workers according to the most modest 
estimates, and several  times more for improvements and expansion. The population "is not 
enough to man the economy, let alone reconstruct the infrastructure of the area".10 This implies a 
necessity for recruiting additional (ethnically non-Abkhaz) labour from outside. I am not hinting 
that these labour resources must automatically come from among ethnic Georgians and that the 
economy cannot be restored without these. It is merely observed here that using a multi-ethnic 
workforce and maintaining a heterogeneous population are inevitable if there is to be economic 
growth in Abkhazia.
It cannot be right to maintain that any country that has been legally recognised as an independent 
state will not be able to survive in the conditions prevailing at  the end of the 20th century. 
Russian "national-patriots" foretold great political difficulties and all but starvation for the Newly 
Independent States (NIS) unless they turned to the former empire for aid. For example, in 1994 
the then Chairman of the State Duma Committee for links with the CIS forecast with respect to a 
number of NIS, that they have "to become our satellites or die".11 In fact, however, by closing the 
rail link through Chechnya and allowing the secessionists to cut themselves off from the three 
Transcaucasian  states,  Russia  has  merely  produced  a  situation  in  which  these  states  have 
established new economic ties, have survived and have learned to live without the former empire. 
Georgia is definitely moving towards a market economy: privatisation is proceeding rapidly, the 
stability of the new currency – the Lari – introduced in 1995 is being maintained (the Russian 
ruble is still used as currency in Abkhazia), and in spite of obvious difficulties there are visible 
signs of economic recovery. All this is being achieved with the help of international community.
This example might also inspire secessionist regions – local elites may argue that even the very 
small  states that  may emerge in  their  territories could survive and even flourish. However, 
normal economic development can be achieved only through contacts with the outside world, 
which will follow only after a full political settlement is reached. In such a case Abkhazia also 
can enjoy the benefits which the unified state will obtain from its position in terms of transport 
and geography. There may be a widening of the "Central Asia-Europe" transport corridor af-
fecting Abkhazia. The proposed railway around the Black Sea and the "North-South" transport 
corridor assume the use of the territory of Abkhazia as well.
Of course, one may argue that there is also an option of economic development for Abkhazia 
within, or with special aid from, another larger state. The latter option is difficult to consider in 
current circumstances, as it implies a certain (clearly irresponsible) political decision – if a state 
is prepared to issue a challenge to the international community by recognising as independent, or 
taking under its wing, a secessionist region which Georgia regards as an integral part of itself, 
referring not without good reason to international law.
10 P.B. Henze, "Georgia and Armenia: Troubled independence", Eurasian Studies, no. 2, 1995, pp. 25-35.
11 I. Rotar', "Stat' nashimi satellitami ili umeret': takovo mnenie o Blizhnem Zarubezhye Konstantina Zatulina – 
Predsedatelya  komiteta  po  delam  SNG  i  svyazyam  s  sootechestvennikami  Gosudarstvennoy  Dumy", 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 May 1994.
The Cultural-Geographical Background
Some attention must be given to ethnic dynamics and to the attitude of public opinion to them in 
order to understand the cultural-geographical aspects of the conflict.
Since the 1950s the numbers of ethnic Abkhaz, which had fluctuated previously,12 have shown a 
clear rising trend: their proportion in the Autonomous Republic population rose from 15.1% in 
1959  to 17.8% in 1989  (from 61,200  to 95,300  in absolute terms), while the proportion of 
Georgians increased from 39.1% to 45.7% during the same period. Whereas in 1959 the Abkhaz 
were fourth in terms of numbers among the nationalities in the Autonomous Republic (Russians 
and Armenians also outnumbered them), they were in second place by 1989.
Under Soviet authority the "titular nation" of a Union or an Autonomous Republic had definite 
official and unofficial advantages of representation in the administration, and in a bureaucratic 
state such as the USSR this was of decisive importance throughout public life: the Abkhaz held a 
greater proportion of such posts than their numbers in the population as a  whole.13 A sort of 
"affirmative action" was pursued in relation to the ethnic Abkhaz – the titular nation, but a mi-
nority in terms of numbers.14 After the independence of Georgia was restored (1991) its first, 
extremely nationalistic President, agreed to a formula for elections to the local Supreme Council 
(parliament) in which the ethnic Abkhaz obtained a relative majority of seats. None of the above 
should be regarded as some kind of "excess of charity": in my opinion the Abkhaz must be given 
even more special guarantees of free development for the future.
However, all this was seen by the local Georgian population as encroachment on their rights as a 
community (this is not a matter of "democratic rights", because even now there is a long way to 
go to  democracy),  especially against  the background of demands by the ethnic Abkhaz for 
separation from Georgia as a sovereign republic or joining the Russian Federation directly: such 
a development would mean the local Georgians becoming an "actual minority" (in terms of legal 
rights) and for Georgia as a whole the loss of over 12% of its territory and about 10% of its 
population. Meanwhile, in complaints by the Abkhaz addressed to the Soviet leadership the 
existence of Abkhazia as an autonomous republic within Georgia was declared to be an historical 
injustice; the numerical superiority of the ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia was seen as intentionally 
created by the communist government of Georgia and the repressions of the Stalinist era as 
specifically aimed only at the Abkhaz.15 As a rule there were no complaints of direct political, 
social  or  economic  discrimination  by  any  ethnic  Abkhaz  as  an  individual;  the  collective 
complaints were only about the rights of one ethnic community, while the rights of the other 
communities were almost completely ignored. Without entering into a discussion on the extent to 
which the complaints were justified, I wish to put forward some brief views on certain ethno-
demographic issues that are clearly territorial in nature (the cultural-geographic dimension).
12 For more detail see R. Gachechiladze, The New Georgia: Space, Society, Politics, London, UCL Press, 1995.
13 D. Slider, "Crisis and response in Soviet Nationality Policy: the Case of Abkhazia", Central Asian Survey 
4(4), 1985, p. 54.
14 Robert J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR, Princeton/New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press, 1994, p. 362.
15 Obrashchenie [uchastnikov sobraniya v sele Lykhny Gudautskogo raiona] k General'nomy sekretaryu TsK 
KPSS,  Predsedatelyu  Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR  tovarishchu M.S.  Gorbachovu,  Sovyetskaya  
Abkhaziya, 24 March 1989.
The values, or "ideas and beliefs shared by the people in a society on what is important and 
worthwhile"16 of the Georgians and Abkhaz are quite similar, though not identical. In the conflict 
between them something like a "clash of civilisations"17 is not apparent. Rather the opposite: they 
definitely share  a  common cultural  and  historical  heritage  from medieval  times,  when the 
Georgian Bagrationi dynasty called themselves the kings "of the Abkhaz and Georgians", while 
the  realm  itself,  embracing  the  territory  of  present-day  Georgia  with  its  own  name  of 
"Sakartvelo" (i.e. Georgia) since the 10th century, was known among the neighbouring nations in 
the 10-13th centuries as "Abazgia" (i.e. Abkhazia).
From the 10th right up to the end of the 19th century the language of worship for the Orthodox 
Abkhaz (who were an absolute majority among the Abzhu or Ochamchira Abkhaz to the south of 
the River Kodori and accounted for a  substantial proportion of the rest of the Abkhaz) was 
ancient Georgian. For the Bzyb (Gudauta) Abkhaz, however, many of whom had been converted 
to Islam in the late middle ages, the Georgian language and culture had become quite remote. 
However, Islam does not play a dominant part in their social life: almost all the true Muslim 
Abkhaz emigrated to the Ottoman Empire some 120 years ago. Incidentally, some Georgians 
take the view that it is the Bzyb Abkhaz who are the main supporters of secession, although this 
may be incorrect.
When the Russian Empire was expanding rapidly southwards and reached the Transcaucasus at 
the beginning of the 19th century, this territory, including Abkhazia, was essential to the Empire 
as a military bridgehead rather than as an area to be opened up economically. Economic interest 
in the Sukhumskiy okrug (Sukhumi region) – as Abkhazia was called at the time – increased 
only during the last third of the 19th century. The possibility that this was why tsarism decided 
on the direct annexation of a previously 'autonomous' principality (1864) and a drastic change in 
the ethnic structure of the population of Abkhazia (following the example of the North-West 
Caucasus,  which was settled by the Slavic peoples mainly after  expulsion of the Adighean 
peoples in the 1860s) cannot be ruled out. The expulsion in 1878 of more than half (32,000) of 
the ethnic Abkhaz,18 almost half of whom soon returned,19 into the Ottoman Empire was provoked 
by the tsarist authorities (although both the Ottoman government and the Muslim clergy had a 
hand in it, not a single Georgian had participated in it). This was followed by settlement of the 
vacant lands both by "planned" Slavic immigrants from European Russia and by Armenians, 
Greeks  and,  least  desirable  from the  Imperial  viewpoint,  Georgians from the  neighbouring 
districts or from the south-east of the Sukhumi region itself.20
In contrast to the North Caucasus, in Abkhazia not a Slavic but a Georgian population grew 
rapidly: the latter lived in similar ecological conditions and adapted more easily to the Abkhazian 
coastal environment, infected to a  considerable extent by malaria at  that  time, and to alpine 
conditions. These natural  conditions limited the influx of a  Russian population (malaria was 
eradicated only by the 1930s). According to the Imperial administrative statistics, the Georgians 
were already a relative majority in Abkhazia before the First World War I.21 Incidentally, in the 
1920s-40s conditions for Russian population growth in Abkhazia were not less (and possibly 
16 J.R. Eshelman, B.G. Cashion, L.A. Basirico,  Sociology: An Introduction, New York, Harper Collins, 1988, 
p. 69.
17  S.P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?", Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.
18 "Statisticheskie tablitsy naseleniya Kavkazskogo regiona", in: N. Seidlitz (ed.), Sbornik Svedeniy o Kavkaze, 
vol. VII, Tiflis, Tipografia glavnogo upravlenia namestnika kavkazskogo, 1880.
19 Z.V. Anchabadze, Ocherk etnicheskoy istorii abkhazskogo naroda, Sukhumi, Alashara, 1976, p. 86.
20 Ibid.
more) favourable than for Georgians: in the period between censuses from 1926 to 1959 the 
number of Russians increased from 12,000 to 87,000, i.e. by 7.2 times, while during the same 
period the numbers of Armenians increased by 2.6  times and of Georgians –  by 2.3  times.22 
However, the increase in the non-Georgian ethnic groups was never seen by Abkhaz scholars (or 
by Abkhaz public opinion) as a "demographic threat". The reason for such a specific approach 
can be understood when a broader cultural-geographical context is considered.
The growth in the relative importance of the Georgian population in Abkhazia since the end of 
the 19th century, at the same time as a rapid consolidation of the Georgian nation and an increase 
in its national consciousness, aroused suspicion in the tsarist government. Again the geographical 
factor was important: the Georgian provinces bordered the Sukhumi region directly and, unlike 
the Greeks or Armenians for example, whose main area of settlement was much further away, the 
continuous  area  of  Georgian  settlement  was  expanding  and  they  were  becoming  direct 
competitors for the Russians in this sector of the Black Sea shore. This geo-demographic trend 
was artificially transformed later into one of the principal causes of inter-ethnic tension, although 
the new Georgian settlers did not drive out any ethnic Abkhaz, for the simple reason that the 
latter  had  already  gone  and  the  land  was  regarded  as  belonging  to  no-
body.
The Empire moved to encourage Abkhaz ethnic nationalism as a  counterweight to Georgian 
nationalism, which was regarded as more dangerous. As a preventive measure to check growing 
Georgian influence, strict cultural demarcation between the Georgians and Abkhaz was imposed. 
Previously their elites (the noblemen) had many points of contact, not to mention ties of blood 
and friendship. Zurab Anchabadze, the noted Abkhazian historian, gives a typical example of this 
policy, quoting a report by an Imperial civil servant at the beginning of this century: "of course 
the Abkhazian language, being unwritten and having no literature, is doomed to disappear in the 
more or less immediate future. The question is which language will replace it? Obviously the 
vehicle  for  bringing  cultural  ideas  and  concepts  to  the  population  should  be  the  Russian 
language,  not  the Georgian.  It  appears to  me,  therefore that  establishing a  written Abkhaz 
language should not be an end in itself but merely a means of weakening, by way of church and 
school, the demand for the Georgian language and gradually replacing it by the state [Russian] 
language".23 Hence  the  Abkhaz  alphabet,  based  on  Cyrillic,  was  introduced  (the  Georgian 
language has used its own alphabet since the 5th century A.D.) and in 1912 the first work of 
Abkhaz  literature  was  published.  The  creation  of  a  written  Abkhazian  language  and  the 
emergence of a nation should only be welcomed. The only problem is that the tsarist government 
gave that positive process an imperial slant: "divide and rule".
The repressions of the Stalinist era damaged all Soviet peoples almost equally: the losses of the 
Georgians, particularly the intelligentsia, were no less proportionally than those of any other 
Soviet nation. It is hard to say that the terror was aimed specifically at the numerically small 
Abkhaz nation and might have led to their numerical decline. Statistics show the contrary: in two 
years, from January 1937 to 1939, i.e. when repression was at its height, the number of Abkhaz 
increased by 1.8%.24 Of course, the Abkhaz also were victims of totalitarianism, particularly in 
the 1940s and at the beginning of the 1950s, when the total lawlessness of the Soviet authorities 
21 Sakartvelos akhal administratsiul  erteulebad daqopis proekti. Memorandumi – statistikuri tskhrilebi, Tbi-
lisi, Saxelmtsipo stamba, 1920.
22 A. Totadze, Sakartvelos demografiuli portreti, Tbilisi, Samshoblo, 1993, p. 69.
23 Z.V. Anchabadze, Ocherk etnicheskoy istorii abkhazskogo naroda, Sukhumi, Alashara, 1976, p. 96.
24 R. Gachechiladze, The New Georgia: Space, Society, Politics, op.cit., p. 84.
in relation to entire nations or subethnic groups (deportation of some North Caucasian peoples, 
Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Meskhetian Muslims, Pontic Greeks, and so on) affected the 
Abkhaz as well, who were subjected to certain attempts to assimilate them to the Georgians. I 
wish to express my abhorrence at all this, so that there are no misunderstandings. The historical 
memory of such events is damaging to mutual understanding among peoples.
However, in spite of the widely-held view, this was not an exceptional phenomenon "started by 
the Georgians Stalin and Beria" who, they say, practised a sort of "Georgian chauvinism" in 
Abkhazia. Without wishing to defend these individuals in any way it should first be said that in 
reconstructing the empire Stalin was indifferent to the fate of small nations, whether they were 
the Georgians, Abkhaz or any others: if he had thought that the Abkhaz were a threat to HIS 
Empire he would not have bothered with a prolonged process of assimilation, but would simply 
have ordered their deportation, as in the case of the much more numerous Chechens. Secondly, 
under Stalin there were similar processes in other republics: for example, many Iranian-speaking 
Kurds,  Tats  and  Talishs  were  assimilated  to  Turkic-speaking  Azeris25 and  the  ethnic 
consciousness of the Ingilos (Muslim Georgians) in the then Azerbaijan SSR was eroded, al-
though the "Father of the nations" was not an Azeri. The process of russifying certain Ugro-
Finnish nations was under way: as the Russian demographer V. Kozlov wrote
among the nations in autonomous republics of the RSFSR...the processes of transition to an-
other language, usually Russian, increased on the whole in the period from 1926 to 1959. The 
proportion of those who replaced their mother tongue was particularly high among the Mordva 
(from 6 to 22%) and Karelians (from 4.5 to 28.7%).26
The Soviet authorities obviously took the view, though without advertising this doctrine, that 
small  nations  should  merge  with  the  larger  Soviet  Republic  titular  nations,  in  order  to 
"consolidate" the latter in the future to form a kind of "Soviet supernation". In the 1970s, the 
birth of a  "new historical  community –  the Soviet people" was announced, the obvious as-
sumption being that it would be Russian-speaking. Fortunately, by this time mass repressions 
were no longer being practised and the regime did not particularly pursue the russification of the 
"Soviet people", although this process was encouraged. Russification especially affected small 
nations, including the Abkhaz, which are, on the whole rightly, regarded as Russian speakers. 
(This is specifically stressed by the Russian nationalists who appeal for their "protection" outside 
the borders of Russia, which is perceived by other nations, also rightly, as "neo-imperialism".)
However, even under Stalinism relations at the personal level between the Abkhaz and Georgians 
were fairly close. This is indicated by the widespread intermarriages and even the assimilation of 
a certain proportion of Georgians into the Abkhaz cultural environment, especially in rural areas. 
Obviously this is why many Abkhaz have Georgian surnames and Georgian roots: this is a 
normal  process of  ethnic  interaction.  Incidentally  there  has  been practically  no  process of 
assimilation of the Abkhaz by Georgians in the Autonomous Republic. Although there was a 
cultural take-over of ethnic groups living in Abkhazia, this was entirely based on the Russian 
language. This affected most Abkhaz and many of the local Georgians: among the children of the 
latter the proportion of those studying in Russian schools was almost 3.5 times higher than in the 
rest of Georgia, where most Georgian children were taught in their mother tongue.27 Russian was 
used as  the actual  lingua  franca in  Abkhazia  and in practice no-one was putting Georgian 
25 Yu.V. Bromley  (ed.),  Narody  mira:  istoriko-demograficheskii  spravochnik.  Sovetskaya  Entsiklopediya, 
Moscow, 1988, p. 430.
26 V.I. Kozlov, Natsional'nosti SSSR (etnodemograficheskii obzor), Moscow, Statistika, 1975, p. 215.
27 A. Totadze, Sakartvelos demografiuli portreti, Tbilisi, Samshoblo, 1993, p. 192.
forward  as  such  (although  it  was  regarded  as  the  state  language  throughout
Georgia).
The settlement of Georgians and Abkhaz in the Autonomous Republic was a patchwork, and 
interethnic cultural and economic contacts were intensive. According to data for 1989, only the 
Gali district was practically mono-ethnic: the Georgians accounted for over 93% there. Only in 
the Gudauta district was there a majority of the Abkhaz (53%; the local Armenians accounted for 
15% and the Russians and Georgians for 13-14% each) and Georgians were in the majority in 
the Gulripshi district (53%, followed by Armenians – 25% and Russians – 13%; the proportion 
of the Abkhaz here was a mere 2.4%). In the remaining towns and districts no one ethnic group 
accounted for more than half: the Georgians had a relative majority in the city of Sukhumi (42%, 
followed by 22% Russians and 13% Abkhazians), while the Abkhaz predominated in the city of 
Tkvarcheli (42%, with 24% each of Russians and Georgians). Georgians predominated in the 
rural district of Ochamchira (40%, followed by 37% Abkhaz) and in the Sukhumi rural district 
(44%, with 29% Armenians, 10% Greeks, 7% Russians and 5% Abkhaz). In the territory of the 
Gagra City Council Armenians, Georgians and Russians were more or less equal in number – 
24-29% each – while the Abkhaz there accounted for 9%.28 Leaving out the monoethnic Gali 
region, the historical site of settlement of a Georgian subethnic group (Megrelians), there were 
160,000 Georgians, or 36% of the total population, in the rest of the territory of Abkhazia. The 
Abkhaz accounted for 20% and Armenians, Russians, Greeks and others for 44%.
It can be argued that "the Georgian demographic problem" for the ethnic Abkhaz was relative 
rather than absolute: the absorption of the latter by the Georgians was not a real danger. If there 
was  a  linguistic  conflict  it  was  between Russian  and  Georgian,  not  between Abkhaz  and 
Georgian. The real problem was political, not  demographic. The civil war helped to make the 
interethnic conflict much worse, to the point where representatives of the different communities 
said that living together in one town, village or region was impossible. The property of many 
families from both sides was looted, burned or taken over; many houses abandoned by fleeing 
families are now occupied by families of other nationalities. The process of restoring peace and 
order may be very long and difficult. It is even possible that, after the IDPs return to Abkhazia, 
separate settlement of the ethnic communities may be a panacea for a while to allow wounds to 
heal and gradually restore confidence at  the personal level. And there is no doubt that such 
confidence existed previously.
It should be noted that the standard stereotype of an Abkhaz among the Georgians is a positive 
one, because it is created on the basis of classic Georgian literature, in which the Abkhaz are 
represented as noble, hospitable and brave people. Even at the height of the civil war there was no 
anti-Abkhaz hysteria,  and in  Georgia  proper and particularly in  Tbilisi  there were no anti-
Abkhaz slogans to be seen; the fairly free Georgian press often stressed the positive features in 
relations between Abkhaz and Georgians (even during the military operations and the subsequent 
ethnic cleansing of Georgians in  Abkhazia),  and many atrocities in  the war  were ascribed, 
possibly  without  foundation,  to  alien,  unknown  "North  Caucasians"  and  persons  of  other 
nationalities, but not to the ethnic Abkhaz.
There were no direct contacts between most Georgians from the rest of Georgia and the Abkhaz 
if the former did not travel to particular regions of Abkhazia, so that the mythological stereotypes 
remained alive. On the other hand, the majority of the Abkhaz were in contact with Georgians. 
This does not imply the creation of a priori negative opinions about each other; most probably 
28 Sakartvelos dasakhlebuli punktebi da mosakhleoba. Sakartvelos respublikis statistikis sakhelmtsipo komiteti, 
Sakartvelos dasakhlebuli punktebi da mosakhleoba. Statistikuri krebuli, Tbilisi, 1990.
there were many more pleasant than unpleasant episodes at personal inter-ethnic contact level: 
the general Caucasian traditions of hospitality, neighbourly solidarity and feasting are typical of 
both the Abkhaz and the Georgians.
Perfectly reasonable questions may arise on reading the above: "What is going on? Is it possible 
that the conflict arose without cause? Did someone stir it up? Is only 'the hand of the Kremlin' to 
blame again?" The answer may be that  of course the Kremlin had a  hand in  the conflict. 
However, this cannot be the complete explanation for the conflict, which had ripened over a 
period  of  decades.  It  became  particularly  acute  in  1989,  when  the  Abkhaz  political  and 
intellectual elite appealed to Moscow demanding secession from Georgia: the Appeal was signed 
by many ethnic Abkhaz.  This  led  to  an  escalation of the  conflict,  and large-scale  disorder 
claiming many victims. On the surface of the conflict there were visible ethno-cultural differences 
(but these were not decisive), problems of ethno-demographic change (a fairly frequent argument 
by the Abkhaz) and wounded national pride (on both sides). The pattern of Abkhaz thought 
might have been approximately as follows: "we are few, and the Georgians are many; they do not 
give us our lawful statehood; we must neutralise them with the aid of Russia, giving Russia 
jurisdiction over our territory". The pattern of thought among the local Georgians might have 
been something like this: "the Abkhaz are a minority but they are oppressing us, the majority; 
they want to create their own separate state illegally out of our territory or to seize our land for 
the benefit of Russia, where we will be an unprotected minority".
Although there was an obvious clash of interests, such ideas could not in themselves lead to 
conflict, still less to warfare, until they became public property and a "guide to action": someone 
really must have needed the ideas to begin "to work for conflict". It is clear who could gain from 
inciting conflict from without, especially after the Georgian national liberation movement (or 
"Georgian nationalism"29) had begun to gather momentum since 1987 and, in the fully justified 
opinion of Kremlin analysts,  began to  threaten the  established order  in  the USSR:  the old 
imperialist motto "divide and rule" is as true as ever it was! However, even the imported seeds of 
conflict need local soil, and local gardeners even more. Someone from within must deliberately 
guide the situation towards conflict.
It is easy to ascribe the complications in inter-ethnic relations to the completely visible actions 
and widely read works of the intellectual elites, above all  the historians, whose profession is 
"constantly to re-open old wounds so that the nation is always on the alert" and no less to writers 
and journalists who cannot, of course, keep silent if "the other side has written something wrong" 
and immediately call upon public opinion, which instantly heats up. The more a writer or scholar 
is a "patriot", the less he may feel bound to ensure the validity of his sources, relying mainly on 
emotion. This affects both sides, Abkhaz and Georgians. However, the somewhat trivial view 
seems to be more accurate: the conflict was most probably stirred up by ethnic political elites 
(nomenklatura), each wanting "a bigger slice of the national cake": the undercover fight of the 
bureaucratic (nomenklatura) bulldogs of various shades in Abkhazia was always because of the 
high and obviously highly profitable posts, while academics and poets merely ennobled this fight.
As a result of the civil war the ethnic Abkhaz elite does not have to share power either with the 
Georgians or with anyone else. Ideally, under democratic conditions, moral and professional 
qualities should play a part in the election of a politician, not national allegiance. Unfortunately 
such an ideal position is a long way off (and not only in Abkhazia or Georgia, but also in many 
quite highly developed countries).
29  R.J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR, op.cit.
The Political-Geographical Background
It seems preferable to consider many geopolitical issues at the regional, all-Caucasian level. In 
the course of the last five centuries the Caucasus has been a subject of dispute and an area of 
expansion involving three regional superpowers – the Russian empire (tsarist, Soviet), the Ot-
toman empire and the Persian empire. During the past two centuries the dominant power in the 
Caucasus has been Russia, which became a world superpower in the 20th century. Even now, 
when the Soviet Union has disintegrated, Russia regards the three states of the Transcaucasus as 
its "near abroad", maintaining military bases in two of them (Armenia, Georgia) and retaining 
control over their external frontiers, actually limiting their sovereignty.
It is natural that Russia, in spite of a policy that is sometimes contradictory and outwardly in-
consistent, has an interest in its own military security in the region and therefore views any 
internal conflicts in the Transcaucasus from this position. Influential politicians in Moscow (but 
not all of them) take the view that the conflict in Abkhazia is not a real threat to the security of 
Russia, since both parties to it rely on preferential aid from the latter. Russia can therefore allow 
itself to help both sides in escalating the conflict and then delay its settlement, justifying this by 
the "fear of complicating its relations with nations of the Northern Caucasus" (many of which are 
sensitive towards the measures against their kinsfolk – the Abkhaz). On the other hand wise 
Russian  politicians  cannot  fail  to  see  that  the  example  of  Abkhaz  secessionism,  should  it 
ultimately succeed, may be followed in the Russian Northern Caucasus. Incidentally the best 
Chechen fighters received their baptism of fire in the Abkhaz civil war, where they fought against 
the Georgians alongside many ethnic Russian troops (officially retired), and later successfully 
used  the  weapons  and  military  know-how  gained  with  their  assistance  against
Moscow.
Small states always have to take international interests into account to a greater extent than the 
dominant powers30 although the latter also are obliged to respect general interests. Therefore 
relations between the centre of such a small state and its secessionist regions cannot always be 
settled at the bilateral level. Even when the parties declare "Their firm intention" they are in fact 
taking the prevailing international situation into account and hope to use it to their advantage. In 
this sense, if we view the position objectively, a recognised state usually has more possibilities 
than its breakaway province: even in spite of possible military successes the latter will be able to 
resist for just as long as the central government takes to arrange its relations with the stronger 
power that has decided to act as "referee". These relations can be arranged through specific 
concessions or deals, or through the rivals of that same "referee". Of course, this may take a long 
time or, in a situation very favourable for the secessionists, may not occur at all. Much depends 
upon the success of diplomacy.
In our specific case the vital factors in the conflict are geography and economics, not ethnic or 
political history and they influence policy. Georgia was the only one of the eight southern NIS 
with access to the open sea. A substantial section of the Eurasian transport corridor (at least in the 
foreseeable future) will pass through its territory (possibly even through Abkhazia). If it is in 
Russia's interest to reap the benefit of this corridor, political stability in the region will serve its 
purpose. Conversely, if it sees no advantage in it Russia can use the "ethnic conflict" trump card, 
especially close to its borders. Some Moscow political scientists (who did not wish to be named) 
openly urged the Russian government to stir up these conflicts artificially.31
30 A. Rondeli, "Georgia in the Post-Soviet Space", Caucasian Regional Studies, no. 1, 1996, pp. 96-100.
31 "Commonwealth  of  Independent  States:  the  beginning  or  the  end  of  history?",  Nezavisimaya  gazeta, 
26 March 1997.
Under present conditions practically all the NIS have to manoeuvre, in order to avoid directly 
confronting the former centre of empire, where a new "Monroe doctrine", while not declared by 
the official executive authority, is being implemented in practice by the legislative authority.32 
The geopolitical location of the NIS and their regions can explain much in this context: both the 
international relations of each of them and the practical results of those relations.
It is quite natural for Russia to devote more attention to Abkhazia, which has a direct frontier 
with the Russian Federation and whose resorts have traditionally been the holiday destinations of 
Moscow's political, and more importantly military, elite (according to the press, Russian generals 
still use these resorts extensively and own holiday houses there33), than to other ethnic regions in 
the "near abroad".
Russia must not be regarded as some kind of "evil genius" who just wants to spoil things for 
Georgia or as too large to bother to keep a close eye on Georgia, or still less Abkhazia. Incon-
sistency in Transcaucasian policy is just an illusion: Russia wants safe borders, and artificially 
creating enemies for itself, even in the form of small states, cannot be in its interests. Russia 
would prefer Georgia to be tied to its policy and regards Abkhazia as a "good hook" to prevent 
Georgia from straying too far. But a strategic partnership with Georgia, if the latter always feels 
humbled and deprived of its rightful heritage, will be an unreliable one. Probably Russia simply 
"didn't have time" to settle the conflict. But the longer it takes to find time, the greater the number 
of other candidates for strategic partnership.
The actual possibility of other countries in the region influencing the settlement of the conflict at 
the moment are limited. Turkey, which has quickly become a leading power in the Black Sea 
area, even if inherently interested in extending its influence in the Caucasus, has expressed no 
intention of interfering in what it may regard as "an internal affair of the CIS". The world powers, 
even further  from the  region,  initially  confined themselves to  playing the  part  of  detached 
observer. "In the early years of the post-cold war period, Western governments failed to develop a 
clear regional concept of the Caucasus within the framework of their European security policies. 
Their interest in the region remained marginal. Their Caucasian policies were subordinated to 
their relations with Turkey and, especially, Russia."34 However, after the autumn of 1994, when 
the western countries' interest in developing Caspian oil began to increase sharply, their interest 
in Caucasian politics increased also. The issue of the route for transporting the oil and building 
pipelines went beyond purely economic decisions and became an issue of high policy.  It  is 
probable that Georgia's territory will be chosen for routing pipelines vital to the West.
On the other hand, as Coppieters states:
The issues of the oil wealth in the Caspian Sea and the routing of pipelines have dual conse-
quences. On the one hand, they make the pacification of this region by international agreements 
more imperative,  while,  at  the  same time,  they increase destabilization  by generating fierce 
international competition among those attempting to gain a foothold there. In the long term, the 
economic interests of all the players involved in the Caucasus lie in the lasting settlement of the 
main ethnic conflicts. This does not mean that any of these players is prepared to accept such 
32 D. Trenin, "Russia's Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region", in: B. Coppieters (ed.),  Con-
tested Borders in the Caucasus, Brussels, VUB Press, 1996, pp. 91-102.
33 Moskovski Komsomolets, 10 June 1997.
34 B. Coppieters, "Conclusions: The Caucasus as a Security Complex", in: B. Coppieters (ed.), Contested Bor-
ders in the Caucasus, op.cit., p. 196.
pacification unconditionally,  or that  they are all  pursuing a foreign policy based on primary 
economic interests.35
The new political realities in the Caucasus clearly increase the opportunity for foreign policy 
tactics for Georgia somewhat. Abkhazia, however, can only count on Russia, which in turn must 
want to "keep Georgia on the Abkhazian hook". If this becomes unnecessary, because a strategic 
partnership  with  Georgia  will  be  guaranteed without  it,  or  Russia  cannot  do  this  because 
circumstances  (for  example,  domestic  difficulties  or  active  intervention  by  international 
organisations) will not allow it to continue such a policy, Russia may cease its actual support for 
Abkhazia. Most probably Russia will not give up its traditional "hook" so easily, but may relax 
the tension on the line, the more so because an economic interest for Russian capital may be 
found in Georgia.
In the case of Georgia, foreign policy diversification  is becoming a vital priority. The steady 
though slow movement towards democracy, the achievement of internal political stability, the 
signs of economic revival and the definite marginalisation of radical nationalism are helping to 
increase international interest in Georgia. If its internal conflicts end happily this will enhance 
Georgia's  investment  value  and  may  bring  peace  and  welfare  to  all  parts  of  it,  including 
Abkhazia.
It is obvious that neither side is interested in resuming the war. An unbiased and impartial ne-
gotiator is essential for a peaceful solution to the conflict, a part that could be played  by inter-
national organisations. As for internal political geography, Tbilisi is definitely ready to overcome 
bitter internal opposition to the federalisation of Georgia and to offer Abkhazia a special status 
(and more rights and guarantees for the Abkhaz) within a  single state  –  an  "asymmetrical 
federation". The recognition of Abkhazia (actually –  the ethnic Abkhazians)  and the rest of 
Georgia as equal partners in the federation (actually a confederation) which is presented as a 
"concession" from the Abkhaz side, is equivalent to the recognition of Abkhazia's independence 
and is unacceptable to Tbilisi and to Georgian public opinion. Above all, in Georgia there are 
other  ethnic regions which would like to have a similar status, and this is the route to disin-
tegration of the state.
On the other hand it is understandable that Suhkumi is not ready to accept the proposal of a 
"special status for Abkhazia within a single Georgia", to let the refugees and IDPs return (there is 
a quite understandable fear of these people returning to their houses – destroyed or taken over by 
other families). The "burden of victory" outweighs any economic or other proposal based on 
rationality: it might be difficult to explain to the local public, still influenced by the euphoria of 
"military achievements", the necessity for real concessions to prevent a resumption of the war, 
especially when there is always faith in "invisible hand of the elder brother" which will come and 
help at the proper time. Nevertheless it is not always necessary to be defeated in order to learn 
something: the decision-makers must find the courage to persuade their people to look the future 
in the face and to come to a compromise.
Conclusion
Of the hypotheses set out above, the more self-evident seems to me to be that a single economic 
space will be advantageous to all of Georgia, including Abkhazia. The international community 
would also prefer to deal with a single Georgia rather than with several creatures of international 
law that  are too small,  the more so because the division of one country always revives the 
"domino effect". In addition, stability and peace in the region are guarantees of safety for foreign 
35 B. Coppieters, "Introduction", in: Ibid., p. 9.
investments.  The  possibility  that  Russia  will  find  a  profitable  economic  niche  in  the 
Transcaucasus cannot be ruled out. In addition Russia will be able to guarantee its strategic 
security  in  the  region  by  collaborating  with  Georgia  on  an  equal  footing,  not  by  con-
frontation.
Theoretically there are no serious obstacles to finding common points of contact between the 
Georgian and Abkhaz nations. However, the assumption that it will be relatively easy to over-
come the psychological problems of coexistence is not really justified: inter-ethnic relations have 
been seriously damaged by the civil war and its consequences to the point of incompa-tibility, 
which we hope is temporary. Perhaps initially,  after the refugees and IDPs have returned to 
Abkhazia, it will be better if conditions can be created for the two ethnic groups to live apart 
temporarily (e.g. in separate villages, towns or districts). From this point of view international 
organisations (e.g. by way of police forces to maintain public order) may be particularly helpful.
The greatest problem in settling the conflict arises from the issue of Abkhazia's political status 
and the geopolitical calculations of the third force. Restoring the territorial integrity of the single 
state is the aim of the Tbilisi  government, while Sukhumi regards this as unacceptable. In-
ternational organisations and the world community as a whole may play a decisive part in set-
tling the conflict.
Yuri Anchabadze
Georgia and Abkhazia: The Hard Road to Agreement
It is a truism that any war is concluded with a peace. However, the long-awaited peace does not 
come all at once. An end to military action does not mean that the parties are immediately ready 
to use political methods to settle the problems that could not be resolved on the field of battle. It 
takes time, sometimes a considerable period, before the parties can rid themselves of the inertia of 
confrontational thinking and make the transition from a categorical refusal to accept the enemy's 
position,  the  highest  degree  of  this  (refusal)  being  war,  to  a  dialogue  based  on  a  sober 
understanding  of  the  opportunities  for  alternative  solutions  and  mutual  compro-
mises.
Any social conflict, including inter-ethnic conflicts, has its own specific features, so the logic of 
its occurrence and pattern of development cannot be entirely explained by reference to general 
principles. The parties' route to peace is equally individualistic. It often fails to fit into the ex-
pected framework,  because  considerations of  logic  and  expediency frequently  give  way  to 
completely different arguments, governed on the one hand by the desire (normal in behind-the-
scenes diplomacy) to outsmart the other party, to obtain unilateral political advantages, to con-
solidate the results of the war or, conversely, to modify them, and the like. At the same time 
different priorities shape the parties' "peace" strategy. These priorities are governed to a con-
siderable extent by certain constants in the mass historical and ethno-social consciousness, acting 
as a prism through which a particular ethnic group scrutinises the prehistory of the conflict, the 
war and its results, as well as the desired outlines of the future peace. Considerations of this kind 
do not always find verbal expression at the official level. Often, however, it is their dominant 
influence that really bars the way to peace and agreement. The clashes in the four-year-long 
Georgian-Abkhazian peace dialogue  provide a  great  opportunity for tracing this extremely 
specific and peculiar phenomenon, which persists as a background to the negotiating process.
The parties' assessment of the historical experience of Abkhazian-Georgian relationships is a vital 
factor in the range of public moods connected with the war. To the Abkhazians this experience is 
entirely negative. Its principal landmarks are seen in the context of "Georgia's 100-year war 
against Abkhazia",1 and its main element is seen to be a constant drive by Georgia to absorb 
Abkhazia politically, demographically and ethnically. The historical memory of the Abkhazians 
still puts the sources of confrontation in the pre-revolutionary period, but the view is that the full 
offensive by Georgia against Abkhazia came during the Soviet years, reaching its high point 
during the Stalinist period. This period has been the source of many extremely painful memories 
in the recent history of the Abkhazians, particularly the successive reductions in the legal status 
of Abkhazia (a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921, and an Autonomous Republic as part of the 
Georgian SSR in 1931), the repressive policy of Georgianization implemented from the end of 
the 1930s to the beginning of the 1950s, the large-scale colonization of Abkhazian lands during 
the same period by settlers from Georgia, and the concept of ethnic identity of Abkhazians and 
Georgians officially approved as a "scientific truth".
During the post-Stalinist period the most offensive forms of Georgianization were eliminated. 
However, the purely formal nature of the autonomous republic's powers, the petty dependence of 
the local government upon the centre in Tbilisi, which in a number of cases could foist certain 
1 S. Lakoba, Stoletnyaya voina Gruzii protiv Abkhazii, Gagra, 1993.
decisions upon Sukhum, remained as irritants in Georgian-Abkhazian relations. The situation 
became explosive several times, in 1957, 1964, 1967 and 1987, and in July 1989 there were 
bloody inter-ethnic clashes with losses on both sides.
Anti-Georgian sentiments in Abkhazia received a fresh impetus in the recent post-war years and 
were directly linked to  political  processes in  Georgia  itself,  where ethnocratic,  unitary  and 
chauvinist tendencies were developing to an ever-increasing extent. These trends had been fairly 
apparent  under  the  last  communist  rulers,  and  reached  their  full  flowering  under  the 
Gamsakhurdia regime, where the view that there should be no autonomous ethnic groupings in 
an independent and sovereign Georgia was openly expressed. The accession to power of Eduard 
Shevardnadze, who was extremely unpopular  in Abkhazia, and the subsequent new wave of 
political and ideological confrontation between Sukhum and Tbilisi fixed the idea of Georgia's 
immemorial  hostility  to  Abkhazia  in  Abkhazian  public  consciousness,  thus  reinforcing the 
pressure to keep some distance between the two.
At the same time Georgian public consciousness was being shaped by two factors. Importance is 
attached to the view that Abkhazia has been a constituent part of Georgia since time immemorial 
and  historically  has  always  belonged to  Georgia,  so  that  the  prospect  of  independent  and 
individual development for Abkhazia is seen as nonsense, an infringement of the inalienable 
territorial rights of the Republic of Georgia. Up to the present, historical arguments have played a 
vital part in official Tbilisi ideology, and there have been repeated statements at the highest level 
that "there is not a single inch of non-Georgian land in Georgia", that "Georgia will yield its 
historic lands to no-one" and so on.
There is also another widespread myth – that Georgia has some kind of paternalist role in rela-
tion to the Abkhazians. The view is that the Abkhazians, who have had very favourable condi-
tions for social and cultural development in the Georgian Republic, have been able to retain their 
ethnic personality (again thanks to the single-minded solicitude of the Georgians), unlike the 
Caucasian peoples in the Russian autonomous republics, which  have allegedly been totally 
Russified. Therefore the idea persists in the Georgian public consciousness that the Abkhazians 
are "ungrateful" and are trying to separate from Georgia illegally.
Each party thus bases its view of future peaceful coexistence upon its own firmly fixed historical 
and ethno-cultural ideas of their past experience of Georgian-Abkhazian relations, the negative 
features of which must be eliminated – it is thought that there is no need for talk, as each party 
interprets the negative features in its own way.
The lack of unity of views on what essentially took place in Abkhazia in 1992-1993 is another 
important factor that makes it difficult to achieve consensus. To the Abkhazians, the events of 
those years were an inter-state war between Georgia and Abkhazia. Right at the start of military 
action, on 15 September 1992, the Praesidium of the Abkhazian Supreme Council passed an 
ordinance declaring that  "the armed attack  by the forces of the Georgian State  Council  on 
Abkhazia on 14 August 1992 and the occupation of part of its territory" was "an act of aggres-
sion against the Republic of Abkhazia".2 Later the idea of a patriotic war of liberation waged by 
the  Abkhazian  people  against  the  Georgian  invaders  took  root  in  the  Abkhazian  national 
consciousness.
For a long time the Georgian side could not define these events precisely, and still cannot do so. 
The first official assessments of the situation were heard on the third day of military action. On 
17  August 1992  the Georgian State Council issued a  statement that  the events in Abkhazia 
2 Abkhazia. Khronika voiny, Moscow, 1993, Part 2, p. 9.
signified "a revision of the existing frontiers of Georgia and the severance of part of its territory" 
and also "an attempt to complete the process of usurpation of power and to set up a monoethnic 
dictatorship". The State Council used these factors to justify the necessity for sending troops into 
Abkhazia, declaring its resolve "to snuff out the conflict at the very beginning".3
However, it proved to be impossible to snuff out the conflict, either at the very beginning or much 
later.  The  clashes involving  Georgian  and  Abkhazian  units  at  the  end  of  August  and  in 
September took on the features of large-scale military action which it became increasingly dif-
ficult to identify with the concept of "conflict". As a result the concept of war made its appear-
ance in the official Tbilisi lexicon, and in time the propaganda machine began to interpret it as 
"the struggle for the territorial integrity of Georgia". However, even in the early stages of military 
action Eduard Shevardnadze coined a "stronger" definition, declaring in one of his interviews that 
what was happening was "aggression by international terrorism against a sovereign state".4 After 
the defeat of the Georgian forces near Gagry at the beginning of October 1992, the concept of 
"aggression" became an integral part of Georgian propagandist clichés and official statements. 
Thus it was claimed in a letter dated 2 October 1992 from the State Committee to Dr. Boutros 
Ghali,  the  UN  Secretary  General,  that  "Georgian  forces have  been  the  subject  of  blatant 
aggression".5 Even today there is much talk in Georgia of "aggression", foreign intervention and 
the like.
The parties' evaluations of the practical results of the war naturally differ. In the Abkhazian view 
the war  ended with the expulsion of the Georgians from the republic,  the liberation of the 
motherland and victory in a just Patriotic War in which the Abkhazian people defended their 
right  to  self-determination as  a  national  state.  The  Georgians were deeply wounded by the 
military defeat and by the de facto establishment of Abkhazian sovereignty. In regarding the war 
as aggression, the Georgian side evaluates its results in the same terms; in particular it speaks of 
the annexation of part of the territory of Georgia. Incidentally this concept was also formulated in 
the  initial  stages of the  military  action.  Thus  Aleksandr  Kavsadze, who held an  important 
government post at the time, identified the situation that developed after the Gagry defeat and the 
Georgians' forced withdrawal from the Gagry bridgehead as the de facto annexation of part of 
the territory of the Georgian Republic.6 One of the recent Georgian political statements – made 
on 18 April 1997 by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia in exile – 
also refers to an "occupied historic region, Georgian from time immemorial".7
Though differing on many points of detail, the Georgian and Abkhazian evaluations of the war 
are similar in one respect – in denying that the conflict was ethnic in nature. Both Tbilisi and 
Sukhum insist that the sources of mutual  conflict were political,  and in a  sense this is true. 
However, conflicts between political elites carried over into the collective consciousness cannot 
fail to excite feelings of ethnic hostility. In this case, aggravated by the losses and sacrifices in the 
war, these feelings have led to strengthening of negative emotions: persistent mutual loathing in 
which everything on the opposite ethnic side is seen as hostile, hateful and indefensible by any 
moral law, so that liquidation and destruction are permissible.
3 Pamyatnaya zapiska "O sobytiyakh v Abkhazskoy avtonomnoy respublike", Svobodnaya Gruziya, 20 August 
1992.
4 E. Shevardnadze, 'Shulerskoe razygryvanie etnonatsional'nykh "kart" sozdast  problemy ne tol'ko v Gruzii', 
Svobodnaya Gruziya, 3 September 1992.
5 Svobodnaya Gruziya, 3 October 1992.
6 Svobodnaya Gruziya, 13 October 1992.
7 Svobodnaya Gruziya, 19 April 1997.
In the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, these features – typical of any war – took the form of mutual 
atrocities and  vandalism .  In  a  special  statement by the  Committee on Human Rights and 
International Relations the Georgian side made veiled references to atrocities against the enemy, 
in  particular  the torture  of hostages and prisoners, "raids on the peaceful population"8 (this 
euphemism covered stealing and looting), etc. and in a number of manifestations of "ethnic" war 
and the burning in Sukhum on 22 October 1992 of the Abkhazian State Archive and the Institute 
for Language, Literature and History. These could obviously have no military importance, so 
their destruction should be seen as an attempt to damage the enemy's spiritual heritage. At about 
the same time something similar was happening in the Balkans, where throughout 1992 Serbian 
artillery was systematically destroying Dubrovnik. Here also there was no military necessity for 
the destruction of this magnificent monument of pan-Slav culture. In the words of Professor Ivo 
Bonaca, an ethnic Croat, the aim was "to inflict serious injury upon the most intimate parts of the 
Croatian national consciousness".9 Manifestations of ethnic intolerance were also characteristic of 
the  Abkhazians.  As they squeezed the  Georgian  forces at  the  end of  September 1993  the 
advancing Abkhazian units totally destroyed Georgian villages, the inhabitants of which had 
abandoned their homes by that time and had fled into Georgia proper.
At present the psychological aims of both peoples have not changed; allowance should therefore 
be made for the fact that the road to a true peace may be made harder by yet another factor – 
acute mutual antipathy between Georgians and Abkhazians. Today extremely negative, low and 
pejorative images and assessments of each other prevail in the collective consciousness. The 
period of  political  and  ideological  confrontation,  then the  war,  have altered  the  traditional 
assessments,  making  them unambiguously  negative.  The  Georgian  example  is  particularly 
striking in is respect. Georgians as a whole had a fairly high opinion of Abkhazians, who were 
seen as a nation with a rich traditional culture, which in some respects was a point of reference 
for Georgian culture. "Brought up (well) like an Abkhazian" – this Megrelian saying is clear 
evidence of the recognition of Abkhazian cultural standards as the ideal for the local Caucasian 
ethno-cultural milieu. The heroic status and idealization of the Abkhazian were also features of 
Georgian  classical  literature,  particularly  in  the  works  of  Akakii  Tsereteli  and  Konstantin 
Gamsakhurdia.
With the onset of the conflict, however, the traditional stereotypes began to change; positive 
characteristics gave way to negative ones, and high opinions were pushed out by disparaging and 
sharply negative descriptions. Abkhazians were viewed in the Georgian collective consciousness 
as  some kind  of  wild,  uncivilised  and  uncultured  people  without  their  own ethno-cultural 
potential and incapable of self-development or of achieving high cultural standards. An extremely 
negative view was taken of the role of Abkhazians in the history of Georgia. In line with the 
views of certain Georgian academics, extensively popularised at the time, Abkhazians were seen 
as relatively recent migrants from the mountainous regions of the North-Western Caucasus who 
had resettled in traditional Georgian lands as the seventeenth century gave way to the eighteenth, 
in  part  driving  out  and  in  part  assimilating  the  aboriginal  Georgian  popu-
lation residing there.
The widespread idea that the Abkhazians were in general Muslims, a  negative feature in the 
collective consciousness of Georgians, was also incorrect. The following sentence trotted out in 
"Svobodnaya Gruziya" by one of the most severe critics of Vladislav Ardzinba, is typical in is 
respect: "What more can be expected of a man who said many years ago: I am a Muslim and will 
8 Svobodnaya Gruziya, 12 January 1993.
9 Sevodnya, 25 January 1993.
do all I can to link myself to the Muslim world".10 Apparently affiliation to one of the three world 
religions – Islam – is in itself an unworthy act, and a person desiring it is capable of only the 
basest acts.
In addition to the ideas that the Abkhazians were in general Muslims, they were seen as an 
extensively Russified people, also a completely negative feature in the collective consciousness of 
Georgians. The main arguments in support of the Russification of the Abkhazians are the high 
percentage of people (in particular when compared with Georgians) who have no command of 
the mother tongue but are Russophone, the absence of secondary and higher education in the 
Abkhazian language and political gravitation towards Russia.
The gravitation of Abkhazia towards Russia does indeed occur, and in this case it  probably 
cannot be denied that the free bilingualism of the Abkhazians gives them a good grasp of the 
basic parameters of Russian culture. This naturally stimulated post-Soviet integration aspirations, 
and accordingly a lack of knowledge of the Georgian language meant that Georgian culture was 
closed  to  Abkhazians;  other  things  being  equal,  this  would  always  act  as  a  factor  for 
disintegration.
Nonetheless the principal factors in the Russian orientation of Abkhazians are historical and 
political, not elements of culture and everyday life, the more so because the "Russification" of the 
Abkhazians is no more than a myth. The reduction in the active area of the Abkhazian language 
did not entail erosion of the people's ethnic consciousness or a transition to Russian standards of 
culture and lifestyle; in that event it might have been possible to say that the Abkhazians had 
been Russified.
However this reality, obvious to any unbiased observer, is ignored by the Georgian side. This 
"Russification" of the Abkhazians is explained in Tbilisi as a conscious effort by Kremlin poli-
ticians to detach Abkhazians from Georgians, to replace the allegedly historical Georgian ori-
entation typical of Abkhazians by a Russian orientation and in so doing secure a Russian pres-
ence in the Georgian land of Abkhazia.
This constant in the contemporary public consciousness of Georgians is part of a broader stratum 
of contemporary public attitudes linked with Russian-Georgian relations, their historical context 
and present prospects that ultimately shaped Georgians' negative  views of Russia and Russians. 
These ideas spring from beliefs that relations with Russia have been to Georgia's detriment. Thus 
Georgians take the view that their country has been annexed by Russia twice – first in 1801, 
when the emperor Alexander I,  having deposed the Bagrationi dynasty, abolished the Kartli-
Kakhetian kingdom by bringing it into the administrative and territorial system of the Russian 
Empire, and for the second time in 1921, when the forces of Soviet Russia invaded the territory 
of the Georgian democratic republic, overthrew its government and put the local communists in 
power. The view of the history of the 70-year  Soviet regime is particularly emotional. This 
period is seen in an exclusively negative light, as a time of social and cultural regression due to 
the single-minded suppression of the Georgian people's national aspirations and encroachment 
upon its ethnic rights.
In these circumstances the idea that the Russians have a secret dislike of Georgia dies hard. These 
negative tendencies in the Soviet history of Georgia referred to above are linked to the concealed 
Georgiophobia of the Russians, at times hating the freedom-loving Georgian people, who have 
tried repeatedly to cast off the shackles of the Soviet empire. Even Eduard Shevardnadze has 
expressed this constant feature of Georgian consciousness. In his appeal to Boris Yeltsin during 
10 "Nashi narody nevozmozhno razdelit''', Svobodnaya Gruziya, 24 March 1993.
the struggle for Sukhum accusing him of failing to help, the President of Georgia wrote: "What is 
our offence in the eyes of Russia and the world? Is it not that  many times in the history of the 
Georgian people we have desired freedom and independence for ourselves?". On the whole this 
matches the widely held Georgian view  of the  "sacrificial"  nature  of their  history,  of the 
casualties suffered by the Georgian people during those years and of Russia's constant plots 
against Georgia.
It is important to recognise that on the whole the Abkhazian problem is also seen in Georgia 
through the prism of a Russian complex. All the difficulties in Georgian-Abkhazian relations are 
seen as the result of Russian intrigues. The very formation of a national Soviet state system for 
the Abkhazians in 1921 is regarded as part of a cunning Russian plan to weaken Georgia, to 
inject the germs of future separatism into its unitary state body. The birth of the Abkhazian 
national movement in the 1960s was not seen as independent either. The widely held view in 
Georgia was that Abkhazia had very favourable conditions for social, economic and cultural 
development as part of the Georgian SSR, not to be compared with the oppressed state of other 
Soviet autonomous regions, particularly in the Russian Federation. Accordingly the Abkhazians 
had no grounds for dissatisfaction, and the periodic Abkhazian disturbances aimed at  taking 
Abkhazia out  of Georgia were again said to be the result of Kremlin plots. G.  Nodia drew 
attention to this feature of the Georgian social consciousness, observing that the Ossetians and the 
Abkhazians "were seen not as  fighting for their  own rights, but  as  siding with "them" (the 
Kremlin) against "us" (Georgia)".11 The view still prevails in Georgia that all the political shocks 
that the republic has suffered in recent years, including the conflicts in Abkhazia (and in South 
Ossetia), have been inspired by some "third force", which is usually taken to mean Russia and its 
secret agents.
This constant feature of Georgian social consciousness was also apparent in assessing the course 
and results of the 1992-1993 war and its causes. It was obvious to many in Georgia from the 
very beginning that the war in Abkhazia had been plotted and planned in the offices of the 
Kremlin.  Academician  A.  Bakradze,  a  very distinguished figure  in  contemporary  Georgian 
culture, asserted that "we (i.e. the Georgians: author) know what a cunning plan the Russian 
government thought  up  against  Georgia.  It  is  to  Russia's  advantage  to  create  a  Karabakh 
situation in Abkhazia..."12 The Gagry defeat of the Georgian forces provided fresh grounds for 
allegations of Russian involvement in the conflict. A letter from the Georgian State Council to 
Manfred Wörner stated that "the conspiracy between the Abkhazian separatists and reactionary 
forces in Russia is quite obvious".13 Eduard Shevardnadze has repeatedly supported this posi-
tion by declaring, for example, that "powerful imperialist and fundamentalist forces" were behind 
the Abkhazian separatists.14 The statement by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic 
of Abkhazia in exile already quoted is even more specific. It  states that  our  neighbour, the 
Russian Federation, inspired the conflict and today land Georgian from time immemorial  is 
occupied under its direct control and with the participation of its reactionary forces.15 However, it 
is  not quite clear what is meant by "reactionary forces", because definitions differ and they are 
referred to somewhat vaguely,  sometimes as the Russian generals, sometimes as  communist 
opposition circles,  sometimes as a chauvinist great power and sometimes all of these.
11 G. Nodia, "Political  Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia", in:  Bruno Cop-
pieters (ed.), Contested Borders in the Caucasus, Brussels, VUBPress, 1996, p. 84.
12 Svobodnaya Gruziya, 4 November 1992.
13 Svobodnaya Gruziya, 6 October 1992.
14 Svobodnaya Gruziya, 1 January 1993.
15 Svobodnaya Gruziya, 19 April 1997.
It is obvious that the persistent efforts to make Russia the sole culprit cloak a desire by the 
Georgian side to justify its defeat in the war, the more so because the Georgian public eagerly 
accepts this version. The general background of anti-Russian feeling in Georgia also makes this 
version easier to believe. However, such a position is of necessity an obstacle on the way to 
peaceful mutual  understanding, because it  reduces the possibility of the Georgians properly 
assessing their own role and the errors that led to an escalation in the tragic events of 1992-1993; 
the opportunities for a rational diplomatic strategy are reduced accordingly.
The principal issue at the present stage of negotiations is the future of political relations between 
Georgia and Abkhazia. The parties' views on this issue are diametrically opposed. The Georgian 
public consciousness is finding it difficult to adjust to the idea of a federal arrangement. Eduard 
Shevardnadze's former statement to the effect that  Georgia  is not ready for this reflects the 
substance of the matter very clearly. In any event, even several years ago few in Georgia could 
tolerate the thought that future development for Georgia was possible outside a unitary state and 
political organization. Thus an analysis of the programmes of Georgian political parties going to 
the polls in October 1992 shows that most of them saw Georgia either as a unitary state or, if the 
autonomous regions were allowed to exist, these should be under strict control by the central 
authority.
Eduard Shevardnadze's position was no less clear. When addressing parliament on 17 November 
1992  he rejected the idea of federal links between Georgia and Abkhazia, declaring that the 
Georgian authorities were "prepared to consider only defining the legal status of the Abkhazian 
autonomous region".16 According to Shevardnadze this was the only thing that the Abkhazians 
could rely on as part of Georgia. The tone of the debate on the agreement of 4 April 1994 in the 
Georgian parliament is highly symptomatic also. The agreement was severely criticised by the 
legislators because, in the opinion of most of them, it undermined the unitary foundations of the 
Georgian state, dooming it to a federal, and what is more to a confederative, system.
Meanwhile the idea  of federalization as  a  possible way of settling the Georgian-Abkhazian 
conflict, though not without its difficulties, is nevertheless gaining ground in Georgia. Many 
Georgians already understand that a classic unitary approach can hardly form a basis for the 
internal  arrangements of the state.  Georgia  regards the  latter  as  a  meaningful  compromise. 
However, it is difficult to understand how realistic outlines for a future federal union are viewed 
in Tbilisi.
Very highly placed Georgian public servants, including Eduard Shevardnadze, have declared 
repeatedly that Abkhazia would be given the widest possible powers of autonomous self-gov-
ernment as part of Georgia, taking into account world experience and appropriate legal stan-
dards. Abkhazia's rights to its own constitution, national emblem, flag, national anthem and so on 
are offered as the attributes of independence.
Certain  other nuances in the Georgian position are  very striking, in  particular  the previous 
statement that  Georgia  would  give Abkhazia  the  same powers that  Russia  would  grant  to 
Chechnya. This position, stated by Eduard Shevardnadze at the height of the military action in 
Chechnya, reflected his belief both in a final victory by the federal centre over the forces of 
Chechen separatism and in a firm approach by Moscow to post-war relations between the Centre 
and Chechnya. For obvious reasons, the present situation in Russian-Chechen relations makes it 
inconvenient to refer to Chechen status as a prototype for the future legal position of Abkhazia. 
That is why rhetoric on this topic has disappeared from the official Georgian vocabulary.
16 Svobodnaya Gruziya, 20 November 1992.
The leaders of Abkhazia have already cast off the romanticism of the first few months after the 
victory, when Sukhum was counting on final separation from Georgia, complete independence 
and international legal status. Today Abkhazia has been forced to agree to the possibility of 
coexistence with Georgia as part of a kind of unified (common) state, which will thus restore the 
Soviet frontiers of the Georgian SSR.
At the same time the model for the internal state system proposed in Tbilisi will not be accepted 
in Abkhazia, in particular any versions whereby Abkhazia joins Georgia as an autonomous entity 
but an administrative tie is retained in relations between Sukhum and Tbilisi. Promises that 
Abkhazia will be granted extensive autonomous rights, including the right to a constitu-tion, an 
anthem, an emblem, a flag and so on sound like no more than empty words, especially in the light 
of  the  historical  parallels:  during  the  previous  autonomous  period  as  part  of  Georgia  the 
Abkhazians already had most  of  the  attributes  in  the list,  but  this  did  not  save Georgian-
Abkhazian relations from difficulties and conflicts. In addition, they are convinced in Abkhazia 
that the Tbilisi government will never implement the promised "extensive rights" in practice. 
However, above all  the view in Sukhum is that  the Georgian proposals do not take today's 
realities into account, in particular the war and its results.
In the end Abkhazia is prepared to build its relationships with Georgia within the framework of a 
union state only on the basis of equality, and the view in Sukhum is that this principle should be 
the foundation of the future state system. Accordingly Sukhum is refusing to grant Tbilisi any 
exclusive powers, agreeing only on joint jurisdiction in such areas as foreign policy, defence, 
finance, the frontier and customs service and some others.
The diplomatic activity in the summer of 1997, culminating in the sensational meeting in Tbilisi 
on 14 August between Eduard Shevardnadze  and Vladislav Ardzinba, gave rise to hopes of an 
important breakthrough on the way to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. However, these hopes 
proved to be unjustified. Both sides suspended the movement that had just begun and the Russian 
mediator, who had embarked upon his task so eagerly and purposefully, unexpectedly withdrew 
into the shadows and the negotiating process reverted to its usual sluggish state. On the whole the 
diplomatic  commotion  in  the  summer  did  more  harm  than  good;  not  only  did  it  end 
inconclusively,  it  also gave the parties fresh grounds for distrusting each other.  Now much 
greater diplomatic efforts, or some extraordinary event forcing them into realistic arrangements, 
are needed before Shevardnadze and Ardzinba can meet again at the negotiating table. As a result 
the parties' positions have remained substantially unchanged, and in particular Tbilisi has again 
attempted to intensify its activities along the lines already approved. Thus Shevardnadze again 
observed, at the meeting of heads of CIS countries in October 1997 in Kishinev, that Russia's 
peacekeeping efforts were ineffective and called upon President Yeltsin to step up blockade 
sanctions against Abkhazia and to take more decisive action to ensure the return of Georgian 
refugees.
Russia's peacekeeping strategy is certainly in need of modification, because at present it is ex-
tremely ambiguous. While today the Russian peacekeeping contingent on the River Ingur is the 
sole guarantee that military action will not be renewed on the line of Georgian-Abkhazian con-
frontation, the blockade sanctions against Abkhazia applied by the frontier forces on the other 
frontier on the River Psou serve to fuel the smouldering conflict, because it is obvious that a 
blockade is one of the most effective measures in the arsenal of war, but not of peace.
Meanwhile Russia's peacekeeping potential can show itself, not in trying to suffocate one of the 
parties to the conflict by a blockade and not by attempts to impose a particular peace agreement 
on the parties,  but  by guiding Tbilisi  and Sukhum to  a  direct,  independent and unassisted 
dialogue with each other. Of course, appropriate conditions must be created for this, and the first 
step should be the complete lifting of the blockade on Abkhazia without reservations and with no 
preconditions. There can be no normal dialogue while one party to the conflict is awaiting the 
final suffocation of the other, and the latter is preparing itself for a fresh tightening of blockade 
sanctions against it or a possible invasion from across the river. However, as soon as the parties 
understand that from now on they themselves have to solve their problems, together, without 
looking to third forces for help or hostility, when clearly the machinery for achieving peace must 
be commensurate with their own resources and capabilities, they will be able to demonstrate 
political will and begin a realistic search for the road to peace.
Gia Tarkhan-Mouravi
The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict in a Regional Context
In March 1996 a meeting of Georgian and Abkhaz intellectuals was organized in Moscow. In the 
ensuing common declaration, signed among others by Yuri Anchabadze, one of the co-editors of 
this volume, several ideas were put forward, with which I would fully agree:
"It is of no use to accuse one another, trying to find out who actually started the violence (...) 
Dialogue should be sought instead."
"Prior to discussing the issue of the future legal status of Abkhazia, it is necessary to develop a 
system of social and political guarantees that can secure peace in Abkhazia and a just settlement 
of the conflict."
"It is necessary to secure the return of all refugees to Abkhazia."
Unfortunately, mutual accusations and the abuse of tendentiously selected historic factography to 
prove a particular viewpoint still remain typical of the Abkhazian-Georgian dialogue. The reader 
of this volume may judge if its contributors have succeeded in escaping this form of unproductive 
polemics.
The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict from a Comparative Regional Perspective
The  post-cold  war  world,  with  its  numerous  conflicts  emerging against  the  background  of 
competing globalization and de-globalization trends, is confronted with the problem of how to 
reduce intra-regional confrontation and promote a co-operative model. It is therefore necessary to 
develop precise definitions, criteria and indicators for determining the nature, role and influence 
of the main factors contributing both to conflicts and to effective co-operation.
Widespread inter-ethnic confrontation and conflict are relatively new phenomena in the former 
Soviet Union. Governments are experiencing difficulty in maintaining the forms of co-existence 
that were customary in the Soviet past and in designing strategies to facilitate co-existence and 
co-operation.  There  is  no  guarantee  that  the  political  support  and  commitment  needed to 
formulate and follow a  sustainable strategy will be forthcoming. In a  situation in which the 
national  and  international  institutions  that  should  take  responsibility  for  co-ordinating  the 
regional co-operation process are not working properly, or are even absent, it is essential to build 
partnerships, devise flexible strategies and build a consensus around co-operation priorities.
Since the end of the 1980s, ethno-territorial conflicts have become the most noticeable aspect of 
the new political  reality in the Caucasus,  ruining stability,  development prospects and even 
elementary economic self-sufficiency. There are five zones where wars and mass violence have 
erupted in the region during this period: Karabakh, Tskhinvali (South Ossetia), Abkhazia, Os-
setia-Ingushetia and Chechnya.
The high concentration of conflicts in the Caucasus is often ascribed to the Russian secret service, 
to military or political forces fomenting antagonism, or to the particular cultures of the peoples 
inhabiting this region, supposedly characterized by intolerance and aggressiveness. All three 
explanations are unsatisfactory. The inability of ethnic groups to coexist should be seen as the 
result of failed institutional regulations rather than inborn qualities or geopolitical factors. This 
does not mean that an analysis of the roots of conflict in the Caucasus should overlook the role of 
external  manipulation  (the  "hidden  hand"  factor)  or  its  relation  to  (specific)  internal 
"spontaneous" players in the region. It is not easy to determine to what extent an analysis of the 
conflicts may show them to be due to primarily intrinsic, spontaneous causes or, on the contrary, 
the result of deliberate external decisions, in particular in a situation where there are no empirical 
data on the genesis of the conflicts. It is also of the utmost importance to identify the real interests 
of the opposing population groups, interests which differ both from the declared goals and from 
the particular interests of the political élites. Nor should the specific nature of the Caucasian 
context be either underestimated or overestimated, in particular Caucasian cultural traditions and 
the geostrategic importance of the region. Some aspects of the Caucasian context, which are 
worth considering separately, are presented below.
Territorial Factor, Boundaries and Geography
All conflicts, as they involve an attempt to change the political status of a particular territory, are 
essentially territorial in nature. All Caucasian conflicts are – in more up-to-date terminology – 
sovereignty conflicts.  The sacred value  ascribed to  territory and homeland can be observed 
world-wide, but  has particular  consequences in the Caucasus,  with its  extremely diversified 
population, its vague notion of ethnic rights on a particular territory, and the persistence of the 
Soviet legacy (including the legacy of arbitrarily drawn borders, of forced migrations and of the 
myth of the titular nation). In such circumstances, conflicts on boundaries and territories tend to 
be rather explosive.
The availability of an external border and access to other states or areas populated by ethnically 
proximate people, or having an outlet to the sea, is of the utmost importance to the Caucasian 
peoples. It was no coincidence that one of the most sensitive aspects of the Karabakh problem 
was the absence of any such external border (hence the claim on the Lachin corridor). Likewise, 
it was significant that the Confederation of the Caucasian Peoples1 chose Sukhumi as its capital, 
due to its seaside location. Russia too perceives an outlet to the sea as a very sensitive issue, 
especially since the dramatic shrinking of its Black Sea coastline. In so far as all the conflicts in 
the Caucasus are, in one way or another, linked to the traumatic loss of imperial power by 
Russia, this Russian perception has great importance for the region as a whole.
Russia and the Question of External Manipulation
Many analysts, especially those from the region itself, tend to ascribe all  problems and defi-
ciencies in the policies of Caucasian governments and movements to the "Russian factor". A 
critique of this position does not mean that this factor should be underestimated. Russia is indeed 
actively involved in all the conflicts here, not only through its peace-keepers or paratroopers, but 
also through the arms trade (it sells weaponry to all sides in a conflict, though it is selective as to 
quality and quantity), through manipulative activities involving economic levers, or through the 
activities of its military and intelligence services. As Olivier Roy writes: "In the early 1990s 
Moscow had actively encouraged conflicts in the Caucasus while presenting itself as an honest 
1 The Confederation of Caucasian Peoples (initially the Confederation of Mountainous Peoples of the Cauca-
sus) is a loose association of national movements which claim to represent most of the North-Caucasian na-
tions. It was created just before the break-up of the Soviet Union and was actively involved in all the conflicts 
apart from Karabakh. It has been dominated by the Abkhaz, the Adyghes and the Chechens.
broker between the combatants."2 As a rule, Russian policies are inconsistent and contradictory, 
but they possess incomparably greater resources than any of the local forces. All conflicts in the 
Caucasus  are  connected  with  the  presence  of  Russian  troops,  whether  these  are  actively 
participating (Chechnya, Abkhazia), performing the role of peace-keepers (Ossetia, Abkhazia), 
or acting as trainers and advisors (Karabakh). Greater sympathy among the Russian military and 
political establishments for one of the fighting sides is apparent in each of these conflicts (the 
retreat from Chechnya and the absence of peace-keepers in Karabakh constitute exceptions in this 
respect).
The North Caucasians well remember the 1991 visit by the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to 
the region, when he promised the Ingush assistance in the conflict with the Ossetians concerning 
the Prigorodny district, and when, in a second speech, he promised the Ossetians to defend them 
against Ingush ambitions. Not only did the very creation of the Ingush republic (without even 
delimiting its  borders)  contravene the  Russian  Constitution,  but  it  was  seemingly designed 
specifically by one of the interest groups in power to be a source of permanent tension, although 
hardly  beneficial  to  Russian  national  interests.  Such  a  prevalence  of  short-term  group  or 
individual  interests  over  long-term  strategic  interests,  although  not  unfamiliar  elsewhere, 
dominates the political scene in the post-Soviet world. In the case of Russia, this contradiction is 
even more  complicated  by  post-imperial  nostalgia.  Another  specific  illustration  of  Russian 
inconsistencies and contradictory policies was the arrest, in the early stages of the Georgian-
Abkhaz conflict, of the leader of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus, 
Musa Shanibov, a former professor of Scientific Communism – allegedly for organizing military 
and terrorist activities on Georgian territory. The attempt to repress the Confederation turned this 
little-known local politician into a popular regional figure; there were certain signs (such as the 
clumsy way in which he was arrested and then released) that these consequences were calculated 
in advance, even if counter-productive to other policies.
On the one hand, the Chechen war demonstrated the possibility of successful opposition to the 
Russian state machinery, and hence served as an example to radical separatists; on the other, 
however, it  demonstrated the readiness of the Russian State to deploy immense resources to 
suppress such separatist movements by force. In the consciousness of the Caucasian people, 
Chechnya pointed to the real anti-Caucasian aggressors, and shifted previously anti-Georgian 
sentiments northwards. At the same time, many Georgian politicians hoped that the Chechen war 
would lead to a change in the Russian attitude towards the Abkhazian problem. But Russia's 
unwillingness or inability to resolve the Abkhaz conflict betrayed these hopes.
The Russian policy towards one or other of the ethnic groups is also a very important factor. 
With the exception of the Chechens, who were themselves involved in a war with Russia, all the 
parties involved in the Caucasian conflicts tried to solicit Russia's support, usually appealing to 
that country as an arbiter. Such an appeal aimed to enforce their own position in the conflict or in 
its settlement. Political support to Russia or to the Russian government, in the form of electoral 
support (for instance in North Ossetia  and Ingushetia) or in the form of military bases (for 
instance from the Georgian side in  the  Abkhazian conflict),  are  offered in  exchange for  a 
favourable attitude from the arbiter. Such political calculations by the local élites reflect their 
lack of confidence in their own power. By appealing to an external arbiter they are showing their 
lack of any sense of responsibility for the conflicts in which they are involved. Their appeal for 
Russian support also shows that they overestimate Russia's potential to solve the conflicts in the 
Caucasus. Russia is still perceived as an external arbiter, a father-figure, whose force is decisive 
2 Olivier Roy, 'Crude manoeuvres', Index on Censorship, 4, 1997, p. 148.
in the final outcome of this game. Although it could initially have played a decisive role in these 
conflicts, it now seems, however, to be not only unwilling but also unable to resolve them.
Demographic Balance
All the conflicts are  characterized by radical  demographic changes in the period before the 
eruption of the conflict (peaceful migration, forced deportations under Stalin) and during the 
conflict itself (refugees, ethnic cleansing). These demographic changes lead to perceptions of a 
threat and an acute sense of insecurity. An ethnic group – or its élites – may fear that a weaken-
ing of its demographic position could, in the long run, radically alter the balance of power and the 
redistribution of available resources to its disadvantage. Such perceptions, even if they are not 
confirmed by the use of force by the party whose increasing demographic potential is feared, may 
lead to "preventive action" and hence to violent conflict.
Demography is an important, sometimes even a decisive, issue in the effort by the traditional 
political élites to preserve their privileged position by increasing the "weight" of their respective 
ethnic group. The case of the Western Caucasian peoples – who experienced severe demographic 
losses after the end of the great Caucasian War in 1864, when Muslims from the Caucasus were 
either expelled by force or voluntarily emigrated to Turkey –  is notable in this respect. The 
Abkhazian leadership, for instance, is attempting to attract members of their own diaspora in 
Turkey and the Middle East to return and repopulate the country.
Patterns in Argumentation on Territorial Claims and Popular Myths
The Soviet heritage – including the loose definition of the borders between federal units, the 
arbitrary attribution of territorial and political status to the so-called titular nations and the Sta-
linist ideological tradition on the nationality question (definition of "nationality", hierarchical 
distinction between "people" and "ethnos", etc.) – is present in all the conflicts. Symbolic acts and 
statements as well as all sorts of national myths are inflated in the first stage of the conflicts, 
while  the  present  stage  is  characterized by the  gradually  diminishing significance of  these 
symbolic acts, statements and myths. All parties in the conflict had and have a pragmatic – some 
may even say cynical – approach to universal democratic norms and international law, appealing 
to those norms and provisions that they find useful for themselves and ignoring others. Double 
standards are commonplace. As Tim Potier stated recently:  "The government and people of 
Georgia should not be blamed for 'claiming' what international law says is rightfully theirs. If the 
Abkhaz were in their position, they would be doing exactly the same."3
The demand for exclusive rights to a specific territory by one ethnic group or another is often 
linked to the demand for "autochthonous" status, while only "guest" status is attributed to other 
groups. Such claims are generally based on an arbitrary use of historical facts. Some Georgian 
scholars have argued, for instance, that the Abkhazians came to Abkhazia from the North Cau-
casian mountains only recently. This, it is argued, is proved by the lack of an Abkhazian word for 
"sea". The Abkhazian scientists in turn have selected other arguments from the scant historical 
information available to argue that, on the contrary, it is the Georgians who should be regarded 
as newcomers to a region that was part of the Abkhazian Kingdom in the Middle Ages. In the 
same vein, Armenians claim historical rights to Karabakh, although most sources show that the 
3 Tim Potier, The Constitutional Future of the Post-Soviet Caucasian Autonomous Republics, Briefing Paper, 
unpublished.
Caucasian Albanians inhabited the region. Azeri sources claim that most of the Armenians in this 
region are descendants of the Armenian migrants from Iran and Turkey who came to Karabakh 
during  the  19th  century,  after  the  Russian  military  victories.  The  Azeris  claim  to  be  the 
descendants and heirs of the Christian Albanian population, and thus the real autochthonous 
inhabitants of Karabakh.
Some political claims are easier to substantiate with historical facts than others. Thus it is easily 
proved that there were next to no Ossetians among the population of Tskhinvali until the 1920s, 
or that  the Ingush actually did inhabit the right bank of the Terek river before their forced 
deportation to Central Asia at the end of the second world war, when the territory was offered to 
the Ossetians (supposedly more loyal to the Soviet regime). In cases like these, the opposing 
party may indeed find it difficult to substantiate its political claims using historical material. The 
legitimacy of the whole argument based on the difference between autochthonous and immigrant 
peoples may also be rejected by such a party, which then tries to legitimize its political claims by 
a relatively more recent historic past, for example, along the following lines: "Those who are 
currently occupying a territory should have all the rights to it" – as in the case of the Magyars 
who settled in Hungary some centuries ago, or the Turks, who have occupied Constantinople 
since the 15th  century.  In  both types of  legitimization,  history is  manipulated  for  political 
reasons. The impact of such historical arguments on the public consciousness of all the ethnic 
groups living in the Caucasus is a strong a strong factor in the generation of conflicts.
A vaguely defined right to self-determination is the main argument in all the disputes mentioned 
above, with the sole exception of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict. In the case of Abkhazia, this right 
conflicts with the democratic principle of majority rule, but in South Ossetia, where the Ossetians 
constitute a majority, it does not. This is yet another demonstration of the instrumental use of 
historical, demographic and legal arguments in various conflicts.
Different Levels of Ethnic Identity and Religion
Different levels may be distinguished in the ethnic self-identification of the Caucasian peoples. 
The Ingush and the Chechens consider that they have very distinct identities, but at the same time 
they stress their ethnic affinity (their languages belong to the Vainakh, or Nakh, group). They 
also regard themselves as Caucasians, and are ready in some cases to prove this latter identity by 
political or even military action. Likewise, the Abkhazians and the Circassians set great store by 
their ethnic proximity, as well as their Caucasian identity. The barbaric neologism currently 
popular in Russia, "a person of Caucasian nationality" – which reflects the general repressive, 
anti-Caucasian mood in that country – effectively strengthens this common identity.
Peoples who speak Turkic and Indo-European languages also have to define their place within 
the framework of this common Caucasian identity. Not only peoples like the above-mentioned 
Circassians, but  also Balkars,  Ossetians and Kumyks should be taken into account.  These, 
however, are far less active in the pan-Caucasian integration processes (e.g. in the Confederation 
of Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus).
Another feature peculiar to the conflicts mentioned above is that they all take place between 
groups belonging to markedly different linguistic families (Slavic Russians/Kartvelian Georgi-
ans/Iranian Ossetians/Turkic Azeris/Vainakh Ingush and Chechens, Abkhazians of the Adygho-
Abkhaz group, and Armenians). Linguistically related ethnic groups support each other, as in the 
case of the Ingush and Chechens, or the Abkhaz and Adyghes. This is one of the reasons why 
ethnogenetic theories and myths play a much greater role in the Caucasus, while the religious 
factor is secondary, contrary to places like the former Yugoslavia where the ethnic conflicts take 
place between groups that are closely related linguistically but are denominationally distinct.
The role of the religious factor in the Caucasian conflicts is commonly overestimated. Although 
in some cases (e.g. Chechnya, with its strong Islamic networks) religion may play a significant 
role, local political élites generally display a rather pragmatic manipulative attitude towards it. 
After  his return  to  Georgia,  Shevardnadze lost  no time in  getting baptized –  by the  more 
Orthodox name of Giorgi. The Abkhaz president Ardzinba promised to build a mosque in order 
to placate the religious feelings of his more devoted Muslim Abkhazian compatriots in Turkey. 
The population, meanwhile, has to a great extent lost its initial interest in religious ceremonies, 
revived after perestroika.  Religious symbols may,  however, become more powerful during a 
prolonged military action against opponents of a  different religious creed. This happened in 
Chechnya, where there is a still significant Sufi tradition and where the historical memory of the 
19th century jihad against the Russians is still very much alive. Now many Chechens support the 
introduction of shariat principles into penitentiary practice, though they may often be unable to 
demonstrate a basic knowledge of its fundamental principles.
Economic Factors
The economic interests of Russian and Caucasian states and the volume of resources that they are 
ready to deploy in order to achieve particular political goals need to be assessed in detail. Among 
these, the economic interests and resources of various élites and groups – such as the arms and 
drug dealers, oil companies and multinationals – have to be taken into account, together with the 
economic significance of decisions taken by the state administration. All these factors imply 
significant capital  flows. The war in Chechnya has enriched some of the military,  while the 
resources allocated to the rehabilitation of the economy have fed those economic players who 
were able to control this decision politically. Pipeline policies and the future redistribution of the 
oil-generated profits is a dominant factor in the Russian policies in Karabakh and Chechnya, and 
may play an increasingly important role in the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict. Russia seems to be 
persisting in its manipulation of ethno-territorial conflicts in order to secure its strategic economic 
(oil) interests.
The Time Perspective, Concepts of the Future and the Basic Interests of the Population
None of the opposing sides has any feasible, realistic proposal, which may be considered a sound 
basis for conflict settlement, to offer the other side. Russia has no compromise to offer either, and 
until recently seemed not to be interested in sustainable settlements. In most cases a conflict is 
seen as a zero-sum game, in which the perception of both the possible negative consequences of 
certain factors or events for the interests of each party (in particular as regards the demographic 
balance between different populations on the disputed territory, or the overall balance of power), 
as well as possible positive consequences for the interests of the opposing party in the conflict, are 
largely exaggerated.
A population's safety, prosperity and participation in governance could be described as its basic 
needs. This is quite a simple definition. It is, however, not easy to discuss the means of securing 
such basic needs. So in the case of Georgian refugees from Abkhazia, for instance, it is evident 
that there is no rapid solution leading to their return – to northern Abkhazia in particular – that 
would  give  them  sufficient  security  guarantees  and  at  the  same  time  ensure  democratic 
governance in Abkhazia. Only a more complex, stage by stage process can lead to a compromise 
acceptable to both sides. As in many other cases of conflict between "formal" democracy and 
"ethnic"  demography,  the  only  possible  solution  –  albeit  a  slow  one  –  involves  a  basic 
democratization process accompanied by very cautious demographic policies, linked to complete 
procedural transparency and an ongoing process of negotiation.
New Trend in Georgia's Political Orientation
The failure of the assassination attempt on Eduard Shevardnadze in 1995 led to new geopolitical 
initiatives and trends in the Caucasus. Igor Giorgadze, the Georgian State Security Minister and 
son of the leader of the Communist party – the main rival of Shevardnadze's Union of Citizens – 
escaped to Moscow on a Russian military plane, after having been accused of masterminding the 
assassination attempt.  Shevardnadze exploited to  the  full  this  opportunity to  get  rid  of  the 
strongmen dominating the political scene. He scored a clear-cut political victory over all  his 
rivals. But even more important was the reorientation of the country towards the West rather than 
towards Russia.
Despite the Russian military bases in Georgia, the presence of Russian border guards at  the 
Georgian border with Turkey and Russian peace-keepers in the two zones of conflict (Tskhinvali 
and Abkhazia), this reorientation of foreign policy became evident at the end of 1996. It was 
encouraged by Russian failures in Chechnya and the change in Western attitudes to the region. 
The latter were caused not only by the immensely important factor of Caspian oil, but also by the 
general shift in Western priorities after the partial resolution of the Bosnian crisis and the general 
disappointment in Russia's democratization process, revealed most explicitly by the acceleration 
of the NATO enlargement to the East.
The doubling of Western investments in the Georgian economy during the last two months of 
1996 reflected the emergence of a new situation. The rising power of the West in the region – at 
least in the minds of the Georgian people – contrasts with the waning power of Russia. Russia is 
tempted to use the CIS in order to re-establish its control over former Soviet republics, but it 
avoids too strong an integration, fearing an influx of non-Slavic people into Russia –  fears 
heightened by a lower birth rate among the Slavic population than among Muslim minorities. It 
is confronted by catastrophically diminishing resources and organizational abilities. Georgian 
public opinion perceives Russian policies – in particular the policy of "divide and rule" – as 
being a serious threat to the country's security. The potential economic or strategic benefit of any 
Georgian-Russian co-operation is seen as far less important than this type of threat.
Although the visit by the NATO Secretary-General, Solana, to the southern states of the CIS 
sparked a harsh reaction from some Moscow politicians, it may to an extent be considered merely 
symbolic – in line with the still prevailing tendency to substitute demonstrative actions for real 
policies towards the NIS. It may also be seen as an expression of the change in balance of forces 
involved in the region. In his speech delivered on 11 February 1997,  in Tbilisi, Mr. Solana 
stressed the new role of Georgia and the Caucasus:
My visit today should be understood as a sign of the value that we at NATO attach to our rela-
tionship with Georgia. We want to continue and deepen that relationship. Indeed, the opportu-
nities for co-operation with NATO are almost endless. On NATO's side, we would enthusiasti-
cally welcome the growing involvement of Georgia across the whole range of our co-operation 
programmes. Georgia's geographical position may be far from Brussels,  but  its  concerns and 
interests are far from remote. The Caucasus is an important region for Europe, and there is great 
social and economic potential to be realized, once underlying security issues have been resolved 
peacefully and  in  accordance with OSCE values  and  commitments.  Europe  cannot  be fully 
secure, or realize its own full potential, if the Caucasus countries are left out of the European 
security equation.4
4 Human Development Report: Georgia 1997, UNDP, Tbilisi, 1997, p. 30.
The emergence of close co-operation between Ukraine and Azerbaijan, believed to be brokered 
by Shevardnadze, indicates that  forms of integration of CIS countries that  are not Moscow-
centred have some chance of success. This alliance, with implicit Turkish participation, is a 
distinct alternative to  the traditional  CIS process of regionalism which failed to go beyond 
declamatory policies or to substantiate Russia's aspiration to be a superpower. The issues at stake 
in  Azeri-Georgian-Ukrainian  co-operation are  obvious:  a  way  of  counterbalancing  Russia's 
dominance, in particular in relation to the energy and economic security of the participating 
states.
An activation of Turkish-Georgian relations followed this process. On 28  February 1997,  a 
delegation of  Turkish  Mejlis  visited Georgia.  The  head of  the  delegation,  Mr.  Hatin-oglu, 
stressed Turkey's  interest  in  facilitating  the  peaceful  settlement  of  the  Abkhazian  problem, 
categorically supporting Georgia's territorial integrity and emphasising Turkey's desire to oppose 
the Russian scenario there. President Shevardnadze expressed his agreement with the Turkish 
viewpoint: "I  think it  is  time for more active Turkish participation in the settlement of the 
Abkhaz conflict and other conflicts in the Caucasian region". He also stressed the importance of 
the new railway linking Turkey with Georgia.5
On 15 March, Georgian Defence Minister Nadibaidze was sent by Shevardnadze on a personal 
assignment to the Ingush capital Nazran. This was one of the steps in implementing the "Peaceful 
Caucasus Initiative", promoted by Shevardnadze since the 1996 meeting with Yeltsin and other 
Caucasian leaders in Kislovodsk. In Nazran, Nadibaidze met the Ingush President Aushev and 
the Chechen leader Maskhadov. Nadibaidze reported that  both North-Caucasian leaders had 
supported the Peaceful Caucasus Initiative and had expressed their readiness for more active co-
operation. They had both allegedly agreed that Abkhazia should remain part of Georgia, and 
acknowledged that the Chechen participation in the Georgian-Abkhaz war had been a mistake, 
Dudaev's mistake. Aushev and Maskhadov called the deployment of Russian border troops on 
the border between Georgia and the North Caucasus superfluous, while Nadibaidze stated that 
Georgia was opposed to the deployment of Russian troops on the Georgian side of their common 
border.6
The next important event with strong internal implications for Georgian foreign policy was the 
meeting of the CIS leaders in Moscow, on 28 March 1997. Georgia was seeking progress with 
the deadlocked Abkhazian problem, and hoped to achieve several goals, among them the re-
deployment of Russian peace-keepers in an extended security zone in the Gali region, which 
would facilitate the return of some 100,000  Georgian refugees to this district. Such a return 
would significantly relieve the domestic political and economic strain of the refugee question. In 
Moscow, the Georgian side received symbolic support for its perception of the conflict, which 
was expressed in the Resolution of the Council of Heads of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (Moscow, 28 March 1997)  on the Development of the Conflict Resolution Process in 
Abkhazia, Georgia:
"The Council  of the Commonwealth of Independent States,  recalling the Declaration of the 
Lisbon summit of the Heads of the OSCE member states (December 1996)  that  condemns 
"ethnic cleansing, resulting in the mass extermination and forcible expulsion of the predomi-
nantly Georgian population of Abkhazia", as well as "actions hindering the return of refugees and 
displaced persons", condemned in its turn "the position of the Abkhazian side, hindering the 
5 "Rezonansi" newspaper, 4 March 1997; Electronic Bulletin of the US Embassy in Georgia "Recent political 
Developments in Georgia", no. 5, 14 March 1997 (http://www.sanet.ge/usis/usistbl.html).
6 Itartass of 15 March, "Akhali Taoba" newspaper of 17 March, "Rezonansi" newspaper of 17 March 1997.
reaching of agreements on the political settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, and the 
return, in safety and dignity, of refugees and displaced persons to the places of their permanent 
residence..."7
In a sense, the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict has been one of the most powerful of the factors that 
mobilized opposition among Georgians to dependence on Russia. Especially in the long term, it 
has had a decisive influence on the determination of foreign policy priorities. Russia seems to 
have lost  substantial  political  resources through this conflict  by reinforcing an  anti-Russian 
attitude in public opinion and among the political establishment in Georgia. At the same time, 
Georgia's pro-Western orientation may lead to exaggerated expectations of Western support – the 
West may very well sacrifice the interests of small nations for the sake of stability in the Eurasian 
heartland.  The  Georgian  government  was  particularly  concerned about  the  possibility  that 
Russia's  consent  to  the  eastward  expansion of  NATO  would  be  obtained in  exchange for 
American agreement to Russian influence in the Caucasus.
The Abkhazians, who were used for a  long time as Russia's strongest lever of influence on 
Georgia, also seem more and more reluctant to be used in this way by Moscow. The Abkhazian 
and Georgian sides are already trying to start negotiating with each other without mediators. It is 
astonishing to observe how, already, the first meetings between the leaders of the two sides have 
been  able  to  change  the  post-war  stereotypes  and  enemy  images  among  their  respective 
populations, who have suddenly discovered that reality has other colours besides just black and 
white. Georgians were surprised to hear rational – if unacceptable – arguments from Ardzinba 
and other Abkhaz representatives, after several years of an exclusively negative perception of the 
Abkhaz leadership.
Conflict in Abkhazia: Specific Dimensions
The Abkhazian population has suffered great losses in the last two centuries as a result of de-
portation and the artificial in-migration of other ethnic groups to its homeland. At the same time, 
the Soviet legacy included ingenious arrangements for maintaining the disproportionately large 
share  of leadership offices held by the  Abkhaz community.  This  legacy contributed to  the 
conflagration and determined the form it  would take.  Specific factors which had a  decisive 
influence on the outbreak of the war include the North Caucasian diaspora in the Near East, 
different evaluations of the legal aspects of the conflict (such as the right to self-determination 
versus the territorial integrity principle), the perception by both parties to the conflict of the 
righteousness of their actions, the role of regional and international organizations, the role of 
Cossacks in the conflict and the importance of the Russian language in Abkhazia.
Post-Conflict Attitudes and Lack of Information
The general atmosphere in Abkhazia still bears a number of immediate post-war characteristics. 
The population expects war to break out anew sooner or later, and consequently much discussion 
and public discourse concerns the prospect of the renewal of military operations. This keeps the 
population  militarily  mobilized  and  constitutes  the  strongest  obstacle  to  constructive, 
development-oriented thinking, as  well  as  to  the building of civil  society.  In  most  parts of 
Georgia, however, the issue of Abkhazia shifted long ago to the periphery of political discussions. 
7 "Sakartvelos Respublika" of 29 March 1997;  Electronic Bulletin  of the US Embassy in  Georgia "Recent 
Political Developments in Georgia", no. 7, 11 April 1997.
In spite of state propaganda, and the continual attempts by the political groups representing, or 
claiming to represent, the refugees (Internally Displaced Persons – IDPs) from Abkhazia, the 
problems of day-to-day survival or business interests preoccupy the general public far more than 
the prospect of war  in Abkhazia.  Apart  from a  few militants,  mostly among the IDPs,  the 
population would rather support a peaceful solution to the Abkhazian problem, although for the 
majority any solution that involved losing Abkhazia would be unacceptable.
Legal Status
Most debates today revolve around the legal status of Abkhazia within/vis-ŕ-vis Georgia. I doubt 
whether it is possible – or even very important – to resolve the question of political status in the 
short term. Problems other than status have to be resolved in order to reduce tension. But both 
sides' concerns and interests in the discussion on political status have to be properly analysed if 
there is to be a productive dialogue. The Abkhaz are concerned with how they will maintain 
control and who will guarantee their security after they have become a minority again, which will 
happen if the IDPs are allowed to return and take part in the political process through democratic 
procedures. The Abkhaz, who have won the war and – for the first time in a century – now have 
a favourable demographic percentage, have great difficulty in facing such prospects.
The Abkhaz side insists on equal (confederative) status with Georgia, which is unacceptable to 
Tbilisi. In February 1996 the Abkhaz proposed to set up a federal union with Georgia. According 
to Anri Jergenia, the Abkhaz "President's" special envoy, these proposals contained "elements of 
both a federation and a confederation". The new arrangement would include common national 
borders, joint activities in specific spheres and the possibility of setting up joint authorities. 
According to the protocol, each of the two equal sides would keep its constitution and relations 
between them would be regulated by a special treaty which, with the agreement of both sides, 
could have the force of constitutional law. Both sides would co-ordinate their foreign policies and 
foreign economic relations, the operation of border and customs services, power engineering, 
transport and communications, the environment and the guaranteeing of human and civic rights 
and freedoms, as well as the rights of ethnic minorities. The protocol implied that, by mutual 
agreement, Georgia and Abkhazia could increase the number of "co-ordinated policies".8
"President" Ardzinba noted that  the new structure would not amount to a  "classical type of 
federation". One should bear in mind that the Abkhaz side regards the above proposals as a 
compromise. According to Vladislav Ardzinba (and this is also maintained by many experts), the 
vast majority of the current population of Abkhazia would, in virtually every circumstance, seek 
closer relations with Russia than with Georgia, and Abkhazia would ideally prefer to join a 
Russian Federation than any Georgian equivalent.
During his inauguration speech as Georgian President (26 November 1995), Eduard Shevard-
nadze declared:
We have always stated, and we are stating now, that time has determined that Georgia's state 
structure be shaped on a federal basis. Abkhazia will be a subject of the federation in Georgia 
with broad political status. It will have its own constitution, which will have to be in conformity 
with the constitution  of a single united  state.  The Republic  of Abkhazia will  have its  own 
parliament, supreme court, anthem, state emblem and other features of a state.9
8 Potier, Tim, op.cit.
9 Ibid.
In 1997, notwithstanding the more active position adopted by the UN with regard to the resolu-
tion of the conflict, the Georgian-Abkhazian negotiations reached a deadlock, despite the fact that 
any further delay is detrimental to all parties. The absence of a clearly formulated and widely 
supported strategy for the resolution of ethno-territorial conflicts is still a problem. The general 
unwillingness to decentralize power in Georgia proper, as well as an extremely cautious attitude 
towards the repatriation of the Meskhetians (Meskhetian Turks), are causing increased suspicion 
among the negotiating partners as to the sincerity of the liberal and federalist statements made by 
the  Georgian  government,  and  have  led  to  accusations  of  a  double
standard.
Among the various options for the future status of Abkhazia that are being discussed – whether it 
should join Russia, Georgia or a Caucasian Confederation, or stay totally independent – for the 
time being there does not seem to be any alternative to finding some sort of compromise with the 
Tbilisi government, even if other options would be preferable to the vast majority of ethnic 
Abkhaz.  There  are  unfortunately no signs that  both sides are  actually  looking for  specific 
arrangements in a constructive way (contrary to all their rhetoric about doing so). Russia's atti-
tude reduces still further the chances of finding this kind of solution: its post-war policy on 
Chechnya demonstrates that it is ready to deploy its still formidable resources to maintain control 
over the North Caucasus,  and it  still  seems to  believe that  a  compromise that  is  mutually 
acceptable to the Georgians and the Abkhaz would not be beneficial for Russian control over the 
region. Russia is, however, unlikely to decide to incorporate Abkhazia formally, while it may be 
ready to assist it in maintaining its de facto independence for quite a long time.
For the Abkhaz, the issue of status used to be a pretext for blocking negotiations and thereby 
preventing the  return  of  the  IDPs/refugees,  which could  have endangered the  demographic 
balance that emerged after the war. For the Georgians, the negotiation process was only a means 
of demonstrating their  good intentions and readiness to solve the conflict on internationally 
favoured terms, while there was no real will to seek a compromise. Despite their rhetoric, neither 
side really wanted to  get  to  the heart  of the matter  and solve the problem of legal  status, 
preferring – if no explicit gain was possible immediately – to wait until better bargaining po-
sitions were secured.
The only alternatives to a compromise between Tbilisi and Sukhumi are either military action, 
which would be detrimental to all and seems to be less probable, except perhaps on a limited 
scale (e.g. in Gali or the Kodori valley), or a further stalling of the negotiations – "neither peace 
nor war". This last scenario seemed to be the one preferred by all parties for several years, but it 
has now ceased to be so, in so far as both governments are beginning to lose control over the 
situation – a clear trend in 1997.
Moreover, the deadlock in the negotiations is becoming more and more damaging to both parties. 
Finally, it could be argued that the opinion quoted in the document presented at the beginning of 
this chapter – that the final determination of the legal status should not be a precondition for any 
other progress in the peace process – makes a good deal of sense. Postponing such a solution until 
a time when the sides have a better basis for mutual understanding, designing provisional status 
on the basis of functional needs and approaches, and proceeding in the meantime with other 
important issues, is a viewpoint I would fully support.
Georgian Refugees/IDPs and the Gali Region
The Abkhaz side uses two main arguments to counter the Georgian demand for the refugees to 
return soon to Abkhazia. According to the Sochi protocols of April 1994,10 any Georgians who 
took part in military action should be prohibited from returning – economic difficulties and the 
risk of spontaneous violence are used as a second argument against their return. Neither of these 
arguments is convincing. The first is incompatible with any respected legal tradition: of course, 
war  criminals  should  be  prosecuted  notwithstanding  their  ethnic  origin,  but  to  instigate 
proceedings against all those who have carried weapons is a very different matter. It is not only 
unfair, as people should not be prosecuted for taking one side or another in a civil war, it is also 
technically  impossible  to  have  independent  legal  bodies  check  the  behaviour  of  the  entire 
Georgian population during the war. The argument that the economic situation is unfavourable is 
not a very strong one either: technical and financial terms can be agreed by both parties in order 
to make the return of the IDPs possible. Neither of the two arguments can be invoked in relation 
to the return of refugees to the Gali region, which has a homogeneous Georgian population and 
where the return of IDPs is already an irreversible process. According to various estimates, the 
number of Georgians in Gali is about as high as the number of Abkhaz in Abkhazia (the latter 
number continues to decrease, creating a further imbalance).
Although the Gali region has been owned alternately over the centuries by Megrelian/ Georgian 
and Abkhazian feudal lords, it has had almost no Abkhazian population in the 20th century. 
Whatever arguments the Abkhaz use regarding the Georgian presence in their homeland, there is 
no historical or other legitimization for discriminatory policies towards the Georgian population 
in this region. Nor would such policies receive any support from Abkhazia's North Caucasian 
allies.  Abkhaz officials will  therefore have great  difficulty in  coping with any eruptions of 
violence in Gali.
The possibility of returning the Gali region to Georgian control, in exchange for peace and an 
acceptable political status, was discussed among the Abkhaz leadership. The opportunity for such 
an exchange has been lost, however, as the Georgian government no longer has to negotiate the 
future of Gali on the same terms as before – it just needs to wait for a more opportune moment. 
An attempt to create a separate Megrel nationality (out of a linguistically distinct Georgian sub-
ethnic group) as a strategic alternative, which is proposed and strongly supported by a British 
scholar, George Hewitt, and is being implemented in practice by the Abkhaz leadership, has 
come too late, as the majority of the IDPs (predominantly Megrelians) have strengthened their 
Georgian identity after their exodus from Abkhazia.
Specific measures concerning the Georgian IDPs and people who went missing during the war 
could promote dialogue between Georgians and Abkhaz. A moratorium on changing the property 
rights of the IDPs and refugees from Abkhazia – which would in fact mean unilaterally depriving 
them of their property left behind in Abkhazia, until the achievement of a final solution or a 
special  agreement –  could be reciprocated on the Georgian side by long-term commitments 
regarding the economic development of Abkhazia. The mutual exchange of data concerning the 
persons reported missing during the war, as well as further collaboration in searching for them, is 
another area that is important for confidence-building.
10 "On 4 April 1994, an agreement on the refugee question was signed in Moscow in the presence of Boutros 
Boutros  Ghali,  the  UN Secretary-General,  Andrey Kozyrev, the  Russian  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  and 
various Western ambassadors. The Moscow agreement set up a quadripartite commission with representatives 
of Russia and the UN, as well as Georgia and Abkhazia, to supervise the return of refugees; this began work 
in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi at the end of April 1994..." Jonathan Aves, Georgia: From Chaos to  
Stability, RIIA, London, 1996, p. 31.
Demographic Balance
Demographic relations that may benefit one side or the other is a major concern of both parties, 
but especially the Abkhaz. No progress achieved on the question of political status would be of 
much value  to  the Abkhaz if  the pre-war  demographic balance were restored. Hence most 
discussions on political  issues, even if they are not explicitly linked to demography, have a 
demographic dimension that should not be underestimated in efforts to understand the motives of 
both parties.
The demographic position of the Abkhaz community has been progressively weakened, since the 
1860s,  through  an  immigration  flow of  Georgians  (mainly  of  the  Megrelian  sub-ethnos), 
Russians and Armenians. Abkhazians felt particularly threatened by the massive immigration of 
Georgians that started in the 1930s, leading the proportion of Abkhazians in the total popula-
tion to decline to 17 or 18% per cent by the 1980s, when their number was about the same as that 
of both the Russian and Armenian communities in Abkhazia,  and less than half that  of the 
Georgians (approximately 46%).
The importance of this issue needs to be recognized in the negotiation process if real progress is 
to be achieved. The Abkhaz had hoped to win time after the war by slowing down the nego-
tiations and postponing a final solution, in order to establish their position on the international 
scene and change the demographic balance in their favour by a massive repatriation of the di-
aspora Abkhaz. Their hope that these objectives would be achieved, thereby strengthening their 
negotiating position, has waned since then.
According to E. Wesselink, the repatriation of Abkhazians from abroad should not be expected in 
the near future:
The repatriation movement never gained momentum. The number of returnees are counted in 
hundreds rather than in thousands. A number of delegations visited the North Caucasus around 
1990 to study the prospects for repatriation programmes. The visitors were disappointed at the 
low standard of living in the North Caucasus. Another problem was the fact that the Abkhaz in 
Abkhazia appeared to be Christians and that the other North West Caucasians showed no real 
interest in religious teachings.11
Nor is there any sign of international recognition for the Abkhazian State, and even leading 
Chechen politicians have withdrawn their support from the Abkhazian case.12 But even more 
important is the fact that the permanent threat and dire economic prospects are worsening rath-er 
than improving the ethno-demographic balance of the Abkhaz. They are emigrating, thereby 
voting with their feet against current policies. Already there seem to be more Georgians and 
Armenians than Abkhaz in Abkhazia, and this trend may not change if the approach based on 
playing for time continues.
While the importance of the ethno-demographic issue is at present an obstacle to reconciliation, it 
seems likely that it may eventually turn into a powerful stimulus in the search of compromise. 
One can imagine Georgians accepting or even encouraging the repatriation of diaspora Abkhaz 
11 Wesselink, Egbert, The North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey, Writenet, May 1996, [pp. 17-18]; see also Joel 
Boutroue and Stephen F. Jones, Prospect for the Return of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees to  
Abkhazia, UNHCR, May 1997.
12 There are also some other Caucasian leaders who have withdrawn their support from Abkhazia. Remarkably, 
this trend has been noticed in North Ossetia, and even more unexpectedly, in South Ossetia. "In Georgia's pre-
independence and early independence period South Ossetia maintained close links with Abkhazia but these 
ties have gradually weakened...", Jonathan Aves, op.cit., p. 35.
in exchange for the gradual return of refugees, and thus a certain demographic balance could be 
negotiated and secured. Even if a significant repatriation process would require political stability 
and economic revival, the process of repatriation could start on more than a symbolic scale. But 
only compromises between Abkhaz and Georgians can promote such a  process, and Tbilisi 
should be aware of this asset in the negotiations. At present, however, the Georgian political 
establishment is strongly opposed to the idea of Abkhazian repatriation.
The Abkhazian Language and Cultural Security
Cultural insecurity, or a national community's fear of losing its ethnic and cultural identity, is a 
vitally important factor in the Abkhaz attitude towards reconciliation prospects. The Abkhaz 
traditionally tend to lean more than the Georgians towards the Russian culture and language, and 
at the same time they stress their ethnic proximity to the North Caucasian groups of Adyghs and 
Circassians. These cultural attitudes conflict with those of the Georgians, who have a strong pro-
Western bent. Such a  cultural  clash between the Abkhazians and Georgians was potentially 
exacerbated  by  the  displacement  of  the  strongly  Russified  Georgian  (mostly  Megrelian) 
population of Abkhazia to the more explicitly Georgian cultural environment.
The majority of Abkhazians, in particular the Christian population in the southern part of the 
region, are culturally very close to the neighbouring Megrelians, to the extent that until recently 
there were no clear borderlines of ethnic self-identification. Some members of a family might, for 
instance,  consider  themselves  as  being  Georgian,  while  others  in  the  same  family  regard 
themselves as Abkhaz. Pragmatic considerations play a role here. Georgians and Abkhaz share 
many family names. Paradoxically, some very patriotic people on both sides have the same 
family  name.  These  facts  generate  additional  mutual  suspicion and  lead  to  accusations of 
assimilatory policies.
Georgians, formerly the largest ethnic group in Abkhazia, generally accept the Abkhazians' right 
to have their language recognized as a state language. Unlike in the past (in Gamsakhurdia's time 
particularly, this was not always the dominant opinion), now they also acknowledge that the 
Abkhazians are an  "autochthonous" population, a  status they do not ascribe to other ethnic 
groups in Abkhazia, such as Russians or Armenians. At the same time, Georgians believe that 
they themselves have the same right to be considered an autochthonous population there, a claim 
that is based on various historical arguments, such as the dominance of Georgian inscriptions on 
Abkhazian monasteries and other historic monuments. The Abkhaz are unwilling to accept such 
arguments, fearing that the re-establishment of the Georgian majority and culture in Abkhazia, 
without strong guarantees, could endanger the very survival of their own culture and the fate of 
the nation itself. The Abkhaz perceive the Russian cultural milieu as less dangerous for their own 
cultural  survival, owing to the diversity and size of the Russian cultural  arena.  Many joint 
initiatives could be taken in the cultural field shared by Georgians and Abkhaz, to begin with, for 
instance, the recreation of the historic Abkhaz archives burnt in Sukhumi during the war, by 
providing copies of relevant documents and other materials;  the restoration of libraries; co-
operation in  the  field  of  education,  for  example  in  preparing text-books  in  the  Abkhazian 
language, etc. Great caution, however, would be needed here on the Georgian side, due to the 
ever-present suspicion of Georgian cultural expansionism.
Armenians in Abkhazia
The Armenian population, which already dominated some districts before the war, is at present 
considered by some experts to constitute the largest community in Abkhazia. They are, how-ever, 
strongly under-represented on government bodies. In the past,  they generally expressed their 
solidarity with the Abkhazians in their struggle for secession. Some Armenians from Armenia 
and Karabakh took part in military action on the Abkhazian side, while the majority of the few 
Armenians fighting on the Georgian side during the war came from other regions of Georgia. 
While  the  Armenian  government  in  Yerevan  explicitly  states  its  neutrality  in  the  conflict, 
favouring the search for a  peaceful solution, and declares its support for Georgia's territorial 
integrity, there used to be great sympathy for the Abkhaz case among the Armenian population 
and nationalist political circles in Armenia proper. According to Michael Ochs,13 Levon Ter-
Petrossyan was considered, after the 1995 parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections, as a 
democrat, a legitimate president, and more generally "a rational guy with whom you can talk and 
with whom you can compromise, not a nationalist". Tbilisi was unhappy about Ter-Petrossyan's 
weakened position, and worried about political instability in Armenia.
In June 1997, during an official visit by the Armenian president to Georgia, Ter-Petrossyan and 
Shevardnadze went together to Akhalkalaki, where the Armenian president declared that the last 
thing Armenia needed was to have problems with Georgia regarding Akhalkalaki, which has a 
large Armenian minority.14 This concern is not shared by the Dashnaks (an opposition nationalist 
party in Armenia), who have territorial claims against Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia. From the 
Georgian perspective, a  weakening of Ter-Petrossyan's position in Armenia would reduce his 
leverage on the militant, nationalist Armenian groupings.
Relations with North Caucasians/Adyghes
The Abkhaz strive for closer relations with the North Caucasians, and particularly the Adyghes 
(including the Circassians and Kabardinians), who belong to the same linguistic group as the 
Abkhaz, unlike most of the other North Caucasian ethnic groups. Nevertheless, since the co-
ordinated resistance to Russian conquest during the Great Caucasian War of the 19th century – 
in  which  the  battle  between the  Russians  and  Abkhazians  constituted  the  final  episode – 
Abkhazians have developed a strong sense of a  common fate and identity with the Northern 
Caucasus, further strengthened by their co-operative relationship with the descendants of Mo-
hajirs (belonging to different North-Caucasian ethnic groups) in the Near East and Turkey, and 
also by their later attempts to join this fragile North Caucasian unity after the February Revolu-
tion of 1917. During perestroika, there was a new attempt at such a union with the creation of the 
Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus. This Confederation's first conference 
took place in August 1989 in Sukhumi, regarded as the future capital of the new union. The 
various nationalities represented in the Confederation have no fear of being dominated by any 
one group – a confidence which feels very different from what they experienced throughout their 
history  with  Russia  or  Georgia.  This  explains the  attractiveness of  the  idea  of  creating  a 
multiethnic union of Caucasians, even if such a union could be considered romantic and will 
certainly not be easy to achieve. The Abkhaz scholar Gueorgui Otyrba has formulated this per-
ception as follows:15
The history and the destiny of Abkhazia are closely connected with those of all the peoples of 
the North Caucasus. Today they share a common history of suffering and oppression, of depor-
13 The Caucasus and the Caspian: 1996 Seminar Series, vol. II, F. Hill (ed.), Harvard University, J.F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Cambridge, 1996, Presentation by Michael Ochs, p. 77.
14 Ibid.
tations and cultural destruction, and of fighting powerful enemies. They also share a determi-
nation to protect themselves against a repetition of history. They have seized the opportunity 
created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and by Russia's and Georgia's relative weak-
ness, to assert their rights and bring about a situation that can provide better guarantees for their 
survival in the future.
The Abkhaz will therefore strive – even if this is not at the moment explicitly expressed during 
the negotiations – for the creation of open borders to the North Caucasus, and in particular for 
unhindered cultural and economic exchange with the Adyghes. For the Georgians, transparent 
borders are still a sensitive issue, however, as are its borders with North Ossetia, Chechnya and 
Daghestan. In all these cases the Georgian government has to cope with the consequences of 
having national minorities of the same ethnic group inhabiting both sides of a state border.
In conceiving the future of the Caucasus, Georgians stress their central – both advantageous and 
dangerous – position in the region and would like to secure a central role in regional politics. 
Georgia's relations with most of its northern neighbours have improved significantly since the end 
of the Chechen war, culminating in the official visit by the Chechen president, Maskhadov, to 
Georgia in autumn 1997. The Georgian leadership hopes that the Western Caucasian mountain 
peoples will follow the example of the Chechens, who have earned considerable respect in the 
region, and thus ensure more neutrality in the event of renewed conflict.
The Russian Presence and Russian Border
The Russians control their border with Abkhazia, its coastal zone and have military bases there. 
Russia is also the exclusive provider of peace-keeping forces, acting formally under the aegis of 
the CIS. It exercises significant control over the external and internal policies of the Sukhumi 
government.  The  economic blockade  imposed by  Russia  under  Georgian  political  pressure 
conforms to the traditional pattern of Russian politics: its aim is to weaken all the parties in 
conflict so that it can effectively continue to play the role of arbiter in the dispute.
Russia's policies in Abkhazia, as elsewhere in the Caucasus and in the "Near Abroad" regions, 
are in keeping with a "post-imperialist" value system, as described by Pavel Baev:16
The most distinctive feature of Russia's policies towards the other fourteen states which emerged 
from the rubble of the USSR is inconsistency often bordering on incomprehensibility. (...) What 
makes the political complexities even more striking is the quite broad consensus among Russia's 
political  élites on the main policy goals in the so-called "Near Abroad". This consensus had 
already emerged by late 1993 and survived all  the turbulent  election campaigns. (...) To my 
mind, if a definition of Russian policy is needed or indeed possible, it is rather 'post-imperialist'; 
this notion refers to a declining power which tries to compensate for inevitable retreats by some 
new engagements, feels the need to protect compatriots left "out there" but desperately lacks the 
resources to do so, and attempts to prevent spill-over from various violent conflicts while being 
itself a major source of instability.
From the  Abkhazian  perspective,  the  Russian  presence, notwithstanding all  its  vacillations, 
constitutes the only guarantee against  a  catastrophic renewal  of the military  operation,  and 
against the risk of losing the gains from their previous victory. This enables the Russians to 
15 Otyrba,  Gueorgui,  War in  Abkhazia:  The  Regional  Significance of  the Georgian-Abkhazian  Conflict,  in: 
National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New Independent States of Eurasia, (ed.) Roman Szporluk, 
Armonk, NY, Sharpe, 1994, p.  287.
16 Baev, Pavel, Russia's Policies in the Caucasus, RIIA, London, 1997, p. 47.
manipulate Abkhazian concerns to their own advantage, but the Abkhaz cannot fully rely on 
Russian support, which may be withdrawn as soon as the stakes change. The Georgians, while 
blaming the Russian presence for prolonging the stalemate in the conflict, nevertheless expect 
that the Russians will sooner or later take their side.
Economic Development
There is a low level of market economy in Abkhazia, with most food grown for domestic con-
sumption. Many inhabitants possess some land which is enough for their subsistence. Those who 
are employed in the public sector and who have not been paid for months have been given plots 
of land instead of wages by the government. There is some small trade, for instance between Gali 
and Sukhumi. Due to the CIS blockade, the import of goods – some Turkish ships travel to 
Sukhumi – barely meets the population's needs.
Major export items are tangerines and other citrus fruit. The export of the surplus production of 
between 60,000 and 100,000 tons of citrus fruit to Russia is extremely difficult because of the 
semi-closure, by Russian officials, of the railway and road linking Abkhazia with Russia, while 
domestic industry lacks the capacity to process the crop into juice or concentrate. Other exports 
are nuts and scrap metal. The road system is very bad and there are few cars, though there is 
some public transport in the bigger towns. There is also some traffic between Gali and Zugdidi 
(on the Georgian side) – this has to be registered with the Gali authorities, where tax must be 
paid;  there  are  also  several  unofficial  (easier  and  cheaper)  crossing  points  on  the 
Georgian/Abkhaz border. Electric energy is more regular  in Abkhazia than in most parts of 
Georgia, thanks to the power supply from the Inguri dam and from Russia. Widespread economic 
hardship, however, is driving more and more emigrants out of the region.
In the meantime, the Georgian economy is reviving and is even arousing increasing interest 
among potential investors, even though the current situation should not be seen through rosy-
tinted glasses. Co-operation on the economic rehabilitation and development of Abkhazia could, 
in  the  event  of  a  lasting  consensus between the  two opposing sides,  succeed in  attracting 
significant international resources, as is currently happening in Tskhinvali. This could prove to 
be the best means for combining the interests of both sides and fostering mutual understanding.
The areas of technical co-operation that serve the interests of both sides can easily be defined as 
soon as a framework for such discussion is created with the assistance of the UN and OSCE 
missions, and these may represent the best arena for the most important and difficult endeavour – 
building confidence between the former adversaries.
Physical Security of Citizens and the Possibility of a New Wave of Violence
Despite  the  current  negotiations,  the  possibility  of  new outbursts  of  violence remains.  The 
Georgian and Abkhaz governments, as well as the mediators, now have to define what their 
reaction would be in such a situation. Although there is much discussion of the possibility of a 
new war, no preventive action is being taken. It  is far from clear how atrocities and violent 
actions against the civilian population would be prevented. A discussion needs to be started on 
how to design mechanisms for humanitarian intervention and on the types of intervention that 
would be helpful in de-escalating the conflict, in order to reduce casualties and other negative 
consequences for the peace process.
Prospects
The strong interdependence of the conflicts in the region is another very important factor to be 
taken into account when designing peace initiatives for  Abkhazia.  A future  settlement may 
change the balance of forces in the Caucasus region. Hence a holistic approach to the region's 
problems, one which takes into account its specific cultural and political features, is critical for 
drafting effective regional policies.
It is interesting to notice that while the governments often refer to the Israeli-Palestinian expe-
rience, the NGO community and those involved in the Georgian-Abkhazian dialogue pay rela-
tively little attention to the fruitful ideas that have been put forward in the Middle East conflict. 
This concerns initiatives such as the Oslo Declaration, signed initially by the Palestinian and 
Jewish partisans  of  a  peaceful  resolution  of  the  conflict,  which proposes certain  steps for 
achieving this. Private initiatives may start attracting public opinion to positive ideas, for instance 
the collection of signatures in support of peace (with a third/Western party doing the collecting). 
Other lessons to be learnt include the vital importance of a  proper (especially temporal) co-
ordination of initiatives.17
By the second half of 1997, the Sukhumi and Tbilisi governments seemed to be more open to 
real compromises. The obstacles are, however, great. One of the factors is external: Moscow's 
unwillingness to lose this very effective lever of control over Georgian policies, and its para-
doxical  desire  to  maintain  such  control  notwithstanding  great  economic  losses due  to  the 
blockade of transport and communications travelling from Russia to Turkey and passing through 
Abkhazian territory, as well as the other benefits of having a peaceful, prosperous neighbour in 
the south.
Even more important is the unwillingness of the Abkhazians to risk a restoration of the status  
quo ante bellum, i.e., to return to a situation in which they would be a minority, unable to pre-
serve the monopoly of power in a democratic scenario of development, regardless of the legal 
status they would acquire within the framework of Georgia. One of the scenarios being discussed 
at present is a territorial division of Abkhazia into a number of districts, in each of which either 
the  Abkhazians  or  the  Georgians  would  establish  their  political  control.  The  Abkhazian 
government could not make such a decision, based on the "peace for territory" principle, without 
strong popular  support. Detailed scenarios for such a  process are lacking. The parties have 
defined no priorities or negotiable elements that could constitute a basis for a mutually acceptable 
compromise, and no creative approaches are being adopted in the search for such a compromise. 
This is partly due to the governments' lack of political will to achieve real results, and also partly 
to particular  group interests linked to the suspended situation of "no war – no peace". Both 
governments are hostages to their own declarations and promises. Great courage and political 
inspiration are needed to break  down stereotypes and secure popular  support for innovative 
approaches.  It  is  vitally  necessary  to  develop  a  series  of  detailed  scena-
rios that would be acceptable to each side, and then work on the gradual convergence of at least 
some of them – this may lead to the realization that the differences in viewpoint between the 
former adversaries are not as great as they previously appeared to be. The majority of these 
differences are, contrary to popular belief, not mutually exclusive – rather, they are symbolic or 
terminological in nature, and could be overcome if due effort were made.
As the two conflicting parties have different priorities – for instance concerning their legal status 
or  the return  of refugees –  it  is  quite  difficult  to  solve individual  problems when they are 
17 I thank Edie Kaufmann of the University of Jerusalem for these suggestions.
negotiated as part of a whole package. Hence, one of the ways of proceeding with resolving the 
conflict is to try to narrow the focus temporarily, breaking down the problem into a  list  of 
individual issues which are closely linked to one another, certainly, but which may nevertheless 
be handled and discussed separately. Only after considering these issues and coming to some 
agreements, or at least reaching an understanding of one another's viewpoints, will it be possible 
to discuss the whole package again, in an integrated form.
Time is working against the interests of the Abkhazians, but this does not mean that either the 
Georgians or Russians would benefit from a further postponement of a peace settlement. Russia 
has actually lost – and is continuing to lose – a great deal, having been cut off from her southern 
transportation routes, alienated Georgia and forfeited important levers of influence in the region. 
But Georgia too is a loser in this zero-sum game. Apart from the human suffering caused by a 
prolonged conflict, fewer and fewer Georgians may be inclined to return to Abkhazia, while the 
uncertain future of the IDPs is posing enormous problems for the weak Georgian State. At the 
same time, Georgia is losing the considerable economic benefits it would enjoy with an integrated 
economy and a north-south transportation route.
One potential  area  for economic co-operation may be the prospect of transforming the Gali 
district into a free economic zone which would be put provisionally under an international se-
curity regime. This would create a safe buffer area, preventing open military action, but it could 
also serve as a pilot initiative for further balanced economic co-operation. Gali is important in 
this respect not only because of its border location or because of its Georgian population, but also 
thanks to its high economic – particularly agricultural – potential. It is worth noting that, even in 
the current strained situation, Gali is to a certain extent already performing the role of a clearing-
house and exchange market for the two sides.
I am, of course, fully aware that no concrete settlement can be reached by individuals from the 
two communities that are not representing their respective governments, but their proposals can 
contribute to a spirit of compromise, which is essential to the negotiation process. If we are able 
to find common ground in at least some areas, this could serve as a starting point for broader 
discussions. I  am quite sure that almost all  of the contradictions discussed are resolvable, if 
innovative thinking is applied, and if we try to look at the problems through the eyes of other side 
as well. The existing problems have to be correlated to the real, basic needs and interests of both 
peoples, as distinct from populist slogans and wrongly perceived interests that only lead to further 
confrontation. It  does seem that  if the intellectuals of both sides, supported by international 
experts and mediators, were able to formulate at least a few concrete ideas in the form of a set of 
declarations,  this  could  be  instrumental  in  establishing a  co-operative  approach  to  conflict 
resolution, and would help all the sides involved to see the conflict and its consequences through 
other eyes, instead of just their own.
A helpful instrument in proceeding further with the peace and negotiation processes could be the 
creation of a mixed discussion forum constituted by respected individuals from both sides. These 
would receive a mandate from their respective leaderships to discuss the possible terms of the 
conflict settlement, and would regularly inform their leaderships about progress, but would not 
have the authority to  sign any documents or  make decisions. Such a  forum, moderated by 
international experts and assisted by the authority of organizations such as the UN or OSCE, 
could perform several important functions: generating and testing new ideas in a non-restrictive 
environment; maintaining a two-way exchange of information between the governments; working 
as  an  informal  negotiating  body,  and  as  a  public  advocate  of  a  peaceful  so-
lution.
Conclusions
While it is important to speculate about how and when the solution to the Abkhazian conflict will 
be found, it may be of more immediate value to pose the question of where alternative ideas and 
influences that could shape the future solution will come from. In broad terms, one can identify 
three such sources: first, political and social currents within Abkhazia/Georgia, second, Russia, 
including the peoples of the Northern Caucasus, and third, international institutions.
Both sides have been labouring under the illusion that time is on their side. Both are now losing, 
however,  as  a  result  of  the  deadlock  in  the  conflict,  and  experiencing  major  economic, 
demographic and political losses. There can be no winners in the game they are currently playing. 
In the first few years after the war, the Abkhaz could hope that time would bring international 
recognition and the repatriation of the Abkhaz from the diaspora, but this seems less probable 
now. Even the support of the North Caucasians, which played an important role during the war, 
is not assured at  present, especially that of the Vainakh peoples. In its turn, if the Georgian 
government too hoped to use time to strengthen its military forces decisively, secure Russian 
support for its case and see the impoverishment and weakening of the Sukhumi government, they 
must be disappointed, as there are no signs of such trends. Indeed, in the immediate post-war 
period the conflict helped Georgia to distance itself from Russian dominance, and develop an 
independent approach in its state-building. Today, when Russian strength is waning, and the 
Georgian State has already begun to overcome most of the difficulties besetting it at the start of 
independence, priorities need to be changed.
The present situation cannot continue indefinitely. Pressures on the conflicting parties, both from 
without and from within, are mounting, while the leaderships (who until recently demonstrated a 
manifest lack of will to resolve the conflict) now seem to be becoming more flexible and open to 
compromise. There are  several  possible alternative solutions –  the people of Abkhazia  and 
Georgia will decide which of them shall prevail.
Stanislav Lakoba
Abkhazia, Georgia and the Caucasus Confederation
The post-Soviet period, reminiscent  of and in many  cases  seeming to repeat, the events of 
1917-1921 after the break-up of the Russian Empire, has demonstrated quite clearly  that the 
difficulties in Abkhazian-Georgian  relations  cannot  be resolved by those two countries alone, 
without  involving the Caucasus as a whole in this issue.
At the same time it is obvious today that the entire Caucasus has become the arena for a struggle 
for energy resources and fierce clashes between the geopolitical and strategic interests of Turkey 
and Russia, Iran and the West. The marked weakening of Russia's position in this key region was 
a result of the war in Chechnya and of the continuing complete blockade of Abkhazia. The battle 
for the pipeline, or rather for the route for transporting Caspian oil, cannot fail to influence 
political developments and automatically puts the people of the Caucasus on the knife edge 
between war and peace.
In this state of imbalance, neighbouring countries and powers are trying to create their own areas 
of responsibility, new alliances and regional as well as international associations under the aegis 
of the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO. Over the centuries the entire Caucasus, or portions 
of it, has been alternately or simultaneously part of Iran, Turkey or Russia, which still regard 
these territories as traditionally theirs. Thus Turkey sees a substantial part of the Caucasus as 
part of an extensive Turkic state, Turan. Iran in turn sees the future of some Caucasian countries 
in an alliance including Iran itself and certain Central Asian republics. Russia, though still laying 
claim to Transcaucasia ("Transcaucasia" is a peculiarly Russian term, resulting from its wars 
with Iran  and Turkey),  mostly because of oil,  is  now forced to keep an  eye on the North 
Caucasus, realising late in the day what is happening on its southern flank.
Early pacification of the explosive Caucasus region is most unlikely, given this distribution of 
forces in obvious conflict. As regards the prospect of future state and legal relations between 
Abkhazia and Georgia, the way forward seems to be within the framework of a Caucasus Con-
federation.
Not long before the break-up of the USSR the eminent Sovietologist A. Avtorkhanov gave the 
following warning and advice:
Caucasians must understand that if they fight among themselves they will never be either free or 
independent.  In the eyes of  the outside  world such a region does  not  deserve freedom, but 
should be permanently occupied by a strong state and its armed forces... I would recommend all 
autonomous regions in the Caucasus to combine in one republic, which already existed under 
the name of "Gorskaya Respublika" (Mountain Peoples' Republic). In spite of our multilingual 
nature,  but  in  view of  our  common historical,  social,  cultural  and geopolitical  heritage,  the 
outside  world  gave us  one  general  national  name –  the  Russians  called  us  the  "Caucasus 
gortsy" (mountain people)" and in the West we were known as "Circassians". We have never 
known racial discrimination or religious friction.1
The idea of a Caucasus Confederation had its origins in the spring of 1917 and was developed 
further in 1918. Caucasian unity was proclaimed at the first Mountain People's Congress on 1 
May 1917  in Vladikavkaz. At the Congress the "Alliance of United Mountain People of the 
1 Gazeta: Kavkaz (Sukhum), 1990, no. 1.
North Caucasus and Dagestan", headed by T. Chermoev, a Chechen, R. Kaplanov, a Kumyk, P. 
Kotsev, a  Kabardian,  V. Dzhabagiev, an  Ingush, and others, was officially established. The 
Abkhazian people also became full members of this alliance. A Mountain Peoples' Government 
was formed in November 1917. S. Ashkhatsava represented Abkhazia in it.2
On the eve of this important event, on 8 November 1917, the Abkhazian People's Congress in 
Sukhum elected the first parliament, the "Abkhazian People's Council" (ANS) and the following 
vital  documents were approved: "Declaration by the Abkhazian People's Congress" and the 
"Constitution of the Abkhazian People's Council". It is interesting to note that the representative 
of the Abkhazian Parliament gave the following address on 19 November 1917 in Tiflis  at the 
opening of the first Georgian parliament (the Georgian National Council): "I am happy that the 
high honour of conveying warm greetings to you on behalf of the Abkhazian People's Council 
has fallen to my lot. The Abkhazian people, as part of the Alliance of united mountain peoples, 
congratulate  fair  Georgia  on its  first  steps on the way to  national  self-determination...  The 
Abkhazians, having formed an alliance with their northern brethren are therefore convinced that 
in the near future they will join the noble Georgian people in a  common alliance of all  the 
peoples of the Caucasus. In this future alliance the Abkhazian people see themselves as full 
members of the United Mountain Peoples' Alliance".3
However, according to Emir-Khassan, a prominent figure in North Caucasus emigration, this was 
the period when a  number of mistakes were made, which led to the isolation of the South 
Caucasus from the North Caucasus and the creation of the "so-called Transcaucasian Federa-
tion". Emir-Khassan observed:
The differences that began to appear even during the first revolutionary period became even more 
pronounced.  A narrow national  egoism flourished.  The minds of  Caucasian  statesmen were 
entirely directed to organising separate nations; each one was protecting and establishing only 
his own frontiers, without regard to what neighbouring peoples were doing.4
The situation in the North Caucasus very quickly worsened, with the increasing savagery of the 
civil war and the formation in March 1918 of the Terek Soviet Republic. However, the previous 
1st Mountain People's Congress still traced "the outlines of national ideology", which led the 
North Caucasus to proclaim its independence within a year. It is clear from the minutes of the 
first  meeting of the  Batumi  peace conference dated 11  May 1918  that  it  was attended by 
delegations from Germany, Turkey, the Transcaucasian Republic and the mountain peoples of 
the North Caucasus and Dagestan.5 On the same day the independence of the Caucasus Mountain 
Peoples' Republic  and  its  separation  from Russia  were  announced.  The  Republic  included 
Dagestan, Chechen-Ingushetia, Ossetia, Kabarda, Karachai-Balkaria, Abkhazia and Adygeya. Its 
territory  extended  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Caspian  and  amounted  to  260,000  square 
kilometres, with a population of almost 6.5 million.6
The deputies from the Abkhazian People's Council, A. Shervashidze (Chachba), T. Marshaniya, 
S. Basariya and others then appealed to the Turkish government and declared at the Batumi 
Conference that "Abkhazia does not wish to be included in the group of Transcaucasian peoples, 
but  aligns itself with the North Caucasus union of mountain peoples, which should build a 
2 Soyuz  obedinennykh  gortsev  Severnogo  Kavkaza  i  Dagestana  (1917-1918),  Gorskaya  respublika 
(1918-1920). Dokumenty i materialy, Makhachkala, 1994, p. 4-5, 134.
3 TsGVIA RF, f. 1300, op. 1, d. 130, l. 135 ob.
4 Severnyi Kavkaz (Warsaw), 1934, no. 2, p. 11.
5 Dokumenty i materialy po vneshnei politike Zakavkaz'ya i Gruzii, Tiflis, 1919, p. 312-313.
6 Ahmet Hazir Hizal, – Kuzey Kafkaz, Ankara, 1961, p. 143 (in Turkish).
separate state under the protection of Turkey".7 Later, during the years of Stalinist repression, 
particularly in 1937-1941,  this was the pretext for eliminating practically all  the Abkhazian 
intelligentsia,8 who were in sympathy with the idea of a Caucasus Confederation.
The territory of the independent Mountain Peoples' Republic of 1918,  which was recognised 
internationally, coincided precisely with that pan-Caucasian area that had been involved in the 
mountain peoples' national liberation campaign in the nineteenth century and developed under 
the banner of Shamil. After Shamil had been forced to lay down his arms in 1859, the Ubykh, 
Adygeyans and Abkhazians continued their unequal struggle with tsarism for a further five years. 
This ended on 21 May 1864 with a parade of Russian and Georgian forces on the Krasnaya 
Polyana, in historic Abkhazia. This marked the end of the Caucasian war (1817-1864). The 
historian Ali Sultan made the following comment with regard to the tragic events of those years:
In none of the conquered regions did Russian imperialism produce such devastation as it did in 
the North Caucasus. Here, as a result of many years of aggressive war, many localities settled 
since ancient times disappeared from the face of the earth, the boundaries of areas settled by 
individual  autochthonous tribes were altered and the cultural  monuments of the past  and an 
ancient civilisation were destroyed. In many cases entire ethnic units were uprooted and sent 
into the unknown... The western provinces of the Caucasus, Western Adygeya and Abkhazia 
were particularly hard hit: their populations were forced into large-scale emigration in the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century and found refuge in what was then the Ottoman Empire.9
This is a suitable place to note that on 9 May 1984 the US Congress approved an address of 
welcome to the peoples of the North Caucasus to mark the 66th anniversary of their declaration 
of independence. On that  portentous day Congressman Robert  Roy addressed the House of 
Representatives on the anniversary of the proclamation on 11  May 1918  of the Caucasian 
Mountain Peoples' Republic. The Congress documents also included a "Brief historical note on 
the struggle by the oppressed peoples of the Northern Caucasus for independence..."10
The Transcaucasian Democratic Federal Republic (ZDFR) broke up after the formation of the 
Mountain Peoples' Republic and on the same day, 26 May 1918, following an ultimatum by 
Turkey,  the Democratic Republic of Georgia was proclaimed (the Azerbaijan Republic was 
proclaimed on 27 May and the Armenian Republic on 28 May). This period in the history of the 
Caucasus has been called the "Caucasian May", and it was said in this connection in one of the 
proclamations: "When the anti-nationalist storm of bolshevism was raging in Russia, the idea of 
healthy national statehood was triumphant in the Caucasus".11
The instrument of Georgian independence was adopted on the day on which the republic was 
formed (26 May 1918); however, this did not define the frontiers of Georgia. Preliminary out-
lines of the frontier were drawn for the first time by someone with a very keen interest in the 
matter, in a secret letter to Tiflis dated 28 May 1918, by the German general von Lossow, who 
undertook to make every effort to ensure that "Germany would assist Georgia in securing its 
frontiers".12
7 Istoriya Abkhazii, Sukhum, 1991, p. 291.
8 R. Clogg,  "Documents  from the  KGB archive in  Sukhum, Abkhazia in  the  Stalin  years",  Central  Asian  
Survey, 1995, 14(1), pp. 181-188.
9 Severnyi Kavkaz, 1935, no. 9, p. 16.
10 US Congress Bulletin, 9 May 1984, 2nd Session, sitting 98, vol. 130, no. 59 (in English).
11 Severnyi Kavkaz, 1937, no. 37, p. 13.
12 Z. Avalov, Nezavisimost' Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoi politike 1918-1921, Paris, 1924; New York, 1982, p. 68.
However, even von Lossow, an ally of the Georgian government and at the same time a supporter 
of the Caucasian Confederation,  proposed the temporary inclusion of the Sukhum district – 
Abkhazia – within Georgia (i.e. within Germany's area of influence) with a reservation to prevent 
interference by his ally (Turkey). In commenting on this letter the international lawyer Z. Avalov 
(Avalishvili), a distinguished figure in the Georgian republic, wrote:
The reservation in the letter is curious: the Sukhum district (including Gagry) shall be part of 
Georgia until  Georgia forms a separate state within the Caucasus. However, should  a confed-
eration of Caucasian peoples  (italics mine – S.L.) be formed involving Georgia the population 
of  the  Sukhum district  should  be  allowed  to  determine  its  position  among the  Caucasian 
countries. In other words, in this case the population of Abkhazia would have the choice of un-
ion with Georgia, entering the Union of Mountain Peoples or being part of the Caucasus Con-
federation as a separate state-canton (italics mine – S.L.). It is apparent from this what impor-
tance was attached to the plan for political union of the Caucasian peoples at the precise time 
when circumstances made dissolution of the Transcaucasian Union essential.13
Thus Abkhazia was outside Georgian territory when Georgian independence was proclaimed on 
26 May, because since 11 May 1918 it had been part of the Caucasus Mountain Peoples' Peoples' 
Republic, which unfortunately lasted for only a year.
In breach of the arrangements with Abkhazia, as early as 17-19 June 1918,  troops from the 
Georgian republic supported by the military might of Germany landed in Sukhum and virtually 
occupied the country. General A.S. Lukomskii, Denikin's comrade-in-arms, wrote in this con-
nection:  "Taking  advantage of German support,  Georgia  occupied Abkhazia  and  the  Sochi 
district against the wishes of the population ..."14 By this time Abkhazia was in an extremely 
difficult position, because it was virtually deprived of real support from the "Mountain Peoples' 
government" due to  the increasingly brutal  civil  war  in  the North Caucasus.  However, the 
Mountain Peoples' Republic government condemned the Georgian invasion of Abkhazia. Thus in 
June 1918 the Foreign Minister of the Caucasus Mountain Peoples' Republic (Gaidar Bammat) 
lodged a protest with the government of Georgia and with Schulenburg, the head of the German 
government diplomatic mission in the Caucasus about  the incursion by German troops into 
Sukhum and "the presence of Georgian bands in Abkhazia".15
Several months later, in August 1918,  T.  Chermoev, the president of the Mountain Peoples' 
government, again protested to the German government about  the occupation of Abkhazian 
territory by Georgian troops supported by regular German army units. At the same time he gave 
a warning that the peoples of the North Caucasus, linked to Georgia by "race and a long-standing 
community of interests" must not allow any political complications to interfere with their drive 
for "the closest possible ties,  up  to and including  confederation" (italics mine –  S.L.),  and 
subsequently
On  behalf  of  my Government  I  protest  in  the  strongest  terms  against  Georgian  policy  in 
Abkhazia, a constituent part of the Federal Republic of the Union of Caucasus Mountain Peo-
ples  (italics mine – S.L.) and my Government considers it essential for Georgian troops, civil 
servants and emissaries to be withdrawn from Abkhazia immediately, in order to avoid the se-
rious complications that may result from this Georgian Government policy.16
13 Ibid., p. 68-69.
14 Arkhiv russkoi revolyutsii, Berlin, 1922, vol. 3(5-6), p. 114.
15 Soyuz ob'edinennykh gortsev, op.cit., p. 132.
16 Ibid., p. 133-135.
It  was during this period, in  June-August  1918,  that  Aleksandr Shervashidze, Tatash  Mar-
shaniya, Simon Basariya and other influential Abkhazians appealed for aid to Abkhazian mak-
hadzhirs living in Turkey whose forefathers had been compelled to leave their motherland in the 
nineteenth century  as  a  result  of  the  Russo-Caucasian  war.  The  people  and  parliamentary 
deputies of Abkhazia  regarded the forcible action by Georgia  as  armed intervention in  the 
Mountain Peoples' State. Noi Zhordania, the president of the Georgian Republic government, 
recalled that at that time the representatives of the North Caucasus gave Georgia an ultimatum: 
"Abkhazia is ours, get out!"17 The Turks in their turn were dreaming of Sukhum and planning to 
"protect Abkhazia from the Georgians" with the help of the Chechens.18
On the night of 27 June 1918 an Abkhazian armed force from Turkey landed near the River 
Kodori. Turkey was not involved in this conflict at the official level; the landing party was es-
sentially an armed force of the Mountain Peoples' Republic. In addition, German sources make 
clear that in June-August 1918 the "Mountain Peoples' government" was still laying claim to 
Abkhazia  and the port  of Sukhum.  It  is  not  surprising, therefore, that  there were repeated 
seaborne landings by Abkhazian makhadzhirs in Abkhazia during the same few months. These 
aspirations were fundamentally at variance with German policy interests in this region.
The Mountain Peoples' Republic government continued to regard Abkhazia as part of its state, in 
spite of the fact that it was occupied by Georgia. Thus a coloured ethnographic and political map 
of the Caucasus Mountain Peoples' Republic intended for the Paris Peace Conference was printed 
in  French  on  the  orders  of  the  Mountain  Peoples'  Delegation  in  1919  in  Lausanne  (a 
representative of Abkhazia also travelled to the conference as part of the Mountain Peoples' 
delegation19). On this map both Abkhazia and South Ossetia were shown as within the Mountain 
Peoples' State,20 not in Georgia.
Carl Erich Bechhofer, who was in the Caucasus at the time, described Georgian government 
policy as follows:
The "Free and Independent  Social-Democratic  State  of  Georgia" will  remain in  my memory 
forever as a classic example of an imperialistic "small nation", both in the matter of external 
territorial  seizure  and  in  bureaucratic  tyranny within  the  country.  Its  chauvinism passes  all
bounds.21
The Georgian politician Z. Avalov also described the situation at the time very accurately:
At the beginning of 1921 Georgia had a simple party organisation in its government and in the 
form of the Constituent  Assembly...Georgian democracy in 1918-1921,  which was a form of 
social-democratic dictatorship, i.e. right-wing Marxism, was the preparation for the triumph of 
Soviet dictatorship in Georgia.22
The "Mountain Peoples' Government" was forced to emigrate in 1921 as Soviet power became 
established in the Caucasus. In the 1920s and 30s representatives of the Caucasus Mountain 
Peoples' Republic in Prague, Paris and Warsaw published the journals "Vol'nye gortsy", "Gortsy 
17 N. Zhordania, My Life, Stanford, 1968, p. 98.
18 G. Avetisyan, 'K voprosu o "Kavkazskom dome" i pantyurkistskikh ustremleniyakh', in: Alexei Malashenko, 
Bruno Coppieters,  Dmitri Trenin (eds.), Etnicheskie i regional'nye konflikty v Evrazii, vol. 1, Moscow, 1997, 
p. 140.
19 Soyuz obedinennykh gortsev', op.cit.,  p. 197.
20 S. Kiladze, 'Edinstvo Kavkaza: popytka vykhoda iz krizisa', Tbilisskii meridian, 1997, no. 1, 20-22.
21 C.E. Bechhofer, In Denikin's Russia and the Caucasus. 1919-1920, London, 1921, p. 14.
22 Avalov Z. Nezavisimost' Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoi politike 1918-1921, Paris, 1924, p. XI-XIV.
Kavkaza",  "Severnyi  Kavkaz",  etc.  During  this  period  the  political  exiles  carried  out  an 
enormous amount of research on the future national state structure of the Caucasus. They pub-
lished a large number of articles, recommendations and books on this pressing problem, and on 
14 July 1934 in Brussels representatives of the national centres of North Caucasus, Georgia and 
Azerbaijan signed an international  treaty of great  political  importance –  the Caucasus Con-
federation Pact – with a place kept in the pact for Armenia.23
The Caucasus Independence Committee and the Caucasus Confederation Council, the governing 
body in all diplomatic activity, were set up at the same time. The Caucasus Confederation was to 
have been an alliance of states retaining a sovereign existence but bound together by several 
common  ties:  common  customs  frontiers,  defence  and  foreign  policy.  The  Caucasus 
Confederation Pact has been called a "tactical-strategic document".24 The Polish journal "Vostok" 
made this comment in 1934: "An independent and united Caucasus will cease to be a source of 
military conflict and will become a vital element in maintaining the overall balance".
Eminent political figures spoke in defence of the Caucasus Confederation, but were against a 
"Caucasus community" on a  federal basis, rightly regarding it  as an imperfect model. Thus 
B. Bilatti wrote:
A federation cannot stand compulsion... A federal link can be forged only between materially 
and spiritually equal values; otherwise it is likely to turn into a screen, under cover of which the 
strong will strive to absorb the weak. The great-power aspirations of large nations are organic 
phenomena derived from the very nature of mankind, and for that reason the cohabita-tion of 
large and small nations, even where such cohabitation is initially absolutely voluntary, is likely 
to end in conflict. This has been the fate of all states in which small nations have united round 
large nations.  The former were either absorbed by the latter or finally joined forces to bring 
down the state and free themselves from the tie...25
The issue of Caucasian unity was raised several times, but came into the open again on the eve of 
the break-up of the USSR, when Georgian-Abkhazian differences reached their high point and 
developed into conflict on 15-16 July 1989. This was the negative background against which a 
hasty consolidation of the North Caucasus nations and Abkhazia took place. The foundations of 
this movement were laid in Sukhum, the capital of Abkhazia, on 25 August 1989 at the first 
congress of Caucasus mountain peoples, which formed the Assembly of Caucasus Mountain 
Peoples (AGNK), by analogy with the 1917 United Mountain Peoples' Alliance.
The second AGNK congress on 13-14 October 1990 in Nal'chik (Kabardino-Balkaria) was a 
vital stage. It was announced then that a period of practical work to implement a programme for 
a new state structure for the North Caucasus and Abkhazia was on the way. Special attention was 
given to the unity of the Caucasus nations, put into effect on 11 May 1918 by the proclamation 
of an independent state – the North Caucasus Republic.26
Great events followed this congress. The Russian Federation showed signs of breaking up after 
the collapse of the USSR, and the existence of former "union-republic" small empires was called 
into question. The resolve of the Chechen nation, the proclamation of an independent Chechen 
Republic and the election of a president in October 1991 raised the Caucasus mountain peoples' 
movement to a new level. The third AGNK congress was held in Sukhum in the context of the 
23 Severnyi Kavkaz, 1935, no. 9, p. 11.
24 Severnyi Kavkaz, 1934, no. 8, p. 26.
25 Severnyi Kavkaz, 1934, no. 8, p. 13-14.
26 Edinenie (Sukhum) 1991, no. 1; Kavkaz, 1990, no. 1.
political turbulence in Chechnya (on 1-2 November 1991). It was attended by plenipotentiary 
representatives of the Abaza, Abkhazian, Avar, Adygeyan, Aukhov-Chechen, Darghin, Kabarda, 
Lak,  Ossetian  (North  and  South  Ossetia),  Circassian,  Chechen  and  Shapsug  nations. 
Representatives of social and political movements in Georgia were also present. In his speech a 
Georgian parliamentary deputy also called  for the entire Caucasus to merge to form a "single 
fist".27
Following a proposal by the deputies the AGNK was changed to the Confederation of Caucasus 
Mountain  Peoples (KGNK) and a  little  later,  in  Groznyi in  1992,  was renamed the Con-
federation of Caucasus Nations (KNK). The following declaration in particular had been made at 
the third KGNK congress:
It is quite probable that, in the first stage at all levels, the Caucasian autonomous republics and 
oblasts will declare themselves sovereign states, and after this act of national self-assertion will 
in  all  probability begin to  unite  to  form a new alliance – a Caucasus Confederation,  which 
Chechnya,  Dagestan,  Georgia,  Ingushetia,  Ossetia,  Kabarda,  Karachai-Balkaria,  Abkhazia, 
Adygeya, etc. may join as equal members.28
A Treaty was signed at the third congress and a "Declaration on a Confederated Alliance of 
Caucasus Mountain  Peoples" was adopted. Decisions were taken to form a Caucasian Parlia-
ment, an Arbitration Tribunal, a Defence Committee, a Caucasus Communities Committee and 
other structures for confederation, the headquarters of which would be in Sukhum.
Even during the Georgian-Abkhazian war,  in  April  1993  at  the London conference on the 
problems of the North Caucasus, representatives of Abkhazia also put forward a plan for the 
Caucasus Confederation.29
Under present conditions, such an alliance of sovereign Caucasus states in the form of a con-fed-
eration is becoming a matter of particular urgency. Even in 1934 Emir Khassan was stressing in 
his paper "A Caucasus Confederation" that "the Caucasus can be liberated and can retain its 
freedom only provided that all the Caucasus nations unite fully".30
Today it is quite obvious that only the Caucasians themselves, within their own union and with 
the support of the international community, are capable of settling vexed questions and resolving 
conflicts in the North and South Caucasus. Inter-Caucasian peacekeeping forces will also be 
needed to implement such a  programme. At the present stage this seems to be essential  in 
building a "Caucasian home" and, as the Azeri academic R. Aliev rightly observed, the "concept 
of inter-nation reconciliation"31 must prevail in this process.
Of course, today it would be Utopian to raise the matter of immediate union of all states and 
nations in the Caucasus to form a confederation, in view of the political, territorial and religious 
differences between them and the lack of any single unifying ideology.32 However, it seems quite 
possible at this stage to create the nucleus of such a confederation, which could consist of, for 
example,  three  countries:  Abkhazia  –  Georgia  –  Chechnya.  Unfortunately  some Georgian 
academics have seen the threat of "Georgian centrism" in this model; the problems inherent in 
27 Abkhazia, 1991, no. 51, 1st issue, December.
28 Abkhazia, 1991, no. 51, 2nd issue, December.
29 See Central Asian Survey (1995), 14(1), p. 103.
30 Severnyi Kavkaz, 1934, no. 2, p. 12.
31 R.  Aliev, '"Kavkazskii dom": vzglyad iz Azerbaidzhana', in: Alexei Malashenko, Bruno Coppieters,  Dmitri 
Trenin (eds.), Etnicheskie i regional'nye konflikty v Evrazii, vol. 1, op.cit., p. 162.
32 Ibid., p. 168.
this will recede into the background, while the importance of the Caucasus Confederation to the 
world community may become of paramount importance.
Later  Ingushetia,  Dagestan,  Ossetia  (North and South),  Azerbaijan,  Nagorno-Karabakh,  Ar-
menia, Adzharia,  Kabarda,  Karachai-Balkaria,  Circassia,  Adygeya, etc. may join the A-G-C 
triangle, given the enormous popularity of the idea of a  confederation among the Caucasian 
nations. A horizontal,  not a  vertical,  structure for state legal relations among the Caucasian 
countries in a confederative alliance can solve the basic problem: together or apart? It appears 
that in such a confederation not only Georgia and Abkhazia but other Caucasian states will be 
both together and apart at the same time in their mutual relations. This is undoubtedly necessary 
at the present stage in order to overcome the existing mistrust and to build relations among the 
nations of the Caucasus based on equality and trust. It is quite probable that in the historical long 
term the Caucasus Confederation will  transform itself into a  federation, but  this will  occur 
peacefully and painlessly. However, to propose federal relations in the Caucasus today means 
complicating the situation and resorting to  force and compulsion, which will  never lead to 
pacification and stabilisation throughout the Caucasus. There cannot be partial freedom: only the 
Caucasus as a whole can be free.
Maarten Theo Jans
Theory and Experiences of Ethnonational Conflict Regulation:
Their Relevance to the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict
Internal, Ethnonational Conflicts: Dynamics and Difficulties
At the end of the 1980s, the gradual weakening of the communist dispensation in the Soviet 
Union occasioned a reorganization of inter-group relations, often to the detriment of peaceful 
coexistence and moderation.Titular nations of Union republics and Autonomous republics found 
themselves locked into a  process of self-definition and a  quest for national and international 
legitimacy. The consolidation of the new states in terms of borders, population and political 
power  brought  about  a  nationalizing tendency which,  despite  existing ethnic  heterogeneity, 
sought a close fit between the nation and the state, thereby alienating the minorities in the new 
states.1 Nationalist policies and rhetoric speedily filled up the ideological space vacated by the 
exit of communism. Ghia Nodia correctly points out that not only was the rise of primordial 
nationalist feelings spurred on by the end of communist encapsulation, but these feelings were 
effectively stimulated through the introduction of democratic principles.
Democratic politics require the definition of the demos. Democracy, understood as the rule of the 
people by the people, begs the question of what is to be understood as "We, the people".2 Group 
definitions inherent in nationalism proved to offer the most powerful instrument for identifying 
the players in the new democratic game. Insider/outsider stigmatization occurred during the 
definition  of  the  demos along nationalist  lines,  and  this  gave  rise  to  violent  ethnonational 
tensions. The problematic necessity of defining the demos in new democratic states, as argued by 
Nodia, is, however, only one of the conflict-prone features of democracy. Democratic institutions 
also firmly install the elements of competition and group support in society. Access to political 
power in democracies depends on the degree of group support one manages to gain in an electoral 
competition. Elections are little more than a struggle for support, a competition between groups. 
Ethnonational definitions provide an easy and obvious basis for securing group support, support 
which is indispensable in the competition for power. Politicians will therefore find it tempting to 
use ready-made ethnic definitions for rallying popular support.
States with century-long traditions of dealing with ethnonational diversity in a democratic context 
(such as  Belgium,  Canada,  Switzerland and the United Kingdom) have never ceased to be 
troubled  by  ethnonationalist  mobilization.  Even  the  textbook  example  of  ethnonational
peace and calm –  Switzerland –  is increasingly confronted by inter-group friction. It  should 
hardly be surprising, therefore, that the end of communism and the subsequent introduction of 
democracy has given rise to a large number of internal, ethnonational conflicts. Many former 
Soviet states are currently struggling to come to grips with the problems of (ethnonational) 
diversity under the new post-communist, democratic dispensation. The nature and complexity of 
internal  conflicts  based  on  ethnonational  division  renders  regulation  and  accommodation 
particularly difficult. In general, the marrying of diverging interests requires a concerted effort, 
1 R. Brubaker Nationalism reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
2 G. Nodia, "Nationalism and democracy", in: L. Diamond, M.F. Plattner (eds.), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict,  
and Democracy, Baltimore & London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 3-22.
and the addition of an ethnonational dimension increases even further the difficulties inherent in 
regulating a conflict.
Ethnonational identities base their credibility and legitimacy on an interpretation of the historical 
past. The reference to mythical forefathers, battles, homelands, etc., entrenches the national self-
perception in history. By bringing history back into the picture, ethnonationalism also brings 
historical wrongs and traumas back to centre-stage in politics and conflict. But historical traumas 
cannot be relived in a more satisfactory way. Historical legacies are the structural foundations of 
a conflict situation, and it is not possible to erase them. Conflicting players seeking settlement 
thus have no alternative but to accept the remnants of frustration which history has left them. The 
past cannot be regulated. This means that historical traumas are difficult to address in concrete 
bargaining terms.
As Donald Horowitz points out, ethnonational affiliations tend to permeate all features of social 
life, especially when ethnic tensions emerge. In a conflict, an ethnonationally divided society no 
longer consists of workers and employers, buyers and sellers, conservatives and liberals, but 
essentially  of  members  of  different  ethnonational  groups,  as  the  ethnonational  dimension 
supersedes all  other forms of social segmentation.3 By homogenizing the members of an eth-
nonational group, ethnonationalism also becomes intimately linked with other forms of social 
affiliation.
Besides the purely ethnic dimension, ethnonational conflicts involve religion, ideology, economic 
interests, partisan politics, etc. These bundles of intertwined interests and demands are hard both 
to disentangle and to satisfy. The regulation of ethnonational conflicts presents the difficult task 
of reducing complex and intertwined demands into disentangled, workable packages of issues to 
be addressed. Moreover, national identities and the emotions they awaken correspond to the basic 
human need for self-definition in a changing and puzzling environment. Ethnonational identities 
infuse emotions and psychological needs into conflicts. Disputes tend to revolve around issues 
related to a sense of belonging, security and national pride – all of which are highly emotional 
and non-negotiable matters.
Zartman  singles out  another  typical  and  problematic  characteristic,  namely,  the asymmetric 
nature of many internal ethnonational conflicts. Tensions between insurgents and incumbents are 
often characterized by an asymmetry in coercive capacity, legal position, international support, 
numbers  and  administrative  or  bureaucratic  capacity.  Such  asymmetric  relations  are  less 
amenable to regulation because the stronger party has little incentive to deal with the weaker side 
on an  equal  footing, while the weaker side will  invest more in attempts to change the dis-
advantageous balance of power than in attempts to settle the conflict.4
Internal conflicts display a recurrent pattern, in which one side tries to maintain the asymmetry 
which the other side is seeking to redress. Asymmetric internal conflicts are likely to remain in a 
state of constant flux until some level of symmetry is reached or until the existing asymmetry is 
no longer perceived by either side as sufficient reason not to seek a joint settlement. Needless to 
say, such realizations may only emerge when both sides have exhausted one another in conflict, 
at the expense of a great deal of time, energy and bloodshed.
Once violent acts have been perpetrated, internal conflicts often enter a spiral of violence. Re-
petitive cycles of violence can be arrested, but they do jeopardize the chances of a future set-
3 D.L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1985.
4 I.W. Zartman, Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institu-
tion 1995.
tlement, not least because the harm inflicted raises the level of frustration which will need to be 
addressed in a settlement. Violence also decreases the possibility that the warring partners will 
perceive each other as credible and acceptable partners in dialogue.
Conflicting parties often find the thought of being on speaking terms with those who have al-
legedly committed atrocities against  them to  be unacceptable.  Inter-group violence involves 
regular armed forces, but it also attracts uncontrolled, disparate armed groups lead by warlords 
or common criminals. These irregular forces gain prominence during the conflict, a prominence 
they are likely to lose once the peace process is on track. Though they have no vested interest in 
the specifics of a settlement, their lack of hierarchic control puts them in a position to derail the 
settlement process by not complying with agreements or by breaking fragile cease-fires.
As noted earlier, ethnonationalism touches upon many aspects of social life. Territorial, linguistic 
and socio-economic delimitations are part of how ethnonational groups define themselves. The 
overwhelming variety of ethnonational identities is made up of different mixtures of similar 
constituent elements. The apparent diversity of ethnonational symptoms should not distract us 
from identifying the similarity of underlying causes that can be found in cases of ethnonational 
hostility. When the specific features of each single conflict are temporarily put aside for the sake 
of generalization, we find that a common thread running through many ethnonational conflicts is 
a  basic fear  of extinction.  Insurgent ethnonational  groups in  Canada,  Belgium,  the Basque 
country,  Northern Ireland and South Africa, to  name but  a  few, have all  been driven by a 
primordial  fear  of  being  overwhelmed  or,  as  Horowitz  puts  it,  of  being  swamped  by 
ethnonational outsiders. This anxiety often reflects the numerical inferiority of the ethnonational 
group or a downward demographic trend. Even where demography does not lend legitimacy to 
fears of extinction, the perceived disappearance of important ethnonational markers (language, 
customs, culture) will. Flemings were always the largest group in the Belgian population. Despite 
Flemish numerical preponderance, the higher social status associated with French language use 
stimulated an increased "frenchification" of the Flemish population. The gradual retreat of the 
Flemish language in favour of French led to the perception that a crucial defining characteristic 
of "Flemishness" was under attack.  Flemings felt engulfed by the French language, and the 
nationalist  movement  capitalized  on  the  fear  of  extinction  of  "Flemishness"  in  Flanders. 
Generally, fears of extinction – which are present in many if not all ethnonational conflicts – will 
need to be reduced or proved unwarranted if regulation is to be successful. In practice, this 
anxiety will only be allayed once institutions have been established that guarantee the continued 
survival  of the ethnonational  group. The ongoing tensions between Quebec and anglophone 
Canada are evidence that even the most (socio-economic) successful states remain ineffective as 
long as they fail to provide sufficient guarantees of ethnonational survival.
The Regulation of Internal Conflicts: What Are We Aiming at?
Pointing out the complexity of ethnonational conflict is one thing, suggesting how conflicts can 
be reduced and satisfactorily managed is another, even more demanding exercise. There are no 
uniform, straightforward answers to the question of how to reduce ethnonational conflicts. Each 
conflict is different – for example in time, space, parties involved, intensity, issues, etc. – and it is 
likely that different conflicts will require different approaches. A technique which was successful 
in conflict A may prove to be irrelevant – or worse still, detrimental – in conflict B. It therefore 
makes little sense merely to copy successful structures from one country to another in the hope of 
producing results which will reduce the conflict. Different diseases require different treatments.
Even if we are aware of the need for context-specific regulations, the path to be pursued needs to 
be specified. What precisely is meant by conflict regulation or conflict reduction? Should the 
intended regulation merely focus on the cessation of violent interactions, or should it do away 
with all sources of friction between groups in order to be deemed successful? Clearly, the first 
stumbling-block in dealing with internal,  ethnonational  conflicts is the difficulty of defining 
conflict regulation itself.
One could uphold an intuitive notion of peaceful coexistence devoid of conflict, but hardly any 
ethnonationally divided country (except perhaps Switzerland) would fit in with this intuitive 
notion of conflict regulation. All states characterized by ethnonational segmentation have ex-
perienced some degree of inter-group friction and conflict. If we were to accept the absence of 
conflict as the ultimate aim of conflict regulation, hardly any ethnonationally divided state would 
qualify as a case of successfully regulated conflict. The absence of conflict cannot be used as an 
operational indicator of the success of conflict regulation.
Once ethnonational tensions have occurred they will affect future relations between the opposing 
groups. No regulation or  pacification will  succeed in turning the clock back.  In  this sense, 
conflicts can never be "resolved" or ended in an absolute sense. The conflictual acts which oc-
curred during the tensions will continue to affect and colour interactions between the groups, 
even if pacification has decreased the intensity of the dispute. Settlements cannot efface previous 
conflictual  acts, nor will every source of friction be brought to a  mutually fully satisfactory 
outcome in an agreement. The heritage of past conflictual acts and the remnants of dissatisfaction 
on one or both sides will often contain the seeds of future conflict between ethnonational groups. 
Settlements may decrease the amount of overt hostility or violent interaction, but they will never 
end or bring about the disappearance of conflict.
Strategies aiming at the annihilation of conflict between (ethnonational) groups are unrealistic 
and often even undesirable. It could be argued that inter-group conflicts are a perfectly normal 
and essential feature of politics. If societies consist of different individuals organized in different 
groups, it is likely that these groups will develop dissimilar sensitivities, needs and preferences, 
which are a corollary of their group or individual differences. The institution which, following 
the formulation of dissimilar interests, processes these different interests into a common policy 
outcome, is the state. The creation of policy outcomes applicable to all involves high stakes, 
divergent interests and intense competition between these group interests,  often resulting in 
disagreement and conflict. In the policy process, the competing groups resort to a  number of 
coercive, persuasive, bargaining and other tactics to achieve their desired outcome. The heated 
competition  to  determine  policy  outcomes  clearly  involves  conflictual  relations.  It  is 
commonplace  to  portray  conflictual  relations  in  politics  as  detrimental,  dysfunctional  and 
counterproductive to the functioning of a political system. All too often there is a tendency to 
overlook the fact that these conflicts identify the relevant issues, they clarify the sensitivities and 
importance attached to these issues by societal players and they also illustrate the power balance 
between groups. In this respect, conflicts are an essential and even a functional feature of politics, 
allowing the production of realistic, balanced and sensitive policy. The point here is that the goal 
of  conflict  regulation  cannot  be  the  disappearance of  conflict.  Conflicts  are  a  normal  and 
functional corollary of group differences. Conflict-regulating strategies should aim at controlling 
and orienting the  conflict  towards stable outcomes, rather  than  investing in  the  creation of 
conflict-free environments.
The proposed view – that conflicts are part and parcel of political decision-making – should not 
be interpreted as an unqualified plea for the uncontrolled proliferation of conflicts. Ten-sions and 
conflicts often escalate and lead to highly sub-optimal outcomes or even to the collapse of the 
policy-making institutions.  Regulatory strategies should  focus on avoiding such detrimental 
escalation by stimulating the recognition and acceptance of divergent interests as the starting-
point from which differences can be processed into stable policy outcomes. Conflict regulation 
techniques will not succeed in resolving conflicts, but will at best manage to channel damaging 
tensions towards outcomes which allow for  the  coexistence of  competitive  groups.  Having 
reduced unwarranted expectations of the capacity of regulatory acts to end conflict, we now 
propose the following definition:  the successful regulation of internal conflicts occurs when 
group dissatisfactions and opposing  interests are confronted and addressed  in a political  
system and conflicting demands are subsequently processed, at the lowest possible cost and  
risk, into stable policy outcomes. Some elements of this definition of conflict regulation require 
closer scrutiny. First, regulation requires dissatisfactions to be voiced and responded to by the 
conflicting  parties.  Without  clear  statements  of  group  discontent,  there  is  little  to  which 
regulatory techniques can be applied.
If the deprived group fails to mobilize (for lack of organizations, infrastructure, communica-tion, 
etc.), it may not be effective in putting forward demands. Once grievances have been voiced, the 
group in relation to which the discontent is expressed needs to recognize and attend to the 
problem. This is certainly not always the case, as the (dominant) group, to which demands are 
addressed, can choose to ignore or deny the existence of this dissatisfaction. By denying the 
existence of a conflict, the (dominant) group legitimizes its lack of response and avoids taking 
any policy steps designed to  reduce the dissatisfaction. These two conditions for successful 
conflict regulation are often lacking. Conflicts may seem to have been pacified, but the apparent 
calm is merely due to the failure of dissatisfied groups to put forward their demands or the result 
of a (dominant) group's preferring to deny the existence of a problem for as long as it can.
Second, successful  conflict  regulation involves the processing of conflicting demands at  the 
lowest possible cost and risk. It is not possible to indicate precisely the point at which conflicts 
are processed at the lowest cost and risk. Such operationalization requires quantifiable indicators 
of costs and risks and a thorough understanding of how the conflicting parties assess these costs 
and risks.  The general  notion of lowest possible costs proposed here is  that  the amount  of 
resources, time and energy devoted to dealing with the conflict does not interfere with the suc-
cessful  formulation of other  policy outcomes. Conflict regulation can be deemed successful 
(where all the other conditions are met) if the cost of dealing with the conflict does not hamper 
the policy-making capacity of the political system. The regulation of a conflict can drain a sub-
stantial amount of resources, to the extent that all other policy issues need to be put on hold, 
leading to a policy blockage and the inability of the political system to function at all. Such 
instances of policy-making overload are failures of conflict regulation, even if they come about 
without violence. Next to costs, the element of risk needs to be taken into account. The costs 
involved in regulation may be low while the chances of jeopardizing the continued existence of 
the political system may very be high. If the regulation of conflicts involves bringing the political 
system time and again to the brink of disintegration and collapse, then the techniques applied are 
unsuitable for repeated use and, therefore, unsuccessful.
Third, successful conflict regulation should result in the formulation of stable policy outcomes. A 
stable policy outcome is perceived as one from which none of the parties has an incentive to 
deviate. There is no incentive to deviate because, in the given circumstances, all the other rea-
sonably possible outcomes could be expected to leave each of the parties worse off. A stable 
outcome does not necessarily correspond to the full realization of one or both parties' goals. It is 
likely to leave a residue of dissatisfaction on each of the opposing sides. Despite falling short of a 
full realization of their goals, both sides can adhere to the outcome and render it stable because 
they  are  aware  that  the  struggle  for  maximum individual  gain  leads  to  mutually  inferior 
outcomes.
Inherent in the above description of a stable outcome is the fact that the stability achieved is 
unlikely to be maintained indefinitely. Changing circumstances (changing environments, needs, 
leaders, etc.) can alter and decrease the benefits linked to an outcome, thereby making other 
outcomes more desirable. Conflicting parties seeking the regulation of their differences should 
therefore be prepared for an ongoing process of establishing new stable outcomes. Longevity of 
outcomes  can  be  pursued  by  entrenching  them  in  institutions.  Institutional  frameworks 
(constitutions,  bureaucracies,  jurisprudence,  etc.)  tend  to  reinforce  and  attribute  a  certain 
"robustness" to outcomes, thereby prolonging their existence. Institutionally embedded outcomes 
can be expected to be more resistant to change, but there is ample empirical evidence that even 
institutionalized outcomes are not immune to changing needs and environments.
The definition of conflict regulation presented in this paper can be regarded as fairly pragmatic 
for several reasons. First, the termination of conflict (understood as the end of tension and friction 
between groups) is rejected as a goal of conflict regulation. The aim is not to abolish conflict, but 
rather to limit some of its destructive consequences. Conflicts between groups cannot and should 
not disappear. Instead, conflict regulation should aim to process conflicting demands, at a low 
cost and low risk, into stable outcomes. In more concrete terms: conflicting groups should learn 
not to avoid living in disagreement, but to live with disagreement. Second, the definition is not 
centred on the presence or absence of violence. On the one hand, the absence of violence – 
desirable  as  this  may  be –  is  no  guarantee  of  successful  coexistence.  Non-violent  conflict 
situations may be accompanied by high costs and risks and a failure to produce stable policy 
outcomes, rendering group coexistence fragile or even unbearable. On the other hand, the use of 
violence does not necessarily entail the failure of conflict regulation.
Law enforcement or the voicing of discontent can take a violent form. Such eruptions of violence 
do not, by definition, jeopardize the success of regulation or group coexistence. Although the use 
of violence in conflicts is not a suitable indicator for determining the failure or success of conflict 
regulation, it is unlikely that violence will be part of a successful regulation strategy, as the use of 
violent means to enforce an outcome is usually a costly, risky undertaking and leads to hotly 
contested, and therefore unstable, outcomes.
Joint Decision-Making as the Optimal Approach to Conflict Regulation
Three ways of settling a conflict may be discerned: an external authority can impose a solution 
upon the conflicting parties, the conflict can result in an outcome through a number of unilateral 
actions, or the conflicting parties can decide to settle their differences jointly. It will be argued 
that the latter approach is both normatively and factually the preferable procedure for regulating 
conflict.
Conflicting  parties  deciding  to  settle  their  disagreements  jointly  accept  that  the 
formulation of a conclusion to the conflict shall be dependent on the agreement of both sides. 
This necessity for mutual agreement has important consequences for the nature and quality of the 
decision-making process.
The pursuit of a mutually acceptable outcome implies an interactive process. First of all, 
the grievances and demands of both sides are put forward. These grievances will need to be ad-
dressed if an outcome is to ensue, and this forces all participants to note and act upon the dis-
satisfactions expressed by their opponents. Moreover, this exchange of information clarifies the 
sources of discontent, the relevant issues and the relative importance attached to the matters in 
dispute. It cannot be assumed a priori  that the adversaries have adequately assessed the con-
tentious issues. Conflicting parties often have only indirect information regarding how far the 
opponent is willing to go. One side's sensitivities, intentions and real goals are often uncertain or 
blurred by their opponent's negative perceptions. Confrontation and the exchange of information 
and perceptions are instrumental in forging workable definitions of the conflict situa-tion. Joint 
decision-making  encourages  conflicting  parties  to  redefine  their  own  positions  and,  more 
importantly, to reconsider their perception of the opponent in the light of conveyed information.
Through the interactive exchange of information and the subsequent adjustment of perceptions, 
opponents gain knowledge of each other's goals and bottom lines. This exchange of information 
reduces the element of uncertainty in the interaction. The importance of minimizing uncertainty 
and achieving certainty cannot be overestimated, as certainty with regard to the relevant features 
of the conflict situation (issues, opponent, minimum demands, etc.) allows for the emergence of 
mutual trust in the joint decision-making process. Conflicting parties operating under conditions 
of great uncertainty as regards their opponent's motivation, means and goals cannot be expected 
to develop sentiments of trust vis-ŕ-vis an unpredictable adversary. The exchange and adjustment 
of information reduces uncertainty, increases the predictability of the opponent's behaviour and 
favours the emergence of trust. Conversely, uncertainty in interactions is a factor which inspires 
feelings of fear and vulnerability – feelings which, according to psychological theory,5 are highly 
conducive to violent reactions.
As was mentioned in the introduction, a number of scholars have pointed out the problematic 
asymmetric nature of most internal or ethnonational conflicts. Generally, the asymmetry can be 
qualified as a power imbalance, based on coercive, legal or moral grounds, between the dissat-
isfied group and the incumbents. Such asymmetry is deemed problematic because equals are said 
to  make  peace  more  readily  and  more  easily  than  unequals.6 Adversaries  seeking  conflict 
regulation through joint decision-making accept, by implication, that settlement can only occur if 
both sides agree. Joint decision-making, therefore, equalizes the relative weight of asymmetric 
adversaries in the formula for the final decision.
As unanimity is essential to this formula, both need to agree, so each of them has the power of 
veto. Joint decision-making entails an equalization of power in the decision which might not be 
paralleled by equality in the coercive or legal capabilities of the conflicting parties. This equali-
zation of power in decision-making is one possible reason why rival groups reject joint settle-
ments, because their favourable power position on the battlefield is significantly curtailed by the 
equalizing effects of joint decision-making. In general, jointly accepted outcomes will be less 
power-induced than those which are the result of unilateral or external (hierarchical) actions. 
This does not mean that  conflict regulation through joint decision-making will be devoid of 
power struggles or the effects of bargaining power. The degree of dependence, the availability of 
alternatives, the consequences of non-agreement and the salience and importance of the issues at 
stake for each of the parties will largely determine the parties' strength in the joint decision-
making process. Power relations between the conflicting parties will still be a crucial variable in 
this process, but imbalances will be partially redressed by their equal share in the formula for the 
final decision.
5 L.N.  Rangarajan,  The Limitation  of  Conflict.  A Theory of  Bargaining  and  Negotiation,  London,  Croom 
Helm, 1998.
6 C.R. Mitchell, "Asymmetry and strategies of regional conflict", in: I.W. Zartman, V.A. Kremenyuk,  Coop-
erative Security. Reducing Third World Wars, Syracuse-New York, Syracuse University Press, 1995, p. 36.
Finally, outcomes resulting from joint decision-making will incorporate the minimum demands 
of each of the parties. Under unilateralism or imposed regulations, there is no guarantee that the 
needs of both sides will be addressed in the final outcome. The unanimity rule implicit in joint 
decision-making means that, in order to be mutually acceptable, an outcome should satisfy at 
least the minimum needs of both parties. This mutual satisfaction of minimum needs renders the 
outcome more stable than unilateral or imposed solutions, which are likely to give rise to dispute 
and the re-emergence of inter-group hostilities.
At the start of this section we stated our conviction that joint – as opposed to unilateral or hier-
archical – decision-making is the most beneficial approach to conflict regulation. Joint deci-sion-
making encourages a  full  discussion of all  dissatisfactions through a  clarifying exchange of 
information, which reduces uncertainty and allows for the emergence of trust. Moreover, the 
unanimity rule partially reduces asymmetry and guarantees that at least the minimum demands 
of the opposing sides will be part of a mutually accepted outcome. The inclusion of minimum 
demands increases the stability of the outcome, as each side receives a share of satisfaction.
Bargaining and Negotiations: The Stuff Joint Decision-Making is Made of
Juxtaposed interests and demands in a conflict situation will not simply dissolve once joint de-
cision-making has been selected as the procedure for regulation. But there is still a need for a 
painstaking search for an outcome that offers a mutually satisfactory balance between the jux-
taposed demands. The process of weighing up these demands and finding ways of rendering 
incompatible  interests  more  compatible  under  joint  decision-making  involves  a  bargaining 
process. 
As bargaining is so central to decision-making, we shall explore this concept further. A standard 
definition  of  bargaining  is  offered by  Rubin  and  Brown.  According  to  these  authors,  the 
bargaining process should display the following characteristics:
1. at least two parties are involved in the interaction; 2. these parties have a conflict of interest 
with respect to one or more different issues; 3. whether or not previously acquainted, the parties 
are temporarily involved with one another in a voluntary relationship; 4. the essential activity in 
this relationship involves either the exchange of one or more specific resources or the resolution 
of one or more issues among the parties (or both); 5. the nature of this activity is sequential 
rather than simultaneous, in the sense that there is a presentation of proposals or demands by 
one party followed by the evolution and presentation of counterproposals by the other, until a 
resolution or impasse occurs.7
The above paragraph gives a good description of bargaining, but reveals little of the nature of the 
relationship which binds bargainers.  Negotiations often signal  the beginning of co-operative 
coexistence.  Nevertheless,  they  should  not  be  perceived  as  a  purely  co-operative  activity. 
Conflictual attitudes remain an important feature of a bargaining process. Bargaining relations 
are best understood as mixed-motive relationships. The relationship combines a concern for co-
operation with conflictual attitudes. Bargainers are separated by some conflicting interests and 
linked by some common interests.8 The conflictual element can be traced back to the fact that 
7 J.Z. Rubin, B.R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, New York, Academic Press, 
1975, p. 5.
8 Kochan (T.A.), Verma (A.). "Negotiations in organizations: blending industrial relations and organizational 
behavior approaches", in: M.H. Bazerman, R.J. Lewicki,  Negotiating in Organizations, Beverly Hills, Sage 
Publications, 1983, p. 19.
each bargainer aims at maximizing his/her benefit in the outcome bargained for. The struggle by 
each bargainer to obtain a favourable outcome, in a context of incompatible interests, entails 
conflict. Without diverging interests, the parties would not need to bargain – to reach the desired 
goal, it would be enough to co-ordinate their actions. Despite the conflict-prone configuration of 
interests, bargaining processes have an important co-operative dimension. The incentive for co-
operation comes from an awareness by the bargainers that their goals cannot materialize without 
the some degree of participation by their adversaries. The parties must feel that goal achievement 
is to a  large extent dependent upon the agreement of the opponent. The combination of co-
operative and conflictual stimuli locks bargainers into an almost "schizophrenic" relationship 
which Schelling describes as "incomplete antagonism" or "a precarious partnership". For an 
interaction to  be defined as  a  bargaining process, both the conflictual  and the co-operative 
dimensions need to be present. Interactions lacking the mixed-motive characteristics are either 
open conflict or co-ordination settings which, as Bacharach and Lawler succinctly state, have 
little bearing on a bargaining situation: "If they had no incentive to co-operate, they would not 
bargain  at  all,  if  they had no incentive to  compete, they would not  need to  bargain".  The 
definition formulated by Rubin and Brown clearly points to the dynamic nature of bargaining. 
Negotiations are portrayed as a process which can be summarized in a number of subsequent 
stages. Several authors (Rangarajan 1985, Gulliver 1979) have analysed bargaining processes 
from this developmental perspective.9 Bargaining is presented as a sequenced process in which 
the negotiators move through distinct phases, each of them containing different problems, until a 
solution or collapse follows.
Though the authors define the phases differently, the sequenced descriptions of bargaining are 
roughly parallel. For our present purposes, a short summary of the essential bargaining phases 
will suffice:
1. The initial phase consists in the expression and recognition of discontent. The parties voice 
their dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs, and this dissatisfaction is noted. Through 
tacit bargaining, the parties signal and test each other's willingness to commence negotiations.
2. If the discontent expressed is responded to in a positive fashion, indicating that the party 
addressed acknowledges the problem, the phase of "negotiation about negotiation" (NAN) 
can begin. During the NAN a  consensus on basic attributes of the bargaining setting is 
sought. This involves decisions about a mutually acceptable arena or forum for negotiations, 
the  agenda,  rules  about  decisions,  the  number  and  type  of  actual  negotiators  and  the 
acceptance or rejection of preconditions to negotiations. Each of these decisions can be the 
object of dispute and bargaining. Many negotiations reach the NAN stage but then collapse 
because of disagreement on the fundamentals of the setting for the bargaining. Often, unre-
solved disagreements during the NAN phase point to a lack of commitment by the parties to 
the bargaining process.
3. Once the basic features of the negotiations have been agreed upon, substantive bargaining can 
take place. The real  bargaining usually starts with the bargainers stating their maximum 
demands and the legitimacy of their enterprise. The aim of the entire process that follows 
these statements is to bridge the differences between the adversaries. This necessitates an 
identification of the crucial issues at stake. Negotiations are simplified by concentrating on a 
number of priority issues. In order to narrow the differences on priorities, initial demands can 
be redefined in more manageable terms. Another, much-used technique for narrowing gaps in 
9 P.H. Gulliver,  Disputes and Negotiations. A Cross-Cultural Perspective, New York Academic Press 1979; 
Rangarajan, op.cit., 1985.
initial expectations is the exchange of benefits and disadvantages between negotiators. If the 
bargainers have asymmetrical priority lists, the log-rolling technique can be applied. Log-
rolling is an exchange of concessions on issues of differing importance to the bargainers. Each 
bargainer gets his/her way on one issue in exchange for making a concession on another issue 
of lesser importance to him/herself.10
4. A last  and often underestimated phase concerns the implementation or  execution of the 
agreement. This is the stage at which poorly-negotiated agreements often collapse. During 
implementation, the ambiguous nature of stipulations and a lack of genuine consensus tend to 
surface forcefully. Agreements usually require re-negotiation and monitoring devices to keep 
the implementation of the agreement on track.
Turning Adversaries into Co-Operative Negotiators: Stalemate and Interdependence
As indicated above, the factor spurring the opponents to co-operate in bargaining is their ac-
knowledgement  that  they  depend  on  each  other  for  reaching  their  individual  goals,  their 
awareness that they cannot reach a desirable outcome on their own, without the inclusion of their 
adversary. The perception that unilateral alternatives are ruled out points to the interdependence 
of the opponents. The degree and nature of their interdependence has important consequences for 
the bargaining process.
When alternatives are scarce and the failure of the negotiations is imminent, the negotiators will 
be confronted with a stalemate. Their commitment to the bargaining process will depend on how 
they assess this deadlocked situation. In a case of great interdependence (few alternatives and 
strong probability of stalemate), the evaluation of the stalemate situation in terms of costs and 
benefits  will  be  determined  by  the  importance  to  the  bargainers  of  the  issue(s)  at  stake. 
Bargainers with few alternatives who attribute a high priority to the issue(s) under negotiation 
are likely to regard a stalemate as undesirable. Bargainers for whom the issue(s) at stake has 
(have) a low degree of salience will tend to asses the deadlocked situation as bearable.
The degree of interdependence is the basic variable that determines the bargainers' commitment 
to the bargaining process. Players who feel that they can gain satisfaction independently, or by 
drawing on alternative resources that do not involve their opponent, have little reason to invest in 
the troublesome process of finding a mutually acceptable outcome. On the other hand, those who 
are  aware  of their  mutual  dependence have no other  option than  to  commit  themselves to 
negotiations. The failure of negotiations in cases of low interdependence leaves the players to 
their (unilateral) alternative options. Failed negotiations in conditions of great interdependence 
leave the players facing a stalemate, since there are no alternatives. A high degree of interde-
pendence thus implies a scarcity of alternatives and a high probability of stalemate in the event of 
failed negotiations.
The degree of interdependence is thus crucial to understanding any bargaining process. A clear 
assessment of interdependence indicates the extent to which bargainers have alternatives to joint 
decision-making in trying to secure an outcome, and it clarifies the likelihood of stalemate when 
negotiations  collapse.  Bargaining  theory  focuses  mainly  on  processes  occurring  during 
negotiations (agenda, stages, tactics, concession rates, threats, etc.), but under-emphasises de-
termining features outside the direct negotiations. The extent to which players have alternatives 
10 D.G. Pruitt,  "Achieving integrative agreements", in: M.H. Bazerman, R.J. Lewicki,  Negotiating in Organi-
zations, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1983, p. 39.
to bargaining and their appreciation of failed negotiations are elements fashioned outside the 
negotiations but which have a direct impact on the negotiation.
A number of recent studies in the field of international relations have addressed the question of 
when conflicts are "ripe for resolution". These studies have investigated the conditions necessary 
for  prompting players  to  seek  a  settlement  rather  than  the  continuation  of  hostilities.  The 
generally accepted conclusion is that conflicting players cease hostilities when confronted by a 
"mutually hurting stalemate". This "mutually hurting stalemate" is defined as "the point where 
parties no longer feel they can use force to gain unilateral advantage and become willing to 
consider other options". At this point the parties perceive the costs and prospects of continued 
confrontation  as  becoming  more  burdensome than  the  costs  and  prospects  of  a  settlement 
(Zartman, Hampson, Druckman). The concept of "hurting stalemate" goes a long way towards 
encapsulating the constellation which promotes bargaining and joint decision-making. Stalemate 
indicates that players feel they cannot improve their position by continuing the hostilities.
Furthermore, stalemate is supposed to harm both sides, which suggests that the players will not 
merely cease hostilities but need to invest actively in altering the stalemate. Zartman's concept of 
"mutually hurting stalemate" amounts to a necessary but not sufficient condition for describing a 
conflict as "ripe for resolution". A hurting stalemate indicates the point where the conflicting 
players no longer perceive the continuation of open hostilities as  a  beneficial  strategy.  The 
decision to stop fighting necessarily entails a simultaneous decision to begin co-operating. In a 
situation of hurting stalemate, unilateral actions merely cease to be a viable strategy – they do not 
preclude the emergence of other non-co-operative interactions.
Instead of seeking a joint settlement, the players may – and often do – seek to involve external 
players who can enforce an outcome hierarchically. Or the adversaries may invest in rendering 
the condition of stalemate less harmful by increasing their self-sufficiency. All too often, players 
confronted by a hurting stalemate in a conflict develop a capacity to live with the deadlocked 
situation, preferring to accept a  state of inertia  than embark  on the cumbersome process of 
settling the conflict jointly.
Though useful,  the concept of "hurting stalemate" only partially  describes the  constellation 
leading to joint settlement. An additional factor is needed to push conflicting players towards the 
bargaining table to work out a joint settlement. Beside a hurting stalemate, a perception of great 
interdependence has to be solidly entrenched in the minds of the adversaries. It is not enough to 
be blocked in a conflict: opponents also need to realize that their fates are intimately linked and 
that there is little prospect of this changing in the near future. As long as the conflicting  parties 
feel that the net result of the conflict can be an outcome which does not take into account the 
position of the adversary, joint settlement is unlikely to ensue. A joint settlement can only occur 
when the adversaries realize that living with the opponent is difficult, but living without the 
opponent is impossible.
Two cases of successful conflict regulation – namely, Belgium and South Africa – are enlight-
ening in this perspective. Ethnonational and racial tensions have been prominent for decades in 
these countries. Though the two countries have not experienced similar levels of violence,11 these 
tensions were highly divisive and dominated politics in both countries in recent decades. Despite 
high  ethnonational/racial  polarization  and  juxtaposed  interests,  both  conflicts  resulted  in  a 
negotiated settlement. There was no outright cessation of (violent) inter-group hostilities, but 
each settlement produced a stable outcome in the sense that none of the key players (ANC, NP in 
11 The Belgian ethnonational conflict did not produce any fatal casualties, while South African political fatali-
ties run to tens of thousands.
South Africa and Christian Democrats, Liberals and Socialists in Belgium) subsequently sought 
to change the fundamentals of the agreement. The analysis of what led South Africans and 
Belgians  to  overcome their  outstanding  differences by  working  out  a  joint  settlement  can 
contribute to a general understanding of what drives players to joint decision-making.
During the 1970s and 1980s,  tensions between Flemings and Francophones increasingly im-
mobilized the functioning of national government. The power-sharing arrangement in force in the 
national government produced a stalemate whenever an ethnonational conflict occurred. Parity 
rules, consensus decision-making in the national government and a number of special majority 
requirements  tempered  a  direct  translation  of  Flemish  demographic  predominance  into  a 
corresponding share of decision-making power. Flemings and Francophones carried roughly 
equal weight in policy decisions. Although temporary power imbalances occurred between the 
ethnonational groups, institutionally-geared unanimity or consensus rules precluded the contin-
ued dominance of either side. A system based on unanimity decisions (whether  de  facto or 
formal) and diverging interests is, of course, easily stalled. The unanimity rule implies a right of 
veto for every participant. Each party has the capacity to stall the process and is likely to do so 
when interests are perceived to be incompatible. Ethnonational mobilization in Belgium infused 
decision-making with just such incompatible zero-sum perceptions and this, under the unanimity 
rule, led to a recurrent stalling of policy-making. The recurrent pattern of government crises and 
collapse  over  ethnonational  issues  during  the  late  1970s  and  1980s  led  to  what  Zartman 
described as a "mutually hurting stalemate".
Similarly, towards the end of the 1980s the South African government and the anti-apartheid 
movement had reached stalemate stage. The apartheid regime had encountered insurmountable 
difficulties in containing an increasingly strong and efficient anti-apartheid movement. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, the ANC-led movement was drawing support from almost every segment 
of black society (unions, churches, students, women, traditional leaders, homeland populations, 
etc.). Anti-apartheid mobilization could bring the country to a virtual standstill. The opposition 
strategy, aimed at  making the black population ungovernable, was not without success. The 
National Party government managed to maintain only limited control over its territory, at very 
high policing and security costs. The invigorated anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s could 
corner  the  regime,  but  it  was  still  not  in  a  position  to  overthrow it.  The  South  African 
government, bureaucracy and security forces still represented a formidable opponent, no longer 
able to crush the opposition but certainly able to maintain white rule for some time to come. The 
main conflicting players, the NP government and the ANC, were clearly locked into a stalemate 
position. The lack of a clear power preponderance on either side limited the potential success of 
unilateral actions. Two roughly equal sides were at loggerheads, and the continuation of open 
(violent) conflict was not expected to alter this balance of power in the near future.
As was mentioned before, the concept of stalemate goes a long way towards encapsulating the 
constellation leading to joint settlement. However, it also overlooks an important feature that was 
present in the South African and Belgian cases. It  was not the mere acknowledgement of a 
stalemate that drew Belgians and South Africans to the bargaining table. Besides the mutual 
recognition that the continuation of overt hostilities would merely harshen the stalemate condi-
tions, the conflicting players also realized that they were highly interdependent. The stalemate 
situation  indicated  that  the  existing conflict  strategies  were  counterproductive.  A stalemate 
demonstrates the erroneous nature of current strategies but leaves a number of non-co-operative 
options open. The realization of interdependence narrows these alternatives down to one single 
option, namely, a joint and mutually acceptable settlement.
Flemings and Francophones were aware that the only way out of the stalemate would have to be 
a mutually acceptable joint settlement. The ethnonationally mixed nature of central institutions 
and the Brussels region, together with supra-ethnonational loyalties to the Belgian state and its 
symbols, are but some of the contextual features which forced the conflicting players to see their 
inherent  interdependence within  the  Belgian  state.  Not  only  were  conflicting  ethnonational 
groups part of the conflict, but they would also have to be integral parts of any reform or new 
dispensation  that  sought  the  regulation  of  the  conflict.  A  similar  realization  of  inherent 
interdependence occurred in the South African case.
Here, stalemate between the apartheid government and the ANC-led movement signalled the 
failure of existing strategies on both sides. In addition, the realization of interdependence fuelled 
the notion that any new democratic solution would have to incorporate the desires of both sides. 
The territorial dispersal of whites on South African soil ruled out white secession as a realistic 
strategy. Moreover, whites were aware that any new political dispensation would reflect the 
demographical preponderance of blacks in South African society. In short, whites realized that 
the change from the current strategy (continued racial segregation) could not be outright white 
separation and would entail  a  considerable degree of black rule.  Under the influence of Joe 
Slovo, the ANC leadership revised its demand for a direct transition to full majority rule (which 
would of course be black rule). Like the white leaders, the ANC was aware that, despite its 
obvious numerical and political strength, it could not "go it alone". The white minority could still 
block any real democratic transition. Furthermore, white control over the financial and economic 
sectors would remain a crucial variable under the new dispensation. In short, stalemate revealed 
that existing strategies on both sides were leading only to a dead end, while interdependence ruled 
out  all  other  unilateral  strategies and pointed to  joint  decision-making as  the only realistic 
solution to the conflict.
Suggestions for the Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict
In the previous sections, general insights into conflict regulation and joint decision-making have 
been presented. In this paper, theory is not treated as an end in itself. What matters here is the 
relevance of theoretical insights to understanding and suggesting approaches to the regulation of 
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Little reference will be made to the precise empirical elements 
of the conflict. The emphasis of the following paragraphs is on broad dynamics and general 
suggestions for improved plurinational coexistence in Georgia and Abkhazia.
Given the problematic, asymmetric nature of internal conflicts, it seems important for the op-
posing parties in the conflict to perceive and treat each other as equals. Discrepancies in the status 
of the opponents encourages the weaker side to improve the balance of power in its favour. The 
lack of equality between adversaries often leads to situations where the inferior side either refuses 
to negotiate or negotiates while continually investing in extra-negotiational strategies in order to 
strengthen its position at the bargaining table. Perceptions of equality should not be interpreted as 
actual  equality of resources (military,  economic, demographic, etc.)  or as a  need for purely 
symmetrical solutions. What is meant here by perceptions of equality is that the adversaries 
should  fully  recognize  that  they  cannot  impose  an  outcome  upon  their
opponent.
Low intra-party cohesion and extremist flanking is a  phenomenon that  has derailed many a 
negotiation process.12 The activities of poorly controlled extremist flanks can not only create 
12 Horowitz, op.cit.; Mitchell, op.cit.
distrust and doubts concerning the bona fide intentions of the negotiators, but can also signifi-
cantly jeopardize the satisfactory implementation of a negotiated agreement. Weak leadership 
control over grass-roots supporters and extremists increases the element of uncertainty in ne-
gotiations. It casts doubt on the legitimacy and representativity of the negotiators and on their 
capacity to reciprocate concessions and, most importantly, it invites scepticism as to whether the 
opponent can and actually will live up to the agreement during its implementation phase. Many 
agreements falter during implementation, the phase where general, often ambiguous, stipulations 
need to be translated into concrete measures. Implementation will forcefully bring to the fore any 
lack of consensus there may be in agreements concluded under duress or clouded by imprecision. 
It is clear that during implementation, which is a highly sensitive phase of conflict regulation, 
intra-party rivalry and extremist flanks can hamper the appropriate execution of an agreement to 
the  point  of derailing the entire  settlement process. It  is  therefore imperative that  both the 
Georgian and Abkhaz governments acquire full  control over their  internal  forces. Disparate 
actions by the Abkhaz militia and unco-ordinated incursions by armed IDPs (internally displaced 
persons) into the Inguri security zone feed distrust at the bargaining table and hinder the co-
ordinated implementation of agreements.
Conflict regulation strategies should aim at the formulation of stable outcomes. In a previous 
section, joint decision-making was singled out as the most efficient strategy for achieving such 
stability. This is based on the principle that an agreed outcome is likely to incorporate demands 
from both sides. The opposing parties in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict should therefore accept 
the idea that any solution to their dispute will require each of them to make concessions in order 
to  alleviate  their  opponent's difficulties.  Exploiting the opponent's short  term weaknesses to 
enforce an outcome may be beneficial for domestic purposes, but an outcome achieved in this 
way is unlikely to remain uncontested in the future. There can be no clear winners or losers in 
joint decision-making. A clear designation of victorious or defeated negotiators is the most fertile 
soil for revanchist conflict in the future. The Abkhaz quest for a  political status as close as 
possible to independence is a  maximalist  strategy that  does not take  into account Georgian 
concerns. The Georgian insistence on the return of refugees and IDPs prior to an overall political 
settlement, meanwhile, disregards basic Abkhaz anxieties.
None of the strategies cited constitutes an adequate basis for successful joint decision-making, 
because they each aim at maximizing individual benefits, whereas the prime concern should be 
the establishment of a joint benefit. As long as the conflicting parties merely put forward their 
own demands without consideration for their opponent's position, interactions will retain a purely 
competitive rather than a problem-solving quality.
The above suggestions essentially amount to attitudinal and strategical changes which should 
ideally be thoroughly instilled into the adversaries at the outset of the negotiations. These sug-
gestions have to do with a problem-solving disposition prior to joint decision-making. Interactive 
dynamics occurring during the  settlement process are  at  least  as  important  as  the  a  priori 
disposition of the adversaries. The numerous reports by the United Nations Secretary-General on 
the situation in Abkhazia give a rather gloomy picture of the dynamics during this settlement 
process. Despite a number of meetings and (partially- or non-implemented) agreements between 
the opposing parties, hardly any real progress seems to have been made towards a comprehensive 
settlement. Although the meetings between the Abkhaz and the Georgians have been described as 
negotiations, it  is this writer's opinion that  hardly any real  bargaining has taken place. The 
trading of benefits and concessions and the exchange of proposals and counterproposals, which 
Rubin and Brown identified as the key characteristics of bargaining settings, have not developed 
in the Abkhaz-Georgian talks. It appears that the negotiation process has come to a halt at the 
NAN phase (negotiations about negotiations). Negotiations have been hampered by disagreement 
over the elementary features of the setting for the negotiations. Dissension arose over typical 
NAN issues, namely, the composition of the Georgian delegation at the bargaining table13 or the 
question of whether to refer in the title of the negotiations to the "conflict in Abkhazia" or the 
"Abkhaz-Georgian conflict".14
Furthermore, in none of the talks has there been a genuine consensus on the composition and 
ordering of the agenda items. The Abkhazians insisted on a political settlement before the return 
of the IDPs and refugees; the Georgians sought to address these items in the reverse order. The 
Abkhazians demanded a discussion of the terms of their sovereign status (an independent or 
confederal state) and rejected the examination of anything short of outright sovereignty; while the 
Georgian negotiators refused to consider the Abkhaz agenda and insisted that arrangements going 
beyond  an  autonomous  or  federated  status  for  Abkhazia  could  not  form the  basis  of  the 
negotiations.  The  talks  that  followed  the  unresolved  agenda  disagreements  lacked  the 
indispensable interaction of give-and-take and fell short of genuine consensus. Each side confined 
its bargaining activity to a repeated submission of its own demands and a subsequent refusal to 
yield.
Despite the very clear stalemate in the conflict, the conflicting parties did not succeed in starting 
substantive bargaining. This stalemate is surely one that hurts both sides. Georgians are left with 
about 260,000 refugees whose continued presence is a serious burden on Georgia's economic 
recovery. Abkhazia finds itself under an economic blockade and virtually cut off from the outside 
world, which refuses to recognize an Abkhazian state outside Georgian state borders. Yet the 
"mutually hurting stalemate" does not seem to be pushing the parties to regulate their differences. 
It is this writer's view that there are three principal reasons which have kept the adversaries from 
genuinely seeking conflict resolution, in spite of a prominent "hurting stalemate": 1. insufficient 
acknowledgement  of  interdependence  2.  failure  to  recognize  and  act  upon  the  opponent's 
underlying position, and 3. the absence of an emergent political formula which could constitute a 
way out of the conflict. None of these three causes of the impasse is fixed or static. Each of them 
can be remedied so as to stimulate more effective efforts at regulating the conflict.
The denial of the inherent Georgian-Abkhazian interdependence is especially prominent on the 
Abkhaz side. The Ardzinba government mainly focuses on unilateral strategies (referendums, 
elections, the drafting of a constitution, the return of the diaspora) in an attempt to consolidate the 
independent status of Abkhazia. The Abkhaz side seems to view continued coexistence with 
Georgians within Georgia as the least desirable option. According to a senior Russian diplomat, 
the Abkhaz agenda could be summarized as "to freeze the situation, as happened in Cyprus, 
allowing time for a return of the Abkhaz diaspora and for the immigration of North Caucasians. 
Putting the situation on hold for the long term would have the further advantage of gradually 
accustoming the international community to the fact of Abkhaz independence".15 In summary, the 
Abkhaz side seems to be under the impression that a future without Georgia (and Georgians) is 
feasible,  so  they  dismiss  the  notion  of  Abkhaz-Georgian  interdependence.  The  numerous, 
13 Report on the First  Meeting of the Group of Experts Responsible for Preparing Recommendations on the 
Political Status of Abhkazia, Moscow, 15 and 16 December 1993, submitted by Professor Giorgio Malin-
verni, Chairman of the Group of Experts, to Ambassador Edouard Brunner, the Secretary-General's special 
envoy to Georgia.
14 S.N.  MacFarlane,  L. Minear,  D.  Shenfield,  Armed  Conflict  in  Georgia:  A Case-Study  in  Humanitarian  
Action and  Peacekeeping, Occasional paper of the Watson Institute:  Brown University, Providence, 1996, 
p. 73.
15 Statement by a senior Russian diplomat cited in ibid., p. 57.
unanimous UN resolutions in support of Georgia's territorial integrity and the Russian-Georgian 
blockade  are  all  measures  designed  to  prevent  Abkhazia  from  pursuing  an  independent, 
unilateral strategy. Moreover the future of an independent Abkhazia under a  newly enforced 
blockade, internationally isolated and with a  large group of increasingly hostile IDPs at  its 
borders,  does  not  seem all  bright  by  any  standards.  So  far,  attempts  to  prevent  Abkhaz 
unilateralism have been expressed in a negative, sanctioning vein. There also needs to be more 
insistence on confronting the Abkhaz side with the cost of its  de facto independence and the 
benefits and rewards of accepting its interdependence. Instead of merely using penalties as a 
stick, Georgia and the international community could offer more political and economic carrots 
to attract Abkhazia to a negotiated solution. This combination of positive and negative sanctions 
should  not,  however,  be  used  to  pressurize  the  Abkhazians  into  endorsing  the  Georgian 
proposals, but merely to end unilateralism and to produce a more compromise-oriented Abkhaz 
bargaining strategy.
A lack of political will to act upon the opponent's underlying positions can be found on both the 
Georgian and the Abkhaz sides. The combined Georgian proposals for a return of the IDPs and a 
federal state, as they now stand,16 seem very generous but actually offer very little to allay deep-
seated Abkhaz fears of Georgian domination. The rigid Abkhaz bargaining stance seems to be 
fuelled by a strongly held sense of demographical and cultural insecurity. Abkhaz references to 
the fate of the vanished Ubykh people (the last Ubykh language speaker died in 1994), who 
populated the Russian Black Sea coast,17 are a very clear indication of the primordial Abkhaz fear 
of extinction. Georgian settlement proposals should offer the Abkhaz the most solid guarantees 
possible of their continued demographic and cultural survival. The Georgian federal proposals do 
not provide such guarantees. Even in  an  asymmetric federal  arrangement with considerable 
autonomy for Abkhazia, it is unclear how an Abkhaz political elite could retain control over its 
territory  if  Georgian  refugees  and  IDPs  returned.  The  return  of  the  IDPs  and  a  federal 
arrangement could simply result in the ethnic Abkhazians (17% of the Abkhaz population in 
1989) again becoming a regional demographic and political minority. Federal autonomy for the 
Abkhaz region, repopulated by the IDPs, would thus amount simply to autonomy status for a 
region  that  was  politically  controlled  by  a  Georgian  population.  The  protection  of  ethnic 
Abkhazians would then depend solely on the goodwill of the Georgian elites. Given the violent 
events  of  the  past,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Abkhazians  reject  this
option. The formulation of a mutually acceptable outcome will thus require a search for problem-
specific arrangements that provide real guarantees for the ethnic Abkhazians. A first step towards 
such  solutions  would  be  a  Georgian  acknowledgement  of  the  Abkhaz  fear  of  ex-
tinction.
Abkhaz demands for an independent or confederal state also disregard the Georgians' underlying 
goals. There is a consensus among observers and the international community that the current 
state of affairs, with tens of thousands of IDPs outside Abkhazia, is an abnormal and untenable 
situation that cannot be perpetuated. The Abkhaz reluctance to accept significant numbers of 
refugees  and  their  vision  of  Abkhazian  statehood  indicate  a  total  disregard  for  Georgian 
concerns. Clearly, the Abkhaz proposals include just as many guarantees for the protection of 
returned Georgians as the Georgian federal proposals do for the ethnic Abkhaz, that is, next to 
16 Proposals  by Georgia  on  the  status  of  Abkhazia,  Georgia.  United  Nations,  Security  Council  document 
S/1996/165, 5 March 1996.
17 Liana Kvarchelia, 'Georgia-Abkhazia Conflict: View from Abkhazia',  in: Fiona Hill (ed.), The Caucasus and  
the Caspian: 1996 Seminar Series, v. II, Harvard University, J.F. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, 
1996.
none. In this respect, Georgia's insistence on the maintenance of its territorial integrity is perfectly 
understandable.
What would be the position of Georgian refugees and IDPs in an independent Abkhazia? In 
seeking the protection and safeguarding of its interests, the Georgian population in Abkhazia 
would find itself at the mercy of an Abkhaz political elite. Again, given the recent history of 
violent strife, this prospect is hardly one that appeals to the Georgians.
In summary, the institutional proposals of both parties have insufficiently addressed the basic 
goals of their counterparts. Abkhazian proposals in no way accommodate Georgian needs. The 
Georgian federal proposal of 1996 does not respond to the inherent Abkhazian desire for guar-
anteed political and cultural survival. The Abkhaz confederal proposal does not offer sufficient 
guarantees that future conflicts between both communities will not lead to secession. A regula-
tion of this conflict is unlikely to be achieved as long as the parties involved continue to pursue 
exclusive goals which do not incorporate the interests of their opponent. Instead of a rigid ad-
herence to initial demands and a refusal to yield, a bridging technique could be applied. Seeking 
regulation through bridging means that  neither party has its initial  demands met, but a  new 
formula is devised that satisfies the main interests underlying these demands. Pruitt and Carne-
vale provide an elegant example of bridging: "...as in the case of two people who were fighting 
over an orange. The problem was completely solved when it was discovered that one wanted the 
pulp to make juice and the other wanted the peel to put in a cake."18 In a similar vein, Abkhazians 
and Georgians could investigate the purposes for which they desire the metaphorical orange. An 
identification of these purposes could perhaps lead to the formulation of more compatible sets of 
interests. Bridging would involve a reformulation of the issues at stake, based on an analysis of 
the  underlying interests of  both sides. In  addition to  mutual  insensitivity to  the  opponent's 
underlying interests, negotiations are seriously hampered by the absence of an emergent political 
formula that could appeal to both sides. In other words, there seems to be no obvious way of 
separating the orange peel from the pulp.
The following guidelines may make a modest contribution to the formulation of a way out of the 
Georgian-Abkhazian impasse. A bridging solution could be based on a federal structure in which 
1. Abkhazia has autonomous status, 2. within Abkhazia, territorial units are used where possible, 
3.  within Abkhazia,  non-territorial  spheres of authority are  applied where necessary,  and 4. 
Georgians and Abkhazians share power in the regional Abkhaz government.
The key element in the above suggestions is that the ethnically mixed parts of Abkhazia would be 
ruled not by a territorially defined government but by one whose jurisdiction covered population 
groups rather than territories. For example, the Abkhazians living in ethnically mixed parts of 
Abkhazia would be under the government of the Abkhaz community, whose authority extended 
to all Abkhazians in Abkhazia. Those parts of Abkhazia that are relatively homogeneous could 
be  governed  by  purely  territorial  governments.  The  non-territorially  defined  governments 
(Abkhaz)  could  be  put  in  charge  of  all  ethnically  sensitive  areas  (language,  education, 
immigration, security, etc.). Of course, non-territorial government could not, in the nature of 
things, be used in all fields of political regulation. A number of clearly territorial matters (natural 
resources, pollution, transport, communication, regional public infrastructure, criminal law, etc.) 
cannot be governed by non-territorial entities. A vast number of areas of competence will have to 
be organized on a territorial basis and will require substantial Georgian-Abkhaz co-operation.
Thus a regional Abkhaz government in which Georgians and Abkhazians share power on an 
equal  basis or  via  mutual  veto rights could be considered. An additional  guarantee for the 
18 D.G. Pruitt, P.J. Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1993, p. 38.
Abkhazians could consist in a federal constitutional stipulation that any federal regulation (of the 
overarching Georgian state government) affecting Abkhazia (the entire region) would have to be 
ratified by a majority of the Abkhaz community representatives (the non-territorial government 
of ethnic Abkhazians). Through the combined use of territorial and non-territorial definitions, 
both Georgians and Abkhazians could enjoy considerable autonomy within the same region. In 
addition, mutual checks and balances and powers of veto would preclude the domination of one 
group over another.
These preliminary and cursory suggestions obviously overlook a number of practical complica-
tions and difficulties. Nevertheless, they could marry the basic Georgian demands with the un-
derlying Abkhazian goals. These suggestions entail the return of the IDPs, and Georgia's terri-
torial integrity would be restored in a federal context. Ethnic Abkhazians would gain substantial 
self-rule, a disproportionate share of regional government power, and rights of veto in relation to 
federal and regional regulations affecting their community and territory.
Clearly, it will be up to the warring parties to devise their own solutions to the conflict. The role 
of foreign experiences and proposals can at best be a source of inspiration – they will not provide 
all the answers. The most serious obstacle to the settlement process is not a technical, but rather a 
psychological  one.  Each  side  is  unwilling  to  drop  its  unilateral  strategies  in  favour  of  an 
evaluation of its opponent's underlying desires. Without a genuine willingness on both sides to 
consider the opponent's demands, a way out of this complex conflict remains distant.
Bruno Coppieters
Shades of Grey. Intentions, Motives and Moral Responsibility
in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict
Introduction
Moral reflections on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict can focus on five different themes. First, on 
the legitimization of organized violence and other forceful means applied by both parties to 
strengthen their political position in the conflict. A reflection on the regulation of violence should 
focus on the effective use of military force during the armed conflict in 1992-93. The inability of 
the Abkhaz government to undo ethnic cleansing, and the enforcement of an economic embargo 
by the Georgian and Russian governments against Abkhazia, would also be covered by moral 
reflections on the use of force in a political conflict. Economic blockades to break the will of the 
civilian population and to force their political representatives to compromise or surrender are 
traditional  weapons of war.  It  is  also possible to  reflect upon the attempt by the Georgian 
government to  have Russian  troops use  all  the  means at  their  disposal  to  implement  CIS 
decisions, or to get the international community to enforce some kind of 'Bosnian model'. The 
escalation of violent conflicts in the Gal(i) region since the beginning of 1998 makes it clear that 
the cease-fire and the principle of peaceful negotiations, accepted by both sides in 1993, did not 
rule out the use of force in the conflict. Reflections on the political use of violence would have to 
cover the entire post-Soviet period.
Second, the overthrow of the democratically elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia in 1991-92 
by the political opposition and by the president's former supporters among paramilitary forces 
may be interpreted in the framework of the philosophical tradition which established a right to 
overthrow governments that came to power lawfully but govern with gross injustice.1 This op-
position between, on the one hand, a democratically elected president who lost popular legiti-
macy through his authoritarian and erratic policies, and an "unelected autocrat"2 who promised to 
re-establish order  and  democracy,  was decisive for  the evolution of the  war.  At  first,  She-
vardnadze could count only on the paramilitary troops of Kitovani and Ioseliani to resist the 
troops of the  ousted president Gamsakhurdia.  The  'interethnic' Georgian-Abkhaz conflict  is 
closely intertwined with this 'intraethnic' Georgian-Georgian one. The decision to get Georgian 
paramilitary troops to occupy the main communication lines in Abkhazia was said to be aimed at 
stopping Gamsakhurdia's "terrorist" forces and obtaining the release of Deputy Prime Minister 
Alexander Kavsadze and other Georgian government officials who had been kidnapped by these 
forces.3 Getting Georgian troops to re-establish Georgian authority over the territory of Abkhazia 
was a further objective of this move. It is far from clear how the Presidium of the State Council, 
constituted by Shevardnadze and his warlords, discussed the relationship between these two 
objectives. There is  also a  debate over whether Shevardnadze had doubts about  his troops' 
1 The second sort of unjust government that may rightly be overthrown is one which has seized power unlaw-
fully and which has not  been legitimized afterwards by time or the lack of alternatives. cf. Terry Nardin, 
"Introduction" to  Terry Nardin (ed.),  The Ethics  of  War and  Peace. Religious  and  Secular  Perspectives, 
Princeton/New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 31.
2 Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl and Melvin A. Goodman, The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze, London, Hurst & 
Company, 1997, p. xxii.
3 Ibid., p. 265.
chances of crushing the Abkhaz proclivity for secession. It is generally assumed that he could not 
have opposed his paramilitary allies without either resigning or being toppled from power, which 
would have entailed the risk of either a military dictatorship or the return of Gamsakhurdia's 
forces to Tbilisi and a new civil war. Russian and North Caucasian support for the Abkhaz troops 
led to the Georgian defeat in  Abkhazia.  After the Georgian troops had been expelled from 
Abkhazia, Russia helped Shevardnadze to crush definitively the military supporters of his rival, 
Gamsakhurdia. Shevardnadze's defeat in Abkhazia was the necessary condition for gaining the 
upper  hand in  this  intraethnic conflict.  In  1998,  three years  after  the final  removal  of the 
paramilitary organizations from power and the implementation of a new democratic constitution, 
the conditions under which Shevardnadze acceded to power again became an important political 
issue. An attempt on his life in February 1998 by supporters of the ousted president put the 
question of 'national reconciliation' between the two factions in the Georgian civil war at the top 
of the  political  agenda.  Political  stabilization through such a  process of reconciliation may 
facilitate an institutional solution to the various interethnic and interregional conflicts or tensions 
(with Abkhazians, South Ossetians, Ajarians, Armenians and Azeris).
Third, moral reflections on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict may focus on the normative meaning, 
in this conflict, of the right to secession – including the normative dimension of the right to self-
determination and the principle of territorial  integrity.  This issue does not only concern the 
origins of the war. The long-term possibility of Abkhaz secession is being reckoned with in all 
negotiations on the  federative future  of  Georgian-Abkhaz  relations.  The  international  com-
munity's refusal to recognize the Abkhaz government as legitimate or to recognize any border 
changes achieved by force or unilateral forms of secession, puts the normative question of the 
right to secession at the forefront of relations between Abkhazia and the world community. This 
question may continue to be debated even after a peace settlement. There is no reason to believe 
that  confederal or  federal  institutions will  put  an end to conflicts of sovereignty or even to 
secessionist strivings. It may be hoped that debates on this issue in Abkhazia and Georgia will 
take place in an institutional framework which prevents violent clashes, as is the case in Canada 
and some Western European countries. The federalization of a common Georgian-Abkhaz state 
is not necessarily a stepping-stone to secession, but it will not prevent democratic discussions on 
this  issue  and  it  will  require  ongoing  normative  reflection  on  the  legitimacy  of  common 
institutions.
Fourth,  the  Georgian  and  Abkhaz  concepts of  citizenship and  their  view of themselves as 
constituting with 'the other' one single national community (from the Georgian perspective) or 
two different national communities (from the Abkhaz perspective) requires a moral exploration. 
The question as to which parts of the population living on a particular territory are included and 
which are excluded from these concepts of a particular community (the question of who should 
be regarded as  'guests' or  'foreigners' on Georgian soil  or  the question of the rights of the 
Georgian population of Abkhazia to return to their homes) has a clear moral dimension. This 
moral dimension is also present in the discussion about who should be regarded as a political 
minority or a political majority according to these community concepts (Georgians as a political 
majority according to the Georgian concept of a single national community; the Abkhaz as a 
political majority according to the Abkhaz concept of a national state). The discussions on the 
content of value-laden concepts such as democracy and federalism are directly related to these 
discussions on citizenship and nation.4
4 In the literature, federalism is considered a normative or value concept defining the way in which sovereignty 
is  shared between central government and the federal units,  whereas a federation is  a descriptive concept 
which refers to a concrete state structure based on federalist principles.
Fifth, the possible strategies for dealing with the past injustices committed by both sides. A peace 
settlement implies the  need for  policy choices, first  of all  between criminal  prosecution or 
amnesty for the individual perpetrators of gross injustices, and secondly between the need to 
remember or to forget past crimes. Strategies in other countries which have experienced similar 
forms of transition have taken a  wide variety of forms.5 The political  choices involved are 
basically moral choices. These questions are at present not at the forefront of the political ne-
gotiations, but they will inevitably become more prominent in the future.
All these five themes clearly have to be differentiated. They are inextricably interrelated in em-
pirical reality, but they also refer to different traditions in political philosophy. Each has its own 
classics in literature. Research on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict within the framework of these 
various theoretical traditions would require a lengthy analysis, which is not my intention here. I 
will restrict my contribution to the question – which I consider more essential than a detailed 
analysis of any of these issues – of whether a discussion of the moral character of the armed 
conflict could be fruitful in the context of Georgian-Abkhaz collaboration at an academic level. 
This question led to a debate when discussing the first draft of this paper with the participants of 
the conference in June 1997. Some participants (and not only Georgian or Abkhaz ones) had 
strong doubts about whether such discussions could have positive consequences for a dialogue 
between the communities in conflict. This lack of consensus concerning the importance of moral 
debates between Georgians and Abkhaz contrasted with the general consensus that the issue of 
federalism  and  federative  systems  (federative  systems  including  both  federations  and 
confederations)  would  be  of  the  utmost  importance for  a  future  peace settlement.  I  would 
certainly agree that institutional questions must be the main priority in Abkhaz-Georgian col-
laboration, as I also argue in the conclusions to this book. But does this mean that a discussion on 
the moral dimension of the conflict would have merely divisive consequences? There was a 
relative consensus at the conference that the issues of pan-Caucasian integration strategies and 
the historiography of Georgian-Abkhaz relations would be worth discussing. But why this lack of 
agreement concerning the importance of morals in confidence-building programmes, despite the 
overt  moral  character  of the  conflict?  I  am convinced that  such a  rejection is  based on a 
misunderstanding of the place of morals or ethics in political conflicts and scientific disputes. A 
process of dialogue between Georgians and Abkhaz on an academic level should preferably 
include all scientific disciplines – including ethics – and all the scientific traditions represented in 
these disciplines.
In the following, I  will first consider a  major objection concerning the relevance of a  moral 
analysis of a political conflict, and then two alternative approaches – that can be found among the 
contributions to this book –  to the explicit  inclusion of ethics and ethical judgements in an 
analysis of Georgian-Abkhaz relations. I want to demonstrate that these alternative approaches 
cannot replace a moral approach, in particular when the question of political responsibility must 
be analysed. This question has to be addressed as part of a peace settlement, as can be seen from 
the question of how and to what extent the right of the Georgian population from Abkhazia to 
return there should be linked to an assessment of their involvement in the war. In this analysis, I 
will point out the importance of the concepts of 'intentions', 'motives' and 'responsibility' – which 
are central concepts in political ethics – for an analysis of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.
This analysis will not deal separately with the five broad themes of political philosophy men-
tioned above, but will refer to all of them. The references to the conflict itself have primarily an 
5 See Luc Huyse, "Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past", in: 
Albert J. Jongman (ed.),  Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases, Consequences, Leiden, PIOOM, 1996, 
pp. 187-214.
illustrative purpose for my demonstration and do not attempt to give definitive answers to the 
moral questions it raises, and which were mentioned above. As is also the case with contributions 
from 'outsiders' concerning federative structures to be implemented in Georgia and Abkhazia, 
such reflections have as their main aim to deliver general ideas and principles and to refer to 
academic discussions which may be of particular relevance to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.
According to Michael Walzer, the most effective moral criticism is that made by those inside a 
community's moral system. Criticism from the outside is likely to be abstract and rationalist, 
leading to coercion rather than to dialogue.6 Such criticism of an abstract and coercive discourse 
on morals is a recurrent theme in the Western philosophical tradition. The ethical tradition is 
more inclined to refine particular  ethical  questions than to present readers with ready-made 
answers. To take the just war doctrine as an example: Robert Phillips has rightly stated that this 
doctrine should be considered rather as "a series of questions which any moral agent must ask 
himself when faced with the problem of resorting to force. The doctrine of justified war by itself 
does not provide adequate moral guidance".7
Moral Disputes and Scientific Rules
According to one argument against moral discourses in conflict resolution, the question of right 
or  wrong does not  belong in  the  realm  of  scientific  knowledge.  Contrary  to  empirical  or 
analytical research on conflicts, a  moral dispute –  so the argument goes –  cannot be settled 
according to universally valid methodological rules. Morals are seen as being based on subjective 
perceptions, which are themselves based on irreducible contradictions between values and value 
systems. Conflicts between national communities express opposed hierarchies of collective values 
and it makes little sense for individual observers to settle or even to express personal judgements 
on such collective disputes, based on their own value systems.
It is true that empirical research cannot decide how the principle of self-determination or the 
principle of territorial integrity should be applied in a Georgian-Abkhaz peace settlement. His-
torians can describe the way in which wars for secession have been won or lost. Specialists in 
international law can describe how the principle of self-determination has been reinterpreted in 
the process of decolonization, or how the legal concept of sovereignty is being challenged by 
processes of integration and globalization. The history of the Yugoslav conflict may teach us how 
Western governments were divided among themselves on the question of recognizing Croatia's 
right to secession. Political scientists can analyse the consequences of particular  institutional 
strategies which have been adopted in the past.  No deductive analysis from generally accepted 
principles and no analysis based on historical analogies devoid of moral choices can give an 
empirically-based  answer  to  the  question  of  how  the  Abkhazian  people's  right  to  self-
determination should be implemented. This type of analysis could not even answer the question 
of  how the  concept  of  'people'  should  be  interpreted.  Should  the  pre-war  or  the  post-war 
population be considered as the holders of such a right?
The argument that moral issues at stake in a conflict are subjective and cannot be treated ac-
cording to standard empirical practices is true, but such an argument points to the limits of 
empirical research on conflicts rather than to the limits of moral reflection. Empirical research 
may discuss the causes of particular conflicts and the consequences of particular strategies, but it 
has few means at its disposal to help in taking a decision on the variety of political choices 
6 Nardin, "Introduction", op.cit., p. 17.
7 Robert Phillips, War and Justice, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1984, p. 15.
human agents may face or, in particular,  the moral principles they should follow in conflict 
situations. Any analysis of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict that excludes the ethical dimension 
may be regarded as reductive, precisely because it would exclude the opposing hierarchies of 
values and value systems that are defended in both communities.
As in any case the overtly moral dimension of the war cannot be neglected, it may be important 
to address it in positive terms. Moral arguments have been and still are being used in the political 
argumentation and declarations of all  parties involved in the conflict. The weapon of moral 
critique is one of the panoply of instruments used by both protagonists to mobilize domestic and 
international support. As both parties argue in moral terms, a moral analysis of their arguments 
may seem irreplaceable, especially as there is a lack of moral clarity concerning their political 
objectives. It is not clear, for instance, what the moral content of  the basic principles at stake in 
the  conflict  are.  With  which moral  arguments  does the  Abkhazian  government  defend the 
primacy  of  the  right  to  self-determination  over  the  principle  of  the  territorial  integrity  of 
internationally recognized states? Does this right to self-determination challenge the property and 
political rights of the pre-war Georgian population? What is the meaning of political freedom and 
equality in this context? Can equality between peoples only be achieved through independent 
states? Should freedom be identified with the sovereignty of an independent state, which finds its 
limits only in international law and in freely accepted commitments? Or should political freedom 
be seen as the freedom of a community to preserve its identity, which can be achieved in a variety 
of institutional ways? Clarity here is necessary, as common principles have to be found in the 
negotiations on a common state. The question of whether the principle of shared sovereignty can 
be accepted as such a common principle for the Georgians and Abkhaz is still an open one. The 
same lack  of clarity concerning the moral  content of the principle of territorial  integrity is 
characteristic  of  the  Georgian  discourse.  From the  Abkhaz  perspective,  the  Georgians  are 
exclusively interested in the Abkhaz territory and in the property rights of their own population, 
without any consideration for Abkhaz rights over their own homeland.
It may be interesting here to draw a parallel with the American Civil War. Allen Buchanan is the 
author of a classic work on the moral philosophy of the right to secession. His moral reflections 
are rooted in American political history. Buchanan considers that there was a basic lack of clarity 
concerning the  moral  principles that  were at  stake  in  the  American Civil  War.  One basic 
dimension of the tragedy of this civil war was the fact that "on both sides there was a profound 
moral ambiguity concerning what the war was really being fought for".8 It is popularly believed 
that the Northern side fought for the abolition of slavery. Buchanan quotes Abraham Lincoln to 
prove that the emancipation of the slaves was not, however, one of the Northerners' primary 
objectives in the civil war: "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not 
either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would 
do it, and if I could save the Union by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do 
that".9 According to Buchanan, this lack of moral clarity concerning the issues at stake in the war 
had long-term consequences for the development of civic rights in the United States. This basic 
ambiguity surrounding the political conditions under which slavery was abolished in the last 
century has rendered the civic emancipation of the Black population of America more difficult to 
this day.
The Georgian and Abkhaz governments are making tremendous propagandistic efforts to defend 
the principle of territorial  integrity and the  right  to  self-determination,  while Georgian and 
8 Allen Buchanan,  Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec, 
Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford, Westview Press, 1991, p. x.
9 Ibid., p. 1.
Abkhaz scholars are discussing the application of these principles in the context of the Georgian-
Abkhaz conflict. In his contribution to this volume, Viacheslav Chirikba focuses his attention on 
the right to self-determination while Revaz Gachechiladze examines the principle of territorial 
integrity. It would be interesting if the moral meaning of these principles could be clarified within 
the framework of academic collaboration.
The political importance of such a clarification becomes particularly clear when we consider two 
of the most common accusations levelled against the leadership of the two communities. The 
Abkhaz government is accused of using the right to self-determination as an ideological façade 
for defending an ethnocratic dictatorship. According to the principle of territorial integrity, the 
integration of Abkhazia into the Georgian state would –  so runs this critique –  democratize 
Abkhaz state structures and cause the present Abkhaz leadership to lose power.10 The Georgian 
government, meanwhile, is accused of interpreting the principle of territorial integrity as a means 
of retaining the possessions of its 'small empire'. Political negotiations will remain difficult as 
long as those who are responsible for negotiating or mediating use – or even attach any belief to – 
such accusations. A clarification of the values at stake when debating future state structures may 
be helpful in dissipating these strong prejudices.
In  their  contributions to  this  book,  Ghia  Nodia  and  Gia  Tarkhan-Mouravi  argue  that  the 
Georgian attitude towards Western concepts of democracy and human rights is based on an 
outward conformity, and not (yet) on a deeper cultural accommodation.11 Gia Tarkhan-Mouravi 
states in his article that although the Georgian and Abkhaz parties appeal to the principles of 
international law, these have only an instrumental value for them. Moral arguments and the 
principles of international law do indeed tend to be used 'ad hoc' in political conflicts, and not just 
by the Georgian and Abkhaz governments. It  is generally extremely difficult –  including in 
Western Europe – to determine the borderline between outward conformity and a deeper cultural 
accommodation of 'universal' principles.  In international law, universal claims are made on the 
basis of universally recognized values, but this recognition takes place through the ratification of 
treaties and conventions and not necessarily through acceptance by public opinion.12 Nor should 
the fact that  political  players are more concerned about  material  interests than about  moral 
arguments lead  one to  the  conclusion that  morals  may  be neglected in  an  analysis  of  the 
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Political  players always define their 'material'  interests within the 
framework of a cultural idiom, in which moral principles play a prominent role. The cultural 
idiom in which the political representatives of a  particular community operate is decisive for 
selecting those interests that  are to be considered fundamental.13 The fact  that  the Georgian 
government considers 'Western' discourses on democracy, human rights and international law as 
'instrumental', as 'useful' in advancing the country's future development, is as such relevant for an 
assessment  of  Georgian  political  culture  itself.  Such  discourses  are  not  considered  to  be 
instrumental in all parts of the CIS. I have the impression that the Abkhaz culture is not very 
different from the Georgian in that respect. Abkhaz archaeologists and historians like to draw 
attention to the fact that,  since colonization by the Greeks and Romans, for long periods in 
history their country has been at the inner periphery of Western empires and Western civiliza-
10 Such an argument is to be found in Paul B. Henze, "Abkhazia Diary 1997", in: Mehmet Tütüncü (ed.), Cau-
casus: War and Peace, Haarlem, 1998, pp. 90-107.
11 On this distinction, see Basam Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam", in: Nardin (ed.), op.cit., p. 140.
12 James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War, Princeton, Princeton. University Press, 
1981, p. 23.
13 Roger Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood, Cambridge/Mass., Harvard University Press, 1990
tion.14 Abkhaz intellectuals feel no less close to European civilization than do Georgian intel-
lectuals. In the contributions to this volume it will be impossible for the reader to find any 'civi-
lizational' clashes between Georgian and Abkhazian views on the nation or on democracy.
Machiavelli rightly stated that moral rhetoric is one of the most potent weapons in international 
politics and that the ability to convey the appearance of virtue is an indispensable part of the 
statesman's art.15 This generally accepted principle has been applied more easily by the Georgian 
than by the Abkhaz leadership. In recent years, the Georgian political leadership has had the 
opportunity to adopt a Western discourse on democracy. Its progressive integration into Western 
political structures since its recognition as an independent state in 1992 has been accompanied by 
a parallel schooling in rhetoric. Georgian diplomats and statesmen have far less difficulty than 
their Abkhaz counterparts in playing with formulas that are pleasing to Western ears. Abkhazia's 
economic and intellectual isolation since the war – following seventy years of Soviet autarchy – 
and its lack of trained diplomatic personnel have meant that its present leadership has found it 
very difficult to gain recognition for its positions among an international audience. Well-founded 
Abkhaz claims would probably be far better understood and acknowledged in international fora 
if the basic values they wish to defend were set out more appropriately than they have been up to 
now (for instance, it is not easy for an outsider who is not familiar with the Soviet concept of 
federalism to  understand why the  concept of  'autonomy' is  not  a  positive one for  Abkhaz 
officials).  By  clarifying  the  moral  values  at  stake  in  the  different  issues  discussed at  the 
negotiating table, both sides would be able to go beyond a purely instrumental use of moral 
rhetoric.  An  intensified  Georgian-Abkhaz  dialogue  which  clarified  these  basic  values  and 
principles would be helpful in moving beyond a position of mere outward conformity to universal 
democratic principles. A common state undoubtedly calls for more than an instrumental use of 
mutually agreed principles or institutions.
A Georgian-Abkhaz dialogue on the moral  values at  stake in the constitution of a  federate 
common state is relevant for moral debates in other countries at well. The choice between a 
nation's view of itself from an ethnic and civic standpoint, as discussed in the contribution from 
Ghia Nodia, is a universal problem. It constitutes one of the main topics of discussion between 
political parties in Germany, France and other European countries when discussing access to 
citizenship. The right to secession, too, has become a prominent subject of discussion in philo-
sophical studies in recent years. The official Abkhaz position favours not independence but rather 
–  taking  into  account  political  realities  –  national  sovereignty  within  the  framework  of  a 
federated (preferably confederal) state. The nationalist pro-independence current, however, is 
strong in Abkhazia.  Comparative research between discussions on the moral  significance of 
secession and its alternatives for securing a community's basic values may be very relevant to the 
Georgian-Abkhaz  dialogue.  Historical  comparison may  be  of  particular  interest  too.  When 
reading about the moral debate during the American Civil War, in an article of Philip Abbott I 
found a list of arguments which Lincoln used against secession. With the exception of point 6, 
which describes slavery as an evil practice to be expiated, they are all to be found in present-day 
Georgian anti-secessionist discourse:
1. The perpetuity proposition: Since the union was created in perpetuity, seceding units have no 
moral or legal identity separate from the existing republic.
2. The democratic privilege proposition: Secession is a violation of majority rule.
3. The infinite secession proposition:  Secession will provide precedents for further secession 
until all effective government ceases.
14 Interviews by the author with Abkhaz archaeologists and historians in Sukhum(i) in August 1997.
15 A.J. Coates, The Ethics of War, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1997, p. 21.
4. The economic mobility proposition: Secession will severely inhibit economic mobility.
5. The outlaw culture proposition: There is no legitimate cultural claim to secession for those 
who violate basic human rights.
6. The expiation proposition: Resistance to secession will expiate national guilt for tolerating 
evil practices.
7. The exceptionalism proposition: Secession is unjustified in cases in which a state is under-
taking an extraordinary course in democratic development.
8. The  common  heritage  proposition:  Secession  will  sever  an  irretrievable  and  treasured 
common heritage.16
The Neutral Observer
In the discussion about whether moral arguments can have a place in a scientific discussion on 
the  Georgian-Abkhaz war,  the  position of the  scientific observer  is  an  important  one.  The 
conviction that scientific analysis should be not only impartial but also morally neutral when 
dealing with national or ethnic conflicts is widespread. When this ideal of a neutral observer is 
applied to conflict resolution and negotiation analysis it may, for instance, imply that the observer 
should start out from the presupposition that all parties involved in a violent conflict are making 
rational choices regarding the means of promoting their interests and values, and that they have a 
rational perception of the situational context, even if the conflict situation largely escapes their 
control. Such presuppositions do not necessitate a  particular  moral  stand on the part  of the 
observer.
The observer could also start out from the contrary presupposition that all parties involved are 
basing their decisions concerning the use of means on irrational choices, which are contrary to 
their interests or are based on an erroneous perception of the situational context. In this case too, 
observers should not  feel obliged to  take  a  particular  moral  stand (even where they would 
criticize the irrationality of the players). Their observation is independent of the particular values 
of the players and of their rational or irrational behaviour.
To take a third example: the observer may put forward his or her own practical objectives and 
turn into a facilitator in the conflict, which does not necessarily compromise a neutral position 
either. The actual  resolution of the conflict with an optimal gain for both sides (a  win-win 
situation) then constitutes the principal basic value at stake, which also confirms the impartial 
position of the facilitator. Setting aside the moral character of a conflict presupposes that the 
moral interests of the parties involved are to be treated no differently from their other interests. It 
is up to the parties themselves to establish a list of priorities in the negotiation process and to start 
bargaining. It is not relevant in this case if 'moral' interests are considered to be more or less 
important than 'material' interests. The observer remains completely indifferent to the order of 
priorities defended by the two sides at the negotiating table. This type of analysis is to be found in 
the contribution to this volume by Theo Jans.
The observer may also describe moral choices or political attitudes with a moral dimension as 
empirical observable choices. The ethical analysis is replaced by an empirical description of 
possible moral choices or of existing attitudes without the observer's actually taking a choice or 
expressing a moral judgement. Ghia Nodia's contribution is based on such an approach. Unlike 
the former perspective, this type of analysis highlights the importance of the moral dimension of 
16 Philip Abbott, "The Lincoln Propositions and the Spirit of Secession", in: Percy Lehning (ed.), Theories of  
Secession, London and New York, Routledge, 1998, p. 187.
the  conflict.  In  analysing  the  Georgian-Abkhaz  conflict  as  a  clash  of  national  projects  he 
describes his observations as "an attempt to understand (author's own stress, B.C.) why Geor-
gians and Abkhaz developed the kinds of national projects they did, and why their visions came 
into conflict." He clearly does not want to take a position in a dispute concerning the normative 
value of those projects: "In doing this, I will not question the legitimacy of either group."
Nodia's further  analysis deals with the dramatic  choices facing Shevardnadze when sending 
troops to Abkhazia. His analysis of the variety of moral choices the Georgian president was 
confronted with is linked to an analysis of the complexity of the situation which these choices 
would affect directly. Each possible choice is related to a particular outcome that, according to 
Nodia, Shevardnadze could reasonably have expected. The choice of legitimizing the actions of 
paramilitary troops was not without alternatives, but  each alternative choice open to him is 
related to a predictably even more unfavourable outcome. The main alternative – refusing to 
support the actions of his warlords – would have led to his definitive loss of power. Shevardnadze 
opted for an armed conflict and remained in power.
Nodia does not use the – far too strong – concept of  'necessity' to describe this choice, and he is 
right. The concept of 'necessity' ('necessary choice') is indeed of little value in an analysis of 
political choices which presuppose a certain degree of freedom. As Michael Walzer writes, in a 
moral discourse the concept of 'necessity' has a retrospective character, and the apparent inevi-
tability of making a  particular  choice is in  any case mediated by a  process of political  de-
liberation.17
It may be argued that such two approaches to the moral dimension of the conflict – to set it aside, 
as in the contribution of Theo Jans, or to describe moral situations in empirical terms, without 
passing judgement, as in the contribution of Ghia Nodia – are more productive, in a reflection 
process by the parties involved in the conflict, than moral debates on just ends or legitimate 
means. Debates focusing on right and wrong may indeed reinforce enemy images. Leaving aside 
the moral dimension of the conflict (Jans' choice) would make it possible to focus the analysis on 
the  negotiating  or  bargaining  process  in  which  the  parties'  fundamental  (including  moral) 
interests are dealt with, regardless of the observer's moral opinion of what should be done. In 
acknowledging the importance of the moral dimension of political choices by describing them in 
detail without, however, passing judgement on their normative value ("understanding positions 
without judgement on their legitimacy" as expressed by Nodia), the observer has the advantage of 
standing at a certain distance from the conflict in order to analyse all its facets.
Intentions, Motives and Responsibility
These two types of approach cannot be opposed to a moral analysis of the conflict. The empirical 
approach which leaves aside the moral dimension of the conflict and the empirical approach 
which refrains from any moral judgement may in fact complement an empirical approach in 
which such a judgement is made. This does not mean that they can or should be joined in a single 
analysis. The first two types of analysis enhance our capacity to understand the interests at stake 
in a conflict and the parties' own view of themselves. A moral judgement – developed in the third 
approach – goes beyond a theoretical understanding in taking a practical position, but it requires 
empirical understanding. In his book on just war ethics, Ken Coates pleads for empirical analysis 
as part of the ethical judgement, as there is a
17 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, New York, Basic Books, 1992, p. 8.
need of empirical analysis in difficult moral circumstances. An accurate, complete and impartial 
account of the physical or pre-moral structure of the act, eschewing euphemistic and tendentious 
description and focusing clearly and exactly on its total human costs, is a precondition of sound 
moral judgement.18
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, my intention is not to make a detailed moral analysis 
of one of the various aspects of the Georgian-Abkhaz war but to argue the importance of such an 
analysis in the framework of Georgian-Abkhaz academic co-operation. In order to demonstrate 
this importance, I will apply the distinction between intentions, motives and responsibility to the 
analysis of what I consider to be the major moral issues in this war: the decision by the Georgian 
leadership  to  deploy  troops  in  Abkhazia  in  August  1992  (the  accusation  of  Georgian 
"aggression"), the conditions under which the Georgian population fled from their homes and the 
refusal by the Abkhaz leadership to permit their orderly return in a reasonable time period or to 
discuss seriously the conditions for their return (the accusation of Abkhaz "ethnic cleansing"). It 
is important to see how Georgian and Abkhaz scholars themselves analyse the responsibility their 
governments have been accused of. I will base my analysis on the contribution of Ghia Nodia for 
the first issue and on that of Viacheslav Chirikba for the second.
An understanding of the dynamics of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict implies an understanding of 
the intentions, motives and responsibility of both parties. The differentiation between the two first 
concepts is particularly important: intentions refer to the 'why' of an action (what is aimed at by 
the agent), whereas the motives constitute the agent's 'spirit' or state of mind (including interests 
and emotions).19 To take a concrete example: someone may kill a sick animal out of pity. The 
intention refers to the aim of the action (= killing) whereas the motives refers to the state of mind 
in which this action is carried out  (= pity).  Moral theorists tend to be more attentive to the 
motives than the intention, which does not mean, however, that the intentions are not relevant. 
For St Augustine, the real problem in war was not that soldiers sometimes kill intentionally, but 
that they kill for the wrong motives – that they kill out of hatred and cruelty and not reluctantly, 
in a spirit of self-defence or in obedience to a higher law.20
A further distinction has to be made between personal and political motives. Personal motives for 
the use of force, for instance, would refer amongst other things to the agent's self-interest (as 
implied in the accusation of looting levelled at the Georgian paramilitary forces or the accusation 
that the Abkhaz leadership wanted to remain in power at any cost). Political motives may consist 
of the readiness to use force either as a means to achieve some good in the interest of the wider 
community (to achieve the right to self-determination, for instance) or as a means that is forced 
upon the political leader and the nation. States that initiate wars may emphasize one political 
claim or another.21 In the case of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, both parties have invoked the 
second political claim as their motivation for using force: the Abkhaz authorities have never 
claimed that they started a war for secession, but rather that the war was forced upon them. The 
Georgian side has also claimed the right to self-defence (the restoration of order on the entire 
Georgian territory) as its motive for launching military operations.
Nodia's Analysis of Georgian Motives
18 Coates, op.cit., p.  243.
19 Terry Nardin, "The Comparative Ethics of War and Peace", in: Nardin (ed.), op.cit., 1966, p. 256.
20 David R. Mapel, "Realism and the Ethics of War and Peace", in: Nardin (ed.), op.cit., pp. 63-64.
21 Robert W. Tucker, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine, Baltimore, 1960, p. 1.
An analysis of the intentions and motives of Eduard Shevardnadze (why he performed a certain 
action and the state of mind he was in when acting this way) is present in the contribution of Ghia 
Nodia, even if he does not use or differentiate between these two concepts. He first states that 
Shevardnadze's individual responsibility is at the same time a political responsibility and should 
be seen as the result of a broader decision-making process in the Presidium of the State Council. 
We could add that the premises of the decisions taken by this government were in fact largely 
supplied and screened by subordinates further down in the hierarchy.22 The role of Georgian 
political and military forces, acting in name of the State Council but largely outside its direct 
control, should also be acknowledged. The process of implementing decisions is, like the process 
of decision-making, a collective process, for which political representatives, however, bear full 
responsibility. Nodia analyses Shevardnadze's intentions, and in particular the question whether it 
is true that the leaders of the Georgian troops transgressed Shevardnadze's orders for limited 
military operations in Abkhazia and started a fully fledged war which he then had to legitimize, 
as it was later claimed. He also analyses the attitude of the Georgian population. Nodia states 
that Georgian public opinion supported the war and the war effort, except for the numerous 
supporters of Gamsakhurdia among the Georgian population from Abkhazia. These supporters 
did not want to fight, as they were strongly opposed to Shevardnadze's leadership, despite the fact 
that for them much was at stake.
This analysis, however, remains secondary to the analysis of his motives. Nodia's personal hy-
pothesis is that Shevardnadze's attitude towards the war was highly ambivalent. It even seems 
that he did not want the war ("there are serious reasons to believe that Shevardnadze did not want 
the war to start"), but that the general situation at the time, in particular the fear of revenge by 
Gamsakhurdia's supporters and of a dismantling of the country through Abkhazian secession, 
gave him a strong motive to use military force. Opposing the warlords would have caused his 
downfall, with incalculable consequences including the risks of growing anarchy throughout the 
country. Nodia would have regarded this alternative as a wrong choice ("The only other option 
would have been resignation – which would have been a noble but extremely irresponsible act at 
that point").
Nodia does not intend to express any judgement on individual or political responsibility or to go 
beyond a precise description of motives. He departs from these rules, however, in stating that 
resignation by Shevardnadze might have been noble for Shevardnadze as an individual refusing 
any  intention of  waging a  war,  but  would  have been irresponsible for  Shevardnadze as  a 
statesman refusing to acknowledge the legitimate political motives for waging a war (in order to 
save the state). In Nodia's analysis, the war is not justified retrospectively as a kind of police 
operation – on Akbhaz territory and against Gamsakhurdia's troops – which got out of hand. The 
uncontrolled actions of the Georgian troops and their numerous violations of the rules of war are 
not glossed over as inevitable consequences of any war or as being "involuntary" consequences of 
the decision by political leaders to use force. The fact that Nodia clearly states that at that point 
choosing any other alternative than war would have been irresponsible on Shevardnadze's part 
means that  he implicitly departs from an ethics of responsibility in which motives are more 
important than intentions. This means that in the end it was impossible for Nodia, contrary to 
what he stated previously, to remain within the bounds of an empirical analysis of moral choices 
or to avoid judgements on moral responsibility.
This description of Shevardnadze's intentions and motives and of the support he received from the 
Georgian population in Georgia proper (but  not from Gamsakhurdia's supporters among the 
22 Sanford  Levinson,  "Responsibility for  Crimes of  War", in:  Marshall  Cohen,  Thomas Nagel  and  Thomas 
Scanlon, War and Moral Responsibility, Princeton – New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 104.
Georgian population from Abkhazia) is important in a discussion on how to assess responsibility. 
Nodia states on the one hand that at that particular moment legitimizing and supporting the war 
was a lesser evil than resignation (a lesser evil than the probable consequences of resignation: the 
total disintegration of the country through civil and ethnic wars). On the other hand, he describes 
a whole process of conflicting national projects, without questioning their legitimacy, but making 
it very clear that there were alternatives to war if the two parties had had a different political 
attitude in dealing with each other. This means that there is, in my view, a contradiction between 
the  long-  and  the  short-term  perspective  in  Nodia's  analysis.  Concerning  the  long-term 
perspective, he does not formulate a  moral judgement but points out better political choices, 
while concerning the short term perspective he does formulate a moral judgement and points out 
that there were no better moral choices. In Nodia's view, the long-term perspective is, however, 
more important and central to his whole argumentation than the short-term perspective, because 
Shevardnadze as  an  individual  political  leader  had  only  limited  choices at  that  particular 
moment. In my view, it would be quite legitimate to make not only a moral judgement on the 
particular choice made by Shevardnadze but also to formulate a more general moral judgement 
on the legitimacy of the policies of both parties,  including their  national  projects and their 
readiness to use force unrestrainedly.
I personally doubt that in August 1992 Shevardnadze had any moral problems of a prudential 
nature regarding the use of force for settling the serious political dispute with Abkhazia. He may 
have doubted the chances of success of military operations against the Abkhaz government, but 
the statements he has made in support of Russia's military policies towards Chechnya or in favour 
of an enforcement of a  peace settlement in Abkhazia by CIS or other troops (following the 
Bosnian example) indicate that he generally does not defend a prudential concept of the use of 
force as a 'last resort' but rather as a means which may be used in parallel with classic diplomatic 
methods when it  seems that  military  force is  more  suitable  than  negotiations for  reaching 
particular political goals. The fact that the military deployment of Georgian troops in Abkhazia 
could not in any case be considered an act of aggression under international law (as was also the 
case with Russia's intervention in Chechnya) removed an important barrier to a more restrained 
use of force and facilitated the initiation of the war.
Abkhaz scholars  would  probably dispute  Nodia's  analysis  of  Shevardnadze's intentions and 
would refuse to see his attitude as ambivalent. They would not agree with Nodia's assessment 
that Shevardnadze would not have been able to stop the war even if he had wanted to, that he 
may have had understandable motives for preferring to stay on in power rather than to resign, and 
that his deeper motivation for saving the Georgian state may to a certain extent offset the evil 
nature of the act of aggression. But I suppose that there may be a more productive discussion 
between Nodia and Abkhaz scholars concerning the motives behind Shevardnadze's actions than 
concerning his intentions. They may perhaps also agree with his general assessment that politics 
do not generally deal with choices between good and evil, but mostly with the choice of the lesser 
evil. I would expect there to be even more agreement on his description of the development of the 
conflict over the long term and its implicit assessment that the use of force was not inevitable if 
other  political  choices had  been made.  This  possibility  –  of  having a  more  fruitful  moral 
discussion between Georgians and Abkhaz on the responsibility of their  leaders when it  is 
focused on motives rather than on intentions – is in my view a first reason to prefer such a type of 
analysis.
An analysis of intentions is not necessarily more speculative than an analysis of motives. In the 
example given above of killing a bird out of pity it is easier to assess empirically the intention of 
the deed (killing) than its motive (pity). In the case of the origins of the war, on the contrary, it is 
easier to assess empirically the motives (including ideological motives and general attitudes of 
both parties towards the political circumstances and their readiness to use force) than the military 
and political intentions (the precise objectives of the deployment of Georgian troops in Abkhazia 
by Shevardnadze). This is the second reason for me to prefer to focus on motives rather than on 
intentions, in this particular research topic.
The deeper motives of both parties in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict were not so far removed 
from one another, despite their total opposition in their intentions. This is the third advantage of 
such a focus on political motives rather than intentions. Nodia describes the Abkhaz nation's deep 
fear of extinction as the fundamental motive for the actions taken by the Abkhaz nationalist 
government in the conflict, as the fear that the Georgian state would disintegrate completely was 
already described as the inner motive for the actions of Shevardnadze (i.e., as the 'spirit' in which 
he  pursued  certain  intentions).  The  Abkhaz  leadership  considered that  the  decision by the 
Georgian Military Council in February 1992  –  to restore the 1921  constitution in order to 
emphasize legal continuity with the independent Georgian republic of 1918-21 – constituted a 
threat  to  the political  status  of Abkhazia.  The  Abkhaz leadership challenged the Georgian-
Abkhaz agreement of 1991  which did not allow constitutional changes without a  two-thirds 
majority – which meant the consent of the Georgian representatives in the Abkhaz parliament – 
by restoring the 1925 constitution for Abkhazia. According to Nodia, this amounted to a "latent 
declaration of war on the Georgian community in Abkhazia and on Tbilisi, and significantly 
strengthened the position of those factions in the Georgian leadership who believed that military 
methods were best in dealing with Ardzinba." This open challenge to the Georgian community by 
the nationalist Abkhaz leadership did not directly lead to the war but is an important factor in an 
explanation of its origins and implicitly attributes co-responsibility for the war to the Abkhaz 
side. The Abkhaz fear of being completely outnumbered by the Georgians then made ethnic 
cleansing understandable as a desperate move to change this situation. By focusing his attention 
on  Georgian  and  Abkhaz  motives,  Nodia  reveals  important  similarities  which  I  would 
characterize as follows: both parties shared a similar exclusive view of the nation in which the 
rights of other nationalities were not acknowledged, and both were driven by an ideologically 
framed fear of extinction and by the fear that current political events could lead to total political 
defeat if they did not follow a confrontational policy involving the use of force and violations of 
the rules of war. This negative assessment of the attitude of both parties could, in my view, lead 
to the positive conclusion that  it  is possible in principle to remove such motives through a 
political solution which would give sufficient security guarantees to both parties.
Chirikba's Analysis of Abkhaz Intentions
Chirikba's contribution to this volume, on the question of whether or not the Abkhaz government 
has implemented a policy of ethnic cleansing, is based on a very different way of analysing 
political responsibility. Chirikba focuses on the intentions and not the motives of the Abkhaz 
leadership.  My  personal  preference for  an  analysis  which  focuses  on  motives  rather  than 
intentions does not mean that intentions are not relevant to an assessment of responsibility. A 
complete picture of moral actions requires both dimensions – both intentions and motives are 
empirically and morally relevant concepts. In the following, I will not discuss the alternative 
approach taken by Chirikba in general, but only the logical consistency and empirical validity of 
his arguments, even if I would consider an analysis of the Abkhaz motives for ethnic cleansing 
(fear of a "fifth column", fear of being made into a minority, fear of revenge, etc., in conditions 
where mistrust impedes the creation of secure political institutions) to be more productive in a 
moral assessment of 'ethnic cleansing'.
The political importance of the question of ethnic cleansing should not be underestimated. The 
forcible transfer of population is a  war crime according to Article 49  of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention ("Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War").23 
Chirikba states that the Abkhaz government had no policy or even intention of expelling the 
Georgian population from Abkhazia, but that they fled out of panic and fear of the advancing 
Abkhaz troops, who encountered no further resistance after they had occupied Sukhum(i). In 
order to support this statement, he quotes the UN report on the Secretary-General's fact-finding 
mission to investigate human rights violations in Abkhazia in October 1993, writing that there it 
is "clearly stated that most Georgians living in the region between the Gumsta and Ingur rivers 
had  tried  to  flee  before  the  arrival  of  the  Akbhazian  forces".  He  then  refers  to  Revaz 
Gachechiladze who, as "a more objective Georgian author", in his book The New Georgia would 
have  avoided  exploiting  the  controversial  term  "ethnic  cleansing",  unlike  the  Georgian 
government's "propagandistic use" of this term.
One of the main problems with the discussion on this issue – should the term 'ethnic cleansing' be 
applied to Abkhaz policies? – is that there are no historical accounts of the war itself on which 
Georgian and Abkhaz (or other) scholars would agree. The report of the UN mission which is 
quoted by Chirikba could be considered a good source. It seems to have checked testimonies as 
carefully as possible under the circumstances, and it is balanced in accusing both sides of gross 
human rights violations.  But to make a selective use of this document is highly problematic, 
even in the paragraph from which this quotation is taken. For in fact, in his contribution above 
Chirikba refers only to the following sentence in the UN document: "After the Abkhazian forces 
had taken Sukhumi, most Georgians living in the region between the Gumista and Inguri Rivers 
tried to flee before the arrival of the Abkhazian forces". He then omits to quote the next sentence: 
"some others who stayed behind were reportedly killed when the Abkhazians took control of 
villages and cities in Ochamchira region", despite the fact that this sentence is clearly an integral 
part of the same statement in the UN report. The fact that the majority of the Georgian Abkhaz 
population fled before the arrival of Abkhaz troops and that "some" among the minority who 
stayed behind were reportedly killed by those troops is hardly proof that no ethnic cleansing has 
taken place!
This report refers also to numerous eye-witness accounts which say that the first Abkhaz units 
entering the south of Abkhazia did not commit atrocities against Georgians, but warned the 
population that they were being followed by other units who were "engaged in looting, burning of 
houses and killing. However, nothing appears to have been done to prevent those units from 
carrying out such acts." The UN report also clearly states that
numerous killings of civilians were also committed by Abkhazian forces, both during and after 
armed confrontations. Many of the allegations concern atrocities committed after the Abkhaz-
ians regained control over Gagra in October 1992. The mission received information indicating 
that several hundred Georgians were killed after Abkhazian forces had entered the city. Despite 
claims that only combatants with automatic weapons in their hands had been killed, there is 
evidence that most of the victims were no longer participating in combat, and that many others 
were civilians who had not actively taken part in the confrontation.
The final conclusion of the report  – in which crimes committed by the Georgian side are ex-
tensively listed – does not deny the existence of ethnic cleansing by either side (the report has 
gathered sufficient testimonies for strong evidence to suggest this), but appeals for further careful 
research on this issue:
23 Jean-Marie Henckaerts,  Mass  Expulsion  in  Modern  International  Law and  Practice,  The Hague/Boston/ 
London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 164.
On the basis of the information collected, the mission was not in a position to ascertain whether 
it had been an actively pursued policy of the authorities of either side, at any time, to clear the 
areas  under their  control  of  either  the  Abkhazian  or  the  Georgian population.  Only further 
careful investigation and evaluation can establish the relevant facts in a conclusive manner.
It would therefore be possible to claim that the UN report did not ascertain intentions of ethnic 
cleansing on the part of the Abkhaz authorities – but it is surely not possible to use just one single 
sentence of this authoritative report to prove the contrary.
Chirikba states that the absence of the term 'ethnic cleansing' in a book by Revaz Gachechiladze 
may be contrasted with the accusations formulated by the Georgian government. It is possible to 
use the authority of scholars from the other community to discredit their government, but this is 
not the best argument in a scientific discourse. Authors may quite simply change their mind. 
Revaz Gachechiladze did not use the expression 'ethnic cleansing' to describe the Abkhaz policies 
in  his previous book,  but  he has used it  in  his contribution to  this volume. He  may have 
considered that there are now – five years after the publication of the UN report mentioned above 
– sufficient generally known facts concerning the Abkhaz policies to compel him to use this term.
Ethnic Cleansing
Ethnic cleansing has been defined by Andrew Bell-Fialkov as a "planned, deliberate removal 
from a certain territory of an undesirable population distinguished by one or more characteristics 
such as ethnicity, religion, race, class or sexual preferences."24 Research has been done in both 
communities on the extent to which such a policy was implemented either during the war by the 
Georgian side or as the war was ending by the Abkhaz side. This research is based on eye-witness 
accounts and written sources. It may be useful (despite the psychological difficulties inherent in 
this task) to compare research results. This empirical historical research should be complemented 
by a moral analysis. There are indeed a number of moral issues involved in applying the concept 
of 'ethnic cleansing' to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, and these cannot be solved by historical 
descriptions of facts, but need to be analysed separately. This analysis should not confine itself to 
the meaning of the term 'ethnic cleansing' in international law. Moral analysis can define its own 
procedures in this respect.
The concept of ethnic cleansing as a "planned, deliberate removal" should refer not only to the 
original intentions of those who planned this removal but to all the elements that are included in a 
"planned" policy. Unintended but predictable consequences have also to be taken into account. 
This distinction between intended and unintended but predictable consequences is used in war 
ethics to assess the consequences of armed conflicts for the civilian population, who, according to 
the 'discrimination principle', are not supposed to be the immediate target of war operations. The 
discrimination  principle  forbids  military  operations  targeted  against  non-combatants,  but 
considers that under certain conditions the evil effects of military operations on non-combatants 
are tolerable. One of these conditions is that these consequences are merely foreseen or expected 
as  the  outcome of  a  particularly  important  and  legitimate  military  action,  but  not  directly 
intended.25 The flight of the Georgian population, for instance, may reasonably be expected or 
even foreseen as the outcome of major  military operations by the Abkhaz against Georgian 
troops, regardless of whether or not this flight was intended. This distinction between intended 
24 Andrew Bell-Fialkov, Ethnic Cleansing, London, Macmillan, 1996, pp. 3-4.
25 Robert Holmes, "Can War be Morally Justified?", in: Jean Bethke Elshtain (ed.), Just War Theory, New York 
University Press, New York, 1992, p. 200. For a discussion on this issue see Coates, op.cit., pp. 239-264.
and unintended consequences of military acts takes into account,  however, the fact that  the 
unintended consequences of military operations are also foreseen, accepted and thus voluntarily 
caused. Even if the departure of a  large proportion of the Georgian civilian population from 
Abkhazia had not actually been intended by the Abkhaz authorities (which may be doubted26), it 
remained foreseen, accepted and thus voluntarily caused as a  side-effect of planned military 
operations against Georgian troops. The distinction between intended and unintended actions 
does not imply a distinction between acts for which the agents are responsible and those for which 
they are not – it implies rather a distinction between different kinds of responsibility.27 From the 
perspective of war ethics, it remains the responsibility of those who have caused the suffering of 
the civilian population to undo it. According to de Zayas, it makes no sense to speak about the 
right not to be expelled but at the same time to deny the existence of a right to return.28 This 
means that the term 'ethnic cleansing' does not apply exclusively to voluntarily intended military 
policies of removal or  to acts of killing inspired by revenge, but  also to voluntary military 
policies which are not directly intended to remove the population but which accept this removal 
as an expected side-effect of their actions, without any prospect of remedying it at a later stage. In 
my view, the term 'ethnic cleansing' is appropriate for describing the policies of state authorities 
to the extent that  these authorities, which have voluntarily caused these departures by their 
military actions (regardless of whether this fleeing of the civilian population was intended or 
whether  it  was  an  unintended side-effect  of  military  operations),  are  not  prepared  to  take 
responsibility for their consequences or to remedy them within a reasonable period of time under 
appropriate circumstances.
The broader interpretation of the term 'ethnic cleansing' – which would include both intended and 
unintended forms of the removal of certain categories of an undesirable population from a certain 
territory, and for which the right to return is not acknowledged or implemented "at the earliest 
practicable date" (to use a current UN formula29) – has two main advantages.
First, it is more easily applicable to the empirical analysis of wars, where it is often difficult to 
distinguish between intended and unintended actions by political authorities, or between forms of 
removal of an undesirable population which are ordered by political authorities and forms of 
removal which are beyond their control. This broader definition is probably more appropriate for 
historical  research. It  implies that  the unintended consequences of the actions taken by the 
Georgian authorities who initiated the military operations in Abkhazia in August 1992 should be 
included in an analysis of the "voluntarily caused removals" of certain sections of the population 
26 The difficulty in finding empirical evidence of the intentions of a government can be seen in Robert Paul 
Churchill's analysis of genocide. He states that it is often difficult to find conclusive evidence of the intention 
of genocide but that such evidence can be deduced from the consequences of an act: "Conclusive evidence of 
a premeditated and planned state policy is too stringent as a standard, especially since governments can lie 
about their intentions and obstruct efforts to uncover them. For this reason, it is necessary to impute or infer 
intent from consequences. Thus, genocide occurs when the foreseeable, predictable, and cumulative results of 
a course of action are the extermination of an outgroup and when a state either produces this outcome or 
acquiesces in bringing it about by consistently refusing or failing to protect victims, often in contravention of 
its own legal code." Robert Paul Churchill, "Genocide", in: Donald A. Wells (ed.), An Encyclopedia of War 
and Ethics, Greenwood Press, Westport/Connecticut – London, Routledge, 1996, p. 167. It is thus possible 
to consider war crimes committed by subordinates as being part of the intentions of the authorities if these 
authorities had been informed about them but  had not  taken legal action. The failure of a government to 
protect victims is implied in the broader definition of ethnic cleansing given above.
27 Ibid., p. 245.
28 On the following, see Henckaerts, op.cit., p. 183ff.
29 Ibid., p. 185.
and of the political responsibility for 'ethnic cleansing'. The effects of any war largely escape the 
control of those who start it. This aspect gives war its apparently 'irrational' character and makes 
the act of starting a war (or a civil war) a decision of paramount moral importance. This means 
that it is necessary to assess the responsibility of both sides regarding the moral question of the 
'ethnic cleansing' of the Georgian population. Here it  should be added that an assessment of 
shared responsibility for the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population does not mean that both 
parties are equally responsible.
A second advantage of including the right to return in a definition of ethnic cleansing is that in 
assessing political responsibility it takes into account a longer time frame than the relatively brief 
period in which the civilian population were actually leaving their homes. According to the 
Memorandum of Understanding of 1 December 1993 between both parties, the return of all the 
refugees, as well as occupied homes and properties, was envisaged.30 The term 'ethnic cleansing' 
would hardly have been applied to the Abkhaz policies if they had worked in good faith for an 
implementation  of  this  decision,  as  this  would  have  indicated  that  they  had  accepted 
responsibility for the negative effects of their  military actions on the civilian population by 
permitting their return. Besides the inability of the two governments to come to an institutional 
compromise, it is possible to assess directly the intentions of the Abkhaz authorities after the war: 
their  refusal  to  initiate  a  dialogue  with  the  representatives of  the  Georgian  population  of 
Abkhazia, their policy of intimidation towards the Georgian population of the Gal(i) region in 
March and early April 1995,31 which was brought to a halt under strong international pressure, 
and  the  organization  of  parliamentary  elections in  1996  – which aimed  at  a  domestic  le-
gitimization of the new state structures, excluding the pre-war Georgian population  – are all 
indications that the Abkhaz government had no desire to undo the intended or unintended con-
sequences of the war for the civilian population.
Abkhaz commentators often point to the Abkhaz tradition of 'blood revenge' to explain the crimes 
committed by Abkhazians against the Georgian civilian population. A majority of the Abkhaz 
fighters had lost relatives or  friends  – often civilians  – during the early stages of the war. 
According to the Abkhazian tradition, all adult male members of a family are held responsible for 
the actions of one individual and constitute targets of a retaliatory murder.32 'Blood revenge' may 
have been an important motive for individual Abkhaz soldiers in their actions against Georgian 
civilians during the war. Paula Garb reports
stories of Abkhazian soldiers who, immediately after liberating occupied territory, committed 
crimes against Georgian families that  resembled the crimes that were committed by Georgian 
troops against their own families. This can happen after any war, but in Akbhazian culture it is 
perceived through the prism of the rules of blood revenge and therefore condoned, or at least, 
not condemned, and the perpetrators apparently are not prosecuted.
The breakdown of law and order caused by the war would have reinforced such practices in 
Abkhaz society.
30 See  The United  Nations and  the Situation in Georgia, Reference Paper April 1995, United Nations, De-
partment of Public Information.
31 Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, Security Council Document 
S/1995/342/1, May 1995, p. 6.
32 See Paula Garb, "The Return of Refugees Viewed through the Prism of Blood Revenge", in: The Anthology of  
East  Europe  Review,  vol.  13,  no.  2,  Autumn 1995,  which  may be  read  on  the  Internet:  www.socsci. 
uci.edu/socsci/personnel/garb/garb.html.
In my view, in defining the different steps for implementing the right to return, a peace settlement 
between Georgia  and  Abkhazia  has to  take  into  account  such Caucasian  rules  for  warrior 
cultures – but it cannot be led by such rules, as this would mean that in every cycle of violence 
crimes against the civilian population of a particular community could be legitimized by crimes 
perpetrated in a previous cycle. The Geneva Conventions and their rule of discriminating be-
tween combatants and non-combatants in the laws on war are founded not on the presupposition 
that specific cultural concepts of revenge and retaliation should be overlooked in formulating 
universal laws of war – the lawyers who drafted these conventions were very well aware of the 
persistence of particular customs of war in each culture – but rather on the idea that universal 
laws restraining the use of force during violent conflicts constitute the only guarantee that peace 
between different communities may ever be re-established. The condemnation and prosecution of 
crimes that are committed following the tradition of 'blood revenge' is a precondition for a peace 
settlement. It is also a precondition for internal stability and the implementation of law and order. 
Fear of revenge killings has been said to be the primary factor in preventing a more ruthless 
crackdown on abductions in Chechnya. On 30 June 1998, Chechnya's Sharia court ruled that 
blood feud murders were illegal and punishable by the death sentence.33
The lack of progress in the political negotiations also needs to be assessed in this analysis of 
ethnic cleansing. The inclusion of the right to return in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights poses a particular problem when it has to be applied not to individuals asserting 
an individual right but directly to large masses of people.34 The criterion of political practicability 
is generally included in an implementation of this right. The failure of both governments to find 
an institutional solution to the question of the political status of Georgians in Abkhazia and of 
Abkhazia  in  a  common state  means  that  here  too  there  is  a  problem of  shared  political 
responsibility for undoing ethnic cleansing.
In  discussing  this  issue  with  Abkhazians,  and  in  particular  with  high-ranking  officials  in 
Abkhazia, it has always struck me that many of them do not have a clear concept of the principle 
of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, in particular where the right to return 
is concerned. The existence of this principle is not denied, but the concept of innocent non-
combatant is often interpreted as moral or political innocence. According to the discrimination 
principle in war ethics – a principle which has been adopted in the Geneva Conventions – non-
combatants are to be understood as 'not  nocentes'  (not harming), as not directly or actively 
engaged in military operations. This concept of innocence should be clearly distinguished from 
moral  innocence.35 Innocence should  not  be  'descriptive of  the  agent's  interior  moral  state'. 
'Harmless' does not mean 'blameless'.36 Interpreting the term 'non-combatants' in the principle of 
discrimination in the form of moral or political innocence would render all the citizens of a state 
that was seen as fighting an unjust war liable to attack and would lead to 'total war', undermining 
all attempts at discrimination and at establishing laws of war.37 The identification of 'innocent 
non-combatants' with 'blamelessness' or with 'moral or political innocence' would bring Abkhazia 
back to the old Stalinist tradition of 'collective guilt'. According to the Fourth Geneva Convention 
– which sets out the rights of the population after a  war  – even those who are suspected of 
33 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 2, no. 125, Part I, 1 July 1998.
34 On the following, see Henckaerts, op.cit., pp. 183ff.
35 John Finnis, "The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law Tradition", in: Nardin (ed.), op.cit., 
p. 27; Jeff McMahan, "Realism, Morality, and War", in: ibid., p. 88.
36 Coates, op.cit., p. 235.
37 Ibid., p. 234.
activities hostile to the interests of the state have the right to be given a fair trial and to be treated 
with humanity.38 
The attitude of the Abkhaz government towards the right to return of the Georgian refugees is 
essential for an evaluation of its capacity to defend universal human rights. As de Zayas puts it, 
the
inalienable human right to life and the right to liberty must be understood in a concrete time-
and-place sense. Indeed, one lives and one enjoys liberty sometime and somewhere, and this 
somewhere is usually the land where one was born, where one married and had children, (...) it 
should be remembered that a human being is not an object that governments can arbitrarily move 
across a map. The transplantation of peoples deeply rooted in the land and social milieu of one 
country brings  with it  not  only physical  discomfort  and  economic loss  but  also  moral  and 
psychological shock which may permanently ruin the lives of persons who are unable to adjust 
to a new and perhaps inhospitable environment.39
It should be added in this context that the Georgian government has defended the discrimination 
principle only to a limited extent insofar as the civilian population from Abkhazia is concerned. 
The UN document quoted above refers to the many gross human rights violations perpetrated by 
Georgian troops during the 1992-93  war.  The embargo against Abkhazia did not affect the 
transport of medical or other basic supplies to that region, which received assistance estimated at 
almost US $17.5 million in 1997 and a suspected substantially higher amount in 1998. This 
represents more per capita international humanitarian aid than Georgia received, but the lack of 
economic  development  and  of  sufficient  resources  to  fund  basic  social  services  (such  as 
education) has hit the civilian population hard. It  is to be hoped that  the creation of a  Co-
ordinating Council in  November 1997  and the implementation of a  policy of economic co-
operation will put an end to this policy of hurting the civilian population in order to induce its 
representatives to compromise. The creation of this Co-ordinating Council has been said to mark 
a turning-point in the negotiations. This may be true from the perspective of the discrimination 
principle,  if  it  proves possible to  set  up  co-operation aimed at  the  welfare  of  the  civilian 
population irrespective of any power struggle.
Dealing with the Past I: Individual Responsibility
A peace settlement between the Georgian and Abkhaz communities will have to find a political 
solution to the problem of how to deal with individual responsibility for war crimes. One possible 
option is to consider that only a society which has fully come to terms with its past through 
prosecuting the perpetrators of gross human rights violations can satisfy the sense of justice of the 
victims and their relatives, and give the population sufficient security guarantees that nothing like 
this will ever happen again. If perpetrators of human rights violations know that they will be 
protected after committing a crime, future perpetrators may feel secure in committing the same 
crimes or obeying authorities who give them orders to do so. Criminal prosecution would also be 
helpful in preventing some victims or their relatives from resorting to private forms of vindictive 
justice in the tradition of 'blood revenge'. Prosecution performs a moral educational function 
which can last for several generations. Such a long-term perspective is important in the case of 
ethnic conflicts, as gross human rights violations (such as ethnic cleansing) are often legitimized 
by victimizations and atrocities from earlier times. In cultures that have been affected by severe 
38 See Henckaerts, op.cit, pp. 140ff.
39 Quoted in: ibid., p. 186.
ethnic  conflicts,  there  are  long-term  cycles  of  victimization  in  which  the  perpetration  of 
aggression is ensured by a former victimization and in which every community feels itself to be a 
victim.40 It may be argued that such prosecutions can re-ignite ethnic conflicts, even if they are 
initiated  under  conditions of  a  fair  trial  attended by international  observers.  The  manifold 
experiences in this field in recent decades show that there are no clear-cut solutions. It is part of 
the negotiation process to find a political solution which appeals to the sense of justice of both 
communities. 
The major problem in such negotiations is undoubtedly the question of political responsibility for 
war crimes and other gross human rights violations. There is a real dilemma involved in this 
political choice: from a political point of view, there is no point in negotiating if both parties are 
not willing to construct a common framework in which both elites would find their place. From a 
moral and political point of view, however, there is a risk that a negotiated settlement may leave 
those politically responsible for major crimes untouched and that the population will therefore 
not regard the peace settlement as fair. A lack of legitimacy in political agreements may cause an 
already frail construct to collapse altogether.
It is far from clear how the two governments want to settle this question, although the political 
leaders of both communities recognize the importance of finding a  solution to the issue. An 
analysis of experiences of a negotiated settlement in other countries may be helpful in this re-
spect. It is possible to distinguish four political strategies for dealing with the past: 1. criminal 
prosecution of the individual perpetrators and those politically responsible; 2. lustration or dis-
qualification of those politically responsible for crimes, including the loss of political and civil 
rights; 3. granting of an unconditional amnesty; 4. a truth commission which investigates past 
events in their full complexity and officially acknowledges the injustices committed, without, 
however,  prosecuting  and  punishing  ('amnesty  without  amnesia').41 It  is  possible  that  the 
Georgians and Abkhaz may opt for a fifth strategy, if they think that constituting a common state 
through a peace settlement may entail setting up a different legal system for Abkhazia than for 
Georgia, but the knowledge of the problems and consequences of the previous strategies should 
not be simply dismissed.
Academic co-operation between researchers from Georgia and Abkhazia could focus on the way 
individual  responsibility  has  been assessed in  other  countries  and  on  the  formal  rules  and 
procedures which should be followed in the Georgian-Abkhaz case. The fact that most of those 
involved on both sides recognize that crimes have been committed on both sides, and that only 
formal procedures can deal with these crimes, is in my opinion a good sign for such co-operation.
One of the most interesting experiences in this respect is probably the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa.42 This belongs to the fourth strategy described above. Those who 
conceived this commission started out  from two presuppositions. First,  past  tensions, if  left 
unresolved, could lead to new conflicts in the future. Second, it would be difficult to punish the 
perpetrators without touching those who had given the orders. Given the negotiated character of 
the transition from white to majority rule it would have been impossible to try and punish all 
those responsible. The commission, which included both blacks and whites, first had to find out 
the truth concerning the horrors perpetrated under the apartheid regime, then it had to compensate 
victims and finally – and this was to be the most controversial aspect in the eyes of the public – it 
40 On the following, see Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Prosecuting Gross Human Rights Violations from the Perspec-
tive of the Victim", in: Jongman (ed.) op.cit., pp. 175-185.
41 On these four strategies, see Huyse, op.cit., pp. 187-214.
42 On the following, see The Economist, 1 November, 1997.
had to pardon the perpetrators in order to achieve national reconciliation. This approach to past 
injustices makes it possible for the injustices to be clearly and officially acknowledged and for the 
perpetrators – even those at the highest level in the state hierarchy – to be confronted with their 
deeds and victims. Critical self-reflection is laid down as a precondition for reconciliation.
Dealing with the Past II: Responsibility of States
Murdering, raping, looting and other acts which the Georgian and Abkhaz troops have been 
accused of, and which contravene the laws, rights and duties of war as codified in the Geneva 
Conventions, engage the political responsibility of the Georgian and Abkhaz authorities. The 
lack of governmental control over the actions of Georgian or Abkhaz troops is an important 
factor in assessing individual responsibility, but it does not alter the responsibility of the two 
states. The burning of the Abkhaz historical archives in Sukhum(i), for instance, is a crime which 
involves the responsibility of the Georgian state and for which reparation is due.
Post-war German leaders did not refuse to take up the heavy burden of recognizing their state's 
responsibility for the consequences of the crimes that were committed under the nazi regime in 
the name of the German Reich. This did not at all imply personal responsibility on the part of 
German leaders or their personal implication in the nazi crimes. West Germany took this position 
immediately after the war, and the communist regime in the GDR considered the option of 
paying compensation to Israel at the end of the 1980s, shortly before its fall (despite the fact that 
Erich Honecker and other communist leaders were victims of nazi repression). The West German 
Chancellor, Willy Brandt, who had himself participated in the resistance to the nazi regime, 
always defended an unambiguous position with respect to the responsibility of the German state. 
This attitude was crucially important for the reconciliation between Germany and Poland in the 
1970s and has facilitated the acceptance of the German state by international public opinion as 
'another  Germany'.  Japan,  on  the  contrary,  has  always  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in 
acknowledging full responsibility for the deeds of its army in occupied territory, and this remains 
a major stumbling-block in its relations with China and Korea. Turkish-Armenian relations have 
up to now been bedevilled by the question of the responsibility of the Turkish state for the 
genocide of Armenians at the beginning of this century. France has only very recently (after the 
death of President Mitterand) reconsidered whether the responsibility of the French state was 
involved in the actions of the collaborationist Vichy regime in deporting Jews from France. 
During a visit to Africa in 1998, Bill Clinton apologized for America's role in the slave trade. 
After the Labour victory in the recent British elections, prime minister Tony Blair expressed 
regret to the Irish for the potato famine, but the lack of an apology for the Amritsar massacre still 
sours Britain's relations with India.43
The question of how a government should deal with the state's responsibility is a normative one, 
which can only be decided at the domestic level. In the case of Germany and Britain, it seems to 
have been based on a conscious decision to facilitate reconciliation after past conflicts. Japan 
refused for a long time, and hesitantly started to take similar steps only some years ago. Whether 
Georgia is prepared to recognize its responsibility remains an open question. In recent years, the 
Georgian side has appealed for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal to deal 
with  so-called  'hard  core'  crimes,  such as  genocide,  that  pose a  threat  to  the  international 
community,44 but  this  was  done in  order  to  increase  international  pressure  on  the  Abkhaz 
43 The Independent, 24 May 1998.
44 United Nations Security Council, 3535th Meeting , 12 May 1995, UN Document S/PV.3535.
government. The Georgian delegation at the Geneva negotiations of 15-18 November 1994 did, 
however,  acknowledge  partial  responsibility  for  the  war  (but  not  for  starting  it)  in  a 
memorandum issued at the end of the negotiations. According to this memorandum,
errors on the part of the military leadership of the Republic of Georgia gave the separatists an 
opportunity to unleash an armed conflict involving thousands of mercenary soldiers from the 
Northern Caucasus  and other  parts  of Russia  and the most advanced military equipment.  A 
proper evaluation of the war has yet to be made, but already the question of responsibility is on 
the agenda in Georgia. Unfortunately, similar steps are not being taken by the Abkhaz side.45
Eduard Shevardnadze has also stated that his predecessor, Gamsakhurdia, made serious errors in 
his policies towards South Ossetia. Similar self-criticism of his own policies towards Abkhazia is 
probably  more  difficult  to  express,  especially  in  the  present  circumstances.  It  is  certainly 
extremely difficult for Georgians to acknowledge their own responsibility before the Abkhaz 
government attempts to make amends for ethnic cleansing, but mutual steps in this direction, 
within the framework of peace negotiations, should not be ruled out. They could also be part of a 
confidence-building programme. There have been proposals to have a common Georgian-Abkhaz 
programme at  NGO  level  to  reconstruct  the historical  archives of Sukhum(i)  by providing 
photocopies from Georgian archives and other practical support.
The present contribution has avoided dealing with the – albeit considerable – moral responsibility 
of the international community in the conflict.46 I will merely conclude here with the remark that 
the attitude of the Western and Russian governments is not always very helpful in supporting 
Georgia and Abkhazia's efforts to come to terms with their past. UN Security Council resolutions 
and discussions refer exclusively to the responsibility of the Abkhaz government for the deadlock 
in the negotiations and for the inability of the Georgian refugees to return to their homes. As may 
be clear from the contributions to this volume, and contrary to the practice of the UN Security 
Council,  responsibility  for  the  war  and  the  lack  of  progress in  negotiations should  not  be 
unilaterally assigned.
45 UN Document S/1994/1333 (23 November 1994).
46 On this issue see my contribution "Georgia in Europe: The Idea of a Periphery in International Relations" in: 
Bruno  Coppieters,  Dmitri  Trenin  and  Alexei  Zverev,  Commonwealth  and  Independence  in  Post-Soviet  
Eurasia, London, Frank Cass, 1998, pp. 44-68.
Conclusions by the Editors
Bruno Coppieters
It is not a usual practice for an editor to conclude his book by pointing to its intellectual limits. 
Such a critique is made in reviews or by other authors in their own publications. A commercial 
publisher would probably not be delighted to have to sell a book in which the editors highlight 
what that book has failed to offer. Our book project, however, was regarded as a first step to-
wards long-term co-operation between Georgian  and  Abkhaz academics in  an  international 
setting. We also had to see what kind of knowledge was lacking in the analysis of the conflict and 
in its proposed remedies. In the following, I will point out what I personally consider to be the 
main shortcomings of our common experience. According to the European scientific tradition, 
knowledge of such limits is a prerequisite for overcoming them.
The Lack of Institutional Models
One of the most striking aspects of the ongoing negotiations is that both sides are extremely 
precise in their wording when formulating mutual accusations, but rather vague when it comes to 
describing their own views on the functioning of common state institutions and, in particular, on 
security guarantees for the two communities. Unfortunately, the contributions to this volume 
have failed to overcome this limitation. The authors have tried to develop a positive approach to 
a compromise solution, but remain quite general on the subject of institutional arrangements. The 
Georgian contributions focus on the geopolitical conditions for a peace settlement and avoid the 
concretization of federal-type alternatives to the unitary state altogether. The Abkhaz proposals, 
in particular those of Stanislav Lakoba and Viacheslav Chirikba, are more helpful in this respect. 
In this book, the contrast between the readiness of the Abkhaz participants to take up the question 
of political status in practical terms and the relative reluctance of the Georgians to go beyond a 
general analysis of this question is quite interesting – especially if we are to parallel this contrast 
with the ongoing negotiation process. In recent years, the Abkhaz side has been criticized for not 
discussing the question of political status in a positive way. This criticism presupposed that a 
confederal arrangement that gives no guarantee to the Georgian side regarding the rights of the 
Georgian IDPs or the threat of secession could not be considered a concrete proposal. However, 
the fact that the Georgian political leadership has been declaring since 1995 that it is ready in 
principle to discuss more or less radical forms of federalization does not mean that this issue was 
prominent in intellectual debates in Georgia at the time the contributions to this book were being 
prepared – as is quite obvious in the contributions from the Georgian side.
Readers of this book will have the chance to familiarize themselves with Abkhaz perspectives on 
a common state. But in the institutional arrangements proposed they may have great difficulty in 
finding any clear delimitation of powers which would make lasting coexistence possible. None of 
the authors has tried to depict the consequences of a  conflict of interests in the institutional 
framework they are proposing. It is difficult, in the proposals of Stanislav Lakoba or Viacheslav 
Chirikba,  to  see  how a  severe  conflict  of  interests  between the  units  of  the  federation  or 
confederations  could  be  solved  without  inevitably  leading  to  a  break-up  of  the  proposed 
federative institutions and the re-establishment of de facto independence for the various units.
This failure to give  practical consideration to the institutional reforms to be implemented is no 
doubt due to the participants' lack of particular expertise in this field. The conference and book 
project were conceived as a first exchange of views on various aspects the conflict. The editors 
did not single out any one particular aspect of the conflict as being the most important. From this 
perspective, it  should  be explained that  federalism and  confederalism were not  expected to 
constitute major topics of the contributions. The lack of analysis of institutional forms of ethnic 
conflict management,  however, indicates a  more difficult  problem, as  I  have already stated 
above. The decision by the Georgian leadership – to strive for the reunification of Georgia with 
Abkhazia through federalization – was taken during the debates on a new constitution in 1995, 
and did not receive substantial intellectual support from the scientific community. Such a gap – 
between the insight of the leadership that federalization is the last resort for re-establishing po-
litical stability after the failure of all other options, on one hand, and the lack of federal expertise, 
on the other – should not be seen as an absolute barrier to federal reforms in Georgia. Every 
federation has its own unique experience in the process of federalization and has to produce its 
own expertise while actually undergoing this process. At first, constitutional and legal expertise 
will be called for. Other scientific disciplines (economics, finance, political science) will follow. 
In Spain and Belgium, a whole generation of experts were trained on the spot, during the debates 
on the implementation of federal institutions and in preparing constitutional drafts.
The interest in the mechanisms of federative systems is, however, further hindered by the fact that 
Georgians and Abkhazians attach greater importance to geopolitics than to state reforms. This 
was not the case in Spain and Belgium when discussions on federalization were taking place in 
those countries. This overriding interest in geopolitics can be explained by the history of the 
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict itself. After the forcible incorporation of Georgia and Abkhazia into 
the Soviet Union in 1921,  relations between the two communities became part of 'domestic' 
Soviet policies. During the struggle for sovereignty by the Georgians and Abkhazians at the end 
of the 1980s, and even after the break-up of the Soviet Union, it became extremely difficult to 
distinguish the 'international' dimension of the conflict from the 'domestic' power struggle taking 
place either in Moscow or in Tbilisi. The resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze as Soviet Minister 
of Foreign Affairs in December 1990 was partly due to his differences with Gorbachev over the 
handling of the Tbilisi massacre in April 1989.1 Shevardnadze also expressed his complaints 
about  Gorbachev's passivity in the face of attacks on his foreign and defence policies from 
conservative military elements. Three years later,  Shevardnadze (who had since become the 
leader of an independent Georgia), voiced a similar criticism of Yeltsin's unwillingness to halt the 
support of his (former Soviet and now Russian) troops to the Abkhaz side. The intermingling of 
domestic with international conflicts in Abkhazia, Georgia and Russia became even clearer after 
the retreat  of Georgian forces from Abkhazia  in  October 1993.  Shevardnadze was entirely 
dependent on Russian military support in order to crush the last attempt by former President 
Gamsakhurdia to regain power in Tbilisi. Russian support in the Georgian civil war was a trade-
off for Georgia's entering the CIS and Russia's being allowed to station troops on Georgian 
territory. During the 1992-93 war, Abkhazia had benefited from the direct support of members of 
the Russian parliament. The Russian parliament and president may have shared similar views 
concerning the threat of secession in the Northern Caucasus and the need for a strong Russian 
presence in the Southern Caucasus, but they were involved in a severe conflict with each other on 
domestic policies. In October 1993, shortly after the Abkhaz military victory, Yeltsin ordered his 
troops to expel his adversaries by force from the parliament building in Moscow. With the arrest 
of  vice-president  Rutskoi  and  other  opposition  leaders  in  the  parliament,  Abkhazia  lost 
significant leverage in Moscow.
1 See Carolyn  McGiffert  Ekedahl  and  Melvin A. Goodman,  The wars  of  Eduard  Shevardnadze,  Hurst  & 
Company, London, 1997, pp. 238-251.
If we were to describe the whole period 1989-1993  in more general terms, it would also be 
difficult to draw clear boundaries between domestic and international politics. This period in-
cluded, simultaneously, the secession of Georgia from the Soviet Union, the breaking-up of the 
Soviet Union by Russia's secession, a fully fledged civil war in Georgia against a democratically 
elected president, the crushing of the parliamentary opposition in Russia with military support 
and the  de facto secessions by Chechnya from Russia and by Abkhazia from Georgia. It  is 
possible  to  analyse  Georgian-Soviet,  Russo-Soviet,  Georgian-Russian,  Chechen-Russian  and 
Georgian-Abkhaz relations both as domestic and as international relations.
The fact that the events of the war did not make it possible to disentangle domestic from inter-
national politics largely explains why the present Russian, Georgian and Abkhazian political 
elites, which have all been part of the same Soviet elite, are unable to make a clear distinction 
between the external and internal dimensions of sovereignty or of the conditions for state sta-
bility. This is highly problematic when proposals for a settlement have to be formulated. When 
Eduard Shevardnadze argues in favour of applying the "Bosnian model" to Abkhazia, he is 
referring to the enforcement by the international community of Security Council resolutions, not 
to the domestic model of polyethnic coexistence implied in the Dayton agreement. His view of 
the Bosnian model is based on the recent experiences of the UN and NATO in the former 
Yugoslavia, and legitimizes the possible use of force. The use of this model serves domestic 
purposes by creating the  hope that  the  international  community may  solve the  conflict  by 
enforcing some kind of order. It  also aims to exert pressure on the Russian mediator in the 
conflict.  In  discussions  in  Western  diplomatic  circles  –  where  a  profound  knowledge  of 
Abkhazian problems can hardly be expected – it is particularly useful to speak in terms of a more 
familiar model in order to point out the need for resolute action.
The significance of the Bosnian model has not been well thought out. Shevardnadze's description 
of the exemplary character of intervention in Bosnia overlooks the huge difficulties of undoing 
ethnic cleansing there or securing the continued existence of the Bosnian state. The creation of 
new ethnic enclaves and state entities or the increasing take-over of direct responsibilities by 
representatives of  international  security  institutions (in  April  1998,  for  instance,  the  OSCE 
appointed its own administrator to govern Srebrenica)2 is not reflected upon. The main criticism 
that may be levelled at Georgia's view of the "Bosnian model" is that it is not based on a clear 
view of how the "Georgian-Abkhaz model" of federal relations would prevent political instability 
and the outbreak of fresh violent conflicts. Nor does the propagandistic use of the Bosnian model 
take into account the political conditions for Western/international intervention that were present 
in  Bosnia  and  are  lacking in  Abkhazia  (Bosnia  was not  in  Russia's back  garden, whereas 
Abkhazia is considered to belong to Russia's sphere of influence; Western public opinion exerted 
tremendous pressure in favour of military intervention in Bosnia and the stationing of some 
30,000 troops there, whereas it is not at all concerned about the conflict over Abkhazia).
According to the Georgian approach, the guarantees they would obtain through foreign support 
for the enforcement of any model of ethnic coexistence that respected the territorial integrity of 
Georgia are more important than the guarantees for stability that are inherent in the functioning 
of the model itself. The consequences of such an approach are well analysed in the contribution 
by Yuri  Anchabadze when he  describes the  Georgian  attitude  to  the  Russo-Chechen war. 
Shevardnadze had supported the position of the Russian government (including its bombing of 
the civilian population of Grozny) and declared that he would grant Abkhazia the same powers 
as Russia granted Chechnya. After the military defeat of the Russian forces, Chechnya has been 
offered (and has refused) powers going far beyond what Georgia – which has to take into account 
2 The Economist, 11 April 1998.
the interests of its refugee population – is prepared to grant to Abkhazia. The main lesson to be 
learnt from this experience is that it is not only unrealistic but also counter-productive to hope 
that a co-ordination of Georgian policies with those of other regional powers or international 
institutions can be a substitute for well-thought-out blue-prints for a federal-type arrangement for 
Abkhazia. The Georgian leadership, in replacing its former reference to Chechnya by a new one 
to Bosnia, has apparently learnt the wrong lesson from this experience.
A lack of vision in thinking about the concrete form a common state could take is also charac-
teristic  of the  Abkhaz leadership.  The  question of security and political  guarantees for  the 
Georgian population of Akbhazia does not appear to be well thought-out. The Abkhaz leadership 
is focusing its attention far more on the geopolitical factors that may influence their negotiating 
position than  on blue-prints for  state  structures  in  which sovereignty would  be  shared.  By 
refusing any direct  discussion on the question of political  status,  or  any dialogue with the 
political representatives of the Georgian population from Abkhazia, the Abkhaz leadership is 
expressing this thought in a no less radical form than the Georgians with their use of the "Bosnian 
model".
This lack of a creative vision of the domestic conditions for a peace settlement should not simply 
be explained away by a  lack  of political  commitment or  an  inability  to  compromise. The 
criticism that has repeatedly been made of both parties by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
–  that  the lack  of progress in  the negotiations is  due to their  inability to  make substantial 
compromises –  is quite acurate,  but  it  does not go to the heart  of the matter.  Georgia and 
Abkhazia are in fact confronted by a security dilemma to which it seems initially that federative 
solutions may not necessarily produce a stable outcome. Georgia and Abkhazia have been going 
through a war which has brought both of them to the brink of total disintegration. Both are 
incapable of winning a new war without strong foreign support, while such a war would have 
disastrous effects on their economies and, even in the event of a  military victory, would not 
necessarily achieve the objectives they are aiming at. The consequences of a compromise solution 
are, however, no easier to assess. There are indeed high risks involved for both sides in the 
creation of common state structures. A direct consequence of a  confederal  relationship with 
Akbhazia would be a radicalization of the positions of South Ossetia and Ajaria. The Georgian 
leadership has therefore flatly refused to consider it as an option in the negotiations. It is also 
extremely difficult for the Georgian government to calculate the repercussions of a federalization 
of its  state  structures on its  relations with South  Ossetia  or  Ajaria.  Even very limited fed-
eralization creates its own dynamics, which – non-centralization being a basic characteristic of 
federalism –  may not remain under the complete control of the present government. This is 
probably one of the reasons why no serious attempts have been made to develop any form of 
shared sovereignty with other regions or  other ethnic communities in Georgia.  The Abkhaz 
government has similar difficulty in predicting the political consequences of the return of refu-
gees to Abkhazia and the creation of new state structures in which the present leadership would 
have to share power. 
The primary normative function of any state is to protect its citizens. Up to now, neither the 
Georgian nor the Abkhaz state has fulfilled this function in the post-Soviet period. When its 
troops entered Abkhazia in August 1992, the Georgian state presented a threat to the Abkazian 
community. After the war, it enforced an economic embargo against a civilian population which 
it claimed to represent. The Abkhaz state was neither able nor willing to overcome the situation 
of  ethnic  cleansing  by  providing  security  guarantees  for  Georgian  refugees  returning  to 
Abkhazia. Georgia and Abkhazia can only cease to represent a threat for each other if they are 
ready to take major risks in setting up a common state. It is far from certain whether the two 
leaderships will  be  able,  in  the  near  future,  to  overcome their  fear  of  destabilization.  The 
intensification of economic and other forms of co-operation links, which has been taking place 
since November 1997, is a necessary but insufficient condition for creating the trust necessary for 
overcoming such fear and engaging in a risky form of political co-operation. The support of 
foreign governments to one side of the conflict or the other only exacerbates existing fears. Under 
these conditions, it would make sense not to raise false expectations among Georgian public 
opinion or to exacerbate the fears of the Abkhaz public by using the "Bosnian model", but instead 
to  concentrate  the  political  discussions on domestic conditions for  stability  in  a  process of 
political transformation. As both sides have to overcome similar fears, there is not much point in 
taking a stand for or against one party in the conflict.
The above position is a personal one. The other authors writing in this book would not neces-
sarily share my views on the difficulties for the Georgian and Abkhaz leadership in going beyond 
the present stage in the negotiations. But some of the Georgian and Abkhaz contributions do 
point in the same direction. The fact that both sides rely far too heavily on foreign (Russian or 
Western) support to strengthen their own positions, for instance, is criticized by Gia Tarkhan-
Mouravi. During the conference, it  was also said that  the lack of productive discussions on 
concrete  state  forms was  partly  due  to  a  lack  of  knowledge among the  public  regarding 
(con)federal experiences. It was therefore decided that a second conference in Brussels should 
concentrate on assessing the significance of such experiences for Georgian-Abkhaz relations, and 
that the proceedings of this conference would be made accessible to a wide audience in Georgia 
and Abkhazia. The conference was held in November 1997 and the proceedings are at present 
being prepared for publication.
A Limited Dialogue
The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict does not affect merely the Georgian and Abkhaz communities. 
The Russian, Armenian, Greek and other communities in Abkhazia have  also been drawn into it. 
One of the major limitations of the present Georgian-Abkhaz collaboration – and apparently of 
many other diplomatic and NGO initiatives taken in the region – is their exclusive focus on the 
two communities which were directly opposed to each other during the war. The present Abkhaz 
government includes some non-Abkhaz  ministers,  but  the  non-Abkhaz  communities  do  not 
participate as such in the negotiations. The non-Georgian population of Georgia is virtually not 
represented in the Georgian political establishment, and the questions of the future political status 
of  South  Ossetia  and  Ajaria  are  dealt  with  as  separate  negotiation  issues  by  the  Tbilisi 
government, in order to avoid any interference between one conflict and another.
The fact that it was impossible to include in this conference academics from among the Georgian 
refugee population in Abkhazia is most unfortunate. It can easily be explained by the fact that it 
would have been difficult to organize a dialogue between Georgian and Abkhaz academics from 
Abkhazia in a situation where the Abkhaz government is refusing any form of dialogue with the 
political representatives of the refugee population. It could also be said that a conference which 
aims at  initiating  long-term co-operation first  had to  overcome strong mutual  suspicion by 
Georgians from Georgia and Abkhazians from Abkhazia before widening the dialogue to include 
other participants. A dialogue between all communities from Abkhazia is a prerequisite for any 
peace settlement. The hurdles facing such a  dialogue are in principle no greater than those 
overcome in Northern Ireland, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or between the South African 
apartheid regime and the ANC. There are probably also some areas of common interest between 
the Georgian and Abkhaz communities in Abkhazia, which are now obscured by mutual acts and 
accusations of terrorism, but which may resurface once a dialogue is in place. For a time, the 
Georgian community in Abkhazia will remain dependent on the Tbilisi government in order to 
secure its political and property rights but, once these rights have been secured, it will find that as 
regards the economic future of the region it has more in common with the other communities in 
Abkhazia than with Georgia proper. This is especially true if we take a long-term perspective, as 
is necessary when speaking of national interests. This statement may be challenged – but it would 
surely  be  worthwhile  to  do  so  at  an  academic  conference  with  the  participation  of  all 
communities from Abkhazia.
Ghia Nodia
This volume is a mixture of an academic and a political exercise. Intellectuals do not usually like 
to be portrayed as representatives of nations or ethnic groups: in their capacity as intellectuals, 
they prefer to be regarded as staying aloof from communal allegiances. An academic conference 
where the participants are divided into two ethnically defined and equal "sides" plus "neutral" 
outsiders may be considered a contradiction in terms.
It is also true, however, that intellectuals play a conspicuous role in many conflicts like the one 
discussed in this book. In particular, the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is sometimes viewed as one 
started by historians and philologists. It would be naive to believe that once scholars sort things 
out among themselves there will be no more room for fighting: academics are less important now 
than they used to be before the war (except for those who have become political leaders), and in 
general they are probably better at messing things up than sorting them out. But when politicians 
find themselves in a stalemate (as is the case in the conflict under consideration), it is only natural 
to expect intellectuals at least to make an attempt to explore alternative routes.
This volume may therefore be assessed from two viewpoints. First, it is an effort to describe and 
understand  the  Georgian-Abkhaz  conflict  from different  perspectives.  As such,  it  is  to  my 
knowledge the only one so far, and hence doomed to be the best. Readers may like or dislike the 
purely academic qualities of this or that paper, but the volume will probably become a must for 
those who want to understand the Abkhazian conflict. But as I said, there was also an important 
practical side: that of "exploring alternative routes". Here, assessments will probably be more 
mixed. Anyone who thought that solving the conflict needed only open-mindedness and honest 
intellectual  effort will  probably be disappointed. In the part  devoted to future  solutions, all 
participants  were  much  more  general  and  cautious  than  in  describing  the  causes  of  and 
background to the conflict. The most specific proposal – that of Stanislav Lakoba to create a 
Georgian-Abkhaz-Chechen Confederation –  can hardly be considered a  ground for  realistic 
discussion, as  it  would entail  an  open conflict between Georgia  and Russia.  There was no 
breakthrough, no brave new vision that intellectuals can bring home to brandish at  their re-
spective governments and societies.
But if the objective complexity of the situation is taken into account, then the results may be seen 
in a different light. For all  the difficulties of the situation, which could make a person quite 
pessimistic about the prospects for its resolution (and I believe the articles in this volume show 
this complexity quite well), the participants did agree on an important issue – that a viable final 
solution has to be sought along the lines of federalism. In this, I share the general optimism 
expressed at the end of Chirikba's article. To be sure, this optimism should not be exaggerated 
either: words like "federation" or "confederation" have been routinely used by representatives of 
the parties to the conflict as symbols rather than concepts, and Bruno Coppieters is absolutely 
right in saying that serious public discussion on their substance is lacking in both Georgian and 
Abkhaz societies. This was obvious during the conference as well. But that is exactly the point: 
the substance of specific options needs to be explored and discussed, and who are supposed to be 
the first do this, if not academics? An understanding of the necessity to go into the details of 
federal projects was probably the major outcome of the conference – and provided an idea for 
another project. On behalf of the Georgian participants, I can say that we came away from the 
conference a little bit more optimistic than when we arrived at it.
Events on the ground since the conference was held have fuelled the arguments of both optimists 
and pessimists.  On  the one hand,  in  August  1997  in  Tbilisi  there was a  meeting between 
Ardzinba and Shevardnadze which caused a  sensation, but  did not bring too many tangible 
results. It was important, though, that the sides agreed not to use military means (however little 
agreements like this tend to be honoured in the Caucasus), and that the meeting was followed by 
a  number of visits which explored the possibility of economic co-operation –  a  whole new 
development which had not taken place before. On the other hand, guerrilla fighting intensified in 
the southern part of Abkhazia, and May 1998 saw a major outbreak of violence which raised 
fears of a  new, fully-fledged war. The Georgian government dissociates itself from Georgian 
armed groups and may even ostensibly condemn their actions, but it is also an open secret that it 
does provide help to  at  least  some of the  guerrilla  groups.  Most importantly,  the  guerrilla 
movement is legitimate in the eyes of the Georgian public, which has been disappointed by years 
of  fruitless  negotiations,  and  there  is  pressure  on  the  government  to  support  the  guerrilla 
movement openly (as the exiled government of Abkhazia does). This does not mean that there is 
public support for a large-scale new war, but it is assumed that the Sukhumi government should 
get a clear message that it cannot simply get away with ethnic cleansing. This is obviously a 
dangerous  development  –  bitterness  caused  by  new deaths  may  reduce  the  willingness to 
compromise even more, and guerrilla groups may eventually become a destabilizing force in 
Georgia proper.
This leads one to think that, even though we wish otherwise, the final settlement in Abkhazia is 
probably a long-term project and should be treated as such. As a result, meetings like the one 
which gave birth to this book are even more important. The unwillingness of bad politicians or 
the vested interests of particular groups are not the major obstacle to lasting peace. Illusions 
about oneself and others, lack of information, being unaccustomed to facing difficult problems 
and tough choices are much more important – and take more time to overcome. In that sense, any 
joint attempt to explore honestly the problems and choices that  are there, besides having an 
academic value, has significance as a step towards peace.
Yuri Anchabadze
The conference "Georgians and Abkhazians: The Search for a Settlement and the Role of the 
International Community" has become an appreciable landmark in the nascent scientific dialogue 
between Georgian  and  Abkhazian  researchers  on  the  problems associated  with  the  war  of 
1992-1993 and its consequences – extremely painful and serious for both parties – and on the 
search for ways to resolve this conflict. The need for such a dialogue had already been felt for a 
long time. Meanwhile, previous sporadic attempts to establish contact had ended in failure, since 
the diametrically opposed positions of the participants, based on their emotional and personalized 
perceptions of recent tragic events, have become a  serious obstacle to constructive academic 
dialogue and discussion.
The conference, held in June 1997 in Brussels at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, has become a 
testimony to the new situation that has been evolving. An intensive three days of work has shown 
that the period of emotional attacks and sweeping accusations, to which both parties were so 
frequently prone in the recent past, is already behind them. The particular political circumstances 
on which the position of many authors writing about the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict was based has 
lost relevance. Nowadays, scientists both in Tbilisi and in Sukhum are trying to comprehend 
objectively the origins of and reasons for the tragic opposition between Georgia and Abkhazia, 
and to present their own vision offering possible ways out of the situation as it stands.
The presentations made at the conference and the discussions that followed them have shown that 
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is being divested of its burden of mythological notions, which 
have until recently been an integral part of political science treatises and publications on this 
topic. In any case, legends about the Christian-Islamic underpinnings of Georgian-Abkhazian 
antagonism, about  the "genetic" Abkhaz adherence to Communist ideology and the Soviets, 
about  300,000  Georgian  refugees  expecting  repatriation,  etc.,   were  not  at  issue  at  the 
conference. Attention focused instead on the real situation in the region, on the complex problems 
that actually had engendered the conflict or become a consequence of it, and that now represent a 
fundamental obstacle to achieving a peace settlement.
At the same time, it is clear that the parties do not always adequately understand the specific 
features of the political, social and ideological processes taking place in the opposite "camp". 
Thus our Georgian colleagues obviously do not take into account the impact of the post-war 
syndrome on people of all walks of life in Abkhazia and, in particular, on the moral attitude and 
psychological state of the population of the republic when it comes to possible contacts and forms 
of  mutual  relations with  Georgia  and  the  Georgians.  An inaccurate  negative  estimation  of 
Russia's role in the genesis of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict, in the events of the war and at the 
present  stage  of  peace  settlement,  was  also  expressed.  On  the  other  hand,  the  critical 
interpretation by the Georgian participants of the position and actions of the Tbilisi leadership, 
which had aggravated a deterioration in Georgian-Abkhazian relationships and contributed to the 
unleashing of hostilities in August 1992, was in many respects unexpected by the Abkhazian 
representatives. Such appraisals were perceived by the Abkhazian side as a new phenomenon 
among both scientists and the general public in Georgia.
Nevertheless, discussions were quite heated. As was to be expected, the basic scientific problem 
posed at the conference proved to be a source of considerable debate. A consensus on the issues 
raised in the search for agreement between the parties has not yet been found. The divergence 
between the positions of the conference participants is far greater and deeper than the areas where 
convergence was reached. In the process, the specific approaches to this question adopted by the 
Georgian and Abkhazian conference participants have come to light.
The position of the Georgian scholars is that agreement should be sought in the context of the 
territorial integrity of the former Georgian SSR. Among the arguments cited are not only the fact 
that Georgia has been internationally recognized as an independent state in its Soviet borders – 
although for the Georgian participants this is obviously the most essential circumstance – but 
also reasons of a geopolitical, economic and historical nature, adduced to support the unification 
of Georgia and Abkhazia within the framework of a single state. In its polity, this state would 
replicate a certain variation on the model of relationships between Tbilisi and Sukhum from the 
period of the Soviet regime.
The  Abkhazian participants preferred to  examine other  settlement models.  In  their  opinion, 
overcoming the deep-seated mistrust which the parties now feel towards each other would be an 
important step in the direction of concord. This should be promoted by the institution of new, 
non-traditional  forms  of  relationships  (for  Stanislav  Lakoba  for  example,  a  Caucasian 
confederation), within the framework of which the Abkhazian representatives are inclined to 
envisage the future peace settlement of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict.
At the conference, the question of the role of the international  community in  achieving an 
Abkhazian-Georgian agreement was raised. The conference has shown that in this case, too, the 
positions of the parties do not wholly coincide. The Georgian participants had a  rather high 
estimation of the peace-making potential of the world community, and considered that Russia's 
unsuccessful mediation could be replaced, or at least complemented, by more active participation 
by Western countries in  the  process of political  settlement.  The  statements by the  Abkhaz 
representatives were not so optimistic. In their opinion, a more active role by the West might 
endanger the existing geopolitical balance in the region, an occurence that would not be con-
ducive to the positive development of the peace-making process.
At the same time, the conference papers have shown complete unanimity on the question of the 
need to  attract  Western  theoretical  thinking  to  address scientifically  the  complex problems 
associated with the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, and, on a broader scale, the relationship be-
tween Georgia and Abkhazia from both a historical and a modern perspective. Research should 
also  concentrate  on  analysing  the  European  experience  of  federalization  and  community-
building, the particular features of the development of local regionalism, and the positive and 
negative aspects to the history of constructing the common European home. From this point of 
view,  it  is  difficult  to  overestimate  the  importance of  the  presentations contributed by the 
European participants and the discussions they sparked off. It is also extremely important that a 
study of the moral aspects of the situation – focusing, in particular, on the war and its conse-
quences – was entered on the list of problems to do with the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict that were 
discussed at the conference.
In conclusion, it is to be hoped that the publication of the conference proceedings will not only 
serve the purposes of research on the various problems of Abkhazian-Georgian relations, but will 
also become an important step on the way towards mutual understanding between the scientific 
communities of Georgia and Abkhazia, whose joint efforts can help in the search for peace and 
concord in the region.
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